3 vo. C.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PELOPONNESIAN WAR,

Tranſlated from the *GREEK* of

THUCYDIDES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

By *WILLIAM SMITH*, A. M.

Rector of the Pariſh of the *Holy Trinity* in *Cheſter*, and Chaplain to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Derby*.

Κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί.



LONDON:

Printed by JOHN WATTS. MDCCLIII.



G.V.^r Gucht Inv.^t & Sculp.^t

TO

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE

PRINCE OF *WALES*.

SIR,

THE Hiſtory of Thucydides hath been ſtudiouſly read and admired by the greateſt Princes, and may therefore preſume to lay ſome claim to the Protection of Your ROYAL HIGHNESS. Great Britain, of

all the States now exiſting in the world, moſt nearly reſembleth what Athens was at the time when the War, which is the Subject of it, broke out in Greece. A love of Liberty, which hath erroneouſly been ſuppoſed to thrive and flouriſh beſt in a democratical Government, was then warm and active in every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raiſed to a great height of maritime power, and was become a very formidable State: But Faction diſjointed a noble Plan, and at length brought on the loſs of her Sovereignty at Sea. The Athenians ſoon ceaſed to be great, when they deviated from thoſe ſalutary maxims, which their worthieſt Patriots and moſt conſummate Stateſmen had recommended to their conſtant obſervance.

The

DEDICATION.

The Maritime power of Great-Britain is more ſubſtantially founded, and hath ever been more ſteddily ſupported than was that of Athens. The moſt complete and moſt laſting Form of Government, that man can invent, happily ſubſiſts in this Realm under Your ROYAL GRANDFATHER. The Britiſh Conſtitution hath long been, and may it long continue to be the envy of other Nations! For the future ſupport of it, the public hopes and expectations are fixed upon Your ROYAL HIGHNESS. Long may HIS MAJESTY Your ROYAL GRANDFATHER live to ſecure the freedom and happineſs of his People, that Your ROYAL HIGHNESS may become equal, in every reſpect, to the ſame great and glorious Charge!

DEDICATION.

I have a heart duly ſenſible of the great honour conferr'd upon me, by being thus permitted to profeſs myſelf,

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moſt devoted and

moſt humble Servant,

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PRE-

PREFACE.

IT was not from a private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public call, that the following tranſlation of Thucydides was firſt undertaken. To explain the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. The performance, upon the whole, muſt juſtify the undertaking. In what manner it is done, and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration.

It will be alſo needleſs to tell the Engliſh Reader, how many verſions have been made of Thucydides into Latin. Their deſign was to bring the author more under the obſervation of what is generally ſtiled the *learned* world; as the tranſlations of Him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance, as an hiſtorian capable of innocently amuſing moſt ranks of men, but of uſefully inſtructing the perſons, who from duty and from paſſion would guard the rights or ſecure the welfare of public communities. The grand buſineſs of Hiſtory is to make men wiſer in themſelves and better members of ſociety. For this purpoſe it recals paſt ages to their view; and thus opens a more extenſive ſcope to reflexion than any perſonal experience

can offer. To be well verſed in a ſimilarity of caſes prepares men better for counſel or action on preſent contingencies. The ſtateſman, the patriot, the friend to liberty and reaſon will be better enabled to plan and to regulate his *own* meaſures, when he can ſee the tendency and conſequence of ſuch as were followed on parallel occaſions, and adjuſt the degrees, in which they were either prejudicial or ſerviceable to public good.

All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leiſure, to make themſelves proficients in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honeſtly, perhaps beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek hiſtorians, as they take a precedency in time, lay further a ſtrong claim to precedency in merit. Thucydides is the moſt inſtructive of theſe; and, ſince the reſtoration of letters in the weſtern world, each nation, that hath piqued itſelf at all about humanity or politeneſs, as his manner was ſoon found to be excellent, have given thanks to thoſe who have endeavoured to inveſtigate his matter and lay it open to public view.

It is to the honour of the *French*, that they took the lead. The firſt tranſlation of Thucydides into *French*, publiſhed at *Paris* in 1527, was that of *Claude de Seyſſel* biſhop of *Marſeilles*. However performed, it went, within the ſpace of little more than thirty years, through four impreſſions. It is ſaid to have been done at the command of Francis I. king of France; and, to have been

been carried about with him in his wars, and diligently ſtudied by the Emperor Charles V. The *Germans* had alſo a tranſlation of him ſoon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545 *Francis di Soldo Strozzi* publiſhed an *Italian* tranſlation dedicated to *Coſmo di Medicis*. The firſt *Engliſh* tranſlation made its appearance in *London* in 1550; but, in fact, was only the tranſlation of a tranſlation, ſince it was intitled a verſion from the French of *Claude de Seyſſel*. In 1564 he was publiſhed in *Spaniſh*. A ſecond *French* tranſlation by *Louis Jonſaud d'Uſez* was publiſhed at *Geneva* in 1600. The ſecond into *Engliſh*, by the famous Mr. *Hobbes* of *Malmsbury*, was firſt publiſhed in the year 1628, about which it will be neceſſary immediately to inlarge. A third *French* tranſlation, by the Sieur *d'Ablancourt*, was publiſhed at *Paris* in 1662, and hath ſince gone through four editions. There is alſo a *Daniſh* tranſlation, which cloſeth the liſt given of them in the *Bibliotheca Græca* of *Fabricius*.

Mr. *Hobbes* declares in his preface, that "the virtues "of this author ſo took his affection, that they begot "in him a deſire to communicate him further." He conſidered alſo, that "he was exceedingly eſteemed of "the Italians and French in their own tongues, notwith-"ſtanding that he be not very much beholding for it to "his interpreters." He ſays afterwards, that, by the firſt tranſlation of *Nicholls* from the French of *Seyſſel*, "he "became at length traduced rather than tranſlated into

" our language;" alluding perhaps to the Italian ſarcaſm on tranſlators, *Traduttore traditore.* He then reſolved himſelf " to take him immediately from the *Greek* ---- " knowing, that when with diligence and leiſure I ſhould " have done it, though ſome errors might remain, yet " they would be errors but of one deſcent; of which " nevertheleſs (ſays he) I can diſcover none, and hope " they be not many."

Mr. *Hobbes*, however ſorry and miſchievous a philoſopher, was undoubtedly a very learned man. He hath ſhewn it beyond diſpute in his tranſlation of Thucydides. He is an excellent help, for any one who conſults him, to find out the meaning and adjuſt the ſenſe. But, tho' his tranſlation hath now paſſed through three editions, and hath profitably been read by many, yet (I ſpeak not from my own private judgment) he cannot now be read with any competent degree of pleaſure. He is faithful, but moſt ſervilely ſo, to the letter of his author. Even in the *orations*, he merely acts the interpreter, and hath quite forgot the orator. He tranſlates literally throughout, and numbers rather than weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the conſtruction is very often intricate and confuſed, the thoughts pregnant with ſenſe are not ſufficiently opened, nor the glowing ideas of the author or his orators transfuſed with proper degrees of warmth and light. Too ſcrupulous an attachment to the letter of the original hath made the copy quite flat and heavy, the ſpirit is evaporated, the lofty and majeſtic air

hath

hath intirely diſappeared. Too many low and vulgar expreſſions are uſed, which Thucydides ever ſtudiouſly avoided. Such frequently occur in the midſt of ſome grand circumſtance, which they throw into a kind of burleſque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The Engliſh language hath gone through a great variation, hath been highly poliſhed, ſince Mr. *Hobbes* wrote. Hence, tho' his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatneſs, preciſion, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the laſt century have habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that Mr. *Hobbes* either executed in great haſte, or performed his reviſals in a very curſory and negligent manner. I am inclined to think ſo from the very many paſſages, neceſſary and emphatical periods, nay ſometimes in the very ſpeeches, which to my great ſurpriſe I have found omitted in his tranſlation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the greateſt attention ſometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omiſſions in Mr. *Hobbes* are too numerous and important, to be excuſed in any tolerable conſiſtence with repeated care and circumſpection.

Monſieur *Bayle* hath aſcribed the tranſlation of Thucydides by Mr. *Hobbes* to a motive of which he hath not left the leaſt hint himſelf in his preface;--- " in order to " ſhew the Engliſh, in the hiſtory of the Athenians, " the diſorders and confuſions of a democratical govern- " ment. Mr. *Hobbes* could not poſſibly, ſo long before they

they happened, foreſee the ſtrange revolutions, that were ſoon to take place in the government of his country. The very actors in them could not poſſibly diſcern the conſequences of their own embroilments. Some violent incroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and property of Engliſhmen, and a ſpirit of diſcontent began to ſpread throughout the nation. But it cannot be ſuppoſed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, or for ſeveral years after. The hiſtory of Thucydides abundantly ſhews, how dangerous and deſtructive is faction in a State; that ſevere or wanton power may make men deſperate; and that liberty abuſed may make them inſolent and mutinous. It detects and expoſeth venal orators and falſe patriots; but it exhibits men, who are ſtudious and eloquent in behalf of public welfare, and active in ſupport of liberty and honeſt power, in full beauty and proportion. And his leſſons lie not ſo oppoſite and ready for the application of any State now exiſting in the world, as for that of Great-Britain.

The Reader may by this time have caught a glimpſe of ſeveral reaſons, for which the preſent tranſlation of Thucydides was finiſhed and is now made public. No care hath been omitted to make it as correct as poſſible. It hath been attentively reviewed; the *narrative* part, more than once; the *oratorial* part, with repeated endeavors to reach the ſpirit and energy of the original. In the former, the Author hath been followed ſtep by ſtep:

ſtep: Bold deviations here might imperceptibly have miſrepreſented or diſtorted the facts, and quite baniſhed the peculiar ſtile and manner of the author. In the latter, it hath been often judged neceſſary to dilate the expreſſion in order fully to include the primary idea; tho', where it ſeemed poſſible, the ſtudied conciſeneſs of the author hath been imitated, provided the thought could be clearly expreſſed, and the ſententious maxim adequately conveyed. The turns and figures of expreſſion have been every where diligently noted, and an endeavour conſtantly made at imitation. This was judged a point of duty; or a point at leaſt, where tho' ſomething may be permitted to a tranſlator's diſcretion or to the genius of a modern language, yet he muſt not indulge himſelf in too wide a ſcope, leſt, when what ought to be a copy is exhibited, the prime diſtinctions of the original be loſt, and little or no reſemblance be left behind.

It is very juſt and true what Mr. *Hobbes* hath obſerved, that "this author ſo carrieth with him his own light "throughout, that the Reader may continually ſee his "way before him, and by that which goeth before ex-"pect what is to follow." And he, who applies to any commentator but Thucydides himſelf for an explanation of his own meaning, muſt exceedingly often get quite wide of the ſenſe. The writers of *Scholia* and the *notes* of verbal critics put us frequently on a wrong ſcent, and more frequently leave us utterly in the dark. But, if we will

will be patient at a dead lift, ſomething will ſoon occur in the author himſelf to help us out, the obſcurity will vaniſh, and light beam in upon us. Tho' ſometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, ſince in many caſes it is vain to apply to the aids of Grammar to develope the conſtruction, yet the context at length will ſhew whether we have ſucceeded, or help us to aſcertain the ſenſe. This however demands repeated and attentive reviſals. The preſent tranſlator hath not been frugal of his time or labour in theſe points. And whether he hath generally ſucceeded in aſcertaining the thought and properly expreſſing it in another language, muſt be left to the deciſion, not of men of no learning nor of mere learning, but to that claſs of judges, who are well acquainted with the ſtate of Athens at the time of the hiſtory, and are really *Attic* both in taſte and judgment. This claſs, it may be thought, will be but ſmall: It is larger however, and higher ſeated in this our commnunity, than the generality have either opportunity enough to diſcover or good-nature enough to own.

The complaints ſo often made by the moſt able tranſlators are indeed alarming. Their performances (they ſay) may very much diſgrace, but can never commend them. The praiſe of all that is clear, and bright, and pleaſing, and inſtructive, is reflected back upon the original author; but every appearance of a different nature is laid with ſeverity of cenſure at the door of the tranſlator. If it be ſo, we know the terms beforehand on which, either

either able or unable, we engage, and muſt patiently acquieſce in the iſſue. But candor is always expected, nay ever will be had from perſons of good ſenſe and ſound judgment. Few but ſuch may be pleaſed with Thucydides either in his old native Greek, or in a modern Engliſh garb; and, if ſuch confer the honour of their applauſe, the clamour of ſome will not terrify, nor the ſilence of others mortify at all. The bookſeller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others from the ſale. And it muſt be owned, that every original writer as well as every copyiſt is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation.

The preſent tranſlation of Thucydides is accompanied with *maps* of ancient Greece and Sicily, with a few *notes*, and three preliminary *Diſcourſes*. Concerning each of theſe ſomething muſt be added.

The *maps* are borrowed from the laſt edition of the original in *Holland* in the year 1731. That of ancient *Greece* was drawn by Dr. *Hudſon*, partly from the hiſtory itſelf, and partly from a chart that was lent him by Dr. *Halley*: That of Sicily is taken from *Cluver*; but a multiplicity of names are omitted, which have no connexion with the ſubject. The geography of places is exactly fitted to ſuit the hiſtory. It will help to trace the motions of the fleets and armies, and will preſerve the view of all military occurrences very clear and diſtinct.

PREFACE.

The *notes* are only deſigned for the Engliſh Reader, to give him light into that *antiquity*, with which he may be little acquainted. And therefore the firſt time, that any thing relating to the conſtitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their fleets and land-armies occurs, I have endeavoured in a *note* to give him a competent perception of it. I have done the ſame, in regard to the characters of the chief perſonages in the hiſtory, which ſeemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath given them. The perſons were well known when he wrote: But a modern reader may not be diſpleaſed to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted with the characters of the principal agents in theſe buſy and important ſcenes. In *notes* of verbal criticiſm or mere learning I have been very ſparing, judging they would never be read with patience.

Of the preliminary *Diſcourſes*, the two *firſt* were due, by the rules of decorum obſerved by editors and tranſlators, to the author. In the *laſt*, I have thrown into one continued diſcourſe what might have been broke into pieces, and interſperſed occaſionally by way of *notes*. The method obſerved appeared moſt eligible, as it will give the Reader a clear proſpect of the whole hiſtory; preparing him for or inciting him to a cloſe and attentive peruſal of it; or, enabling him, after he hath peruſed it, to recollect the moſt inſtructive paſſages and moſt material occurrences. By this means alſo, a more lively and ſuccinct acount could be given of the ſpeakers and the ſpeeches, than

than could have been done by way of ſet and formal arguments.

I think the Engliſh Reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucydides with pleaſure and profit; eſpecially, if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian hiſtory, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, ſince Mr. *Stanyan*'s *Hiſtory* of Greece and the *Univerſal Hiſtory* are in ſo many hands. I diſmiſs the work with ſome hope, but more terror, about its ſucceſs. That hope is encouraged and ſupported by the liſt of my *Subſcribers*. There are NAMES that do me honour indeed; and which, whether the work may ſuit the generality or not, will preſerve me from ever repenting, that I have beſtowed ſo much time on tranſlating *THUCYDIDES*.

THREE PRELIMINARY

DISCOURSES.

I. On the LIFE of *THUCYDIDES.*

II. On his Qualifications as an HISTORIAN.

III. A Survey of his HISTORY.

DISCOURSE I.

On the LIFE of

THUCYDIDES.

IT is a natural piece of curioſity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one commended, to enquire after the author. We acquieſce not in his bare name; we immediately ſeek farther informations. The ſtranger ſhews an inclination to form ſome acquaintance with him; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length grow inquiſitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars.

Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He, who endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at leaſt to have ſomething to ſay about him, and ſomething rather tending perhaps to give favourable impreſſions. All his editors and tranſlators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them: But, it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and ſlovenly manner. His *life* wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morſel, hath been prefixed to all the Greek editions. *That* by Suidas is an unſatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A *third* in Greek by an *anonymous* author is alſo but a very ſlight and ſhapeleſs ſketch, and ſeems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed but very ſuperficially read his hiſtory. Some incidental eſcapes

from

from his own pen are the marks, which ſhould be always kept in view by him, who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. Writers of a better age and claſs will contribute now and then a little aſſiſtance. And the laborious care of a late * author, in adjuſting the chronology and clearing away rubbiſh, will enable one now to give at leaſt a coherent, tho' by no means an accurate, account of Him.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, by borough an Halymuſian, was born in the year before Chriſt, four hundred ſeventy one; twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius; and about three years before Socrates, as the birth of the latter is ſettled by Laërtius. He was deſcended of a very ſplendid and noble family, tho' perhaps not ſo honourable as many others, ſince it was not purely Attic. Its ſplendor can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of Miltiades. Miltiades the *elder*, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, a people in Thrace; and left vaſt poſſeſſions in that country to his deſcendents: And Miltiades the *younger* had married Hegeſipyle the daughter of Olorus a Thracian king †. Yet foreign blood, tho' royal, was always thought to debaſe the Athenian. The firm republicans of Athens had an hereditary averſion to every circumſtance of royalty; and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexion with *Barbarians*, the ſcornful *title* they gave to all the reſt of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphicrates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the ſon of an Athenian ſhoemaker and a Thracian princeſs. Yet, being aſked to which of his parents he thought himſelf moſt obliged? he replied haughtily — "To my mother. She did "all ſhe could to make me an Athenian; my father would have "made me a Barbarian." The younger Miltiades, whom wars had

* Vitæ Thucydidis Synopſis chronologica, ab Henrico Dodwell.

† *Herodotus* in *Erato*.

obliged

obliged to quit his hold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine ſet upon him by the *people* of Athens. His ſon Cimon contrived afterwards to pay it. The family for a time had been in poverty and diſtreſs, but emerged again in Cimon. Cimon the ſame day gained a victory both by land and ſea over the Perſians at Mycale. By his conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put it in a train of much greater advancements. In civil affairs he claſhed with Pericles, who was leader of the *popular* party: Cimon always ſided with the *noble* or the *few*; as were the party-diſtinctions in vogue at Athens.

The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are ſtrong and convincing. Plutarch directly aſſerts it in the *life* of *Cimon*. His father, in grateful at leaſt if not honourable remembrance of the Thracian king, whoſe daughter Miltiades had married, bore the name of Olorus. His mother alſo was another Hegeſipyle. He inherited rich poſſeſſions in Thrace; particularly, ſome mines of gold. A monument of him was to be ſeen for many ages after, in the Cœle at Athens, amongſt the Cimonian, or thoſe belonging to the family of Cimon; and ſtood next, according to Plutarch, to that of Elpinice, Cimon's own ſiſter. His father's name in the inſcription on this monument, at leaſt ſome latter grammarians have averred it, was *Orolus*. Thucydides himſelf, in the fourth book of his hiſtory, calls it *Olorus*. Can we want ſtronger authority? Whether any ſtreſs ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the miſtake, tho' a very minute one, might proceed, are points too obſcure and trifling to take up any attention.

Such was the family of which Thucydides was deſcended. His pedigree might be fetched from the Gods; ſince that of Miltiades is traced down from Æacus. But, like my author, I ſhould chooſe to keep as clear of the *fabulous* as poſſible. Cicero ſays of him, " Tho' " he had never written an hiſtory, his name would ſtill have been

" extant, he was ſo honourable and noble *." I quote this, merely as a teſtimony to the ſplendor of his birth, ſince it may be queſtioned whether the *hiſtorian*, in the preſent inſtance, hath not intirely preſerved his memory, and been ſolely inſtrumental in enobling and perpetuating the *man*.

His education no doubt was ſuch, as might be expected from the ſplendor of his birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taſte then prevailing in Athens, the politeſt city that then exiſted, or ever yet exiſted in the world. It is impoſſible however to give any detail of it. The very little to be found about it in writers of any claſs whatever, ſeems merely of a preſumptive tho' probable kind. It is ſaid Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philoſophy, becauſe the name of Anaxagoras was great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and of Socrates, is named alſo by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that " it was whiſpered about that Thu-" cydides was atheiſtical, becauſe he was ſo fond of the theory of " Anaxagoras, who was generally reputed and ſtiled an atheiſt." The ſolution of an eclipſe from natural cauſes, accounting for appearances from the laws of motion, and inveſtigating the courſe of nature, were ſufficient proofs of atheiſm amongſt a people ſo ſuperſtitious as the Athenians. Thucydides, poſſibly, might be well acquainted with the philoſophy of Anaxagoras, without having perſonally attended his lectures. However that be, his own hiſtory abundantly ſhews that he was no *atheiſt*; it may be added, and no *polytheiſt*. By his manner of ſpeaking of the oracles and predictions toſſed about in his own time, it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather inſinuates them to be mere forgeries. " And yet, ſays Mr. *Hobbes* †, " he confirms an aſſertion of his own, touching the time this war " laſted, by the oracle's prediction." The paſſage occurs in the fifth

* *In the* Orator. † Of the Life and Hiſtory of *Thucydides*.

book

book of this hiſtory. But whoever conſiders it, will find it only an *argumentum ad hominem*, to ſtop the mouths of ſuch as believed in oracles, from conteſting his own computation of the whole time the Peloponneſian war laſted. I can only ſay, that he was undoubtedly a ſerious man, and of a large fund of ſolid ſenſe, which deriving originally from the bounty of nature, he had moſt certainly improved by a regular and ſound education.

For a reaſon of much leſs weight, Antipho is aſſigned for his maſter in rhetoric — becauſe he ſpeaks handſomly of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due acknowledgment to the merit of Antipho as a ſpeaker; but it cannot be inferred from hence, that he had ever any connexion with him. Others have made Antipho a ſcholar of Thucydides, * with full as little reaſon. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by profeſſion. It is pity to waſte ſo much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides had a liberal education, tho' the particular progreſs of it cannot now be traced.

But, to ſhew the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognoſtic what ſort of perſon he would prove, the following ſtory is recorded by ſeveral authors, and dated by Mr. Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age. — His father carried him to the Olympic games. He there heard Herodotus read his hiſtory to the great croud of Grecians aſſembled at that ſolemnity. He heard him with fixed attention; and, at length, burſt out into tears. "Tears childiſh indeed!" it hath been remarked: But however ſuch as few children would have ſhed, and highly expreſſive of his inward ſpirit. The active aſpiring mind of Themiſtocles was not ſtronger ſhewn, when the trophy of Miltiades would not let him be at reſt; nor the genius of the lad at Weſtminſter-ſchool, when he could not ſleep for the colours in Weſtminſter-hall. Herodotus is ſaid to have obſerved it, and to have

* Plutarch's *Lives* of the ten *Orators*.

complimented Olorus on his having a ſon, that had ſo violent a bent to letters. A ſimilar paſſage in any perſon's life would always be called to mind, when he was the ſubject of converſation.

In about two years more, Thucydides was obliged by the laws to take his exerciſe in the ſtudy of arms, and to begin to ſhare in the defence of his country. Every citizen of Athens was alſo a ſoldier. They ſerved at firſt within the walls, or on great emergencies marched, tho' to no great diſtance from home. As years and ſkill advanced, they were called upon to join in more diſtant and foreign expeditions. We are quite in the dark about the particular ſervices, in which he might thus be employed. We are ſure at leaſt he much improved in the theory of arms. He qualified himſelf for the great truſt of heading the forces of the *State*; and, in the ſequel, we ſhall ſee him inveſted with a command.

The *anonymous* author of his *life* relates, that Thucydides was one of the number, whom the Athenians ſent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritus were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is ſaid to have been aſſociated in it. If Thucydides went the voyage; (and the ſtrange inconſiſtencies of him who relates it render his whole account ſuſpicious,) he muſt have been about twenty-ſeven years of age. One thing is pretty certain; his ſtay at Thuria could have been of no very long continuance. This is not to be inferred from the *oſtraciſm*, which the ſame writer ſays he ſoon after ſuffered; a miſtake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him with Thucydides the ſon of Mileſias, who was of the ſame family, and being a leader in the oligarchical-party at Athens, had the *oſtraciſm* thrown upon him by the intereſt and popularity of Pericles. But, the quarrel between the Corcyréans and Corinthians about Epidamnus broke out ſoon after this. The enemies of Athens were now ſcheming the demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory tranſactions, marks all the defenſive meaſures of the Athenians, as a perſon who was privy to every one

of

of them. And there ſhould be very ſtrong and very poſitive proofs of the contrary, before any reader of his hiſtory doubts of his having been all the time at Athens.

His own *introduction*, of itſelf, in a great meaſure eſtabliſheth the fact. He perceived the ſtorm was gathering; he knew the jealouſies of the *States* which compoſed the Lacedæmonian league; he alſo knew the real ſtrength of Athens, and heard all the preventive meaſures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper poſture of defence. He himſelf ſeems to have been alert for the contention, and ready both with lance and pen, not only to bear his ſhare in the events, but alſo to perpetuate the memory of them. His own words (ἔλπισας and τεκμαιρομένος) ſeem to denote the great earneſtneſs and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter, which was now going to be opened. He longed to become an hiſtorian; he ſaw a fine ſubject for hiſtory faſt approaching; he immediately ſet about noting all occurrences, began at once to collect materials; and was reſolved to write the Hiſtory of *The Peloponneſian War* before it was actually on foot.

Can we doubt then of his reſidence during this portion of time at Athens? He was arrived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigor and ripeneſs of his years and underſtanding, according to his chronologiſt (Mr. Dodwell) was juſt forty years old. We learn from himſelf *, that he knew perſonally the whole ſeries of things; he was ever preſent at the tranſactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his exile at thoſe of the Peloponneſians; and conſequently, before his exile, at thoſe of the Athenians. He ſpeaks of Pericles, as one who was an eye-witneſs of his conduct; as one who heard him harangue in the aſſembly of the people, convincing that a war there would neceſſarily be, and for that reaſon they ought not to weaken themſelves by ill-judged conceſſions, but gal-

* Book the fifth.

lantly

lantly to exert that naval power, which had made Athens envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He muſt regularly have taken his poſt upon the walls, and ſeen the Peloponneſians, in the firſt year of the war, lay all the adjacent country waſte. He muſt have marched under Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, ſince the whole force of the *State* was obliged to take the field on this occaſion. He muſt have aſſiſted at the public funeral ſolemnized in the winter for the firſt victims of this war, and heard Pericles ſpeak in honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own laws and conſtitution. The *plague* broke out immediately after this; we are abſolutely certain he was then in Athens. He himſelf aſſures us of it: He was an eye-witneſs to all that horrid ſcene. He had the plague himſelf; and hath given a circumſtantial detail of it.

The war proceeds with vigor, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides muſt have born his ſhare in the ſervice; the particulars he hath not recorded. No man was ever leſs guilty of *egotiſm*; he never mentions himſelf but when it is abſolutely neceſſary. His next ſix years were certainly employed in fighting and in writing; the latter was his paſſion, and the former his duty. In the forty-ſeventh year of his age, he was joined in the command of an Athenian ſquadron and land-force on the coaſts of Thrace. He might be aſſigned to this particular ſtation, on account of his poſſeſſions and intereſt in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was beſt qualified to ſerve his country in this department. The Lacedæmonian commander in Thrace dreaded his oppoſition. Let us wait a little for the event: It is the moſt important paſſage in the *Life* of THUCYDIDES.

It was intirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was aſſerted above to be a deſcendent from Miltiades, and in the *mode* of conſanguinity to have inherited his fine eſtate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is for ever jumbling and confounding facts,

facts, hath alſo made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold-mines for her fortune. Mr. Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and ſolves all the difficulty in a very plauſible manner. "In Thrace, ſays he, lay alſo the poſſeſſions of Thucydides and "his wealthy mines of gold, as he himſelf profeſſeth in his fourth "book. And although thoſe riches might come to him by a "wife (as is alſo by ſome affirmed) which he married in Scapte-"Hyle a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it appeareth, "that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility "was not there unknown." I cannot believe, that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely Attic. He ſeems to have been high-ſpirited in this reſpect, and proud of his country. Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princeſs; and nothing, but the vaſt eſtate brought into the family by this match, could have made his deſcendents eaſy with ſuch a blemiſh in their pedigree: For, a blemiſh undoubtedly it muſt have been thought at Athens. Let us ſee, how Thucydides himſelf drops his ſentiment of ſuch another match. The paſſage I have in view occurs in the ſixth book. He is ſpeaking of Hippias the ſon of Piſiſtratus, tyrant of Athens. "To "Æantidas the ſon of Hippoclus tyrant of Lampſacus——to a "Lampſacene tho' he himſelf was an Athenian—he married his "daughter Archedice." I cannot think, that he, who let ſuch a ſarcaſm fall from his own ſerious pen, could ever condeſcend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be never ſo great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine for himſelf.—This digreſſion was cauſed by the expreſs mention Thucydides hath made of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the liſts againſt the moſt gallant and active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedæmonian league.

It was Braſidas the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponneſian troops in Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Theſſaly and Macedonia. By his fine deportment and his perſuaſive

perſuaſive addreſs joined to uncommon vigilance and activity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get poſſeſſion by ſurpriſe of the important city of Amphipolis: He had very nearly ſucceeded. Eucles commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the iſle of Thaſus, about half a day's ſail from Amphipolis. A meſſenger was diſpatched to him, to haſten him up for the defence of that city. He put to ſea immediately with a ſmall ſquadron of ſeven ſhips. Braſidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Amphipolitans, and gained admiſſion for his troops. Thucydides ſtood up the Strymon in the evening, but too late, ſince Braſidas had got faſt poſſeſſion of Amphipolis. The city of Eïon is ſituated alſo upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and ſecured the place. "Braſidas, (in his "own words) * had deſigned that very night to ſeize Eïon alſo. "And, unleſs this ſquadron had come in thus critically to its defence, "at break of day it had been loſt." Thucydides, without loſing a moment, provided for its defence. Braſidas, with armed boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts upon it, but was repulſed in both: Upon which, he gave up the ſcheme, and returned back.

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occaſion, and deſerved to be thanked inſtead of puniſhed. The people of Athens made a different determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greateſt influence there, and is generally ſuppoſed to have exaſperated them againſt the man, who had not wrought impoſſibilities in ſaving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury roſe ſo high againſt him, that they ſtripped Thucydides of his command, and paſſed the ſentence of baniſhment upon him. It is himſelf who tells us †, "It was his lot to

* Book the fourth. † Book the fifth.

"ſuffer

ſuffer a twenty years exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis.

We have thus loſt Thucydides the *commander* to ſecure more faſt Thucydides the *hiſtorian*. Tho' ſadly treated, he ſcorned to be angry with his country. His complexion was not at all choleric or reſentful; there appears not the leaſt ſign of any gall in his conſtitution. Diſcharged of all duties, and free from all public avocations, he was left without any attachments but to ſimple truth, and proceeded to qualify himſelf for commemorating exploits, in which he could have no ſhare. He was now eight and forty years old, and *intirely* at leiſure to attend to the grand point of his ambition, that of writing the hiſtory of the preſent war; a calm ſpectator of facts, and diſpaſſionate obſerver of the events he was determined to record.

To judge of him from his hiſtory, (and we have no other help to form our opinion about him,) he was ſo nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no paſſion. No murmur or complaint hath eſcaped him upon account of his ſevere undeſerved treatment from his country. Great ſouls are congenial; their thoughts are always of a ſimilar caſt.

> Sweet are the uſes of adverſity,
> Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
> Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Shakeſpear hath thus expreſſed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, muſt have thought. "Exile, according to Plutarch *, "was a bleſſing which the Muſes beſtowed upon their favourites. "By this means they enabled them to compleat their moſt beautiful "and noble compoſitions." He then quotes our author for the firſt proof of his obſervation — "Thucydides the Athenian compiled his

* Of Baniſhment.

" Hiſtory of the *Peloponneſian War* at Scapteſyle in Thrace." At that place he fixed his reſidence. It lay convenient for taking care of his private affairs, and overlooking his mines: They lay not within the dominions of Athens; for then they would have been forfeited to the *State*. Hence he made excurſions at proper ſeaſons to obſerve tranſactions, and pick up intelligence. He was now more converſant in perſon on the Peloponneſian ſide. Some private correſpondences he might ſtill carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchaſe all proper materials, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment 'till the very end of the war; and it is certain he had collected materials for carrying down his hiſtory to that period of time " when (in his own words *) the Lacedæmo-" nians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and be-" came maſters of the Long-walls and the Piræus." But whoever reads it, will be inclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate and elaborate manner in which it now appears, 'till the war was finiſhed. He might keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might go on altering or correcting, as he ſaw better reaſon or gained more light. His compleat well-connected hiſtory, tho' the firſt thing in his intention, was the laſt in execution.

His exile laſted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the war, in the year before Chriſt four hundred twenty-three. Conſequently, he was reſtored the year before Chriſt four hundred and three, being at that time ſixty-eight years old. In that very year an *amneſty* was publiſhed at Athens, in the archonſhip of Euclides, after the demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thraſybulus.

Thucydides was now at liberty, if he pleaſed, to return and paſs the remainder of his days at Athens. Whether he did ſo or not, is left quite in the dark. He lived twelve years after, and died in the year before Chriſt three hundred ninety-one, being then about

* Book the fifth.

fourſcore

fourſcore years old. He was conſtantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to this *Hiſtory*; — with what accuracy, what ſeverity, what toil, the reader may judge, ſince he will find that after all he left it imperfect. The firſt ſeven books are indeed fully and exactly finiſhed. The eighth, tho' moulded into due form, hath plainly not had a final reviſal, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is ſaid to have fallen into Xenophon's poſſeſſion, who, at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from Athens: And Xenophon is alſo ſaid to have made it public. This carries a great air of probability with it, ſince Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in ſo lofty and majeſtic, but in a ſweeter and more popular ſtile. There is a chaſm indeed between the time the *Hiſtory* of Thucydides breaks off, and the *Grecian Hiſtory* of Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to offer one, I believe intirely new, but which, for that reaſon, I ſhall readily give up to the firſt perſon of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation? It is this — that Thucydides left ſomewhat more behind him than now appears. How it came to be ſuppreſſed or loſt, I will not pretend to gueſs. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledged continuator reſumed the ſubject at the very ſpot where his predeceſſor had left off. Nearly two years are however wanting, in which ſeveral important incidents took place. It is pity, but we have no redreſs. General hiſtorians are by other means enabled to ſupply the deficiency; but the loſs of any thing from ſo maſterly a hand is ſtill to be regretted.

The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was moſt probably Scapteſyle in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a ſpot, where he had paſſed ſo many years in ſtudious and calm retirement. The hurry and buſtle and engagements of Athens could not have been much to the reliſh of ſo grave, and now ſo old a man. His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, ſince moſt writers agree, it had the mark upon it

which ſhewed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, *Here lieth*, were not in the inſcription *. I have nothing to add about his family. It is ſaid he left a ſon; but the very name of that ſon is merely conjectural. I have collected every thing that carries any conſiſtency with it about the *Man*; I ſhall proceed with more pleaſure to view him in a clearer and more ſteddy light, and mark the character, in which it was his ambition to be diſtinguiſhed, that of an *Hiſtorian*.

* *Marcellinus.*

DISCOURSE

DISCOURSE II.

On his QUALIFICATIONS as an

HISTORIAN.

IT is now to be conſidered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake that nice and arduous taſk of writing Hiſtory. — No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by outward circumſtances; and very few, ſo enabled to perform it well by the inward abilities of genius and underſtanding.

Lucian, in his celebrated treatiſe "How a Hiſtory ought to be "written," is generally ſuppoſed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every perſon of judgment, who loves a ſincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were poſſible, to have the writer of them abſtracted from all kind of *connexion* with perſons or things that are the ſubject-matter; to be of no *country*, no *party*; clear of all *paſſions*; *independent* in every light; intirely *unconcerned* who is pleaſed or diſpleaſed with what he writes; the ſervant only of *reaſon* and *truth*.

Sift Thucydides carefully, and we ſhall find his qualifications in all theſe reſpects very nearly, if not quite, compleat.

No *connexion* with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards any one *perſon* in the world can be fixed upon him. Never man ſo intirely detached, or proceeded ſo far (if I may uſe the expreſſion) in annihilating

lating himſelf. He had a father indeed, whoſe name was Olorus; he was an Athenian born; — But, who are his relations? who were his aſſociates? what rival or competitor doth he ſneer? what friend doth he commend? or, what enemy doth he reproach? — Braſidas was the immediate occaſion of his diſgrace and exile. Yet, how doth he deſcribe him? He makes the moſt candid acknowledgments of his perſonal merit, and doth juſtice to all his ſhining and ſuperior abilities. Cleon is generally ſuppoſed to have irritated the people againſt him, and to have got him moſt ſeverely puniſhed, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth he ſhew the leaſt grudge or reſentment againſt this Cleon? He repreſents him indeed in his real character of a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of courſe an arrant coward. And how do all other writers? how doth Ariſtophanes paint this worthleſs man, this falſe bellowing patriot? I would never call Ariſtophanes for an evidence to character, but in caſes where every other writer accorded fully with him, on the ſame foundation of truth, tho' not with the ſame ſuperſtructure of bitterneſs and abuſe. He ſhould not be a voucher in regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may be heard about an Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himſelf as oppoſed to any man but Braſidas; and never ſo much as drops an inſinuation that he was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general conſent, he hath gained immortal honour by giving fair and true repreſentations of men, whom he never *felt* to be ſuch, but whom ſucceeding writers have aſſured us to have actually been his *enemies*. — As to *things*; tho' in the firſt ſeven years of the war he muſt in ſome meaſure have had employment, yet he was ſoon diſentangled from all buſineſs whatever, in a manner which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath ſtated the fact; and then, with the greateſt calmneſs and unconcern, he hath left the deciſion to poſterity.

He was henceforth of no *country* at all. Cut off from the republic of Athens, he never ſought after or deſired a naturalization in any other

other *State* of Greece. He was now only to chuſe out and fix a proper ſpot of obſervation, from whence, like a perſon ſecurely poſted on a promontory, he could look calmly on the ſtorm that was raging, or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, diſtinguiſh every turn, and with a philoſophical tranquillity enjoy it all. In ſhort, he now was, and continued all the reſt of the *Peloponneſian War*, a citizen of the world at large, as much as any man ever actually was.

But, before this ſeparation from the community, whilſt yet he continued at Athens, where liberty opened the field to all paſſionate chaces after power, where conſequently competitions were ever fermenting, and *party* was always alive and active, — can we find him aſſociated with any particular ſet of men? can we find him dabling in political intrigue? a leader of, or led by any party? or, can we aſſuredly find out his principles? or even gueſs at his real thoughts about the form of government, under which he had lived? His *biographers* indeed, tho' ever parading his candor and impartiality, are often tracing out ſigns and marks of party-zeal and perſonal prejudices from the very characters in his hiſtory. Marcellinus ſays, "he deſcribed Cleon as a madman becauſe he hated him;" forgetful, what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent teſtimonies to the truth of the character. The *anonymous* writer ſays, "he oppoſed "Pericles at Athens, got the better of him, and became the firſt "man in the republic." A ridiculous ſtory! void of all manner of ſupport. According to this writer's way of arguing in other places, who ſays, "he cajoled the Lacedæmonians, and inveighed againſt "the tyrannic all-graſping temper of the Athenians, in his hiſtory, "becauſe he had no opportunity to rail at them in any other "ſhape," — he ſhould have left a far different character of Pericles behind him, than he hath actually left. But theſe are ſtrange compilers of patch-work, and deſerve no regard. From what the former hath ſaid about him, a reader might be tempted to judge him

of

of the *oligarchical*; from what the latter hath ſaid of him, of the *democratical* principle. Mr. Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real principles, and avers him a tight and ſound *royaliſt*. He is ſure, that he leaſt of all liked the *democracy*; as ſure, he was not at all fond of an *oligarchy*. He founds this aſſurance on a paſſage in the eighth book — " They decreed the ſupreme power to be " veſted in the *five thouſand*, which number to conſiſt of all ſuch " citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour, and that no one " ſhould receive a ſalary." — Thucydides juſt after pronounceth this, in his own opinion, " a good modelling of their government, a fine " temper between the *few* and the *many*, and which enabled Athens " from the low eſtate into which her affairs were plunged to re-erect " her head." If this paſſage proves any thing of the author's principles, it certainly proves them in a pretty ſtrong degree *republican*. Mr. Hobbes however ſets out from hence to prove him a *royaliſt*. " For (ſays he) he commendeth the government of Athens more, " both when Piſiſtratus reigned (ſaving that it was an uſurped " power,) and when in the beginning of this war it was democrati- " cal in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles." He praiſeth, it is true, the adminiſtration at both theſe periods; and he alſo praiſeth the good effects reſulting from an adminiſtration lodged in the hands of five thouſand men. Under Pericles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet, Pericles was all the time a ſtrong republican, and owned his maſters. Plutarch ſays, he never harangued them without praying beforehand, that " not a word might ſlip out of his mouth, that was " not pertinent to the buſineſs in hand;" and that he never put on his armour to lead them out into the field without ſaying to himſelf-- " Remember, Pericles, you are going to command free men and " Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of Thucydides can thus be diſcovered. It appears only, that he was always

always candid to a good adminiſtration, and might poſſibly think of government, as Mr. Pope hath wrote:

> For modes of government let fools conteſt,
> That which is beſt adminiſtred is beſt.

That ſtudied obſcurity, in which he hath veiled himſelf, will not let us diſcover, whether on inſtant and critical occaſions he ever ſuffered himſelf to be actuated by any of the darker paſſions, or too fondly indulged thoſe of a brighter caſt. But it cannot be found from what he writes, that he hath praiſed any man from fondneſs, or even from gratitude, degraded any one through envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill-nature. The ſame will hold in regard to *States* or whole communities. Doth he ever cenſure the Athenians in the wrong place? or commend the Lacedæmonians but in the right? Were his name expunged from the beginning of the whole work and the concluſions of the years, could any one gueſs to what *State* he had ever belonged, whether he was a Lacedæmonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity of the Attic dialect in which he writes? In that dialect he was cradled; he could not poſſibly ſwerve from it; without it he could neither write nor ſpeak. Could he have thought, that this might yield ſuſpicion of an impaſſioned or prejudiced ſpirit, he might perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Doric or Ionic idiom.

Independent, further, he certainly muſt have been, ſince he had no great man to cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of Perſia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch of France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on the ſunny ſide of a hill in Switzerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not ſo much, influence at Scaptefyle, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lauſanne. The *States* of Greece had garriſons on the coaſts, but were

were not maſters of Thrace. Thrace was full of little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongſt them to inſure his perſonal ſafety and guard his retirement. He could diſoblige thoſe about whom he wrote, without fear of their reſentment, and could praiſe without being in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a ſtricter *independence*.

His *unconcern* about the opinions of a preſent generation is ſtrong and clear. It looks as if he thought they would ſcarce give him a reading, ſo little care had he taken to ſooth or to amuſe them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a year. He hated contention, and ſcorned ſhort-lived temporary applauſe. He threw himſelf on poſterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the preſent he had made them. The judgment of ſucceeding ages hath approved the compliment he thus made to their underſtandings. So long as there are truly great princes, able ſtateſmen, ſound politicians, politicians that do not rend aſunder politics from good order and the general happineſs, he will meet with candid and grateful acknowledgments of his merit.

Other hiſtorians have ſooner pleaſed, have more diffuſively entertained. They have aimed more directly at the paſſions, have more artificially and ſucceſsfully ſtruck at the imagination. *Truth* in its ſeverity, and *Reaſon* in its robuſt and manly ſtate, are all the Muſes and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obeiſance. Can we wonder, that he hath not been more generally read and admired? or, could we wonder, if he had not been ſo much? A great work planed under ſuch circumſtances and with ſuch qualifications as I have been deſcribing, cool ſerious judgment will always commend as a noble *deſign*, even tho' *executed* it may prove too chearleſs to the more lively paſſions, its reliſh not ſufficiently quick for the popular taſte, or piquant enough to keep the appetite ſharp and eager.

But to proceed. Thucydides hath been cenſured in regard to the *choice* of his ſubject. It hath occaſioned the ſolidity of his judgment and

and excellence of his taſte to be called in queſtion. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus hath exerted himſelf much on this account; hath tried him by laws, which have *poetry* rather than *hiſtory* for their object; and cenſures him for not *delighting*, when his profeſſion was only to *inſtruct*. Mr. Hobbes hath gallantly defended his author, and ſhewn all the arguments of Dionyſius to be impertinent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I ſhall not repeat, it will ſuffice to refer the curious réader to what Mr. Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer hath celebrated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the hiſtoric ſtrokes of that and of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting every thing he touched. That ſplendid part of the Grecian hiſtory, in which his countrymen reſiſted and triumphed over the very formidable arms of the Perſian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legendary and romantic writer? He had, he could have no ſubject equal to his ambition and his abilities, but the war, which broke out in his own days, which he foreſaw would prove extenſive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorouſly exerted to pull down the power of Athens, to demoliſh that naval ſtrength which gave her the ſovereignty of the ſea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly therefore with my reaſon as an examiner of things, and warmly with my paſſion as an Engliſhman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the ſoundeſt and beſt ſyſtem of Engliſh politics, ſo long before the conſtitution had exiſtence; and hath left us fine leſſons, ſuch as his factious countrymen would not obſerve, how to ſupport that dominion of the ſea, on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare intirely depends. In this light it is a moſt inſtructive and intereſting hiſtory, and we may felicitate ourſelves on the choice of Thucydides. I muſt not anticipate: Thucydides would have his readers pick out their own inſtructions. I can only add, that Thucydides is a favourite hiſtorian with the ſtateſmen

and patriots of Great-Britain: This fits him alſo to be an Hiſtorian for the people. Other nations have admired him, and I hope will continue to admire him *gratis*: We are bound to thank him, and never to loſe ſight of that grand political ſcheme, formed by a Themiſtocles, and warmly and ſucceſsfully purſued by an Ariſtides, a Cimon, and a Pericles; the ſwerving from which at Athens drew after it the loſs of the ſovereignty at ſea, then ſunk her into a petty *State*, and made her end at laſt in a mere academy, tho' moſt excellent in its kind.

From ſuch conſiderations it will alſo follow, that the hiſtory of Thucydides is more uſeful than that of Livy; at leaſt, that *we* have more reaſon to applaud the choice of the former. I deſign no compariſon between theſe two hiſtorians. The performance of the Jeſuit *Rapin* on that point is in general reading. Livy's hiſtory is certainly more auguſt, more ſplendid, more amazing; I only inſiſt that it is not more uſeful. And, tho' Livy be happier in his ſubject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who ſeized the only fine ſubject that could offer itſelf to him: In regard to *him*, it was either this or none at all. The parallel ſhould be only drawn in regard to *execution*, where much hath been ſaid on both ſides, and the ſuperiority ſtill remains undecided.

This brings me to the inward abilities of genius and underſtanding, which capacitated my author to execute his work. His *genius* was certainly of the higheſt order: It was truly ſublime. Here the critics unanimouſly applaud. In the arrangement of his matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftineſs of his ſenſe he copied Pindar. He is ever ſtately and majeſtic; his ſtatelineſs perhaps too formal, his majeſty too ſevere. He wrote, as he thought, far beyond an ordinary perſon. He thinks faſter than he can utter: His ſentences are full-ſtored with meaning: And his very words are ſentences. Hence comes his obſcurity. Where pure thought is the object, he connects too faſt, nor is enough dilated for common

common apprehenſion. But this is not the caſe with the *narrative* part of his hiſtory, which is pithy, nervous and ſuccinct, yet plain, ſtriking, and manly. He never flouriſheth, never plays upon words, never ſinks into puerilities, never ſwells into bombaſt. It is a relation from the mouth of a very great man, whoſe chief characteriſtic is gravity. Others talk more ingeniouſly; others utter themſelves with a more chearful air; yet, every one muſt attend to Thucydides, muſt hearken with ſerious and fixed attention, leſt they loſe a word, a weighty and important word, by which the whole ſtory would be ſpoiled. It is in his *Orations*, that he is moſt remarkably obſcure. He might not be ſo in ſo high a degree to the apprehenſions of mankind, when his hiſtory was firſt made public. The world was then uſed to hear continual harangues: No buſineſs of a public nature could be carried on without them. In his time, the ſpeakers aimed intirely at ſtrength and brevity. If they were not exceeding quick, the apprehenſions of the Athenians would outſtrip, or at leaſt affect to outſtrip, their utterance. They muſt think much, and yet leave much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in the following hiſtory * calls them "Spectators "of ſpeeches." They affected to diſcern at the firſt glance, and without waiting for formal deduction and ſolemn inference, to be maſters of the point as it were by intuition. The more copious and diffuſive eloquence was the improvement of the next generation. But the moſt forcible orator, that even Athens ever boaſted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from Thucydides. It was Demoſthenes, who copied him in the cloſe energy of his ſentences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demoſthenes is ſaid to have tranſcribed him eight times over with his own hand: ſo diligently did he perſevere to form an intimate acquaintance with him, and habituate himſelf to his quick manner of conception, and to his cloſe and rapid delivery. Cicero ſays however †, that "no rheto-

* Cleon's ſpeech in book the third.

† In the *Orator*,

"rician

" rician of Greece ever drew any thing from Thucydides. He " hath indeed been praiſed by all; I own it; But, as a man, who " was an explainer of facts with prudence, ſeverity, and gravity: " Not as a ſpeaker at the bar, but an hiſtorical relator of wars. And " therefore he was never numbered amongſt the orators." Cicero learned nothing from him: He could not, neither in his own words " would he if he could." His talents were different; he was quite in all reſpects accompliſhed; he was eloquence itſelf. But Demoſthenes--and can there be higher praiſe? — Demoſthenes certainly loved, and ſtudied Thucydides; for whoſe perfection I am not arguing; I would only eſtabliſh his character of loftineſs and ſublimity. Longinus * propoſeth him, as the model of true grandeur and exaltation in writing hiſtory.

And now I have mentioned this princely and moſt judicious critic, let us call Thucydides to take a trial at his bar, and ſee whether he hath all the genuine conſtituents of the true ſublime. — For *elevation* of thought, for his power in alarming and intereſting the *paſſions*, for his bold and frequent uſe of *figures*, his character will ſoon be eſtabliſhed. Even Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus bears teſtimony here, who loved him not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the moſt pathetic, and a writer of the greateſt energy and variety that ever was. The ſcenes in his hiſtory are ſtrong moſt expreſſive paintings. He makes the paſt to be preſent; he makes hearing ſight. In the very words of Plutarch † — " His readers are " thrown into the ſame aſtoniſhment and hurry of paſſion, as the " eye-witneſſes to every ſcene muſt have felt. Demoſthenes drawing " up his men on the craggy ſhore of Pylus — Braſidas calling out " on his pilot to run the veſſel aſhore, getting himſelf on the ſtairs, " then wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the " Spartans fighting a land-battle from the water, the Athenians a " naval-battle from the ſhore; — and again, in the Sicilian war, the " land-

* On the ſublime. Section 14.

† De gloria Athenienſium.

" land-armies of both parties on the beach, whilſt a naval engage-
" ment is yet under deciſion on the water, ſympathiſing in all the
" conteſt, adjuſting themſelves to all the various turns of battle, by
" new attitudes, quick contorſions of the body ;— All theſe things
" are ſet before the readers in actual repreſentation, in all the diſpoſi-
" tion, all the expreſſion, and perſpicuity of picture." Through the whole courſe of the hiſtory, a battle either at land or ſea is an object clear and diſtinct. The writer is never confounded himſelf, nor throws confuſion on his reader. That reader ſees the whole, from the pæan of attack to the erecting of the trophy; he diſcerns the whole train of fight, and beholds exactly the loſs or gain of the victory. He further aſſiſts at the aſſemblies of the people and all important conſultations. He learns the ſtate of affairs from the managers themſelves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the aſſembly, pries into all the politics, and preconceives the reſolution. Where the politics are bad, he will own no other could be expected from thoſe who recommend them. Where they are ſound and good, nor wilfully ſevered from duty to their country, and in moral conſiſtence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, and think he hath been himſelf diſcovering the fine maxims which the author hath been teaching, who never appears in perſon, never puffs his own integrity and diſcernment, and without digreſſing into comments or ſetting up for a *politician*, is found upon reflexion the beſt of the kind that ever wrote.

To quote paſſages for the proof of his *ſublime* thought or his *pathetic* addreſs, would be to tranſcribe the greater part of the following hiſtory. They will be obſerved in the *orations* of theſe two different caſts, and the incidents of the work. His *figures* are thick ſet; the figures, that regard both the ſentiment and the diction. His *metaphors* are ſtrong and uncommon; his *hyperboles* far but not overſtretched, the tone is ſtill preſerved, they flow out from a warm pathetic in the midſt of ſome grand circumſtance. The figures, in which

which he moſt delights, are the *Interrogation*; the *Change* of number and time; the *Hyperbaton*, or tranſpoſing and inverting the order of things which ſeem naturally united and inſeparable; and above all, the *Antitheſis*. This laſt he hath fondly uſed, almoſt to ſatiety. *Term* is not only oppoſed to *term*, but thought to thought, ſentence to ſentence, and ſometimes whole *orations* to one another, even where the latter ſpeaker cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed to have heard the former. A conſtant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. I am ſenſible there ſhould have been more variety to make the whole quite beautiful and graceful.

As to the fourth conſtituent of ſublimity, which according to Longinus is noble and graceful *expreſſion*, our author's claim cannot be ſo well eſtabliſhed. *Noble* undoubtedly he is, but as for the *graceful* — the reader may wiſh he had been more careful in this particular, and I am ſure his *tranſlator* wiſhes it from his heart. For fear of being vulgar he is too ſet and ſolemn; and from the paſſion to be always great, he hath loſt the air of eaſe and genteelneſs. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus ſays he ſtudiouſly affected hard and obſolete words. But yet the ſame writer ſets him up as the ſtandard of Attic purity; nay, hath frequently ſtrengthned his own ſtile by uſing the hard and obſolete words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this reſpect fallen half-way ſhort: And more ſo, in the fifth conſtituent of ſublimity, the *compoſition* or *ſtructure* of his periods. He hath no harmony, hath given little or no proof of having a *good ear*. He is rough, auſtere; his periods are ſometimes a mile long, in which he labours himſelf both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his *imperfections*, and beg the reader would weigh them and ſet them in the balance with his *excellencies*: He may then judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly; affects ſurpriſingly; his expreſſion is noble, but not graceful; his final colouring is neither bright nor chearful. But, tho' his pieces are not ſo compleatly finiſhed as to ſtand every teſt, yet they are

are certainly high-wrought in his own peculiar *ſtile*, and for greatneſs of deſign and ſtrength of expreſſion are beyond every other *hand*.

I think no fair compariſon can be made of him, except with the Hiſtorians who are his countrymen, who like himſelf are original in their own way, and the firſt in their *manner*. Theſe are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucydides was junior a little to the former, and ſenior to the latter. In ſtatelineſs, grandeur, and majeſty, he far ſurpaſſeth them both. The manner of Herodotus is graceful and manly; his addreſs is engaging; he loves to tell a ſtory; and, however fabulous or trifling that ſtory, he will be heard with pleaſure. The courſe of his Hiſtory is clear and ſmooth, and yields a moſt chearful proſpect: That of Thucydides is deep, rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly perceive the bottom of the one: But it is very hard to dive to the bottom of the other. Herodotus, like a maſter on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harſhneſs ſink down into the loweſt and melloweſt notes. Thucydides ſounds the trumpet; his blaſts are ſonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial ſtrain *. Xenophon never pretends to grandeur; his character is a beautiful ſimplicity; he is ſweeter than honey; he charms every ear; the Muſes themſelves could not ſing ſweeter than he hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in ſome particular points. Each hath his particular excellence: That of Herodotus is gracefulneſs; that of Thucydides, grandeur; that of Xenophon, ſweetneſs itſelf. If generals and admirals and ſtateſmen were to award the firſt rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucydides; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus; if all in general who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing.

As to the Roman Hiſtorians, who ſaw what theſe mighty *originals* had done before them, I cannot judge it fair to form deciſive parallels. Time had enabled them to judge maturely about the defects and

* *Canit quodammodo bellicum.* Cicero *in the* Orator.

excellencies of their Greek predeceſſors. Yet every Roman Hiſtorian ſhews plainly he is a *Roman* himſelf; he ſtood not ſo aloof from his ſubject as Thucydides. The loſs of a Peloponneſian writer is never regretted in regard to the latter; the loſs of Carthaginian and hiſtorians of other nations is highly regretted in regard to the former. National *impartiality* will admit no compariſon here; tho' excellence of *compoſition* may admit a great deal. Saluſt is the only one, who ſeems to have had our author ever in his eye, and to have been his profeſſed imitator. Saluſt frequently tranſlates his political maxims, copies him exactly in the conciſeneſs and laboured energy of his phraſe; and Saluſt, for that reaſon, is like him very often obſcure. It is entirely in *his* manner, that he draws up his orations, contraſts his ſpeakers, and fights his battles. Saluſt hath many, hath deſervedly many admirers: And I hope, if I am ſo fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will beſtow regard upon the other, and pay due honour to his hiſtoric progenitor.

I ſhall wind up this eſſay on Thucydides as an *Hiſtorian* with a paſſage from the Critic on the Sublime *, only deſiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance, as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and proſe ——

" I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are " by no means pure and correct, ſince whatever is neat and accurate " throughout, muſt be exceedingly liable to flatneſs. In the Sublime, " as in great affluence of fortune, ſome minuter articles will unavoidably eſcape obſervation. But it is almoſt impoſſible for a low " and groveling genius to be guilty of error, ſince he never endangers " himſelf by ſoaring on high, or aiming at eminence, but ſtill goes " on in the ſame uniform ſecure track, whilſt its very height and " grandeur expoſes the Sublime to ſudden falls. Nor am I ignorant " indeed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that in

* Longinus, Section 33.

" paſſing

" paſſing our judgment upon the works of an author, we always
" muſter his imperfections, ſo that the remembrance of his faults
" ſticks indelibly faſt in the mind, whereas that of his excellencies is
" quickly worn out. For my part, I have taken notice of no incon-
" ſiderable number of faults in Homer, and ſome other of the greateſt
" authors, and cannot by any means be blind or partial to them;
" however, I judge them not to be voluntary faults, ſo much as ac-
" cidental ſlips incurred through inadvertence; ſuch as, when the
" mind is intent upon things of a higher nature, will creep inſenſibly
" into compoſitions. And for this reaſon I give it as my real opinion,
" that the great and noble flights, tho' they cannot every where boaſt
" an equality of perfection, yet ought to carry off the prize by the
" ſole merit of their own intrinſic grandeur."

DISCOURSE III.

A SURVEY of the

HISTORY.

IN the preceding diſcourſe we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of our author for writing hiſtory, and ſettled his character. Let us now take a view of the *work* itſelf; firſt caſting our eyes upon and noting the general diſpoſition of the *whole*; and then ſurveying it more diſtinctly in its *parts*.

Diſpoſition of the whole.

The *diſpoſition* of the whole is moſt elaborately exact. Order is ſcrupulouſly obſerved; and every incident ſo faithfully arranged in its proper time, that ſome have doubted whether *annals* were not a more proper title for it than *hiſtory*. If we ſhould call it *annals*, it muſt be owned at the ſame time that annals were never compoſed with ſo much majeſty and ſpirit; and never was *hiſtory* more accurately diſtinguiſhed by the punctuality of dates ſo nicely interwove. Thucydides ſtates every occurrence in juſt place and time. But he is forced for this purpoſe to make frequent tranſitions, and to drop a particular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be moſt fixed upon and moſt eager for the event. If they cannot bear a diſappointment here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it regularly reſumed in due

due place and time; and they at once may ſatisfy their own curioſity, without diſarranging the author's ſcheme, or perplexing that work which he was determined to keep quite clear and unembarraſſed. They will afterwards forgive, perhaps applaud him, for his great care to prevent confuſion, and to give a neat and preciſe conception of all that paſſeth. He conſtantly gives notice, when he is neceſſitated, by the method he laid down for himſelf, to make ſuch tranſitions: And, when we have been amuſed with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of hiſtory, but is really a coincidence of events not to paſs unheeded; when we have been ſo long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excurſion at all; yet we are glad to ſee him re-connect, and land us on a ſpot, where we are already well acquainted. He ſhews a ſteddy and inviolable attachment to *chronology*, a neceſſary attendant upon hiſtory. But the chronolgy of Thucydides is like a herald, that exactly marſhals a long ſtately proceſſion, adjuſts the rank, clears the way, and preſerves every ſtep diſtinct and unincumbered.

No writer had done this before him. No ſettled *Æra* was yet in uſe, not even the famous one of the *Olympiad*. The ſeveral States of Greece computed time by a method of their own. It was not eaſy to make thoſe methods coincide with one another. The Athenians reckon'd by their annual *archons*; the Lacedæmonians by their *ephori*; the Argives by the years of the *prieſteſs* of Juno. The ſeaſons of the year, when the two former entered on their offices, were fixed, but did not ſuit together in point of time; the beginning of the years of the latter was variable, ſince it depended on the death or removal of a predeceſſor. Thucydides, to avoid confuſion, left all theſe artificial jarring rules, and adhered to the courſe of nature. He divided the natural year into two halves, into a ſummer and a winter. His *ſummer* includes the ſpring, and reacheth from the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended in his *winter*. He always records *eclipſes*, as ſtrange events, and

and proper concomitants for the horrors of this war. I muſt not be ſo ſanguine as to imagine, that he ſuppoſed ſuch appearances might ſome time or other be reduced to exact calculation, and *aſtronomy* be made the faithful guide of *chronology*.

Book I. The Firſt Book of Thucydides is introductory to the reſt. It is a comprehenſive elaborate work of itſelf. It clears away rubbiſh, opens a view from the earlieſt ages, ſtrikes out light from obſcurity, and truth from fable, that the reader may enter upon the *Peloponneſian war* with a perfect inſight into the ſtate of Greece, and the ſchemes, intereſt and ſtrength of the contending parties. The author unfolds his deſign in writing, magnifies his ſubject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of mankind, rectifies their miſtakes, removes all prejudice, and furniſhes us with the knowledge of every thing proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention with judgment and diſcernment, when the point contended for is no leſs than the ſovereignty of the ſea, which that of the land muſt neceſſarily follow.

He begins at the ſource, and traces the original of the Greek communities from certain and indiſputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural barrenneſs of the ſoil, which tempted no invaſions; and from the ſhelter its inhabitants gave to all, who would ſettle amongſt them, and ſhare their polity. — He ſhews the invention of *ſhipping* to have been exceedingly miſchievous at firſt. It filled the ſea with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coaſt to coaſt, enabling them ſuddenly to ſeize, and at leiſure to carry off and ſecure their booty. No conſiderable commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the ſhore was cleared of ſuch annoyance. And when few durſt venture to ſettle on the coaſts, no marts could be opened for traffic, and no ports were yet ſecure. A ſhip was merely the inſtrument of ready conveyance from place to place: It was not yet become an engine of attack and defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the firſt attempt with ſucceſs to obtain

obtain a naval ſtrength *, by which he cleared the iſles of the pirates, who had ſettled upon them to ſet out readier from thence on their plundering excurſions. — The grand fleet, that carried ſuch a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of tranſports. Thucydides gives us a juſt and clear idea of that famous expedition. After this celebrated æra †, the Corinthians were the firſt people of Greece, who became in reality a maritime power. Their peculiar ſituation gave them an inclination and opportunity for commerce; and commerce muſt have ſtrength to guard and ſupport it. They firſt improved a veſſel of burden into a ſhip of war ‡, and ſet power afloat as well as wealth.

Their neighbors in the iſle of Corcyra ſoon followed their example, and, tho' originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at ſea. They fought on their own darling element for ſuperiority ‖. This was the moſt ancient ſea-fight, but it was not deciſive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the aſcendant over them both, and to aſſert the empire of the ſea for itſelf.

The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occaſioned their moſt recent embroilment §, and a hot war, in which the Corcyréans applied for the alliance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the *firſt* pretext for the Peloponneſian war, and therefore our Author opens the affair at large. Athens held the balance of power in her hands: *How* ſhe came to be poſſeſſed of it, will ſoon give room for as pertinent a digreſſion as Thucydides could have wiſhed. Embaſſadors from both parties are ſoon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; the other, to traverſe their negotiation. The *people* of Athens, in whom the ſupreme power was veſted, admit them both to audience, and *orations* of

* Years before Chriſt 1006. † Before Chriſt 904. ‡ Before Chriſt 697.
‖ Before Chriſt 657. § Before Chriſt 438.

courſe

courſe muſt follow. Our grave Hiſtorian is now retired, to make way for ſtateſmen and orators to mount the ſtage, who are very well worth hearing.

Speech of the Corcyréans.

The Corcyréans, who take the lead, recognize " the neceſſity of " *alliances*, which, tho' ſometimes intanglements, are generally ſecu- " rity and defence. Wronged as they now are, they ſue for alliance " as the means of redreſs. In granting it to them, the Athenians " would ſhew honour and virtue, and at the ſame time promote " their own private intereſt. The acceſſion of the naval ſtrength " of Corcyra to their own was very well worth the gaining; in the " end, it might preſerve their State. —— They open the nature of " *colonies*, ſhew the original contract between them and the mother " country; obedience and protection are reciprocal and imply one " another. — They prove that Athens may grant them alliance, in " conſiſtence with all other engagements; by doing it, may ſecure " herſelf in time againſt the envy and attack of the Peloponneſians; " ſince the naval ſtrength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the " latter in a future war, will be weak and ineffectual againſt the com- " bined fleets of Corcyra and Athens.

Speech of the Corinthians.

The Corinthians, in their anſwer, inveigh highly againſt the Corcyréans. " They deſcribe them as a very deſigning iniquitous ſet of " men, and a colony in the higheſt degree undutiful to its mother- " ſtate. They endeavor to prove it unjuſt, and ungrateful too, in " the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal " behavior. They maintain, that true honour points out another " conduct; and ſchemes of intereſt ſhould never ſuperſede the laws " of equity and good-faith. What *may* happen ſhould be leſs re- " garded, than what on preſent occaſions *is* ſtrictly right. They in- " treat at laſt, tho' with a menacing air; and cloſe, with warmly " adjuring the Athenians, to ſtand *neutral* in the quarrel."

The Athenians however reſolve to enter into a defenſive alliance with Corcyra. The war is renewed; and the Athenians ſend the Corcyréans

Corcyréans a petty aid, which they afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is ſecured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are baffled, who are highly exaſperated againſt the Athenians, and never will forgive them.

Another affair ſoon happens, to embroil them more, and to make the *ſecond* pretext for a general war. Potidæa, a town in the Iſthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its ſituation between two bays, and amongſt the Athenian colonies on the coaſt of Thrace and Macedonia, would enable it to gall the Athenians ſorely in caſe of a rupture. They order it therefore to be diſmantled. The Potidæans refuſe obedience, and revolt. A war enſues. The Athenians attempt to reduce Potidæa; and the Corinthians to ſupport the revolt. It is at length beſieged by the former. The ſiege runs out into a great length of time, and at laſt becomes one of the conſiderable events of the Peloponneſian war.

The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of reſentments, and leave no ſtone unturned to ſtir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themſelves in the Peloponneſian league, of which the Lacedæmonians were the head. The Corinthians never ſet up for a leading *State*. They were ever content with the ſecondary rank, tho' the *firſt* in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. Commerce had long ſince made them rich; riches had made them luxurious; and, tho' they often produced great and excellent ſoldiers, yet they never piqued themſelves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated: Athens had rivalled them in trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of the gulfs on which Corinth is ſeated, that of Sarone, was now intirely in the juriſdiction of the Athenians, who had alſo begun to curb and ſtraiten them much in the gulf of Criſſa. They were conſequently bent on the demolition of this all-graſping rival, but were unable to effect it by their own

ſtrength. They ſolicit all the confederates to repair to Lacedæmon, all full of complaint and remonſtrance againſt the Athenians. The Corinthians reſerve themſelves for the finiſhing charge; and our author repeats (or makes for them) their moſt inveigling and alarming ſpeech on this occaſion.

Speech of the Corinthians.

" They addreſs the Lacedæmonians with an artful mixture of " commendation and reproach; of commendation, for their ſtrict " adherence to good-faith; of reproach, for their indolence and " ſloth. *They* had ſuffered the *State* of Athens to grow too mighty " for her neighbours. Tho' the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, " *they* had now for a length of time taken no notice of the incroach- " ments of the Athenians; but, through wilful ignorance and habi- " tual ſupineneſs, had let them grow too big, and able now to in- " ſlave them all. — They do all they can to irritate and provoke " them. They draw an admirable parallel between *them* and the " Athenians; invidious and reproachful, but directly tending to ex- " aſperate thoſe whom they want to exaſperate. — Then, they " warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedæmoni- " ans; they alarm their fears; they flatter and reproach their foi- " bles. They even threaten to abandon *their* league, unleſs they " exert themſelves in defence of their friends; they endeavour to " prove the neceſſity of active and vigorous meaſures; and end " with a very artful ſtroke of inſinuating and perſuaſive addreſs."

An Athenian embaſſy, now reſiding at Lacedæmon, being informed of theſe loud and bitter outcries againſt their maſters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, they are admitted; not indeed to plead before Lacedæmonians, as their judges or ſuperiors — Athenians ſcorn ſuch ſelf-debaſement; but, to vindicate their *State* from miſ-repreſentations, to clear her reputation, and juſtify her power.

Speech of the Athenian *embaſſy.*

" With this view, they run over the great ſervices they had done " to Greece, in the time of the Perſian invaſions: They had ever " been

" been the moſt ſtrenuous, moſt diſintereſted, and moſt gallant
" champions for liberty. They pompouſly detail their battles of
" Marathon and Salamis; their evacuating Athens on the laſt occa-
" ſion; and, when they had no polity of their own ſubſiſting, fight-
" ing ardently and ſucceſsfully for the other communities of Greece.
" Their power had been nobly earned; and, muſt they forego it,
" becauſe it was envied? They had honourably gained, and juſtly
" uſed it; much more juſtly, than the Lacedæmonians had it either
" in will or ability to have done. They are calumniated merely
" from that ſpite and diſcontent ſo common to mankind, who ever
" hate and abuſe their ſuperiors, and ever repine at ſubjection tho' to
" the moſt gentle maſters. — Lacedæmonians have neither ſkill nor
" judgment for large command, and tho' moſt eagerly graſping at
" it, are unable to manage it with any meaſure of dexterity and ad-
" dreſs. *They* ſhould reflect again and again, before they ventured
" upon war: It might laſt longer, and involve them in more cala-
" mities, than they ſeemed willing to apprehend. *They* had better
" ſubmit their complaints to fair arbitration: If not, the Athenians
" invoke the Gods to witneſs their readineſs to defend themſelves,
" whenever and however their enemies ſhall attack them."

All parties now withdraw; and the Lacedæmonians go to council amongſt themſelves. Exaſperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the ſpeech of the Athenians, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus, one of their kings, roſe up to temper their fury. And the ſpeech of his Spartan majeſty on this occaſion, carries all the marks of a good king, an able ſtateſman, and a thorough patriot: It does honour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure but at the head of an army: *Then* he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no ſelfiſh conſiderations; they are loſt in his regard for the public welfare.

He tells them, " he is not fond of war himſelf; raw unexperienced " youth alone is liable to ſuch weakneſs. The war *now* under conſide- " ration is a moſt important point. It may run out into a great length " of time. It is againſt Athenians, — a remote people, — a naval " power, — abounding in wealth, — excellently provided in all reſpects. " He demands, in every ſingle article, whether they can preſume to " become a match for ſuch antagoniſts? They ſhould remember the " high ſpirit, the habits of activity and perſeverance ſo natural to theſe " Athenians, who are not to be dejected at the firſt loſs, nor frightned " at big words or haughty threats. *Inſults* indeed muſt not be brook- " ed; but, adequate preparations ſhould be made to avenge them, and " time be gained to make ſuch preparations. It would be moſt pru- " dent to begin a negotiation, to ſpin it out into length. If affairs " can be amicably adjuſted, it would deſerve their choice; — If " not, when they are competently enabled, it will be ſoon enough " to act offenſively. He dreads not war himſelf, yet, war cannot " be carried on without money. Ample funds muſt be provided, a " work of time and deliberation. Circumſpection is no real re- " proach; precipitation draws poſitive miſchiefs after it. Lacedæ- " monians are uſed to be calm and conſiderate; they ſhould not now " be cajoled or exaſperated out of their judgment. The Athenians " are a wiſe and dextrous people. The Lacedæmonians ſhould keep " *that* in remembrance, and ſupport their own characters of calm- " neſs of ſpirit and true manly reſolution: They ſhould begin with " caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they " can; if not, when duly prepared and adequately provided, they " might truſt the deciſion to arms."

The *Kings* of Sparta were ever juſtled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing *Ephori*. Sthenelaïdas, one of that college, anſwers Archidamus in a ſhort, blunt, properly Laconic ſpeech. " He " is ſevere upon the Athenians, ſneers Archidamus, and avers that " Lacedæmonians ſhould not deliberate upon, but inſtantly take the

field

" field and avenge their wrongs." He then put the queſtion — Whether the peace was broke? — divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the Engliſh ſtile, that the *Ays* had it.

The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the reſolution. Yet, it ſeems the advice of Archidamus had carried ſome weight, and actual war was to be defer'd, 'till all the parties in the Lacedæmonian league had ripened their meaſures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigor.

Here the author again makes his appearance, and aſſures us the true motive of the determination for war at Sparta, was a JEALOUSY of the Athenian power now very great, and a dread of its more extenſive growth; the latter of which they were determined to prevent, and to reduce the former within leſs diſtaſteful and terrific bounds.

Then follows a moſt pertinent *digreſſion*, in which Thucydides points out the ſteps, by which the Athenians had ſo highly exalted their *State*. In a cloſe and ſuccinct manner he runs over the hiſtory of Athens for fifty years, from the invaſion of Xerxes to the breaking out of the Peloponneſian war. He arranges all the incidents in due place and time. Herodotus hath related the ſplendid paſſages of the Grecian hiſtory during that invaſion; hath exhibited Themiſtocles in all the luſtre of his command at the battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and through the addreſs of Themiſtocles obliged all parties to fight, for liberty againſt Xerxes. On this day they earned a greater title than that of *citizens* of Athens; they were afterwards acknowledged the *ſovereigns* of the ſea. The Lacedæmonians became mortified at it; but the Athenians had glorioufly deſerved it. Themiſtocles was the very life and ſoul of Greece on this occaſion. In the midſt of difficulties he formed a moſt extenſive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to execute at once. Thucydides deſcribes his addreſs and foreſight. He ſoon ſets the city beyond the reach of envy and jealouſy. And tho'

ſoon

ſoon after he loſt his country, through the malice of his perſonal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, yet the ſtateſmen and patriots left behind purſued his plan of naval power: And the ſteps of its progreſs and advancement are minutely traced out by our Hiſtorian.

Themiſtocles had made all ſafe and ſecure at home. The *Long-walls* were built; the *Piræus*, a ſpacious harbour, opened and fortified, a magazine for traffic, and an arſenal for war. Ariſtides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all ſecure abroad. Through his honeſt management, all Greece ſubmitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their common liberty againſt future invaſions; and the *leaders* at ſea were made *collectors* and *treaſurers* of this naval fund. The iſle of Delos was the place, at firſt, of lodging this fund; but, it was ſoon after removed to Athens; — a ſhrewd political ſtep, yet capable however of an ample if not full juſtification. The war is briſkly carried on againſt the Perſian monarch; the iſles and ſeas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on the coaſt are regained or conquered. Cimon alſo performs his part nobly; he earns two victories the ſame day, by ſea and land, on the coaſt of Ionia from the Perſians. He compleated a negotiation with the petty maritime *States*, confederate with Athens, who were tired of inceſſant warfare, for accepting ſums of money inſtead of ſhips and perſonal attendance. By this means the ſhipping of thoſe *States* ſoon mouldered away, and their money was by their own agreement ſent thither, to increaſe and ſtrengthen the maritime power of Athens. In ſpite of all the oppoſition, which the Corinthians and Bœotians gave them at home, whoſe rancor to them was never to be appeaſed, in the courſe of no large number of years, they had eſtabliſhed a very extenſive and formidable empire indeed. The iſles and coaſts of the Ægéan ſea were moſtly their own. The bay of Sarone was intirely in their own juriſdiction: And, by being maſters of Naupactus, they conſiderably awed the bay of Criſſa. Their ſquadrons cruized round

and

and quite awed the coaſts of Peloponneſus. Their intereſt at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the acceſſion of the naval ſtrength of Corcyra, rendered them maſters of the Ionian, and they had colonies to extend their traffic and influence both in Italy and Sicily.

Theſe points are opened ſtep by ſtep in this *digreſſion* by Thucydides, 'till jealouſy in the Lacedæmonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponneſian *States* and their allies againſt them, and ended in the *determination* for war. The Corinthians had now carried their point, and ſoon hoped to gratify all their reſentments. Accordingly, at the ſecond grand congreſs at Sparta, when all the reſt of the *States* had declared their minds, they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an offenſive war, in a very ſtudied and elaborate ſpeech.

Speech of the Corinthians.

" They ſet out with handſome compliments to the Lacedæmoni-
" ans. They animate the landed *States* of Peloponneſus to join ef-
" fectually with thoſe on the coaſts. A firm and laſting peace can
" only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens
" muſt needs be reduced. — They open a plan — for eſtabliſhing
" funds — for weakening the marine of Athens, and conſequently
" for improving and ſtrengthening the marine of her enemies — for
" effectuating the revolts of her dependents — and raiſing fortificati-
" ons in Attica itſelf. Independence can never be earned at too
" great a price; it coſts as much to be voluntary and obedient ſlaves.
" A ſingle *State* ſhould never be ſuffered to play the tyrant in Greece.
" Their own reputation, their dignity, their liberty, their welfare, a
" moſt righteous cauſe, nay the very Gods themſelves ſummon them
" to action. They cloſe with a very warm and pathetic recapitula-
" tion, ſounding as it were the alarm for the deſtruction of Athens."

Now war is a ſecond time reſolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready, with the utmoſt diſpatch, to begin its operations. In the mean time, the Athenians are to be amuſed with embaſſies

and

and negotiations, merely to gain time and ſave appearances. Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an opportunity of introducing ſome notable paſſages relating to Cylon, Pauſanias, and Themiſtocles. He then ſhifts the ſcene to Athens; and introduces Pericles, the moſt commanding orator, the greateſt general, the moſt conſummate ſtateſman, and at this time prime miniſter of the republic — introduces Pericles, I ſay, in the aſſembly of the people, to give them an inſight into the ſchemes of their enemies, and a plan for their own conduct; to encourage them to a brave and ſteddy reſiſtance, in ſtrict adherence to ſuch methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely ſecure but aggrandize their *State*.

Speech of Pericles.

The thoughts in this ſpeech of Pericles are ſo grand, ſo nervous, ſo emphatically and conciſely juſt, that if the reader be not immediately ſtruck into an adequate conception of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his underſtanding. He ſays but little, but ſays every thing in that little. He demoliſheth all the aſſertions of the Corinthians in their laſt ſpeech at Sparta, as if he had heard them ſpeak. Perhaps Thucydides *here* hath not ſufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the ſpeech is intirely in character, compleatly ſuited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. Pericles, I obſerve it with pleaſure, is an Engliſhman both in heart and judgment. England hath adhered and will adhere to the leſſons which Athens neglected and forgot. — "Of vaſt conſequence indeed," (ſays this enlightned ſtateſman) "is the dominion of the ſea. But, "conſider it with attention. For, were we ſeated on an iſland," (as the force of his argument evidently implies) "we could never be "ſubdued. And now you ought to think, that our preſent ſituation is "nearly as poſſible the ſame, and ſo to evacuate your houſes and lands "in Attica, and to confine your defence to the ſea." If this can need a comment, Xenophon will give it in his *Polity of the* Athenians.— "In one point (ſays he) the Athenians are deficient. For if, beſide

" beſide their being ſovereigns of the ſea, they were ſeated on an " iſland, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleaſure, " and yet they could not be ravaged themſelves ſo long as they held " the maſtery at ſea; their lands could never be laid waſte, no ene- " my could poſt themſelves upon them. But now, the occupiers of " lands and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilſt the " people in general, conſcious they have nothing to be burnt and " nothing to be plundered, live exempt from fear nor fly before an " invader. The expedient uſed on ſuch occaſions is, that the former " depoſit their moſt valuable effects in the iſles, and truſting to their " ſuperiority at ſea, ſlight all the devaſtations an enemy can make " in Attica." England is compleat where Athens was deficient. And how fond muſt both Pericles and Xenophon have been of the iſland and maritime power of Great-Britain? I will not pretend to anticipate the reader's pleaſure by deſcending into more particularities. It may ſuffice to add, that the final anſwer of the Athenians is drawn up by the advice of Pericles, that " they will do nothing by " command; they had already offered to refer all diſputes to a fair " judicial deciſion; ſo far only, but no farther, compliance muſt be " expected from Athens." —— Here all negotiation comes to an end; and the war will very ſoon commence.

Thus I have endeavoured to give ſome idea of the firſt book of Thucydides. It is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath overdone it " out of a deſire of pre- " fixing a too ſtately portal to his hiſtory." Could the portal have been thought too ſtately, if the whole fabric had been compleatly finiſhed? To form a right judgment here, we ſhould examine the *deſign* and not the *execution*: The latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the park, the Banqueting-houſe at Whitehall is too big and towering for what ſtands near it. But hath it that appearance in the original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once deſigned to be erected? Something of this nature may juſtly

be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teach us not to judge too haſtily of a *whole*, when we cannot ſurvey all the *parts*, becauſe they never were finiſhed. Moved by decorum, I would gladly juſtify my author, but I by no means pretend to decide the point.

Book II. The Second Book opens with the firſt act of hoſtility. The Thebans march by night, and enter by ſurpriſe the city of Platæa. This city and petty *State*, tho' juſt within Bœotia, was not comprized in the *union*, of which all the other cities of Bœotia were conſtituents with Thebes at their head, but had ever been firmly attached, even in the worſt of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was under the protection of and in faſt alliance with Athens. This ſurpriſe of Platæa our author deſcribes in all its turns, 'till its enemies are driven out or ſlaughtered, and the place is ſecured for the Athenians.

A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides ſounds the charge in all the diſpoſition and ſpirit of Homer. He catalogues the allies on both ſides. He awakens our expectation; and faſt engages our attention. All mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavors are made to diſcloſe futurity. Heaven itſelf is intereſted in the diſpute. The earth totters, and nature ſeems to labour with the great event. This is *his* ſolemn and ſublime manner of ſetting out. Thus he *magnifies* a war between two, as Rapin ſtiles them, *petty* States; *and thus artfully he ſupports a little ſubject by treating it in a great and noble method.*

Writers, who have been long contemplating the vaſt gigantic ſize of the Roman Empire, if they caſt their eyes on the State of Athens even at the preſent juncture, are apt to form a low idea of it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the higheſt meridian of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the moſt diſadvantageous and incongruous parallels? His ſubject was certainly the greateſt that to this day had occurred in the world: And, ought Thucydides to be degraded,

degraded, or even leſſened at all, becauſe he was not born in the ſame age with Livy? As much amuſement at leaſt accompanies, and as much inſtruction flows from reading carefully the hiſtory of Athens, as from that of Rome. Wonder may be more raiſed by the latter, and the wonder may end in deteſtation of a people, who became enormouſly great by the miſeries and deſtruction of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men: They were not tolerably humaniſed 'till they had conquered Greece. Greece re-conquered them, and eſtabliſhed a better more laſting triumph over mind, than the others over body.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit —— *Hor.*

Who then beſt deſerve the applauſe of the heart, the citizens of Athens, or the the citizens of Rome? I am not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and conſiderate ſpirit will decide the queſtion. Or, let ſuch as judge only by numbers, conſider a little more ſedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty *State*, which could be magnified and enobled only by artifice. The firſt army, that invaded her territories in this war, conſiſted (according to Plutarch) of ſixty thouſand men. This is an object big enough to fill the eye. The ſtate of her revenue, when the value of money is adjuſted, will turn out by no means trifling. They were poſſeſſed, at the breaking out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for ſea. Two hundred and fifty of them were at one time in commiſſion, in the fourth year of the war: Conſequently at two hundred men a ſhip, the number of ſeamen employed muſt have been fifty thouſand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a *petty* State, nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one ſhould ſit down to Thucydides with ſuch low prepoſſeſſions againſt his ſubject.

Speech of Archidamus.

The confederate army of Peloponneſians is now aſſembled, and ready to march into Attica, under the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general he harangues his troops, " encou-" rages them with a ſight of their own numbers, but guards them " from catching at that ſight a contempt of their foes. The ſtrict " obſervation of diſcipline is always neceſſary to armies, be they " never ſo large. No enemy ought ever to be deſpiſed, much leſs " Athenians. Tho' an enemy, he ſpeaks in high commendation of " the latter, and eſtabliſhes the dignity of their characters. He ends " with an exhortation to his troops, to obſerve rules, conform to " diſcipline, and bravely to execute orders; and Spartan-like, " concludes with an encomium on the beauty and ſtrength of ſtrict " military obedience."

He then ſends a meſſenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The Athenians are as determined as ever to make no ſubmiſſions. The meſſenger is conducted out of their territories, and parts from his eſcort with a pathetic prediction of the miſeries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica ſoon after is invaded. The miſchief done by the invaders is deſcribed; and the ſenſe at Athens of their ſufferings and diſtreſſes repreſented at large. The reader, on this occaſion, will be let into the form and conſtitution of the Athenian polity. He will ſee, how they began to be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theſeus one of their earlieſt kings. Other hiſtorians expatiate on the method, by which from being under a *regal* they had varied gradually into a purely *republican* form. I ſhall only mention an obſervation *, that, contrary to moſt other nations, they had aboliſhed the regal government, not from diſtaſte but reverence to kings. Codrus, the laſt of their kings, had devoted himſelf for his country, and was ſo worthy a man, that they reſolved no mortal ſhould afterwards wear that title amongſt them. They declared *Jupiter* king of Athens, about the

* Tourreil's Preface Hiſtorique.

fame

ſame time that the Jews rebelled againſt *theocracy*, and would have a man to reign over them. *Archons* for life ſucceeded; whoſe term was afterwards abridged to ten years; then, to a ſingle year. All general hiſtories point out the variations, 'till they came to the *popular* form which now prevailed.

The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica; and the Athenians take the field to retaliate upon them. Their ſquadron had been all the time at ſea, cruizing upon and infeſting the coaſts of Peloponneſus. But, in the winter, we are called to Athens to ſee the public funeral of thoſe, who were killed in the firſt campaign. Here, the firſt time it occurs, our author deſcribes this ſolemnity, and Pericles makes the Funeral-oration.

The Funeral-oration.

I ſhall make no reflexions on *this* celebrated performance. Should the reader not think it deſerving of its high reputation, I fear the *tranſlator* will be ſadly to blame. It is hard to give ſuch noble ideas their proper energy, and ſuch refined ones their due exactneſs. The great orators of Athens were always glad to diſplay their abilities on the ſame occaſion. Plato hath entered the liſts with a high ſpirit of emulation, and with a high degree of ſucceſs: And a great maſter * this way hath lately made him *Engliſh*. If Thucydides ſuffers by a compariſon, which now the unlearned but judicious reader is impowered to make, the latter muſt be intreated to obſerve, that the eloquence of Plato was beyond diſpute more ſmooth and fluent, more accompliſhed in all that is beautiful and ſweet than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an adjudged inferiority in any other reſpect muſt be laid at the door of his *tranſlator*.

The plague.

After ſuch an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for ſuch it muſt have been to all who heard it, and muſt have determined every Athenian to ſuffer any thing with intrepidity and patience in the cauſe of his country, a very mournful ſcene immediately ſucceeds, which lays them under ſuch a load of affliction and diſtreſs, as no arguments,

* Mr. Weſt.

no

no philoſophy can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader muſt be ready to feel very ſharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of morality and virtue too. Amidſt their accumulated diſtreſſes, Pericles is the only ſupport of the community; and, like the greateſt benefactors to ungrateful men, is curſed for being their ſupport, and reproached for being fteddily wiſe and in the right. At laſt he convenes them, and addreſſes them with ſuch an air of ingenuity, ſuch ſpirit, and conſcious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cauſe, as only two orators that I know of have ever equalled on parallel occaſions. Thoſe I mean are Demoſthenes and St. Paul. All the world of letters and good taſte are well acquainted with the *oration* of the former againſt Æſchines about the *crown*; and every claſs of readers is ſurely well verſed in the *Second Epiſtle of* Paul *to the* Corinthians. I can but hint theſe reſemblances, ſince now I muſt attend on Pericles, who ſooths or thunders his countrymen out of all their diſcontent and malice, and ſends them home convinced and aſhamed. But domeſtic diſtreſs ſoon effaceth any other impreſſions; their paſſions are again inflamed by inwardly corroding anguiſh, and Pericles after all muſt be fined, and turned out of his employments. Yet people are not always mad; good-ſenſe and conviction return upon them; and he is begged, becauſe moſt worthy, again to accept the ſole adminiſtration. He enjoys it but a little time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then loſt her ableſt, honeſteſt ſtateſman. He was able to have ſat at the helm of government, to have ſteered the *republic* ſafe through every ſtorm, and to have inſured her not bare ſecurity but open triumph. His ſucceſſors were very alert at catching hold of that helm; but, none of them could hold it long; and the veſſel, through their mutual quarrels, muſt needs run aground or founder at laſt.

The Speech of Pericles.

But the next remarkable paſſage in the hiſtory, is the march of the Peloponneſians to inveſt Platæa, and the ſolemn parley held at their

their approach. Archidamus is at the head of this ungenerous enterpriſe. The malice of the Thebans muſt be gratified, ſince the alliance of Bœotia in this war is of mighty conſequence, and to be purchaſed at any rate. Archidamus indeed ſtruggles hard for the Platæans; he would fain ſpare them, could he perſuade them to a neutrality. But the Platæans have too much honour and gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally ſtruck at. They remonſtrate in vain from the topics of honour, juſtice, gratitude, the glory and ſanction of the great progenitors on either ſide. The ſiege is formed, and ſtrenuouſly plied, tho' without ſucceſs. Our author always ſhines in exact deſcription: No method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned into a blockade; and a ſufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the main army marcheth off.

The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace; and in Acarnania. An Athenian ſquadron, ſtationed at Naupactus in the bay of Criſſa, awed all the motions of the Corinthians and allies on their own coaſts; and it was determined, to clear away this annoyance. Accordingly, they lanch out againſt it with more than double the number of veſſels. The Athenians, at one exertion of ſkill, drive them all on a heap, defeat them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedæmonians, excellent land-men, but very aukward ſeamen, think this an unaccountable event. They ſend down their moſt active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again at ſea. Much artifice is employed on both ſides. The ſhort harangues of the admirals let us into all the views and deſigns of either party. Phormio at length is ſnared; the enemy blunders; then Phormio extricates himſelf, and gives them a ſecond defeat. The reader ſees every tack, and the motion of every veſſel.

Diſconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to ſurpriſe the Piræus by night, and to finiſh the war in a moment. The project is deſcribed, and the probability of ſucceſs eſtabliſhed. But the very

grandeur

grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into a great conſternation; but, the project totally miſcarries, and the Piræus is better ſecured for the future.

All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces againſt Perdiccas king of Macedonia. A vaſt army of Barbarians is aſſembled, marches over a great length of country, ſtrikes a general panic, effectuates no real ſervice, and ſoon diſperſes or moulders away. Such bulky unwieldy armies make an aukward figure, compared with the regularity, exact diſcipline, and perſonal bravery of the diminutive armies of Greece.

Thucydides gives us once more a ſight of Phormio and his gallant ſquadron; and then cloſeth the *book*, and the hiſtory of the third year of the war. "Never hiſtory (ſays Rapin) comprized ſo much "matter in ſo little room, nor ſo much action in ſo few words. If "any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are too "cloſely crowded with one another, ſo that the coherence ſeems "ſomewhat intricate and confuſed, and the multiplying of objects "tends only to diſſipate the attention of the reader." An *hiſtorian* however is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they ſubſiſt in fact. He is not ſo much to diſpoſe, as to deſcribe them. If he does the latter pertinently, accurately, and with a due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted himſelf of his duty. The *poet* or writer of *fiction* muſt pick out and heighten his incidents, with a view to fill up properly, and give to every diſtinct object its needful ſplendor: He is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciouſly to gain applauſe. The *hiſtorian* is not to pick but to make the beſt uſe of his materials. He may give them indeed all poſſible luſtre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader may be embarraſſed with the number, yet no body can be juſtly blamed.

Book III. The Third Book is no leſs full of matter than the preceding. The incidents crowd faſt upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The revolt of Leſbos is the firſt occurrence of importance.

importance. The people of that iſle had been long in the Athenian league: But the members of this league were *dependents* rather than *confederates.* Thucydides always employs the ſame Greek word (συμμάχοι) for the members of either league: The idea it gives is that of *companions* in war. But there is great difference between ſuch as accompany, becauſe they chuſe it; and ſuch as accompany, becauſe they are ſummoned and cannot help it. The former was in general the caſe of thoſe who ſided with Sparta; the latter, of thoſe who ſided with Athens. The leaſt thought of compulſion is grating to any *State*, which thinks it ought, and is able, to be quite independent. This was the caſe with the Leſbians, a people conſiderable in many reſpects, but eſpecially for their naval ſtrength. It was well worth the while of the Lacedæmonians to gain ſuch *confederates*; it muſt be a ſad blow to the Athenians to loſe ſuch *dependents.* The fact was; all the cities of Leſbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians loſe no time, but are at once with a powerful ſquadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylenéans had ſent embaſſadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedæmonians. They had an audience from them and the reſt of their league at Olympia, ſo ſoon as the games were ended. The *ſpeech* they make on this occaſion is very artful, very inſinuating, and nicely adapted to carry their point.

Speech of the Mitylenéans.

" They open the nature of a *revolt*, and the caſes in which it me-
" rits protection and ſuccour from others. They have been ill
" uſed by the Athenians; have been made their tools in inſlaving
" their compatriots of Greece; have been long careſſed indeed, but
" are well aſſured what their own fate would ſoon have been.
" Every *State* hath a natural right to take preventive meaſures againſt
" the loſs of their liberty and to ſtand on their defence. They had
" revolted ſooner, would the Lacedæmonians have countenanced the
" meaſure: They had declared it on the firſt invitation of the Bœo-
" tians. It was a noble revolt; it had diſengaged them from a

" combination to inſlave the reſt of Greece; it had aſſociated them in
" the cauſe of honour and liberty. It had been made indeed with
" too much precipitation; but this ſhould make others more zealous
" and active in their protection, who would reap a great acceſſion of
" ſtrength by it; an acceſſion of maritime ſtrength; whilſt the
" Athenians would be weakened in point of ſhipping, and in point
" of revenue. It would be a ſignal of revolt to others, and aſſur-
" ance to them that they might do it ſafely. It would reflect
" abundant honour on the Lacedæmonians to ſuccour the diſtreſſed,
" to ſave men whoſe preſervation would give them glory and
" ſtrength, and prove them thoſe hearty friends to liberty, which
" all Greece with united praiſes acknowledged them to be."

Intereſt without rhetoric was ſtrong enough to inſure their ſucceſs. But the latter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedæmonians, who reſolve on ſending them a ſuccour, and making diverſions on the Athenians, in order to oblige them to raiſe the ſiege of Mitylene.

The blockade of Platæa by the Peloponneſians ſtill continuing, our author relates the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Platæans, in making their eſcape over all the works of the beſiegers. It is a moſt circumſtantial, and a moſt clear and intelligible relation.

Mitylene is now forced to ſurrender at diſcretion. The principal agents in the late revolt are ſent priſoners to Athens, where the *people* vote that " not they only but all the Mitylenéans in general be put " to death;" and an order is immediately diſpatched to their commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the ſentence. This bloody decree was carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he, who worked up the people of Athens to ſuch a pitch of inhumanity; which, however, inſtantly ſubſided. They are ſtruck with horror at their own *reſolution*, and will have it again debated. We ſhall hear the two ſpeakers on each ſide of the queſtion, Cleon and Diodotus.

" Cleon

" Cleon ſets out with all the fury and fire of a man, who hath a Cleon's *ſpeech.*
" bad heart. He hath abjured humanity to ſhew himſelf a moſt
" zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged to have been, and
" ſo appears in his invectives againſt his own maſters and his own
" tools, the *people*, for their fooliſh commiſeration, for their being
" the eternal dupes of orators, of ſubtle and venal ſpeakers. For
" his own part, he loves his country, and hates her enemies. Guilt
" ſhall never find an advocate in him; he calls out for vengeance on
" the Mitylenéans; none but their penſioners, none but men who
" are bribed and corrupted can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids
" his audience throw away all fooliſh pity, all womaniſh forbearance;
" to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on the
" horrors of their puniſhment; and give this proof to their depen-
" dents, that death ſhall inevitably be the portion of all revolters,
" that their arms may be henceforth employed in oppoſing their pub-
" lic enemies, and not in chaſtiſing their own ſubjects."

Diodotus replies in a *ſpeech* that ſhews him a real patriot, and a man who thought good-manners, a calm conſiderate temper, and a regard to humanity to be very conſiſtent with the true patriot-ſpirit.
" He therefore defends the *re-committing* of their former *reſo-* *Speech of* Diodotus.
" *lution*, ſince repeated conſultations cannot be prejudicial to the
" public welfare. It is a baſe and odious method to laviſh the
" charge of ignorance and venality on men who differ in ſenti-
" ment; it robs the public of its ableſt counſellors and ſincereſt
" friends. Strict juſtice, in the preſent inſtance, may be with
" Cleon; but the future and laſting welfare of their country is the
" object now to be kept in view. The puniſhment of death hath
" never effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make men
" deſperate is very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is lopping
" off their own limbs, and ruining their own revenue. Men ſhould
" be retained in their duty by mild diſcretionary precautions; ſevere
" and ſanguinary proceedings never anſwer the purpoſe. And,

" what cruelty to doom a whole people to deſtruction! to involve the
" innocent with the guilty! to murder even ſuch as had been their
" friends and benefactors! He adviſes them not to give too large a
" ſcope to mercy, but to puniſh the guilty, and the guilty alone.
" This will ſufficiently intimidate others; will ſecure their intereſt in
" Leſbos better for the future; and convince the world how ſoundly
" Athenians can deliberate upon all their concerns."

Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in the fit of choler but habitually humane, repeal the bloody ſentence; and diſpatch a veſſel with all haſte to ſtop execution, which arrives at Mitylene but juſt time enough to prevent the maſſacre.

The next event of importance contraſts the Lacedæmonian character with that of the Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out; but it lies too ready and obvious to paſs unobſerved.—Platæa, after a tedious blockade, is obliged by famine to ſurrender. They ſurrender however to the Lacedæmonians, on condition of being brought to a judicial trial, and only, if found guilty of unjuſt behaviour, to be put to death. Some delegates arrive from Sparta to preſide in this court of mere inquiſition, ſince the whole proceſs is confined to a ſingle queſtion—" Whether they had done any poſitive " ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and allies"—that is, to their declared and determined enemies—" in the preſent war?" The queſtion plainly manifeſted a deliberate reſolution to put them all to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be ſuffered to make a kind of dying ſpeech before men, who were ſtiled indeed judges but in fact were butchers. It was a caſe of great commiſeration, and the ſpeaker lays it open with all that natural eloquence which flows from an inward and keen ſenſibility. If men were not deaf to perſuaſion, it muſt have perſuaded. The cauſe was moſt alarming, and a more pathetic *plea* hath never been exhibited.

Speech of the Platæans.

" They inſiſt that on a fair and explicit condition they had ſurren-
" dered to the Lacedæmonians, whereas now they were prejudged
" and

" and precondemned to gratify their unrelenting foes the Thebans. " The inſidious *queſtion* left them no plea at all. They could not an- " ſwer it, and muſt not be ſilent. Since life is at ſtake, ſomething " muſt be ſaid even by men who deſpair of perſuading. Their " quarrel with the Thebans had been juſt and honourable; quarrel " with the Lacedæmonians they never had any. Nay merely at the " deſire of the latter, had they cultivated Athenian friendſhip, that " unpardonable crime, for which they were now doomed to deſtruc- " tion. They expatiate with truth and energy on the great ſervices " they had done to the liberty of Greece. All Greece was bound in " honour, in gratitude, in deference to poſitive and ſolemn oaths, to " preſerve the Platæans. Ought every tie to be rent aſunder, gene- " roſity to be quite expunged, and all benevolence thrown aſide, to " ſerve a private turn? Ought Platæans to be thus baſely reduced, " as they really had been, either to be ſtarved or to be butchered? " The Lacedæmonians ſhould intreat the Thebans for them, ſhould " beg them to ſave the lives of friends and benefactors; at leaſt, " ſhould replace them within their walls, and leave them to the fate " of war. They apply to their generoſity, to their humanity; " they ſtrive to give them ſome emotions of pity; they re- " preſent the liableneſs of mankind to calamity; how brutal " it is to be deliberately hard-hearted; how ſinful it is to be reſo- " lutely ungrateful! They call upon heaven and earth to interpoſe " in their behalf; they run over every pathetic and perſuaſive " topic; 'till they can add no more, and yet dare not end; and, " again intreat the Lacedæmonians to ſave thoſe worthy patriots, to " whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and independence."

The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedæmonians had a higher ſenſe of honour and gratitude than they really had, demand alſo to be heard.

In the *ſpeech* they make on this occaſion, " they firſt accuſe the " Platæans of ſlander and invective. They endeavour to palliate the " reproach on themſelves, for deſerting the cauſe of liberty and " joining *Speech of the Thebans.*

" joining the arms of Perſia. The Platæans had been active ever
" ſince to betray it to the Athenians; that wicked ſcheme, which
" with all their power the Thebans had ever oppoſed. By ſuch ini-
" quitous conduct the Platæans had extinguiſhed their former glory,
" had effaced all their former merits. No body was bound to redreſs
" or pity them, but their friends the Athenians. Their temper had
" been always bad; always bent on violence and miſchief; always
" addicted to ſet up tyranny in Greece, provided Athenians were the
" tyrants. They then endeavour to throw an *anti-pathetic* into
" their own repreſentations. They paint the death of their coun-
" trymen ſlain at the ſurpriſe of Platæa in a mournful light, as put
" to death contrary to every law, and murdered in the very act of
" ſtretching out their hands and pleading a promiſe of life. The
" lives therefore of ſuch butchers are forfeited to juſtice; and they
" inſiſt the forfeit ſhall be taken: The Lacedæmonians are bound in
" honour to take it. They beg them therefore to be deaf to vain
" complaints and intreaties, to revenge the injured, and to puniſh
" the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not what
" they have ſaid; to defy eloquence, and heed only ſimple unſo-
" phiſticated truth; by which alone men, who preſide in judgment,
" can ſatisfy their conſcience and their duty."

An alliance with Thebes is neceſſary in this war to the Lacedæmonians, and they purchaſe it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Platæans, *by all mankind abandoned*, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hundred; their wives are ſold for ſlaves; their city is rooted up from its foundations.

Thucydides ſoon after deſcribes the ſedition of Corcyra, the horrors of which are ſcarcely to be paralleled in ſtory. He paints all the dreadful conſequences of faction in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous, and innate love of liberty, when carried to exceſs, ſhould be the ſource of ſo much miſery to reaſonable creatures! Our author, contrary to his cuſtom, runs out here

here into many grave and judicious reflexions, in the intereſt of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the luſt of power, that throws embroilments and confuſions into all communities. In governments ſtrictly *republican*, the ambitious are eager to obtain more than an equal ſhare. In an *oligarchical* form, the few in power want ever to retain and often to enlarge their ſhare; and the cry of liberty is ſhouted loudeſt by thoſe who want moſt to overthrow it. But yet, was the matter ever mended, or the miſeries of mankind prevented by ſetting up a ſingle tyrant? Communities have ſuffered more, for the caprice, for the ſupport of the nominal glory of ſuch a *head*, than they have done by a number of popular ſeditions. The reader will certainly all along reflect on the fine model of government eſtabliſhed in his own country; and own, that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power of the *one* and of the *few* and of the *many* may be tempered into an apt and laſting conſiſtence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but unhurt by inteſtine faction, may laſt to the diſſolution of this great globe itſelf.

After this tragical buſineſs of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. The ſeeds of war are ſowing in that iſland, which will afterwards grow into a mighty harveſt. — He relates other incidents, 'till he comes to a remarkable ſcene of war in Ætolia, where Demoſthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated. — He deſcribes the purification of the iſle of Delos by the Athenians; and hath found the art to make it a chearful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath been engaged in ſo many ſcenes of horror and deſtruction, and is ſoon going to be engaged in more. — The battles of Olpe and Idomene are ſufficiently ſtored with ſlaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this hiſtory have been often thought not to be ſufficiently numerous. They make no havoc; they do not knock one another

another on the head faſt enough to preſerve attention. But theſe old Greeks were men and not brutes. And it is pity, that the hiſtory of men ſhould be ſo much a hiſtory of the deſtruction of the human ſpecies.

Book IV. In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, principals in the war, are matched directly againſt one another. Demoſthenes, a wiſe and brave commander, had ſeized and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed ſuch a garriſon in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound the very vitals of that *State*. The Lacedæmonians ſlight it at firſt, as if their bare appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land-armies and their ſquadrons are unable to diſlodge the enemy. It is with the true martial ſpirit of an experienced and gallant commander, that Demoſthenes harangues his ſmall body of Athenians, when he draws them up on the beach of the ſea, to beat off the ſhips of the enemy. Thucydides ſhines on theſe occaſions; in him the addreſſes are always made, and pertinently made, to the ſoldiers who are preſent; they intereſt and animate but never run out into declamation and common-place. — The turns of war at Pylus are ſudden, and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by ſea; nay, what is more, land-battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from off the ſhore. The eye will diſtinctly view theſe ſtrange occurrences; they are painted ſtrong; the groupes are not mere heaps of confuſion, and the principal figures are eminently diſtinguiſhed. The body of *Spartans* intercepted in the iſle of Sphacteria, who muſt either ſtarve, or what to Lacedæmonians is full as bad, muſt ſurrender their perſons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial community. Things had long ſince gone againſt them; but now, their hereditary honour and military glory, on which and which alone they piqued themſelves, are in danger of being miſerably tarniſhed. Their proud ſpirits condeſcend to beg a *truce*, that they may ſend an embaſſy to Athens to ſolicit an *accommodation*.

It

Speech of the Lacedæmonian *embaſſy.*

It muſt have afforded a high degree of ſpiteful joy at Athens, to find the Lacedæmonians lengthening their monoſyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to hear in what manner they ſolicit, when admitted to audience. They declare themſelves ſent, " in " behalf of their countrymen, to propoſe an *expedient* very much for " the honour of Athens, and which would extricate themſelves from " the difficulties that now bore hard upon them. Athens never had " ſo fine an opportunity of raiſing her credit, ſecuring her acquiſiti- " ons, and carrying her glory to the higheſt pitch. They ſhould not " be puffed up, but reflect on the ſtrange viciſſitude of human af- " fairs. Who could expect, the Lacedæmonians ſhould ever be ſunk " ſo low, as to ſue for peace? Yet what was the lot of Sparta " might poſſibly become, ſome time or other, the lot of Athens. " The latter ſhould be moderate now, ſhould accept of offered " friendſhip, ſhould chearfully receive a ſubmiſſion, made only to " prevent deſperation in great and gallant ſouls, and open a field for " mutual benevolence. The rival-States may now be reconciled; and " only now, before things are brought to extremities, and diſgrace " hath rendered one party deſperate. At this criſis, the Athenians " may confer on Greece the bleſſing of a firm and laſting peace, " and reap all the honour and advantage of it, ſince all the credit of " it will be their own. Lacedæmonians may be *obliged*, but will " not be *compelled*. At length, they propoſe their *expedient*, not ex- " plicitly but with a ſhrewd inſinuation, that would the Athenians " ſtrike up a bargain with them, they might jointly lord it over " Greece for the future, beyond control."

Had Pericles been now alive, we may eaſily gueſs, how readily he would have laid hold on this opportunity to end a burdenſome and diſtreſsful war, which on the ſide of Athens had at firſt been neceſſitated and merely defenſive. But ſucceſs had elevated Athens quite too high; and no real friend to the *State* had at preſent ſo much influence as Cleon, that loud and boiſterous demagogue. Hence it

comes, that ſuch terms are inſiſted upon as the Lacedæmonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires; and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important ſcene of contention at Pylus.

The author here interpoſeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then returns to Pylus. The *Spartans* in the iſle ſeem as far off a ſurrender as ever. The people of Athens murmur at the ſlowneſs of their troops, and begin to think that after all they ſhall not carry the point. Cleon amuſes them with lies, and exaſperates them by ſlanders. In ſhort, tho' quite undeſigning it, he bullies himſelf into the command; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demoſthenes at Pylus. The author deſcribes the event with ſo much ſtate and dignity, that he raiſes it into another Thermopylæ. *There* three hundred Spartans ſtopped for a long time the whole numerous army of Xerxes, and periſhed in the ſervice. About the ſame number of them ſtruggle *here* as long as they can againſt the troops of Athens; but, to the diſappointment of all Greece, they at laſt ſurrender priſoners of war, and are carried, nay are carried by Cleon, in triumph to Athens.

The territories of Corinth are invaded ſoon after by the Athenians under Nicias, the conſequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We are then recalled to view the laſt acts of the tragical ſedition at Corcyra, quite of a piece with, or rather in cruelty and horror tranſcending the preceding.

In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with ſucceſs. The conqueſt of the iſle of Cythera by Nicias is another ſad blow to the Lacedæmonians. They are quite diſpirited; and dare no longer face in the field theſe active and lively, and now more ſo becauſe ſucceſsful, enemies.

Our author repaſſeth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a ſquadron on that coaſt, on pretence of aiding the Egeſtéans, but in fact to excite a war and embroil the *States* of that iſland. Syracuſe, the leading *State*, perceived all their ſchemes, and endeavoured

to

to prevent them. They firſt obtain a ſuſpenſion of arms amongſt all the parties at war; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congreſs at Gela, for the amicable adjuſtment of all their quarrels and a perfect re-union againſt foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuſe, opens the true intereſt of Sicily on this occaſion. The warriors muſt now give place to the politician, who ſhews himſelf a maſter in the buſineſs.

Speech of Hermocrates.

" He is here (he tells them) as repreſentative of the greateſt of " the Sicilian *States*. As ſuch, he cannot ſpeak from puſillanimity " or a ſenſe of fear, tho' he declares himſelf averſe to war. It is " difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check ambition. " But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn; a prudence, " which points out the proper ſeaſon for every purſuit. It was ſe- " parate intereſt, that firſt kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but " ſeparate intereſts ſhould always be huſhed, when the general wel- " fare is at ſtake. The Athenians have been buſy amongſt them, to " inflame their mutual reſentments, to note their indiſcretions, and " turn them to their own advantage; that, when the Sicilians have " warred one another down, they may ſeize the whole iſland for " themſelves. The great paſſion of theſe Athenians is conqueſt; they " regard no ties of conſanguinity; they aim at acquiring vaſſals, no " matter who. He blames them not; he can never blame men, " who are deſirous of command; but he muſt blame ſuch as " are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians have " no ſtrength in Sicily, but in the diviſion of its *States*. Let thoſe " *States* but once re-unite, and the Athenians muſt get them gone; " and may depart with a face of ſucceſs, as if they had united whom " they really wanted to diſunite, and had effectually re-ſettled peace, " when their latent deſign was war." — He toucheth every topic in a ſuccinct but maſterly manner. He hath recourſe often to *figures*; renders his addreſſes emphatical, by making his own community ſpeak from his mouth. He applies the *firſt perſon* and the *ſingular*

number with great energy and weight. He uſeth thoſe *figures* in the the ſame manner as ſaint Paul does in the *Epiſtle* to the *Romans*. He preſſeth harmony and cordial re-union amongſt them in a manner beſt fitted to perſuade. The whole ſpeech, in a word, is a very intereſting and perſuaſive piece of oratory.

The conſequence is, a peace is ſettled in Sicily to general ſatisfaction; and the Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their ſquadron, to be puniſhed there for what they could not poſſibly prevent.

The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take their turn in being checked and vanquiſhed. Their attempt on Megara is related at large; and this piece of narration, is by far the moſt intricate of the kind to be met with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this ſtruggle for Megara, the fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Braſidas at laſt ſecures the city, and quite diſconcerts the main project of the Athenians. — The latter alſo had another great ſcheme in agitation for a total revolution in Bœotia. Arms and intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athens takes the field on this occaſion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous battle of Delium enſues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas the Theban is an excellent ſpeaker on this occaſion. The Bœotians are not repreſented in this hiſtory, as that groſs and ſtupid people, which was their character from the ſucceeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins alſo to harangue his troops, but is cut ſhort by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely deſcribed, and the diſpute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful blow, which will ſoon make them begin to accuſe their own judgments, in refuſing the accommodation lately offered from Sparta.

In

In other quarters alſo, the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. Braſidas, that active and accompliſhed Spartan, had now compleated a march, at the head of a ſmall army, through Theſſaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Perdiccas king of Macedonia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers; and whenever he harangues, he effectually perſuades. His ſpeech to the Acanthians, is ſtrong, pertinent, Laconic. He ſays all that can be ſaid in favour of his countrymen, in recommendation of the cauſe of liberty. There is that air of ſincerity and good-faith in it, which were conſtantly approved and verified by his perſonal deportment. The towns revolt to him as faſt as he hath opportunities to addreſs them. The reader will follow him with pleaſure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he wears his laurels deſervedly, and with peculiar grace.

In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the ſtage to ſtop the rapid conqueſts of Braſidas. The former had been laughed into a general, and is now grown ſo conceited that he wants to enter the liſts againſt that truly heroic Spartan. He accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a ſquadron and a fine body of land-forces. He retakes a town or two; is confident, he ſhall ſoon recover the important city of Amphipolis; and, tho' contemned by his own ſoldiers, he endeavours to brave the enemy. Braſidas, having harangued his men with his uſual ſpirit, throws open the gates, ſallies out of Amphipolis, and routs him in an inſtant. Cleon falls a victim to his own cowardice, and Braſidas alſo drops a victim to his own valour. The latter lives long enough to know his own ſide had conquered, and then expires, admired by all that knew him, and moſt highly regretted by the allies of his country. *Book* V.

Their riddance from Cleon diminiſhed the loſs of Athens in this defeat, and the Lacedæmonians had dearly purchaſed their victory with the loſs of their hero. As the principal *States* were now pretty nearly balanced,

balanced, and ſadly tired of the war, a truce is concluded for a year, and a peace ſoon after ſettled by the management chiefly of Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up *treaties*. They are curious morſels of antiquity, and the reader will ſee with admiration, how ſolemn, how conciſe, and yet how guarded they are. The peace turns out to be merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot reliſh it at all, ſet their invention to work in order to embroil Greece afreſh, and to re-kindle a general war. Several wars break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians are concerned as auxiliaries. And another *State* in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and ſaving its ſtrength entire, endeavours now to ſeize the primacy of Greece for itſelf. We ſhall be made privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and ſee it all blaſted by one battle at Mantinéa. This *State* was the republic of Argos in Peloponneſus, which had been in long alliance with but in no dependence at all upon Athens, and had been a long time alſo at peace with Sparta, by means of truces for thirty years. Young Alcibiades doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Mantinéa. Thucydides introduceth the battle with all the ſpirit and preciſion of Homer. The auxiliaries are marſhalled, and animated by ſuch exhortations, as are beſt ſuited to the peculiar circumſtances of each. The Spartans are exhibited at laſt in all their glory. Trained up for a camp and the day of battle, we ſhall view them in their diſcipline and actual exertion of their perſonal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader will judge, whether Thucydides did not love good ſoldiers, and take a pleaſure in doing them juſtice. It was the greateſt battle, which for many years had been fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occaſion, wiped off all the imputations that had lately been thrown on their bravery, becauſe they had not been always ſucceſsful: And the aſpiring *State* of Argos is compelled to acquieſce in her uſual rank, and ſtill leave the contention

contention for ſupremacy to the leading *States* of Athens and Sparta.

This Book affords but one incident more, of conſequence enough to be particularly diſtinguiſhed; and that is the conqueſt of the iſle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell out in the ſixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and incamped on that iſland, they ſummon the Melians to a *conference*, of which Thucydides hath drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and hath ſadly puzzled the critics, whether they ſhould praiſe or condemn it. But, is there any thing more unnatural in reciting what was ſaid at it, than in holding a *conference?* It is my buſineſs only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as they are avowed on this occaſion, ſince my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing could tempt him to make palliating repreſentations, or to ſuppreſs the truth.

Conference at Melos.

" The Athenians, on this occaſion, avow without a bluſh *that* prin-
" ciple on which conquerors and tyrants have always acted, and yet
" have been aſhamed to own: They are ever hunting for colourings
" and pretexts, and would fain give to greedy power a little of the air
" of equity: But here, without the leaſt ſhame or remorſe, the Athe-
" nians aſſert *their* right to inſlave another community, becauſe it ſuits
" their own intereſt, and becauſe they have power to do it. This is
" the principle from which they argue; and, how ſcandalous ſoever
" it be, they argue ſtrongly from it. They repreſent the politics of
" their own *State*, of the Lacedæmonian *State*, nay of all mankind,
" as incroaching, oppreſſive, rapacious, and totally eſtranged from
" humanity, good-faith, and the leaſt tincture of morality. The
" whole conference yields perhaps a juſt repreſentation of human
" nature in the groſs; but then, the repreſentation is diſtaſteful
" to a mind, that is cool and diſengaged. Such a mind muſt intereſt
" itſelf on the ſide of the Melians; and be ſorry, that the Athenians
" have not more equity and honour to qualify their power; or, that

the

" the Melians, with the regard they ſhew to honour and juſtice,
" ſhould not have had more power, or been able to intereſt at leaſt
" one ally in defence of their liberties and rights. In ſhort, through
" the whole courſe of this Hiſtory, the Athenians never make ſo
" ſcandalous a figure as on this occaſion."

Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a ſpacious theatre is opened for a renewal of the war. The ſcene is going to ſhift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have ſo bravely reſiſted all their enemies in Greece, are now going to do for thoſe enemies what they could not do themſelves. No patriot, no *ſtateſman*, no orator is able to diſſuade them from laviſhing their ſtrength on the projects of ſanguine ambition and foreign conqueſts. Their enemies, in the mean time, are at leiſure, to note their indiſcretions, and improve them all to their own advantage, 'till the great name of Athens is quite eclipſed, and an end is put to that empire of the ſea, which ſhe had maintained for ſeventy years with great luſtre and reputation.

The Sicilian war, which ſome critics * are inclined to think hath no connexion with the ſubject of Thucydides and to be mere digreſſion, whatever it may appear at firſt, the reader will at length be ſatisfied was an eſſential part of the Peloponneſian war, and haſtened its deciſion. But, ſuppoſing it remote from the principal ſubject, it muſt however be acknowledged, that it is the hiſtory of a war nobly related, well connected, very cloſely followed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and intereſt the paſſions. Thucydides in the courſe of it, which takes up the two following books, will diſplay the excellencies of the *poet* and the *painter* as well as of the *hiſtorian*. Let his merit be regulated from this portion of his work, it is preſumed that, without a negative, he will be allowed the *maſter* of Hiſtory.

He begins with deſcribing the theatre, on which two mighty *States* are going to enter the liſts. — The *geography* and *antiquities* of

* See Rapin's *Compariſon of* Thucydides *and* Livy.

Sicily

Sicily could not in their nature be very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the conciſeſt manner. — The ſoaring enterpriſing genius of Alcibiades hath formed a ſuperb plan for the aggrandizement of himſelf and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means of executing in ſo imperial a manner as the Monarch of Macedonia and Captain-General of Greece. He was able ſoon to convince the younger and more numerous part of the Athenian community, that the enterpriſe was moſt inviting, and carried with it ſuch a probability of ſucceſs as over-balanced all expence and hazard. It was long the ſubject of general converſation; it gradually inflamed the public ardor; and at length ingroſſed all their hopes and wiſhes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is formally propoſed and decreed in the aſſembly of the people. A ſecond aſſembly is convened on *ways* and *means*. On this occaſion a grand debate enſued, the managers of which are Nicias and Alcibiades.

Speech of Nicias.

Nicias declares himſelf " totally averſe to the expedition; but doth " it with that diffidence, which was a principal foible in his charac- " ter. The honour conferred upon himſelf, in his nomination to " the command, ſhall not ſuppreſs his real ſentiments. He is neither " fond, nor prodigal of his life: But he loves his country, and " would adviſe them to give up the expedition. —— He next runs " over the political *topics*, and ſhews it to be in every light an unde- " ſirable and ill-judged project. And then, without naming him, " ſtrikes at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any reſpect for " ſo important a command; he reflects with ſome ſeverity on his " life and behaviour; and, tho' owning himſelf afraid he ſhall be " out-voted, yet would fain have the queſtion put again, whether " the expedition ſhall proceed?"

Beſide all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked by the perſonalities that Nicias had thrown out againſt him. He had been a conſtant oppoſer of the latter, who was beloved

at Athens for his amiable qualities. For, tho' Nicias had not ſpirit enough to lead the people, yet he had influence enough oftentimes to check and reſtrain the aſpiring buſy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this occaſion ſtrongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades; and delivered with that life and grace, and pretty liſp for which he was remarkable, muſt have engaged all the attention of his hearers, and drawn their approbation perhaps in ſpite of their judgment.

Speech of Alcibiades.

" Cenſured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication " of himſelf. He maintains his right to the command. He hints " at the ſplendor of his birth, his public ſpirit, the generoſity of " his heart. He recites, with an haughty and exulting air, his vic- " tories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home, and his " capacity for political intrigue already and ſucceſsfully exerted. He " then juſtifies the wiſdom of the decree for the Sicilian expedition. " He ſhews all the political *topics* in a different light from Nicias. " He inſinuates the advice of the latter to proceed from indolence " and a deſire to ſow diſſenſions amongſt them. He exhorts to union, " and to the obſervation of *order*. So Athens roſe; ſo Athens may " yet be much higher exalted. The fire of youth, the temper of " the middle-aged, and the experience of the old ſhould ever duly " accord and act together. Sloth ruins a community; practice " enables it to go through every conflict, and to triumph over all " oppoſition."

Such an addreſs could not but affect, ſuch arguments could not but be perſuaſive with the people of Athens: The expedition muſt go forwards. But Nicias makes a ſecond effort, if poſſible, to divert them from it.

Second ſpeech of Nicias.

He begins with " a prayer for its ſucceſs; and a deſire, that the " preparations may be adequate to the ends propoſed. He ſtates the " nature, the power, and ſtrength of the people they are going to " invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of ne-

" ceſſary

" ceſſary articles for thoſe who invade them. He hopes to frighten
" and deter his audience by the vaſt expence, which he ſhews muſt
" neceſſarily be incurred on this occaſion. The Athenians muſt
" provide every thing themſelves, and truſt for nothing to the care
" and fidelity of Sicilian allies. The public welfare, and the ſafety
" of all, who are to be employed in this expedition, demand all
" manner of previous foreſight and care."

This ſpeech had a different effect to what Nicias deſigned. Inſtead of diſcouraging, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly, a decree was ſoon paſſed, inveſting himſelf and his collegues, who were Alcibiades and Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the ſervice.

All hands now were ſoon at work. The quotas from the dependents were demanded; the fleet was equipped and manned; the levies went on briſkly, ſince all men came into the ſervice with alacrity; and every thing was ſoon ready for the expedition.

At this juncture, ſome drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw Athens into conſternation. They were ſoon conſtrued by his enemies into a plot to bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly accuſed of being a party. He avowed his innocence, inſiſted on an immediate trial, which he was ſure would end in his juſtification. The plot, which in fact was a plot againſt Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him; and therefore, by a ſtrange prepoſterous ſtroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take his trial at his return.

Our author next deſcribes the departure of the grand armament in all its ſolemnity, and with all the medley of hopes and fears ſhewn by the whole people of Athens on this occaſion. He lays open to our view the very hearts of the ſpectators. The prime flower of their ſtrength, nay Athens itſelf is now ſailing out of the Piræus, never again to return. They make the beſt of their way to Corcyra, where

they are left for a time, that we may be made privy to the conſultations and defenſive meaſures of Sicily. The ſcene is now removed to Syracuſe, the moſt powerful State in that iſland, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior yet ſecond at this time to no other State in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been haraſſed by ſeditions, had often been plagued with tyrants, but was at preſent under a *democratic* conſtitution.

Advice had been received there of the intended invaſion. The *people* are convened about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermenting, juſtly exemplified. Some are incredulous; others magiſterially pronounce it all a falſhood. At length Hermocrates riſeth up, and gives them his own ſenſe of the affair.

Speech of Hermocrates.

He aſſures them, "his country is eminently indangered, and neither incredulity nor ridicule ſhall awe him into ſilence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians are already at ſea, fully bent on the conqueſt of Sicily. The Syracuſans ought to believe it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear will unite all Sicily againſt the invaders. Athens will only reap diſgrace, but Syracuſe abundant glory on this occaſion. Large armaments are ſeldom ſucceſsful; they moulder away for want of ſupplies, or are ruined for want of conduct. They ſhould therefore prepare for gallant reſiſtance, by getting every thing in readineſs at home, and ſtrengthening themſelves by foreign alliances. They ſhould do more; they ſhould at once put out to ſea, and diſpute their very paſſage with the enemy. A defeat, or even delay thus given them, might oblige them to give up the project. He ſupports his advice by many ſtrong and judicious arguments; and ends with warm exhortations to his countrymen to be lively and active, by no means to deſpiſe the enemy except in action, but vigorouſly and with all their foreſight to prepare for reſiſtance, ſince their enemies are undoubtedly at ſea, and only not arrived on their coaſts."

Such

Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuſe by Hermocrates. That community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, ſince this worthy patriot was regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the bluſtering demagogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence ſhews, that he regarded Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himſelf into employment. He ſeems more alarmed for the lucrative poſts of the State than for the welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good-ſenſe, but in a very impertinent and ſcurrilous manner. Such are the perſons, who ſtudy popularity more than duty, and ſacrifice all their talents to ambition or private lucre.

Speech of Athenagoras.

He affirms, that " none but cowards and traitors wiſh the Athe-
" nians might not invade them, and ſo infallibly meet their deſtruc-
" tion: But the whole account is a glaring falſhood, the forgery of
" a factious cabal. He appeals to his audience, whether it carries the
" leaſt probability with it. Athenians invade them! The Athenians
" eſteem themſelves happy they are not invaded by the Syracuſans.
" Yet, ſuppoſing them ſo mad, nothing but their own diſgrace and
" ruin can be the conſequence. But it is all a fiction; a ſcheme to
" diſhearten the friends of the *people*, and ſeize the government of
" the State. Some men have ever been, and ever will be dabling in
" ſuch vile machinations. But, let them not hope to eſcape de-
" tection. The intention is plain already, and ought to be puniſhed
" like open treaſon. He then exhorts the *people* or the *many* to
" ſupport their friends, and intirely to diſarm the malice of their
" domeſtic foes; and inveighs ſeverely againſt the *few*, or the party
" whom he ſuppoſeth to be bent on the overthrow of the *democracy*
" at Syracuſe."

This ſpeech of Athenagoras was ſo full of ill-timed choler and party-animoſity, that had the debate proceeded, diſſenſions might have run very high at a ſeaſon when unanimity was ſo needful in all the members of that community. A General of great eminence and

weight

weight thinks it high time to interpoſe; who, in a ſhort ſpeech, reprimands Athenagoras, recals the general attention to their own preſervation from the imminent danger, and adjourns the aſſembly.

The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to ſea from Corcyra. The Hiſtorian takes a review of the whole, and gives a ſhort account of its numbers and ſtrength. They arrive on the coaſt of Italy, where they are refuſed a reception. Every thing yields them a diſcouraging and gloomy aſpect. They ſoon find, they had been groſly deluded by their Sicilian friends, who inſtigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, which the Egeſtéans had put on their embaſſadors, is particularly recited. The commanders, at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at laſt come to no ſound reſolution. They hover about the coaſt of Sicily, and parade in ſight of Syracuſe. Alcibiades endeavours to perſuade the Catanéans to join with and receive them, but a mere accident accompliſhes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibiades came here to an end. One of the State-veſſels arrives, and ſummons him to Athens, to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, ever ſince the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confuſion and horror. A plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there muſt be, to ſet up a *tyrant*, that moſt odious ſound to Attic ears. Recollection of the diſmal things they had heard about the tyranny of the Piſiſtratidæ increaſed their fears, and drove them into furious and deſperate proceedings. Thucydides here digreſſeth to ſettle ſome facts relating to that ſet of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly, the affair of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, one of the moſt famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed from moſt other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to reſt the point upon his authority, great as it is; or, tho' no man ever traced out facts, or made his enquiries with more ſedateneſs and impartiality.

But

But to return to Alcibiades. He was obliged to quit the command, and he ſeemed quietly to ſubmit to the orders of the State. But, determined not to face his countrymen in their preſent mood nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were ſent for him the ſlip, and ſheltered himſelf in Peloponneſus. He became inſtantly a moſt violent and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing, except the parade of his own perſonal importance, and the gratification of his private caprice.

Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help of a ſtratagem, land at Syracuſe without oppoſition, and ſeize a ſtrong poſt for their incampment. The Syracuſans determine on a battle to diſlodge them. Both ſides form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a ſhort, but ſpirited and forcible, harangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactneſs, perſpicuity, and ardor of Homer. The Athenians had the better; yet not ſo deciſively, as to think proper to continue in their poſt, ſince they re-embark, and ſail back to Catana.

The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both ſides ſpend in negotiations for the acquiſition of allies. That at Camarina, where embaſſadors from both the warring parties are at the ſame time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. —— Hermocrates, in behalf of Syracuſe, makes the firſt addreſs. *Speech of Hermocrates.*

" It is maſterly, like
" all that Hermocrates performs. It is deſigned to convince the Ca-
" marinéans, how inſidious and how vile the ſchemes of the Athe-
" nians had ever been, and ſtill continue to be. He arraigns all their
" politics and all their conduct ſince the Perſian invaſion; and gives
" that artful turn to his remarks, which might well deter others
" from entering into any connexion or alliance with them. His
" ſtrokes are ſevere and cutting. He makes uſe of the *figures*, which
" give force and energy to diſcourſe. No perſon better underſtood
" the common welfare of Sicily; and no perſon could better explain

" it,

" it. He unfolds the politicai ſcheme at preſent in agitation; de-
" clares the conſequence in caſe the Athenians prevail, to alarm the
" concern of the Camarinéans for their country, and further to alarm
" their fears for themſelves. He even threatens them with a ſevere
" revenge, in caſe the Syracuſans, without their aid, get the better
" of the invaders." In ſhort, if the Camarinéans had been good Sicilians, his arguments muſt have prevailed.

Speech of Euphemus.

Euphemus, who is the mouth of the Athenian embaſſy on this occaſion, makes a bold and ſpirited defence for his country. " He at
" once briſkly attacks Hermocrates for the bitter imputations he had
" caſt upon Athens. He aſſerts her fair reputation, and juſtifies her
" ſeries of politics ever ſince the invaſion of Xerxes. Liberty had
" been the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athe-
" nians had guarded, had eſtabliſhed it in Greece; and were come
" to ſupport and ſecure it in Sicily. He throws back the charge of
" inſlaving projects on the Syracuſans, who now are eager to deprive
" the reſt of Sicily of their beſt defence, by raiſing diſtaſte towards
" the Athenians. He ſpares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely
" to affect. He proves a notable advocate for his Athens, pom-
" pouſly celebrates her paſſion and her care for liberty, and moſt in-
" geniouſly ſtrives to conceal her preſent ambition under a veil of
" moſt generous and diſintereſted principles."

The iſſue is, that the orators have juſt counterpoiſed one another's arguments, and the Camarinéans declare a neutrality.

The embaſſies from Syracuſe ſucceed much better in Peloponneſus. The Corinthians are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouſe up and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to be the beſt ſupport of whatever party he by times eſpouſed. It is the exiled Alcibiades, who pleads moſt effectually in their behalf at a grand conſultation at

Speech of Alcibiades.

Sparta. His ſpeech on this occaſion is a maſterpiece. " He inſi-
" nuates himſelf into the favour and confidence of men who had
" feared

" feared and hated him. Whilſt he is making his own perſonal " juſtification, he praiſeth and magnifieth himſelf. He betrays all " the ſchemes of Athens, diſcloſeth all her plan, points out her weak " and unguarded parts, directs towards them the attack of her foes; " and, full as he is of reſentment againſt and ſkilful to annoy her, " ſhe totters whilſt he ſpeaks." Syracuſe and Sparta are now to grow famous by the debaſement of this mighty and imperial Republic. Her glory hath reached its ſummit: It immediately will begin to ſink, and her laurels will fade away apace.

In the ſummer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians ſtand away from Catana, and land by night at Syracuſe. They inſtantly march, and ſeize Epipolæ, a ſtrong poſt that commanded the city. The Syracuſans fight, but without ſucceſs, to beat them from it. The ſiege now commenceth in form. It is clearly repreſented in the whole of its progreſs, in all its forms. Every ſkirmiſh is a diſtinct and lively picture. In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of courſe left ſingly in the whole command. He carries on the ſiege with vigor and ſucceſs for a ſhort ſpace of time; but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponneſian aids are now only not arrived.

" If you would read truly great things," ſaid a Spartan to *Book* VII. Auguſtus Cæſar, " read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this curſory ſurvey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no Hiſtorian ever executed ſo cloſely, ſo ſtrongly, ſo clearly and ſo pathetically, as Thucydides. " No fleet " but that of the Athenians," it is the obſervation of Cicero *, " was ever able to enter the harbour of Syracuſe. That fleet was " only able to atchieve it by the mighty force and number of three " hundred ſhips. But here firſt was the power of Athens defeated, " leſſened, depreſſed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the " glory of Athens are judged to have ſuffered a total wreck."

* Orat. quinta in Verrem.

Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermocrates and Gylippus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whoſe phlegm and natural diffidence are no match againſt ſuch vigilance and activity. The beſieging party ſoon becomes as it were the beſieged. The *Letter* of Nicias to the people of Athens repreſents all the difficulties, to which he finds himſelf reduced. No man ever wrote ſo preciſely and perſpicuouſly about military affairs. The reader of it wants no light, no dictionary of art, or an adept in war to explain the terms; and can judge, as could the meaneſt citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done. Secure in the conſciouſneſs of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his countrymen for the great foible in their behaviour, juſtifies his own conduct, and begs to be recalled. In ſhort, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epiſtle.

Letter of Nicias.

The Athenians are too high-ſpirited to recal their troops, and have too good an opinon of Nicias to diſmiſs him from the command. Tho' Attica was now invaded by the Peloponneſians and a fortreſs raiſed by them within ſight of Athens itſelf for their laſting annoyance, they ſend a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the command of Demoſthenes. They empty Athens of the reſidue of her ſtrength, ſo highly wanted for domeſtic ſupport. The Syracuſans, when adviſed of this reinforcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finiſh the war before it could arrive. They had had a career of ſucceſs againſt Nicias, had juſt beat him both by land and ſea, when Demoſthenes ſteered into the harbour of Syracuſe. The ſight cauſed a ſtrange alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehenſions in the contending parties. The Syracuſans again become the beſieged; and Demoſthenes is intent to put an end to the ſiege, if poſſible, by vigorous and daring meaſures.

His attempt to re-take Epipolæ is, in our author's deſcription of it, as fine a night-piece as can poſſibly be drawn, and no pencil could expreſs it ſtronger. The moon ſhines juſt bright enough, to

ſhew

ſhew us the Athenians gaining the aſcent, and to give a glimpſe of the approaches of the armies and their firſt ſtruggles with one another. The whole ſoon becomes gloomy confuſion and horrid tumult. What a medley of ſinging their pæans, of conflict, of flight, of purſuit! friends and countrymen routing one another, 'till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and periſh in the fall! The hope of the Athenians is blaſted: Syracuſe erects her trophies faſt.

Demoſthenes is now convinced, the moſt prudent ſtep they could take is to raiſe the ſiege, and Nicias at laſt complies. The very moment they are going to embark their troops, the moon is eclipſed. Who but muſt pity the weakneſs of Nicias at ſo dangerous a criſis? who but be ſorry indeed, that ſo good and amiable a man ſhould ſtop an army from a principle of ſuperſtition, and detain them for ſo long a time on a ſpot of ground, where nothing but ruin and deſtruction could befal them? Men ſo diſpirited can make but faint oppoſition againſt an always high-ſpirited and now ſucceſsful enemy. They ſoon loſe another battle, and the deciſive engagement is faſt approaching.

But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than hiſtoric ſpirit, emulates his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now warring againſt and in defence of Syracuſe. This catalogue is far from being a mere muſter-roll of names. It is full of ſuch ſtrokes as muſt imprint many uſeful and moral reflexions in the mind. His little incidental ſketches repreſent mankind in a true light, as Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the ſoil, and Thucydides the people.

The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The Athenians muſt fight their way out; or, burn all their ſhips and march off by land. It is determined to attempt the former; and the conſequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuſe. A more ſtriking, more aſtoniſhing battle-piece was never exhibited; and a maſterly pencil, tho' none but a maſterly one, might exactly

delineate it from this deſcription. The preſent temper of the combatants on both ſides is ſtrongly marked in the *harangues* before the engagement. Nicias then ſaid *all*, and the Athenians in action did their *beſt*; but all was unavailing. I ſhall ſay no more about it, ſince the reader hath nothing to do but turn his eye towards it, and diſtinctly view it through the whole of its proceſs, 'till the Syracuſans ſail in triumph to their city, and raiſe the moſt glorious of all their trophies.

The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raiſing of the ſiege, the mournful decampment, the good heart of Nicias ſympathiſing in all their diſtreſs, and endeavouring to chear a little their deſponding minds, their laborious marches whilſt the enemy is haraſſing them both in front and in rear and on all ſides, the ſurrender of the column under Demoſthenes, the carnage in the river Aſinarus of the troops under Nicias, his ſurrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miſeries of the captivated reſidue of once ſo flouriſhing and gallant an army, —— Theſe are the ſeveral incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the higheſt commendation to the Hiſtorian, when he hath read them through: He will have no leiſure 'till then to think of Thucydides.

Book VIII. The *cataſtrophe* hath now taken place in this hiſtory, and the reader is aſſured how all will end. The wings of this ſoaring republic of Athens are clipped, never to reach their full growth again: Yet, like an eagle in the ſame ſituation, ſhe will ſtruggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet repulſe her aſſailants, did ſhe not grow ſick at heart. Inteſtine faction will aſſiſt her enemies to finiſh her ruin, as a State *imperial* and *commercial*. A regular deduction of ſuch incidents as theſe is the ſubject of the Eighth and laſt Book of Thucydides. As a writer, he now performs in a more faint and leſs engaging manner, compared with what hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but juſt ſketched his pieces: But the drawings and ſketches will ſtill manifeſt the maſter's

maſter's hand. We will give them a curſory view: The reader will give them a more exact and deliberate peruſal.

He ſets out in his uſual grave and ſolemn manner, to deſcribe the people of Athens, diſpirited and diſtreſſed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the paſſions and emotions of the human nature take their train. They are incredulous; they are angry; they are convinced; and then, they deſpond; they pluck up their ſpirits again, and are reſolved to ſtand it out, nor abandon their own preſervation. They now caſt their thoughts towards every reſource, and prepare again for war with ſpirit and reſolution. All the reſt of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party; all are eagerly running in to ſhare the glory and the ſpoil. Their own dependents are meditating revolts, and ſome make them at once without pre-meditation. The Lacedæmonians, amidſt the many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the revolting States they ſhall firſt countenance and aſſiſt. Alcibiades is buſy at Sparta, adviſing proper meaſures, and guiding their counſels. Even the Perſian monarch, by his lieutenants, enters into league againſt them; and ſome of their fineſt iſlands are immediately rent aſunder from ſubjection to the Athenians.

The various turns of the war at Chios, and on the coaſt of Ionia, are diſtinctly but conciſely related, 'till Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his buſy intriguing genius. Suſpected at length and hated by the Lacedæmonians, he became again their enemy, and turned all his projects on accompliſhing his return to Athens, and ſaving his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now lying at Samos, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a neceſſary meaſure to bring about his recalment. It is the ſcheme of Alcibiades himſelf; but it is oppoſed, and diſconcerted by Phrynichus; by Phrynichus, who ſoon after turns out a violent enemy to the *democracy*, whilſt Alcibiades is active and zealous in its ſupport.

None but our author's pen could have ſo clearly unfolded that ſeries of caballings, that fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading members of the Athenian State amongſt themſelves, which brought on ſeditions amongſt the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The *democracy* is at length overturned; and an *oligarchy*, conſiſting of four hundred perſons, erected in its ſtead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was firſt laid, declare againſt the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican; and Thraſybulus alone manifeſts throughout a ſincere love and regard for his country. Parties newly formed are broke again into diviſions; and Athens was indebted to nothing but the indolence of the Lacedæmonians, that ſhe did not fall immediately into their hands, through the violence of her own inteſtine ſeditions. But the new adminiſtration proved of ſhort continuance; the *democracy*, tho' on a model ſomewhat varied, is again eſtabliſhed; and Athens thus obtains a reſpite.

Full of matter as this part of the hiſtory is, Thucydides hath kept his narration clear and unembarraſſed. But then, it is a ſimple unadorned narration, and never received the finiſhing hand. There are ſcattered occaſionally throughout it ſome ſhort accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their ſentiments at important junctures. They ſeem to have been memorials, laid down as the ground-work, for regular and full orations. The reader will be ſorry the author was hindered, by what accidents can only be gueſſed, from drawing out ſome of them at leaſt into full proportion; particularly *that* of the *deputation* from the army at Samos to Athens, in which "the people are perſuaded to part with their darling *democracy*;" of Thraſybulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the *democracy*, in which "he muſt pathetically have expatiated on "the revolt of Athens from liberty and her choiceſt patriots, who "might now form another Athens at Samos, and preſerve her empire, tho' they had loſt the city;" *that* of Alcibiades further, when

on

on his recalment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where " he deplores the malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability " yet to ſerve his country, and again ſhines in the character of an " able ſtateſman, a ſubtle politician, and a zealous patriot."

Upon the whole. One point more muſt be particularly diſtinguiſhed in honour of the Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedæmonians are ſtrongly contraſted through the whole courſe of this Hiſtory, and highly to the credit of the former. Their ſpirits riſe with difficulties, and patriotiſm ſtarts out of mutiny and faction. The Lacedæmonians are indolent in ſucceſs, and ſhew neither alacrity nor addreſs in promoting that cauſe of liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this deſtructive war. They ſeem at laſt more intent on pocketing the *royal* ſubſidies, than doing their duty as leaders and champions of Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at ſea. The laſt view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-ſema, where they receive a ſignal defeat from thoſe very men, whoſe ruin they judged was well nigh compleated. When Athens is totally to be vanquiſhed, as her doom is faſt approaching, ſhe muſt aid her own conquerors and tyrants, in demoliſhing her own trophies, and trampling under foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accompliſh, what without them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human muſt decay. The beſt-conſtituted State in the world may be undermined by its own members, when they could not be conquered, and at length be rendered an eaſy prey to foreign powers. May GREAT-BRITAIN prove an exception to this affecting but juſt obſervation!

THE

ANCIENT GREECE.

SCYTHIANS
GETES
PART OF THE EUXINE SEA
Ister R.
Haemus Mounts
TRIBALLIANS
Hebrus R.
Rhodope
Mosunis
Machærephori
KINGDOM of the ODRYSIANS
PART OF PONTUS and PROVINCE of DASCYLIS
PROPONTIS
BITHYNIA
Byzantium
Chalcedon
Perinthus
Abdera
Ænus
Thasus or Thalassia I.
Samothrace I.
Imbrus I.
Lemnus Isle
Tenedus I.
Cynosema pr.
Ilæus
Sigæum pr.
Rhœteum
Sigæum
Larissa
Colonæ
Hamaxitus
Lectus pr.
Lampsacus
Parium
Priapus
Abydus
Dardanum
Grynicus R.
Aesopus R.
Scamander R.
Rhundacus R.
Antandrus
Adramittium
TROAS
ÆOLIA
Cuscus
Thuatira
Hermus R.
Sardes
Pitane
Cyme
Phocæa
Polichna
Smyrna
Caystrus R.
Philadelphia
Laodicea
Meander R.
Sandius Hills
Ephesus
Miletus
CARIA
Iasius
Halicarnassus
Caspidna
Patara
Sume Isle
Rhodes
Lindus
Rhodes Isle
Phaselis
Aspendus
Chios Isle
Andrus Isl.
Samos I.
Teños I.
Mycone I.
Delos I.
Rhenæa I.
Icarus I.
Scyros I.
Scyros Isl.
Seriphus I.
Syphnus I.
Parus I.
Naxus Isl.
Melos I.
Amorgus I.
Astypalea I.
Anaphe I.
Thera I.
Carpathus Isle
ISLE OF CRETE
Cythera Isle
Preparethus I.
Lesbus Isle
Ægæan SEA
THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ILLYRIANS
IONIAN SEA
AGRIANIANS
DROANS
TILATÆANS
TRERIANS
PÆONIANS
ODOMANTIANS
THRACE
Haliacmon R.
Axius R.
Strymon R.
Nestus R.
Strymon
Pangæus M.
Mæandrus
Bisaltæ
Edonians
Mygdonia
Bolbe
Sparlolus
Promontorium
Pierian Gulf
Gulf of Torone
Gulf of Contessa
Gulf of Thermæ
Gulf of Argos
Gulf of Laconia
Gulf of Messenia
Gulf of Ambracia
Cyclades
Sporades
MACEDONIA
ALMOPIA
LYNCESTIANS
EORDIANS
ELYMIOTIS
ORESTIS
TAULANTIANS
Epidamnus or Dyrrachium
Apollonia
Aous R.
Europus
Therme
Apollonia
Amphipolis
Argilus
Acanthus
Stagirus
Pieria
Olynthus
Scholus
Arnæa
Mecyberna
CHALCIDICA
Sane
Potidæa
Palleneum
Aphytis
Acte
Sermylia
Galepsus
Sanaus
Athos M.
Thyssus
Dium
Pydna
Beroea
Magnesia
Pineus R.
Lucus
Pharsalus
Pharsalia
Pheræ
Melitia
PHTHIOTIS
PERRHÆBIANS
GYRTONIANS
ANTITANIANS
PERRHÆBI
GYRTONIA
THESSALY
PAGASÆ
Hestiæa
Artemisium
Cenæum pro.
Ædepsa
Orobiæ
Oreus
Ægæ
Plains of Lelantius
Chalcis
Eretria
EUBŒA
BŒOTIA
Cenæum
Copæ Lake
Thebes
Tanagra
Delium
Oropus
Marathon
Rhamnus
Brauron
Prasiæ
Sunium
ATTICA
Eleusis
Plains of Thria
Decelea
Athens
Phalerus
Halimus
Salamis I.
GULF OF SARONE
Ægina I.
Cia I.
Troezen
Hermione
Epidaurus
Methone
Polyægus I.
Thera I.
Seriphus I.
Syphnus I.
Parus I.
Naxus Isl.
Melos I.
Amorgus I.
Astypalea I.
Anaphe I.
Thera I.
Phlocandros I.
Sicinus I.
Cimolus I.
Malea pro
Cythera
Aphrodisia
Lacedæmon or Sparta
Amyclæ
Helos
Gythium
Leuctra
Acone
Ithome
Messene
Pylus
Rhium
Rhium Moreæ
Methone
Corone
Abia
Thuria
Æthæa
Thalamæ
Scotitis
Lepreum
Parrhasium
Caphyæ
Scirite
Thiorum
Tegea
Bucolion
Orestheum
Anchisia
Cynuria
Orchomenus
Mantinea
Argos
Nemea
Cleonæ
Phlius
Sicyon
Corinth
Cenchreæ
Isthmus
Crommyon
Megara
Pagæ
Eleusis
Plains of Thria
Decelea
Athens
Phalerus
Halimus
Salamis I.
Aegina I.
Cia I.
Troezen
Hermione
Epidaurus
Methone
Polyægus I.
Thera I.
Seriphus I.
Syphnus I.
Parus I.
Naxus Isl.
Melos I.
Amorgus I.
Astypalea I.
Anaphe I.
Thera I.
Phlocandros I.
Sicinus I.
Cimolus I.
Malea pro
Cythera
Aphrodisia
Lacedæmon or Sparta
Amyclæ
Helos
Gythium
Leuctra
Acone
Ithome
Messene
Pylus
Rhium
Rhium Moreæ
Methone
Corone
Abia
Thuria
Æthæa
Thalamæ
Scotitis
Lepreum
Parrhasium
Caphyæ
Scirite
Thiorum
Tegea
Bucolion
Orestheum
Anchisia
Cynuria
Orchomenus
Mantinea
Argos
Nemea
Cleonæ
Phlius
Sicyon
Corinth
Cenchreæ
Isthmus
Crommyon
Megara
Pagæ
Ithaca
Isle of Cephalenia
Zacynthus Isle
Echinades
Leucas
Corcyra Isle
Gulf of Ambracia
Ambracia
Actium
Nicopolis
Anactorium
Argos Amphilochicum
Ophioneis
Stratus
Thermum
Thermopylæ
Lamia
Callium
Heraclea
Trachinians
Œtæans
Dorians
Locrians Epicnemidii
Locrians Ozolæ
Ætolia
Acarnania
Agræi
Molossians
Thesprotians
Paravæans
Dolopians
Chaonians
Cestrine
Aous R.
Apsus Synus
Pindus M.
Oeta M.
Othrys M.
Pelion M.
Ossa M.
Olympus M.
Cambunian M.
Cambunian Mountains
Acheron R.
Acheron Lake
Cocytus R.
Styx
Thesprotis
Molossis
Epirus
Illyrians
Ionian Sea
Peloponnesus
Elis
Arcadia
Achaia
Messenia
Laconia
Isle of Cythera
Isle of Cerigo
Isle of Carpathus
Isle of Rhodes
Isle of Lesbos
Isle of Scyros
Isle of Samothrace
Isle of Thasos
Isle of Lemnos
Isle of Tenedos
Isle of Andros
Isle of Chios
Isle of Samos
Isle of Icaria
Isle of Naxos
Isle of Paros
Isle of Seriphos
Isle of Melos
Isle of Amorgos
Isle of Astypalea
Isle of Anaphe
Isle of Thera
Isle of Crete
Isle of Cythera
Isle of Cerigo
Isle of Carpathus
Isle of Rhodes
Isle of Lesbos
Isle of Scyros
Isle of Samothrace
Isle of Thasos
Isle of Lemnos
Isle of Tenedos
Isle of Andros
Isle of Chios
Isle of Samos
Isle of Icaria
Isle of Naxos
Isle of Paros
Isle of Seriphos
Isle of Melos
Isle of Amorgos
Isle of Astypalea
Isle of Anaphe
Isle of Thera

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE FIRST.

CONTENTS.

Introduction, containing the Author's reaſons for writing this Hiſtory, upon a review of the affairs of Greece from the earlieſt times.— The true reaſon of the Peloponneſian War was a jealouſy of the Athenian power. Thoſe pretended were, I. *The affair of Epidamnus, which is opened at large;* II. *The revolt of Potidæa, the circumſtances of which are exactly related. Conſultations held at Sparta by the members of the Lacedæmonian League, where at length War is decreed, but the rupture protracted for a year. The Lacedæmonians act from a dread of the growing power of Athens. A Digreſſion ſhewing how that power aroſe, which gives the Author an opportunity to relate the hiſtory of fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes, and the breaking out of this War. Embaſſies accuſing and recriminating are ſent to and fro, in the account of which are interwove the ſtories of Cylon, Pauſanias, and Themiſtocles. The Lacedæmonians ſend a final demand to Athens; and the Athenians, at the perſuaſion of Pericles, return a reſolute anſwer, upon which all negotiations are ended, and an open rupture enſueth.*



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK I.

THUCYDIDES an Athenian hath compiled the hiſtory of the war between the Peloponneſians and the Athenians, as managed by each of the contending Parties. He began to write upon its firſt breaking out, from an expectation that it would prove important and the moſt deſerving regard of any that had ever happened. He grounded his conjecture on the earneſtneſs of both the flouriſhing parties to make all neceſſary preparations for it: and he ſaw, that all the reſt of Greece was engaged on one ſide or the other; ſome joining immediately, and others intending ſoon to do it. For this was the greateſt commotion that ever happened amongſt the Grecians; ſince in it ſome Barbarians and, it may be ſaid, the greateſt part of mankind were concerned. The actions of an earlier date, *Introduction.*

and thoſe ſtill more ancient, cannot poſſibly through length of time be adequately known; yet, from all the lights which a ſearch into the remoteſt times hath afforded me, I cannot think they were of any great importance, either in regard to the wars themſelves, or any other conſiderations.

State of old Greece.

It is certain, that the region now known by the name of Greece was not formerly poſſeſſed by any fixed inhabitants, but was ſubject to frequent tranſmigrations, as conſtantly every diſtinct people eaſily yielded up their ſeats to the violence of a larger ſupervening number. For, as commerce there was none, and mutual fear prevented intercourſe both by ſea and land, as then the only view of culture was to earn a penurious ſubſiſtence, and ſuperfluous wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was not their employment it being uncertain how ſoon an invader might come and diſlodge them from their unfortified habitations, and as they thought they might every where find their daily neceſſary ſupport, they heſitated but little about ſhifting their ſeats: And for this reaſon they never flouriſhed in the greatneſs of their cities or any other circumſtance of power. But the richeſt tracts of country ever were more particularly liable to this frequent change of inhabitants, ſuch as that which is now called Theſſaly, and Bœotia, and Peloponneſus moſtly except Arcadia, and in general every the moſt fertile part of Greece. For, the natural wealth of their ſoil increaſing the power of ſome amongſt them, that power raiſed civil diſſenſions which ended in their ruin, and at the ſame time expoſed them more to foreign attacks. It was only the barrenneſs of the ſoil, that preſerved Attica through the longeſt ſpace of time, quiet and undiſturbed, in one uninterrupted ſeries of poſſeſſors. One, and not the leaſt convincing, proof of this is, that other parts of Greece, becauſe of the fluctuating condition of the inhabitants, could by no means in their growth keep pace with Attica. The moſt powerful of thoſe, who were driven from the other parts of Greece by war or ſedition, betook themſelves to the Athenians for ſecure refuge, and

as

as they obtained the privileges of citizens [1], have conſtantly from remoteſt time continued to enlarge that city with freſh acceſſions of inhabitants, inſomuch that at laſt, Attica being inſufficient to ſupport the numbers, they ſent over colonies into Ionia.

Low before the war of Troy.

There is another, and to me a moſt convincing, proof of the weakneſs of the Ancients. —— Before the affairs of Troy, it doth not appear that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one common undertaking; nor had the whole country that *one* general appellation; nor indeed did the ſame ſubſiſt at all before the time of Hellen the ſon of Deucalion; the ſeveral nations taking their diſtinguiſhing names from their own ſelves, and Pelaſgicum being *that* of the greateſt tract. But when Hellen and his ſons had acquired power in * Pthiotis, and led out their dependants by way of aid to other cities, converſation made the uſe of *this* name become much more frequent among the ſeveral people, tho it was long before it ſo prevailed as to become the general appellation of them all. For this Homer is my principal authority, who, tho born a long time after the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned them all in *this* general ſtile, but hath appropriated it to thoſe who came with Achilles from Pthiotis and were the firſt that bore *this* name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems Danäans and Argives and Achæans are their diſtinguiſhing titles. Nor hath he farther once mentioned the *Barbarians*, for this plain reaſon in my opinion, becauſe *Grecians* were not yet diſtinguiſhed by *this* one comprehenſive name in contra-diſtinction to *that* other. Theſe Grecians therefore whatever, whether ſo apart in

* *Southern part of* Theſſaly.

[1] They were admitted to the ſame privileges with free-born native *Athenians*. But this was practiſed only in the infancy and early growth of that ſtate. It was, afterwards, an honour very ſeldom and with difficulty granted. Thoſe who came from other places to ſettle at *Athens* are diſtinguiſhed from πολῖται citizens, by the name of μετοῖκοι ſojourners, who had taken up their reſidence and co-habited with them. They performed ſeveral duties as ſubjects to the ſtate which gave them protection, but never became *Athenians*, or citizens of *Athens* in the emphatical ſenſe of thoſe terms.--The *Engliſh* reader will pleaſe to remember this, as the diſtinction often occurs in the ſequel of the hiſtory.

their

their different cities, or united by mutual converſe, or at length comprehended in *one* general name, for want of ſtrength and correſpondence, never acted together in joint-confederacy before the war of Troy: Nor was it, till the uſe of the ſea had opened free communication amongſt them, that they engaged together in that expedition.

Minos. For Minos is the earlieſt perſon, whom we know from tradition to have been maſter of a navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the ſea which is called the Grecian. To him were the iſles of the Cyclades ſubject; nay, moſt of them he planted himſelf with colonies, having expelled the Carians and ſubſtituted his own ſons in the different commands. And then of courſe he exerted his utmoſt power to clear that ſea of pirates, for the more ſecure conveyance of his own tributes.

Piracy. The Grecians formerly, as well as thoſe Barbarians who tho ſeated on the continent lived upon the coaſt, and all the iſlanders, when once they had learned the method of paſſing to and fro in their veſſels, ſoon took up the buſineſs of piracy under the command of perſons of the greateſt ability amongſt them, for the ſake of enriching ſuch adventurers and ſubſiſting their poor. They landed and plundered by ſurprize unfortified places and ſcattered villages, and from hence they principally gained a ſubſiſtence. This was by no means at that time an employment of reproach, but was rather an inſtrument of glory. Some people of the continent are even to this day a proof of *this*, who ſtill attribute honour to ſuch exploits if [2] genteelly performed: So alſo are the ancient poets, in whom thoſe that ſail along the coaſts are every where equally accoſted with this queſtion *Whether they are pirates?* as if, neither they to whom the queſtion is put would diſown their employment, nor they who are deſirous to be informed

2 "With due reſpect, with humanity", as the Scholiaſt explains it. For then they never made booty of or carried away by ſtealth the labouring cattle: They never made their attacks by night, nor committed any murder.

informed would reproach them with it. The people of the continent alſo exerciſed robberies upon one another. And to this very day many people of Greece are ſupported by the ſame practices; for inſtance, the Ozolian Locrians, and Ætolians, and Acarnanians, and their neighbours on the continent: And the cuſtom of wearing their weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, is ſtill retained amongſt them.

The cuſtom of wearing weapons once prevailed all over Greece, as their houſes had no manner of defence, as travelling was full of hazard, and their whole lives were paſſed in armour, like Barbarians. A proof of *this* is the continuance ſtill in ſome parts of Greece of thoſe manners, which were once with uniformity general to all. The Athenians were the firſt, who diſcontinued the cuſtom of wearing their ſwords, and who paſſed from the diſſolute life into more polite and elegant manners. And it is not a long time, ſince thoſe amongſt the rich, who were advanced in years and ſtudied their eaſe, left off wearing their linen garments and faſtening the hair of their head in a knot behind with [3] graſhoppers of gold; tho the aged amongſt the Ionians have conſtantly perſevered in the uſe of theſe ornaments as marks of their affinity. That modeſt uniformity of dreſs, which is ſtill in vogue, was firſt introduced by the Lacedæmonians; amongſt whom in other points alſo there was the greateſt equality of dreſs and diet obſerved, both in the higheſt and the meaneſt ranks. They alſo were the firſt who performed their exerciſes naked, ſtripping themſelves in public and anointing with oil before they entered the liſts; tho, before, the cuſtom had prevailed at the Olympic games for the champions to wear ſcarfs about their loins; and it is only a few years ſince theſe were quite [4] diſuſed. But even yet, amongſt ſome Barbarians, more eſpecially thoſe of Aſia, where the matches

3 To intimate their being the original poſſeſſors and pure natives of the ſoil, as much as the very graſhoppers, which they ſuppoſed to be a natural and ſpontaneous production of the earth. They regarded themſelves as cotemporary with the inſects.

4 See Mr. *Weſt*'s Diſſertation on the Olympic Games, *p.* 50.

of boxing and wreſtling are in repute, the combatants engage with ſcarfs round their loins. Many other arguments might with eaſe be alledged, to prove that ancient Greece had forms and modes of living quite ſimilar to thoſe of the preſent Barbarian world.

As for cities, ſo many as are of a later foundation and better placed for the increaſe of wealth ſince the improvement of naval skill; all theſe have been built on the ſea-ſhore and walled about, and are ſituated upon necks of land jutting out into the ſea, for the ſake of traffic and greater ſecurity from the inſults of neighbouring people. But thoſe of an earlier date, having been more ſubject to piratical depredations, are ſituated at a great diſtance from the ſea, not only on iſlands but alſo upon the main. For even thoſe who lived upon the coaſt, tho' inexpert at ſea, were uſed to make excurſions up into the country, for the ſake of plunder: And ſuch inland ſettlements are diſcernible to this very day.

But the people of the iſlands, that is the Carians and the Phœnicians, were by much the moſt expert at theſe piratical adventures: For by them the greateſt part of the iſles was inhabited. *This* is proved from the expiation ſolemnized at Delos in the courſe of this war; on which occaſion, all the ſepulchres of the dead in that iſland being broke open, more than half of the number appeared to be Carians, known to be *ſuch* from the weapons found in their graves and a particularity of interment [5] ſtill uſed amongſt them. It was not till after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a communication was opened at ſea. For by him the miſchievous Banditti were ejected from the iſlands, and many colonies of his own planted there in their ſted. And from this period it was, that the maritime people, grown more intent on the acquiſition of wealth, became alſo more

5 The Carians firſt invented the boſs of ſhields and the creſt of helmets. In remembrance of this, a ſmall ſhield and a creſt were always buried with them: By this means were the Carians known. The Phœnicians were diſtinguiſhed by the manner of their interment: For, whereas other Nations laid the faces of their dead towards the eaſt, the Phœnicians reverſed the poſture and laid them to the weſt. *Scholiaſt.*

fond

fond of ſettled habitations: and ſuch of them, as then ſurpaſſed in wealth, ſtrengthened their ſettlements by walling them about. And this their paſſion for gain continuing to increaſe, the poorer hired out their ſervices to thoſe who had affluence; and the great, who had all needful ſupplies at hand, reduced leſs powerful cities into their own ſubjection. And their power by theſe methods gradually advancing, they were enabled in proceſs of time to undertake the Trojan expedition.

Review of the expedition againſt Troy.

It is farther my opinion, that the aſſemblage of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing ſo much to the attendance of the ſuitors of Helen in purſuance of the oaths they had ſworn to Tyndarus, as to his own ſuperior power. It is related by thoſe, who received from their anceſtors the moſt certain memorials of the Peloponneſian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there from Aſia with abundance of wealth, ſoon gained ſo great an influence over thoſe needy people that, tho' a foreigner, he had the honour to have the country called after his own name; and, that the power thus gained by him was ſucceſſively enlarged by his poſterity. Euryſtheus indeed, whoſe mother was the ſiſter of Atreus, periſhed in Attica by means of the Heraclidæ; and Euryſtheus, when he departed on that expedition, left the government of Mycenæ and his kingdom, becauſe of his affinity, in the care of Atreus who then reſided with him, having fled from his father upon the murder of Chryſippus. When therefore the return of Euryſtheus was prevented by death, and the Myceneans from a dread of the Heraclidæ were well inclined to Atreus, as a perſon of great abilities and deep in the affections of the people, he eaſily obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ and all the territories which had belonged to Euryſtheus; and from hence the family of Pelops quite overpowered the family of Perſeus. To theſe enlargements of power Agamemnon ſucceeding, and being alſo ſuperior to the reſt of his countrymen in naval ſtrength, he was enabled in my opinion to form that expedition more from awe than favour. It is plain, that he

equipped out the largeſt number of ſhips himſelf, beſides thoſe he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my witneſs here, if his teſtimony have any force; who hath farther at the delivery of the ſceptre ſtiled him,

" Of many iſles and of all Argos king."

And a king who lived upon the continent could not poſſibly be lord of iſlands, except ſuch as were adjacent, the number of which muſt needs be ſmall, unleſs he had a competent ſtrength at ſea: But, from this armament we have good light afforded to gueſs at the preceding.

What though Mycenæ was a ſmall city, or though any place at that time remarkable appear at preſent inconſiderable to us; yet, no one ought on theſe motives prematurely to imagine that armament to have been leſs conſiderable than it is deſcribed by the poets and reported by tradition. Suppoſing the city of Lacedæmon to be now in a ruinated condition, nothing left but the temples and the pavements of the maſs, I fancy, in proceſs of time, poſterity could not eaſily be induced to believe that their power had ever been proportioned to their glory. Of the [6] five diviſions of Peloponneſus they are actually poſſeſſed of two, have the command of the whole, and of many confederate ſtates *without*; yet, as the city is neither cloſely built, as the temples and public edifices are by no means ſumptuous, and the houſes detached from one another after the old mode of Greece, it would ſuffer diſparagement from ſuch a view. If we farther ſuppoſe the Athenians in the ſame reverſe of fortune, from the view the city then would afford, it might be gueſſed that once it had double the ſtrength which it really hath. We ought not therefore to be incredulous, nor ſo much to regard the appearances of cities as their power; and of courſe to conclude, the armament

6 Theſe were Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Meſſenia and Elis. The Lacedemonians were poſſeſſed of Laconia and Meſſenia. *Scholiaſt.*

againſt

againſt Troy to have been greater than ever was known before, but inferior to thoſe of our age. And whatever credit be given to the poetry of Homer in this reſpect, who no doubt as a poet hath ſet it off with all poſſible enlargement, yet even according to his account, it appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to conſiſt of twelve hundred ſhips; thoſe of the Bœotians carrying each one hundred and twenty Men, thoſe of Philoctetes fifty; pointing out, as I imagine, the largeſt and the ſmalleſt rates; for of the rate of other ſhips he hath not made the leaſt mention in his *catalogue*, tho' he hath expreſly informed us that every perſon of the crews belonging to the ſhips of Philoctetes were both mariners and ſoldiers, ſince he hath made all who plyed at the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not probable that any ſhips carried ſupernumeraries, excepting kings or perſons in command, eſpecially as their point was a mere tranſportation with all the neceſſary habiliments of war, and as their ſhips were not decked, but built entirely in the faſhion of the old piratical cruizers. If therefore a *mean* be taken between the largeſt and ſmalleſt rates, the number of the whole will turn out [7] of ſmall account for quotas ſent in general from the whole of Greece. The reaſon of this was not ſo much a ſcarcity of men as want of money. They adjuſted the number of men to the ſlender ſtore of proviſions they already had, and the probability of procuring a competent ſubſiſtence in the courſe of the war. On their firſt landing they got the better in fight; the proof is, that they could not otherwiſe have fortified their camp with a wall. Neither doth it appear that they exerted all their ſtrength at once, numbers being detached for ſupplies of proviſions, to till the Cherſoneſus, and to forage at large. Thus divided as they were, the Trojans were better able to make a ten years reſiſtance, being equal in force to thoſe who were at any time left to carry on the ſiege.

7 Thucydides makes it of ſmall account, in regard to the war which is his ſubject. But the number of men employed in the expedition againſt Troy was 102000. For the mean between 120 and 50 is 85, and 85 × by 1200=102000.

For had the ſtores of proviſion at the firſt landing been ample enough for the whole number of men they brought, and had they been able to proſecute the war free from the avocations of foraging and tillage, their ſuperiority in the field muſt have given them an eaſy and expeditious conqueſt. But in fact they did not ply the work with all their number, but only with a part conſtantly reſerved for the purpoſe: Had they formed the ſiege with their whole force, in leſs time and with leſs difficulty they muſt have taken Troy. Through want of Money it was, that expeditions *prior* to this, and even *this* the moſt celebrated of all that ever happened, are plainly found to have been leſs in reality than they are in fame or current eſtimation at preſent through poetical aſſiſtance.

State of Greece conſequent to it.

Nor did the proſperous event of the Trojan expedition put an end to the unſettled and fluctuating ſtate of Greece, or ſecure that tranquillity ſo neceſſary to advancement. The return of the Grecians from Ilium after ſo long an abſence, gave riſe to many innovations. Seditions were excited in almoſt every city; and thoſe, who were forced to withdraw, built cities for themſelves in other places. The preſent Bœotians, for inſtance, being driven out of Arne by the Theſſalians, ſixty years after the taking of Troy, planted themſelves in the country *now* called Bœotia, tho' *before* that time Cadmëis: But a body of them had already ſeated themſelves there, of whom were thoſe who went in the expedition againſt Troy: And eighty years after it, the Dorians with the Heraclidæ took poſſeſſion of Peloponneſus. It was not without much ado and length of time, that Greece quiet and ſettled at home had opportunity to ſend colonies abroad. Then the Athenians planted Ionia and moſt of the iſlands; the Peloponneſians the greateſt part of Italy and Sicily, and even ſome colonies in the different tracts of Greece. But all theſe tranſactions are of a later date than the Trojan war.

When it began to thrive.

But when once the ſtate of Greece was grown more robuſt, and increaſe of wealth became their ſtudy more than ever before, as the public

public revenues grew apace, in many places *tyrannies* ſtarted up: For before this kingdoms were hereditary and with limited authority. Now Greece throughout was employed in building navies, and became addicted to naval affairs with unuſual application. The Corinthians are ſaid to have been the firſt, who by varying the make of their ſhips, brought them to that model which is now in uſe, and Corinth to be the firſt place of Greece where [8] *triremes* were built. It is a known fact, that Aminocles a ſhip-carpenter from Corinth built four ſhips for the Samians: Now, from the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the concluſion of the *war* which is now my ſubject, there paſſed at moſt but three hundred years. The oldeſt ſea-fight we know any thing of, was that of the Corinthians againſt the Corcyreans: But the diſtance between *that* and the ſame period is not more than two hundred and ſixty. For the city of the Corinthians, being ſeated on the iſthmus, hath ever been a place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both within and without Peloponneſus, more accuſtomed to land than ſea, could have no traffic with one another without paſſing through *their* territory. *They* were alſo remarkable for wealth, as clearly appeareth from the ancient poets, who have given that city the epithet of *rich*. And, when once navigation was practiſed in Greece, they loſt no time in their own equipments; they cleared the ſea of pirates; and, opening their town as a public mart both by land and ſea, made Corinth powerful by the increaſe of its revenue. The Ionians had no naval force till a long time after this, in the reign of Cyrus firſt king of the Perſians and his ſon Cambyſes: And, waging war with Cyrus, they were for a time maſters of the ſea which lieth upon their own coaſts. Polycrates alſo, who was

Aminocles.

The eldeſt ſea-fight.

Corinth.

8 The triremes were the ſhips of war, of the galley kind, and take their name from the three banks of oars with which they were furniſhed. They were alſo maſted and carried ſails; but they generally lowered the ſails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, or to run down upon the enemy with more force and ſteddineſs. See Potter's Archæologia, vol. ii. c. 14.

tyrant

tyrant of Samos in the reign of Cambyſes, having a powerful navy ſubdued many of the iſlands, and among the reſt Rhenea, which as ſoon as conquered he conſecrated to Delian Apollo. The Phocéans alſo, when planting their colony at Marſeilles, had a ſucceſsful engagement at ſea againſt the Carthaginians.

Naval affairs. Theſe were the moſt remarkable equipments of a naval force; and theſe, tho' beyond conteſt many generations later than the war of Troy, had a very ſmall number of triremes, but conſiſted chiefly of veſſels of fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. And it was but a little while before the Median war and the death of Darius who ſucceeded Cambyſes in the kingdom of Perſia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyréans became maſters of any conſiderable number of triremes. For theſe laſt were the only inſtances of a naval ſtrength in Greece, before the invaſion of it by Xerxes, that deſerve particular mention. The veſſels of the Æginetæ, of the Athenians, and ſome [redacted] were few in number and moſt of them but of fifty oars. It [redacted] till later times, when the Athenians had war with the Æginetæ and alſo expected the approach of Xerxes, that at the perſuaſion of Themiſtocles they built thoſe *ſhips* with which they fought ſucceſsfully againſt the *Barbarian*; and even *theſe* were not yet compleatly decked over.

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, both of an earlier and later date. And the *ſtates* to which they belonged gained by them conſiderable ſtrength, through an increaſe of their revenue and the enlargement of their dominions. Embarkations grown more frequent, eſpecially to thoſe who were pent up in a narrow ſoil, occaſioned the reduction of the iſles: But for a *land war*, and in conſequence of *that*, an acceſſion of power, *none* ſuch was at that time known. All conflicts of that ſort, which ever happened, were diſputes of boundary between contiguous ſtates. The Grecians had not yet lanched forth into diſtant expéditions, nor aimed ambitiouſly at foreign conqueſts. There were no dependent cities, which furniſhed

furniſhed quotas at the will of others who gave them law; nor did thoſe who were upon equality concur in any joint undertaking; each petty *ſtate* took up arms occaſionally in its own defence againſt the incroachments of its neighbours. At moſt, the greateſt diviſion of Greece that ever happened was in the old rupture between the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when leagues were formed in favour of both.

By theſe means was the growth of many ſtates prevented, and Ionians.
that of the Ionians by a different cauſe —— the great and ſurprizing growth of the Perſian power. For Cyrus, after he had compleated the conqueſt of Crœſus and all the country which lieth between the river Halys and the ſea, invaded them and inſlaved their towns upon the continent: And Darius afterwards, victorious by the ſtrength of a Phœnician fleet, did the ſame by the iſlands.

As for thoſe tyrants, who had any where uſurped the government *Tyrants.*
of Grecian cities, — their whole application being confined to their own private concerns, to the guard of thei[redacted]s or aggrandizement of their families — they reſided in their own cities ſo far as was conſiſtent with their own ſecurity. Nothing worthy of remembrance was atchieved by them, unleſs we take into account the frequent broils between them and their neighbours: Not but that the tyrants in Sicily had advanced their power to a great height. But Greece in general was *thus* withheld for a long courſe of time from performing any remarkable exploit, by the ſtrength of her united or the adventurous efforts of her ſeparate *ſtates*.

But, after that the tyrants of Athens, and all the tyrants of other Athenians.
parts of Greece, generally and of old ſubject to theſe violent incroachments, notwithſtanding their number and the freſh vigour of * the laſt, were all (except thoſe of Sicily) demoliſhed by the * *The Piſiſtratidæ.*
Lacedæmonians: —— For Lacedæmon, ever ſince it came into the hands of the Dorians, in whoſe poſſeſſion it ſtill continueth, tho' haraſſed with ſeditions the longeſt of any place we know, yet hath

ever

ever been happy in a well-regulated government, and hath always been exempt from tyrants: For, reckoning to the concluſion of this preſent war, it is ſomewhat more than four hundred years that the Lacedæmonians have enjoyed the ſame polity: On this baſis was their power at home founded, and this enabled them to exert it in regulating other *ſtates*. —— But, after that the tyrants were by them extirpated from Greece, not many years intervened, before the battle of Marathon was fought by the Medes againſt the Athenians: And in the tenth year after that, the *Barbarian* (Xerxes) again with a vaſt armament invaded Greece in order to inſlave it. Hanging then on the very brink of ruin, the Lacedæmonians, on account of their preeminent power, took the command of all the Greeks combined together in their own defence; whilſt the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, having already determined to abandon their city and laid in their neceſſary ſtores, went on board their ſhips, and made head againſt *him* by ſea. Having thus by their common efforts repulſed th[illegible]*barian*, the Grecians, not only thoſe who revolted from *the king* but thoſe alſo who had combined together againſt him, were ſoon after divided among themſelves, ſiding either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedæmonian league: For the maſtery appeared plainly to be in their hands, ſince *theſe* were the moſt powerful by land and *thoſe* by ſea. The agreement between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians was but of ſhort continuance; variance enſued; and they entered the liſts of war one againſt another, each with the additional ſtrength of their own reſpective allies: And hence, if any other Grecians quarrelled, they went over in parties to theſe as their *principals*. Inſomuch that from the invaſion of the Medes quite down to the breaking out of this war, one while ſtriking up truces, another while at open war either with one another or the confederates revolting from either league, they had provided themſelves with all military ſtores, and much improved their skill by conſtant practice exerciſed in dangers.

As

As for the Lacedæmonians, they gave law to their confederates without the heavy impoſition of tributes. Their ſtudy was only to keep them well-affected to themſelves, by introducing the *oligarchy* among them. But the Athenians lorded it over theirs, having got in courſe of time the ſhips of all thoſe who might oppoſe them into their own hands excepting the Chians and the Leſbians, and impoſed on them a certain payment of tribute. And their own particular preparations for the preſent war were more ample than former times had known, even during the greateſt vigour of their *ſtate* and the moſt perfect harmony between them and their allies. Lacedæmonians.

Such are the diſcoveries I have made concerning the ancient ſtate of Greece; which, tho' drawn from a regular ſeries of proofs, will not eaſily be credited: For it is the cuſtom of mankind, nay even where their own country is concerned, to acquieſce with ready credulity in the traditions of former ages, without ſubjecting them to the teſt of ſedate examination. Thus, for inſtance, it is yet a received opinion amongſt the bulk of the Athenian People, that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and therefore ſlain by Harmodius and Ariſtogiton; and they have not yet diſcovered, that Hippias then governed by virtue of his being the eldeſt of the ſons of Piſiſtratus, and that Hipparchus and Theſſalus were his brothers. Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, on the very day appointed and juſt at the criſis, ſuſpecting that information had been given to Hippias by ſome who were privy to the deſign, made no attempt upon *him* as put already on his guard. Yet willing, before they were apprehended, to ſhew their reſolution and contempt of danger, they accidentally found Hipparchus at the Leocorium ſuperintending the [9] Panathenaical proceſſion, and immediately *Ignorance and credulity of men.*

9 This proceſſion was made at the great Panathenæa, which feſtival was celebrated once in five years in commemoration of the union of all the people of Attica by Theſeus. The leſſer Panathenæa was celebrated every third year, ſome ſay every year, and was lengthned out by public games. Theſe were alſo uſed at the great Panathenæa, in which the greateſt ſplendor and magnificence were employed, and the proceſſion added

diately ſlew him. There are many other things of a more recent date and of memory not yet invalidated by time, about which the other Grecians are very wrong in their notions; ſuch as, that the Lacedæmonian kings had each of them a double and not a ſingle vote in public queſtions; and, that amongſt them the Pittanate was a military band, which *never yet exiſted*. So eaſy a taſk to numbers is the ſearch of truth; ſo eager are they to catch at whatever lieth next at hand!

The true account.

But, from the teſtimonies alledged in ſupport of what I have hitherto advanced, any one may depend on my account of things, without danger of falſe opinions. Let him withhold his credit from the ſongs of poets, whoſe profeſſion it is to give all poſſible enlargements to their ſubjects: Let him do ſo farther, by [1] the writers of proſe, who ſtudy more that artful compoſition which captivateth the ear than the plain and ſimple recital of truth, where proper atteſtations are never to be found, and many things through length of time have incredibly ſallied out into mere fable; and then he will be convinced upon the plaineſt proofs, that the ſtate of ancient Greece was very nearly the ſame as I have deſcribed it. And this preſent war, when conſidered in all its operations, notwithſtanding the propenſity of mankind to imagine that war in which they are perſonally engaged, to be the greateſt that ever happened, and ſo ſoon as it is over to replace their admiration upon others more ancient, will eaſily be owned to have been the moſt important of all.

Speeches.

As to the *ſpeeches* of particular perſons either at the commencement or in the proſecution of the war, whether ſuch as I heard myſelf or ſuch as were repeated to me by others, I will not pretend to

ided, here mentioned by Thucydides, ...t of which the curious reader may ſee ...icular account in Potter's Archæolo..., vol. i. p. 421.

1 Thucydides is here ſuppoſed to glance at Herodotus; and again a little after he juſtly thinks, that *fiction* and *fable* ought to have no place in hiſtory.

recite

recite them in all their exactneſs. It hath been my method to conſider principally what might be pertinently ſaid upon every occaſion to the points in debate, and to keep as near as poſſible to what would paſs for genuine by univerſal conſent. And as for the *actions* performed in the courſe of this war, I have not preſumed to deſcribe them from caſual narratives or my own conjectures, but either from certainty, where I myſelf was a ſpectator, or from the moſt exact informations I have been able to collect from others. This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, becauſe even ſuch as were preſent at thoſe actions diſagreed in their accounts about them, according as affection to either ſide or memory prevailed. *Facts.*

My relation, becauſe quite clear of *fable*, may prove leſs delightful to the ears. But it will afford ſufficient ſcope to thoſe who love a ſincere account of paſt tranſactions, of ſuch as in the ordinary viciſſitude of human affairs may fully occur, at leaſt be reſembled again. I give it to the public as an EVERLASTING POSSESSION, and not as a contentious inſtrument of temporary applauſe. *The work itſelf.*

Of former tranſactions, the greateſt was that againſt the Medes, which however by two engagements at ſea and as many at land, was brought to a ſpeedy concluſion. But the continuance of this war ran out into a much greater length; and Greece in the courſe of it was plunged into ſuch calamities, as were never known before in an equal ſpace. Never had ſo many cities been made deſolate by victories, ſome by *Barbarians* and ſome by the violence of inteſtine feuds; to ſay nothing of thoſe where captivity made room for new poſſeſſors: Never ſo many inſtances of baniſhment; never ſo many ſcenes of ſlaughter either in battles or ſeditions. Such calamities farther, as were known only by report but had rarely been felt in fact, now gained credit from experience: Earthquakes, for inſtance, which affected the largeſt part of the habitable globe and ſhook it with the utmoſt violence: Eclipſes of the ſun, which happened more frequently than former times had remembred: Great droughts in ſome *Importance of the war.*

places, the conſequence of which was famine: And, what made not the leaſt ravage but did its ſhare of deſtruction, the noiſome peſtilence. For all theſe things enſued in the ſequel of this war, which was carried on between the Athenians and Peloponneſians, after breaking the thirty years truce concluded between them upon the reduction of Eubœa.

Reaſons of it. The reaſons for which this truce was broke, and their *courſe* of variance, I have in the *firſt* place thought proper to write, that none may be at a loſs about the origin of ſo momentous a war among the Grecians. *The real one.* The growth of the Athenian power I conceive to have been the trueſt occaſion of it, tho' never openly avowed: The jealouſy ſtruck by it into the Lacedæmonians made the conteſt neceſſary. *The pretended.* But the pretences, publicly alledged on either ſide for breaking the truce and declaring open war, ſhall now be related.

I. *The affair of* Epidamnus. EPIDAMNUS is a city on the right hand as you ſail into the Ionian gulph: Adjoining to it live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. The Corcyréans ſettled a colony *here*, the leader of which was Phalius the ſon of Heratoclides, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of Hercules, invited to the office out of the mother-city according to the cuſtom of ancient times: and beſide this, ſome Corinthians and others of Doric deſcent joined themſelves to this colony. In proceſs of time, the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous. Yet, having been afterwards harraſſed with ſeditions of many years continuance, they were brought very low (according to report) by a war waged againſt them by the neighbouring Barbarians, and were deprived of the greateſt ſhare of their power. But the moſt recent event at Epidamnus before the preſent war was, that the *people* there had driven the *noble* out of the city. Theſe ſheltering themſelves amongſt the Barbarians began depredations on thoſe who remained behind, both by land and ſea. The

Epidamnians

Epidamnians of the place, ſuffering vaſtly from theſe depredations, diſpatched ambaſſadors to Corcyra as their mother-city, beſeeching them, " Not to behold their deſtruction with eyes unconcerned, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to deliver them from this Barbarian war." The ambaſſadors, ſitting down ſubmiſſively in the temple of Juno, offered theſe ſupplications. But the Corcyréans, refuſing to receive them, ſent them home again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus convinced that no redreſs could be had from Corcyra and ignorant how to proceed in their preſent perplexities, ſent to Delphos to enquire of the God, " Whether they ſhould ſurrender their city to the Corinthians as their founders, and ſhould ſeek ſecurity from their protection?" He anſwered, that " they ſhould ſurrender, and take *them* for their leaders." The Epidamnians, in purſuance of this oracle, arriving at Corinth, make there a tender of the colony; repreſenting that " the leader of it had been of Corinth," and communicating the oracle; and farther intreated them " not to look on with eyes of unconcern till their deſtruction was compleated, but to undertake their redreſs." The Corinthians granted them their protection from a regard to juſtice, imagining themſelves to be no leſs intereſted in this colony than the Corcyréans. But they were alſo actuated by an hatred of the Corcyréans, from whom, tho' a colony of their own, they had received ſome contemptuous treatment: For they neither payed them the uſual honour on their public ſolemnities, nor began with a Corinthian in the diſtribution of the ſacrifices, which is always done by other colonies. This their contempt was founded as well on the ſufficiency of their own wealth, in which at that time they equalled the richeſt of the Greeks, as on the ſuperiority of their military force. Their inſolence became greater in time with the enlargement of their navy, and they aſſumed glory to themſelves in a naval character as ſucceeding the Phæacians in the poſſeſſion of Corcyra. This was their chief incentive to furniſh themſelves with a naval ſtrength, and in it they were by no means incon-

inconſiderable: For they were maſters of an hundred and twenty triremes, when they began this war. Upon all theſe reaſons the reſentments of the Corinthians riſing high againſt them, they undertook with pleaſure the relief of Epidamnus; encouraging all who were ſo diſpoſed, to go and ſettle *there*, and ſending thither a garriſon of Ambraciots and Leucadians and their own people. Theſe marched by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyréans, leſt they ſhould have hindered their paſſage had they attempted it by ſea.

As ſoon as the Corcyréans heard, that the new inhabitants and garriſon were got to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered into the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot with indignation: And putting out immediately with twenty-five ſhips which were ſoon followed by another equipment, they command them "at their peril to receive their exiles;"—For thoſe who had been driven out of Epidamnus had already been at Corcyra, where pointing to the ſepulchres and claiming the rights of conſanguinity they had intreated them to undertake their reſtoration:—"and to ſend away the garriſon and new inhabitants which they had received from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite deaf to theſe haughty commands. And upon this, the Corcyréans with a ſquadron of forty ſhips, accompanied by the exiles whom they pretended to reſtore and an aid of Illyrians, began hoſtilities. Having blocked up the city, they made proclamation, "That all Epidamnians who were willing and the ſtrangers might depart without moleſtation, or otherwiſe they ſhould be treated as enemies." But this having no effect, the Corcyréans beſet the place, which is ſituated upon an iſthmus, on all ſides, in regular ſiege.

Epidamnus *beſieged by the* Corcyréans.

The Corinthians, upon the arrival of meſſengers from Epidamnus with an account of the ſiege, draw their forces together. They alſo gave public notice, "That a new colony was going to Epidamnus, into which all that would enter ſhould have equal and like privileges with

with their predeceſſors; that, if any one was unwilling to ſet out immediately, and yet chuſe to have the benefit of the colony, he might depoſit fifty Corinthian Drachmas, and be excuſed his perſonal attendance." The number of thoſe who entered for immediate tranſportation, and of thoſe who depoſited their money, was large. They ſent farther to the Megaréans, requeſting a number of ſhips to enlarge their convoy, that their paſſage might not be obſtructed by the Corcyréans, from whom they received a ſupply of eight, and four more from Pale of the Cephallenians. The ſame requeſt was made to the Epidaurians, who ſent five. A ſingle ſhip joined them from Hermione; two from Trœzene; ten from the Leucadians; and eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans and Phliaſians they requeſted money; of the Eléans, empty ſhips and money. And the number of ſhips fitted out by themſelves amounted to thirty, and three thouſand *heavy-armed.*

When the Corcyréans were informed of theſe preparations, they went to Corinth, purpoſely accompanied by ambaſſadors from Lacedæmon and Sicyon. There they charged the Corinthians "to fetch away their garriſon and new ſettlement from Epidamnus, as having no manner of pretenſions *there:* That, if they had any thing to alledge to the contrary, they were willing to ſubmit to a fair trial in Peloponneſus before ſuch *ſtates* as both ſides ſhould approve; and to which-ever party the colony ſhould be adjudged, by them it ſhould be held." They alſo intimated "their readineſs to refer the point in diſpute to the oracle at Delphos; —— war, in their own inclinations, they were quite againſt: But if it muſt be ſo, on their ſides (they ſaid) mere neceſſity would preſcribe the meaſure; and if thus compelled to do it, they ſhould for aſſiſtance have recourſe to friends not eligible indeed, but better able to ſerve them than ſuch as they already had." The Corinthians anſwered, That "if they would withdraw their fleet and their Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an accommodation: But, till this was done, their honour would

would not ſuffer them to ſubmit to a reference, whilſt their friends were undergoing the miſeries of a ſiege." The Corcyréans replied, that " if *they* would recal their people from Epidamnus, themſelves alſo would do the like; but were ready further to agree, that both parties ſhould remain in their preſent ſituation, under a ſuſpenſion of arms, till the affair could be judicially determined."

The Corinthians were not only deaf to every propoſal, but ſo ſoon as ever they had manned their ſhips and their allies were come up, diſpatching a herald beforehand to declare war againſt the Corcyréans, and then weighing anchor with a force of ſeventy-five ſhips and two thouſand *heavy-armed*, they ſtretched away for Epidamnus to make head againſt the Corcyréans. The commanders of this fleet were Ariſteus the ſon of Pellicas, Callicrates the ſon of Callias, and Timanor the ſon of Timanthes: Thoſe of the land-forces were Archetimus the ſon of Eurytimus, and Iſarchidas the ſon of Iſarchus.

Fight at ſea between Corcyréans *and* Corinthians.

When they were come up as far as Actium in the diſtrict of Anactorium, where ſtandeth the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the gulph of Ambracia, they were met by a herald diſpatched expreſly in a row-boat by the Corcyréans, forbidding them " at their peril to proceed." But at the ſame time the Corcyréans were buſied at home in manning their own ſhips, repairing ſuch as were old to make them fit for ſervice, and equipping the reſt with the utmoſt expedition. When the herald brought back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and their ſquadron was now compleated to eighty ſhips (for they had forty employed in the ſiege of Epidamnus) they ſailed in queſt of the enemy, and drawing up againſt them came to an engagement. The victory fell beyond diſpute to the ſide of the Corcyréans, and fifteen ſhips of the Corinthians were utterly deſtroyed.

Surrender of Epidamnus.

Their good fortune was ſuch, that on the very ſame day Epidamnus was ſurrendered to the beſiegers upon a capitulation, by which " all

" all the ſtrangers in the place were to be ſold for ſlaves, but the " Corinthians to be detained priſoners at diſcretion."

After the engagement at ſea, the Corcyréans having erected a trophy [2] upon Leucimna a promontory of Corcyra, put to death all the priſoners they had taken, except the Corinthian, whom they kept in chains. And after this, as the Corinthians and allies having been vanquiſhed in fight were forced to retire within their own harbours, they were quite maſters of all the adjacent ſea; and, ſailing firſt to Leucas a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its territory waſte; and then burnt Cyllene a dock of the Eléans, becauſe they had ſupplied the Corinthians with ſhips and money. In this manner they continued maſters of the ſea a long time after their naval victory, and in their cruiſes very much annoyed the allies of the Corinthians. It was not 'till the beginning of the ſummer, that a check was given them by a fleet and land-army, who were commiſſioned, in order to relieve their harraſſed allies, to ſtation themſelves at Actium and round the Chimerium of Theſprotis. There they lay, to cover Leucas and other places which were in friendſhip with them from the ravage of the enemy. The Corcyréans, upon this, with a naval and land-force ſtationed themſelves over-againſt them at Leucimna. But, neither party venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet in

2 This was conſtantly done by the Grecians upon a victory. Nay, when the victory was claimed on both ſides, both ſides erected trophies, of which ſeveral inſtances occur in Thucydides. The trophies for a victory at land were decked out with the arms they had taken: Thoſe for a victory at ſea, with arms alſo and the ſhatters of the enemy's ſhips. " To demoliſh a " trophy was looked on as unlawful, and a " kind of ſacrilege, becauſe they were all " conſecrated to ſome deity: Nor was it leſs " a crime to pay divine adoration before " them, or to repair them when decayed, " as may be likewiſe obſerved of the Ro- " man triumphal arches: This being the " means to revive the memory of forgot- " ten quarrels, and engage poſterity to re- " venge the diſgrace of their anceſtors: " For the ſame reaſon, thoſe Grecians, " who firſt introduced the cuſtom of erect- " ing pillars for trophies, incurred a ſevere " cenſure from the ages they lived in." *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 12.

their oppoſite ſtations the whole ſummer; and, on the approach of winter, both ſides withdrew to their reſpective homes.

Embaſſies to Athens.

During the remainder of the year after the engagement at ſea and all the following, the Corinthians, whoſe indignation was raiſed in this their war againſt the Corcyréans, were building new ſhips, and ſparing neither labour nor coſt to get a ſtrong armament ready for ſea, and ſent throughout Peloponneſus and the other parts of Greece to hire mariners into their ſervice. The Corcyréans, hearing of theſe great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and with reaſon: For at that time they were in no alliance with any of the Grecians, nor comprehended either in the Athenian or Lacedæmonian league. And hence, they thought it quite expedient to go and ſue for the alliance of the Athenians, and endeavour to obtain ſome ſuccour from them. The Corinthians, gaining intelligence of their deſign, diſpatched an embaſſy at the ſame time alſo to Athens *inſtructed* by any means to prevent the junction of the Athenian to the naval ſtrength of the Corcyréans, which might hinder them from bringing this war to a ſucceſsful iſſue. The Athenians being met in [3] general aſſembly, both

3 The ἐκκλησία or aſſembly of the people. In this the ſovereignty was veſted: and it is proper the *Engliſh* reader ſhould grow acquainted with this particular form in the Athenian democracy.

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which preſided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courſes, and each tribe preſided about five weeks. The tribe in courſe elected fifty perſons to manage by their authority and in their name: Theſe were called *Prytanes*. This being too large a number for buſineſs, they were ſub-divided into tens, each of theſe diviſions preſiding for a week: and theſe were called *Proëdri*. One of the *Proëdri* preſided or was in the chair for a day, and was ſtiled *Epiſtates*. For that day, and he never enjoyed this preeminence a ſecond time in his life, he was inveſted with the higheſt truſt in the government. He kept the public ſeal and the keys of the citadel and treaſury. In the aſſembly of the people he ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the queſtion, and declared the majority.

The aſſemblies of the people were of two kinds, *ordinary* and *extraordinary*. Of the firſt kind, four were regularly held during each preſidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambaſſadors from foreign ſtates had public audience. The latter were occaſionally convened by the *preſidents* in courſe or by the *generals* of the ſtate. Some

both embaſſies roſe up to plead their own cauſe; and the Corcyréan ſpoke as followeth.

Speech of the Corcyrean embaſſy.

" IT is quite proper, Athenians, that thoſe who addreſs themſelves to a neighbouring power imploring their ſuccour, which is now our caſe, without being able to plead the merit of prior good-ſervices or an old alliance in their own behalf, ſhould previouſly convince them, *chiefly*, that a compliance with ſuch requeſts muſt turn to their advantage; at *leaſt*, that it will cauſe no manner of inconvenience; and *then*, that the favour will be returned with effectual gratitude. If they are unable to give ſatisfactory conviction in any of theſe particulars, they can have no reaſon to be angry if their ſuit be rejected. The Corcyréans, confident that they can clear up theſe points beyond the reach of ſcruple, have ſent us hither to requeſt your alliance.

" The method, indeed, which hitherto we have fondly obſerved, hath proved in fact abſurd towards you in this our exigency, and prejudicial to our own affairs in our preſent ſituation. In preceding times, we never choſe to grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come to ſue for alliance from others, being through our own maxims quite deſtitute of friends in this our war againſt the

Some days before-hand, notice was publicly given by the ſenate or council of five hundred upon what ſubjects they were to deliberate; but this could not be obſerved upon ſudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning, generally in the Pnyx, at the ſummons of the public *crier*. At the ſecond ſummons they were obliged to attend at their peril. For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a rope ſtretched acroſs and rubbed over with vermilion, and all upon whom a mark was found were fined; but thoſe who attended early and regularly, received half a drachma each for attendance. The number which attended generally amounted to five or ſix thouſand.

The aſſembly opened with the ſacrifice of a young pig to Ceres, and the blood was ſprinkled round by way of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud by the *crier* for the proſperity of the commonwealth of Athens; which ended, a curſe was next pronounced on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of his country. Then, the preſidents of the week opened the points upon which they were convened, and the aſſembly proceeded to buſineſs.

" Corinthians: and *that* which before appeared the conduct of re-
" fined prudence, to keep clear of danger by ſhunning the intangle-
" ments of a foreign alliance, we now find by the event to have been
" both impolitic and weak.

" Once already we have engaged the Corinthians at ſea, and re-
" pulſed them merely by our own ſtrength. But, ſince with a
" greater force collected from Peloponneſus and the reſt of Greece
" they are again preparing to attack us; ſince we perceive ourſelves
" unable to reſiſt them merely with our own domeſtic ſtrength;
" ſince further with our ſubjection the danger will ſpread abroad;
" we are neceſſitated to apply to you and every where elſe for ſuc-
" cour; and, tho' now emboldened to act in oppoſition to our for-
" mer inactive maxims, yet we deſerve your pardon, as they were
" not the reſult of bad deſigns, but of miſtaken judgments: and,
" could we but obtain redreſs from you, this incidental neceſſity
" of ours, will turn out highly to your honour, upon ſeveral
" accounts.

" In the firſt place, you will favour thoſe with your aſſiſtance,
" who have felt but never committed injuſtice. In the next place,
" by protecting thoſe whoſe lives and liberties are at ſtake, you will
" confer ſo vaſt an obligation that the memory of it can never be
" aboliſhed. We are now maſters of the greateſt naval force except
" your own. Conſider therefore how fair an occaſion very ſeldom
" to be met with, of the greateſt advantage to yourſelves, of the
" greateſt vexation to your enemies, now lieth before you; when
" that very power, the acceſſion of which you would readily have
" purchaſed with ample ſums of money and a weight of obligation,
" cometh here to invite your acceptance and make a tender of itſelf
" without any danger or expence to you; nay, what is more, ena-
" bling you to gain the praiſe of the world, the grateful acknow-
" ledgments of thoſe you defend, and an increaſe of power to your-
" ſelves. Few people, in preceding ages, have ever had at any one

" time

" time ſo many fine opportunities within their reach. And few
" there are, who, ſuing for alliance, do it not rather from a view
" of receiving than conferring ſecurity and reputation by their
" ſuit.

" If there be any one amongſt you, who imagineth *that* war will
" never happen in which we may do you ſervice, in ſuch imagina-
" tion he is quite miſtaken. He doth not penetrate the deſigns of
" the Lacedæmonians, who alarmed at your power are intent on
" war; nor thoſe of the Corinthians, who, powerful of themſelves
" and your enemies, have begun with us to open the way for attack-
" ing you; that, united by common reſentments, we might not
" ſtand up in our mutual defence againſt their violence: nor they
" be diſappointed at leaſt in one of their views, either effectually to
" humble us, or ſecurely to eſtabliſh their own power. It is your
" intereſt to prevent them by accepting that alliance which we offer,
" and rather to anticipate their deſigns than counterplot them when
" ripening into act.

" If farther, they tax with a breach of juſtice your preſuming to in-
" terfere with their colonies; let them learn, that every colony, whilſt
" uſed in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard to its mo-
" ther-ſtate, but, when treated with injury and violence, is become
" an alien. They are not ſent out to be the ſlaves, but to be the
" equals of thoſe who remain behind. *Their* violence and injuſtice
" require no proofs. For, invited by us to ſubmit the buſineſs of
" Epidamnus to a judicial trial, they choſe rather to proſecute their
" claims at war than at equity. And let ſuch behaviour towards *us*
" their relations put *you* timely on your guard, that you may not be
" over-reached by their colluſions, nor heſitate one moment to
" grant our petitions. For he, who findeth the leaſt room to repent
" of having gratified his enemies, is moſt likely to perſevere in un-
" interrupted ſecurity.

" You

" You will not break your treaty with the Lacedæmonians by our " admiſſion, who are allied to *neither* of you. By that treaty it is " expreſly ſtipulated, that --- " If any of the *ſtates* of Greece be not " at preſent in alliance with either of the contracting parties, per- " miſſion is given them to go into either league, at their own diſ- " cretion." ---- And terrible indeed it is, if they muſt be at liberty " to man their fleets out of places in their alliance, nay more than " that out of Greece at large, and to no ſmall amount, even out of " your dependents: and we muſt be debarred not only your moſt " inviting alliance, but every poſſible expedient of ſuccour: Then " after all, they muſt raiſe a cry of injuſtice, if we offer our re- " queſts to you and have them granted. But much greater reaſons " of complaint will lie with us, if we cannot prevail upon you. " For then, you will throw at a diſtance thoſe who are beſet with " dangers and never were your enemies; you will not only not re- " ſtrain the incroachments of enemies and invaders, but will be- " hold them through your negligence aſſuming ſtrength out of your " dominions, which you ought never to endure. You ought either " to hinder them from ſeducing your ſubjects into their pay, or " ſend an immediate ſuccour to us, in what manner you may be " perſuaded is the moſt expedient: But the courſe you ought prin- " cipally to take is, to form with us a defenſive alliance, and to act " immediately.

" The advantage of ſuch a meaſure, as we premiſed at firſt, we " are clearly proving. But that which carrieth the greateſt weight is " this, that our enemies are enemies alſo to you (a point too clear to " require proof), and enemies by no means deſpicable, but able to " make revolters feel their vengeance. The bad conſequences of re- " jecting a *land* cannot be equal to thoſe of rejecting a *naval* alliance, " eſpecially to you, who ſhould exert your utmoſt efforts to let none " be maſters of a fleet beſide yourſelves; or, if that be not feaſible, " to make the moſt powerful in that reſpect your faſt allies. And

" who-

" whoſoever, allowing the plain advantage of theſe our arguments,
" may yet dread a rupture if their influence prevail, —— let ſuch an
" one know, that the event he feareth accompanied by ſtrength will
" ſtrike greater dread into all your enemies, but that the zeal of
" him who would have us now rejected, ſince it is founded on a
" weak preſumption of their ſtrength, muſt the ſooner encourage
" thoſe enemies to attack you. The preſent conſultation is not con-
" fined to Corcyra, but very nearly concerneth Athens alſo: —— Let
" him therefore be aſſured, that he doth not provide the beſt for the
" welfare of Athens, when, directly foreſeeing a war faſt approach-
" ing and only not on foot, he heſitateth the leaſt about gaining a
" people provided with all the neceſſary means of being a moſt ſer-
" viceable friend or a moſt prejudicial foe; —— a people opportunely
" ſituated in the courſe to Italy and Sicily, ſo capable to hinder the
" acceſſion of any naval force from thence to the Peloponneſians,
" and to ſecure a paſſage from hence to any of thoſe coaſts, not to
" mention the commodiouſneſs of it in many other reſpects.

" To reduce the whole to one ſhort point, wherein all and every
" individual of you is concerned, learn from *hence* that we are not
" to be abandoned: There are but three naval powers amongſt the
" Grecians of any conſideration, your own, our own, and that of
" the Corinthians. If you indolently ſuffer two of theſe to be in-
" corporated, by leaving us a prey to the Corinthians, you muſt for
" the future make head againſt the Corcyréans and Peloponneſians
" both: But, if you grant your alliance to us, the conteſt will lie
" againſt them alone, and your own naval ſtrength be conſiderably
" augmented."

In this manner the Corcyréans ſpoke: and, when they had concluded, the Corinthians took their turn, as followeth ——

Speech of the Corinthian embaſſy.

" SINCE theſe Corcyréans have not confined their diſcourſe
" merely to ſollicit the favour of your alliance, but have enlarged it
" with

" with invectives againſt our injuſtice in making war upon them, we
" alſo lie under a neceſſity to make ſome previous obſervations on
" both of thoſe points, before we proceed to other matters. By this
" means, you will perceive your own great ſecurity in complying
" with our demands, and what weighty reaſons you have to reject
" their importunate ſollicitations.

" They alledge it as a maxim of prudence that they have been
" hitherto averſe to any foreign alliance: But their motives in this
" were founded upon malice, and not upon virtue. They would
" have no ally to be a witneſs of the wrongs they do; they declined
" the ſociety of ſuch as might put them to the bluſh. Their very
" iſland farther, which is finely ſituated for ſuch arbitrary tempers,
" ſuffereth them alone to judge thoſe outrages they themſelves com-
" mit: exempting them from fair and equitable trials, becauſe they
" ſeldom go abroad to viſit their neighbours, as their harbours are
" the conſtant and neceſſary reſort of others. Here then lieth the
" modeſty of their unaſſociating maxim: It was deſigned to prevent
" their having any partners in violence, that they might have it all
" to themſelves; that, when they were ſuperior, they might oppreſs
" without controul, when there were none to watch them they
" might ingroſs the ſpoil, and might enjoy their rapine without
" danger of a bluſh. Had they been thoſe virtuous ſouls they pro-
" claim themſelves, then, clear of every bad imputation from their
" neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to manifeſt their integrity
" to the world, by doing and by ſubmitting to juſtice.

" But *ſuch* neither we nor any other people have in fact expe-
" rienced them. For, tho' planted by us, they have ever diſowned
" their allegiance to us, and now wage open war againſt us, plead-
" ing that they were not ſent abroad to be maltreated and oppreſſed.
" We alſo aver in our own behalf, that neither did we ſend them
" to receive their injurious requitals, but to retain them in lawful
" dependence, and to be honoured and reverenced by them. Such

" dutiful

" dutiful returns the reſt of our colonies punctually make us, and
" by ſuch no other people are ſo well reſpected as ourſelves. From
" the great ſatisfaction therefore we give to all the reſt it plainly ap-
" peareth, that we afford no reaſonable diſguſt to theſe alone, and
" that without ſome glaring injury, we ſhould have had no inclina-
" tion to declare war againſt them. But, tho we had actually tranſ-
" greſſed, it would have been quite decent on their part to have
" ſhewn condeſcenſion when we are angry; and then, it would
" have been baſe in us, to have preſſed too far on ſuch moderation.
" To their pride and the inſolence of wealth their many tranſgreſ-
" ſions againſt us are juſtly to be aſcribed. Hence it was, that they
" laid no claim to Epidamnus, which belongeth to us, whilſt har-
" raſſed with inteſtine feuds; but, when we came to its redreſs, then
" by force they ſeize and detain it. And now, they pretend that
" previous to that they were willing to have ſubmitted to a fair ar-
" bitration. — Such pleas are not to be regarded, when offered by
" men who are already maſters in poſſeſſion, and on that ſecurity
" make appeal to juſtice: They are only of weight, when facts and
" words are equitably to be judged, before the point hath been de-
" cided by arms. And it was not before they had beſieged that
" city, but when they thought that we were intent on ſaving it, that
" they had recourſe to the ſpecious pretence of a fair arbitration.
" And *here* they are at preſent, by no means content with the
" wrongs they have *there* committed, preſuming to ask conjunction
" from you, not in league but in violence, and on the merit of being
" rebels againſt us to beg your protection. Then was the proper
" time for ſuch an addreſs to you, when their affairs ſecurely flou-
" riſhed; not now, when we have been outraged by them and they
" are beſet with dangers; not, when you, who have ſhared no be-
" nefit from their former power, are to relieve their diſtreſs, and by
" no means their accomplices in crimes are to come in for an equa-
" lity of cenſure from us. A prior conjunction of force juſtly in-

" titleth to a ſhare of what may be the event: But thoſe, who had
" no participation in the guilt, ought to be exempted from the
" conſequences of it. —— And thus we have clearly ſhewn, that
" we have addreſſed ourſelves before you with all the requiſites
" of a rightful cauſe, and that their proceedings are violent and ra-
" pacious.

" It is now incumbent upon us to convince you, that you cannot
" with juſtice receive them into alliance. For, granting it to be ex-
" preſly ſtipulated in the treaty that *any of the ſtates not particularly*
" *mentioned may go into either league at their own diſcretion*, yet the
" intent of the ſtipulation reacheth not to thoſe who join one party
" to the prejudice of another, but to ſuch as having withdrawn
" from neither ſide are in need of protection ---- to ſuch, as bring
" not war inſtead of peace to *thoſe* who receive them, ---- if *they*
" know their intereſt. And yet, the latter muſt be your portion, if
" our arguments loſe their influence: For you will not only become
" auxiliaries to *them*, but enemies alſo to *us* who are your allies by
" treaty. Of neceſſity, if you join with them, our vengeance muſt
" be levelled at them without ſeparating you. Right above all things
" it would be for you, to keep yourſelves at a diſtance from us both;
" ---- if that will not pleaſe, to reverſe your proceedings, and join
" with us in oppoſition to them ---- For, to the Corinthians you are
" bound by firm and laſting treaties, with the Corcyréans you have
" never yet tranſacted even for a truce ----, and by no means to
" eſtabliſh a new law for receiving revolters from the other league.
" We ourſelves did not, upon the Samian revolt, give our ſuf-
" frage againſt you, when the reſt of the Peloponneſians were
" divided upon the queſtion ---- whether they ought to be ſup-
" ported: But we openly maintained, that every *ſtate* had a right
" to proceed againſt its own dependents. For if you receive and
" undertake the defence of thoſe who have behaved amiſs, the
" event will ſhew that the greater number will come over to our
" ſide,

" ſide, and that you eſtabliſh a law prejudicial to yourſelves much
" more than to us.

" The points of juſtice we have thus ſufficiently cleared up to you,
" according to the general laws of Greece. We have only to add a
" word of advice and the claim of a favour, ſuch an one as we now
" affirm upon a principle of gratitude ought not to be denied us,
" who are neither your enemies ſo far as to hurt you, nor ever were
" your friends ſo far as to burden you. When formerly, before the
" invaſion of the Medes, you were in want of long ſhips in your
" war againſt the Æginetæ, you were ſupplied by the Corinthians
" with twenty. The ſervice which we then did you, and that other
" more recent about the Samians, when we prevented their receiving
" any ſupport from the Peloponneſians, enabled you in their turns to
" vanquiſh the Æginetæ and to chaſtiſe the Samians. And theſe ſer-
" vices were done you at a ſeaſon, when the human attention, fixed
" intirely on war, regardeth nothing but what tendeth to victory.
" Whoever forwardeth this men eſteem their friend, tho' he
" was before their foe; and him who checketh it their foe, tho'
" perhaps he may be their real friend. For even domeſtic affairs
" are ſorrily conducted at a time when the mind is inflamed by
" contention.

" Recollect theſe things. Let the young-man learn the truth of
" them from his elders, and acknowledge that we ought to be pro-
" perly requited. Let him not entertain the thought, that what we
" ſay is agreeable to equity, but that in caſe of a war intereſt in-
" clineth another way: For intereſt is moſt ſurely to be found
" there where the leaſt injuſtice is committed. The contingency of
" that war, from a dread of which the Corcyréans encourage you to
" act unjuſtly, lieth yet in obſcurity, and ought not to inflame you
" into open and immediate hoſtilities againſt the Corinthians. It
" would be prudent, farther, to leſſen that jealouſy we have already
" conceived from the proceedings at Megara. For a latter obliga-

" tion, by the favour of time, tho' of leſs weight in itſelf, is able " to cancel a charge of greater moment. Neither ſuffer yourſelves " to be allured with the promiſe of a powerful conjunction of naval " force: For never to act unjuſtly againſt equals is a firmer ſecu- " rity of power, than to be elevated upon preſent plauſibilities and " enlarge it through a ſeries of dangers. Our preſent circumſtances " reſemble thoſe, concerning which we explicitly declared at Lace- " dæmon, that every *ſtate* had a right to proceed againſt its own de- " pendents: And now we beg that liberty from you; and that you, " who have reaped the benefit of ſuch a ſuffrage from us, would " not prejudice us by yours. Render us for it the juſt requital; " remembering, that this is the critical ſeaſon, in which he who " aideth is the beſt of friends, and he that oppoſeth the greateſt foe. " And, as for theſe Corcyréans, take them not into your alliance in " deſpite of us, nor abet them in the injuries they have done us. " By acting in this manner, you will diſcharge the obligations in- " cumbent upon you, and will take thoſe meaſures which are moſt " for your own advantage."

This is the ſubſtance of what was ſaid by the Corinthians.

Reſolution taken at Athens.

The Athenians having heard both parties, [4] met twice in full *aſſembly* on this occaſion. At the firſt meeting, they thought there was validity in the arguments of the Corinthians; but, at the ſecond,

4 Here the *Engliſh* reader ſhould be informed, in what manner buſineſs went on, when difficulties, diverſities of opinion, and conſequently debates enſued.

When it appeared that the point propoſed would not paſs unanimouſly, the crier at the command of the preſident in the chair proclaimed aloud, " What citizen above " fifty years of age hath a mind to ſpeak?" When ſuch had been heard, the crier made a ſecond proclamation, that " any Athe- " nian whatever had liberty to ſpeak." The debate being ended, the preſident in the chair bade the crier put the queſtion. It was decided by holding up of hands. The chairman diſtinguiſhed the numbers in the affirmative and negative, and declared the *majority*. Then the reſolution or decree was drawn up in form: and the Archon's name who gave title to the year, the day of the month, and the name of the preſiding tribe were prefix'd.

The

ſecond, they came to a different reſolution —— not indeed to form ſuch an alliance with the Corcyréans as to have the ſame enemies and the ſame friends (for then, if the Corcyréans ſhould ſummon them to join in an expedition againſt Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponneſians would be broke;) but an alliance merely defenſive, for the reciprocal ſuccour of one another, if either Corcyra or Athens or any of their reſpective allies ſhould be aſſaulted. A war with the Peloponneſians ſeemed to them unavoidable; and they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which had ſo great a naval force, for a prey to the Corinthians; but, to break them to the utmoſt of their power againſt one another, that upon occaſion they might be the better able to war with the Corinthians thus weakened to their hands, though joined by other *ſtates* of Greece which had power at ſea. At the ſame time that iſland appeared to them moſt conveniently ſituated in the paſſage to Italy and Sicily. Upon theſe motives the Athenians received the Corcyréans into their alliance: And, not long after the departure of the Corinthians, ſent ten ſhips to their aid under the command of Lacedæmonius the ſon of Cimon, Diotimus the ſon of Strombichus, and Proteas the ſon of Epicles. Their orders were "by no means to engage the Corinthians, unleſs they ſtood againſt and endeavoured to make a deſcent at Corcyra, or any of its dependent places; if they did ſo, to reſiſt them with all their efforts." Theſe orders were given with a view of not infringing the treaty: And this their aid of ſhipping arriveth at Corcyra.

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy obſervation. The ſentiments of age and experience were firſt to be heard, and then the ſpirit and reſolution of the younger were called in to aſſiſt at the public conſultation. Nay they carried it farther; no perſon convicted of prophaneneſs, debauchery, cowardice, or public miſdemeanor was ſuffered to ſpeak in this aſſembly. From them they expected no ſound inſtruction, no diſintereſted advice. If any ſuch offered to ſpeak, the *preſidents* of the aſſembly immediately injoined them ſilence; or, if they were refractory, ordered their officers to pull them down and turn them out of the aſſembly.

The

Corinthians *again at ſea.*

The Corinthians, when they had compleated their preparations, ſet ſail for Corcyra with a fleet of one hundred and fifty ſhips. Of theſe, ten belonged to the Eléans, twelve to the Megaréans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-ſeven to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and the other ninety were their own. The quotas from the allied cities had each of them their reſpective commanders; but the Corinthian ſquadron was commanded by Xenoclides the ſon of Euthycles with four collegues. So ſoon as they were all aſſembled at that part of the continent which looks towards Corcyra, they ſet ſail from Leucas, and arrive at the Chimerium in Theſprotis. A harbour openeth itſelf here, and above it is the city of Ephyre at a diſtance from the ſea in Eleatis a diſtrict of Theſprotis: Near it is the outlet into the ſea of the lake of Acheruſia, into which the river Acheron, having run through Theſprotis, is at laſt received; from which alſo it deriveth its name. The river Thyamis alſo runneth here, dividing Theſprotis from Ceſtrine, and between theſe two rivers ariſeth the cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians therefore arrive at this part of the continent, and fix their ſtation there. But the Corcyréans, ſo ſoon as ever adviſed of their ſailing, having manned a hundred and ten ſhips under the command of Miciades, Æſimides, and Eurybatus, took their ſtation at one of thoſe iſles which are called *the Sybota*, accompanied by the ten Athenian ſhips. Their land-force was left at the promontory of Leucimna, with an aid of a thouſand heavy-armed Zacynthians. The Corinthians had alſo ready upon the continent a numerous aid of Barbarians: For the people on that coaſt have ever continued their friends. When every thing was in order among the Corinthians, taking in proviſions for three days they weigh by night from Chimerium with a deſign to fight; and having ſailed along 'till break of day, they diſcover the ſhips of the Corcyréans already out at ſea, and advancing againſt them. When thus they had got a view of each other, both ſides form into the order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyréans were

were the Athenian ſhips; the reſt of the fleet was all their own, ranged into three ſquadrons, each of which was reſpectively under the orders of the three commanders: In this manner was the order of the Corcyréans formed. In the right of the Corinthians were the ſhips of the Megaréans and Ambraciots; in the centre the other allies in their ſeveral arrangements: The Corinthians formed the left wing themſelves, as their ſhips were the beſt ſailors, to oppoſe the Athenians and the right of the Corcyréans. When [5] the ſignal-flags were hoiſted on both ſides, they ran together and began the engagement; both ſides having ſtowed their decks with bodies of heavy-armed, with many further that drew the bow or toſſed the javelin. Their preparations ſtill retained ſomething of the aukward manner of antiquity. The engagement was ſharply carried on, yet without exertions of ſkill, and very much reſembling a battle upon land. When they had laid one another cloſe, they were not eaſily ſeparated again, becauſe of the number and hurry of the veſſels. The greateſt hope of victory was placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks, who fixed to their poſt engaged hand to hand, whilſt their ſhips continued without any motion. They had no opportunity to make their charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of ſtrength

Battle of Sybota.

5 To give the *Engliſh* reader, once for all, a proper light into their method of beginning an engagement, I ſhall quote the following paragraph from archbiſhop *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 21.

"Before they joined battle, both parties invoked the Gods to their aſſiſtance by prayers and ſacrifices; and the admirals going from ſhip to ſhip in ſome of the lighter veſſels, exhorted their ſoldiers in a ſet oration to behave themſelves like men: Then all things being in readineſs, the ſignal was given by hanging out of the admiral's-galley a gilded ſhield, as we read in Plutarch, or a red garment or banner, which was termed ἀίρειν σημεῖα. During the elevation of this the fight continued, and by its depreſſion or inclination towards the right or left, the reſt of the ſhips were directed in what manner to attack their enemies, or retreat from them. To this was added the ſound of trumpets, which was begun in the admiral's-galley, and continued round the whole navy; it was likewiſe uſual for the ſoldiers before the fight to ſing a pæan or hymn to Mars, and after the fight another to Apollo."

and

and courage without any dexterity. The tumult was great on all ſides, and the whole action full of diſorder: In which, the Athenian ſhips relieved the Corcyréan wherever they were preſſed too hard, and did what they could to intimidate the enemy; but their commanders refrained from any direct attack, remembering with awe the orders of *the Athenians*. The right wing of the Corinthians ſuffered the moſt: For the Corcyréans with twenty ſhips, having put them to flight, chaced them when diſperſed to the continent; and, continuing the purſuit to their very camp, land immediately, where they ſet fire to their abandoned tents and carried off all the baggage: In this part therefore the Corinthians and their allies were vanquiſhed, and the Corcyréans were plainly ſuperior. But in the left, where the Corinthians perſonally engaged they eaſily prevailed, as twenty ſhips of the Corcyréans, and thoſe too from a number at firſt inferior, were gone off in the purſuit. But the Athenians, ſeeing the Corcyréans thus diſtreſſed, now came up to their ſupport more openly than before, having hitherto refrained from any direct attack. And when the chace was clearly begun and the Corinthians followed their ſucceſs, then every one amongſt them applied himſelf to action. There was no longer any time for diſcretion: Corinthians and Athenians were forced by abſolute neceſſity to engage one another.

The chace being thus begun, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the veſſels they had ſunk, but turned all their attention to the men *who were floating about*, and cruized at large more to ſlaughter than take alive. And, having not yet diſcovered the defeat of their *right*, they ſlaughter'd through ignorance their own friends. For the number of ſhips being large on either ſide and covering a wide extent of ſea, after the firſt confuſion of the engagement they were not able eaſily to diſtinguiſh which were the victors or which the vanquiſhed: Since Grecians againſt Grecians had never at any time before engaged at ſea with ſo large a number of veſſels. But after the Corinthians

rinthians had purſued the Corcyréans to land, they returned to look after their ſhattered veſſels and their own dead. And moſt of theſe they took up and carried to Sybota, where alſo lay the land-force of their Barbarian auxiliaries: *This* Sybota is a deſart haven in Theſprotis. Having performed this duty, they gathered together again into a body and went in queſt of the Corcyréans, who with thoſe damaged veſſels that yet could ſwim and with all that had no damage, together with the Athenians, came out to meet them, fearing leſt they might attempt to land upon their ſhore. It was now late in the day, and they had ſung their *pæan* as going to attack, when on a ſudden the Corinthians [6] ſlackened their courſe, having deſcried a reinforcement of twenty ſail coming up from Athens. This ſecond ſquadron the Athenians had ſent away to ſupport the former ten, fearing (what really happened) leſt the Corcyréans might be vanquiſhed, and their own ten ſhips be too few for their ſupport. The Corinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, and ſuſpecting they came from Athens, and in a larger number than they yet diſcovered, began gradually to fall away. They were not yet deſcried by the Corcyréans (for the courſe kept them more out of their ken) who were ſurprized to ſee the Corinthians thus ſlacken their courſe, till ſome, who had gained a view, informed them that ſuch ſhips are coming up, and then they alſo fell back themſelves: For now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians being turned about had diſſolved their order. In this manner were they ſeparated from one another: And the naval engagement ended with the night.

The Corcyréans having recovered their ſtation at Leucymna, thoſe twenty ſhips from Athens under the command of Glauco the ſon of

6 The original is πρύμναν ἐκρέουσι, *they knocked the hind-deck*, a phraſe elegantly applied by Thucydides to thoſe that retreat fighting, and ſtill facing their enemies. It was done by running their ſhips backwards upon their hind decks in order to tack about. See *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 20.

Leager and Andocides the ſon of Leogoras, having paſſed through floating carcaſes and wrecks, came up to the ſtation, not long after they had been deſcried. Yet the Corcyréans (for now it was night) were in great conſternation leſt they ſhould be enemies: But they were ſoon known, and then came to anchor.

Next morning the thirty Athenian ſhips, accompanied by ſuch of the Corcyréans as were fit for ſea, weighed away and made over for the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians lay, deſigning to try whether or no they would engage again. The Corinthians, putting their ſhips from off the ſhore and drawing up into order in the deeper water, remained there without advancing. They had no deſign or inclination to begin another engagement, as they were ſenſible of the junction of the freſh Athenian ſhips, and of the numerous difficulties with which they were beſet, about the cuſtody of the priſoners whom they had on board, and the want of neceſſary materials to repair their ſhips upon this deſart coaſt. Their thoughts were more employed upon their return home, and the method to accompliſh it, from the apprehenſion leſt the Athenians, judging the league to be broke as they had come to blows, might obſtruct their paſſage. For this reaſon they determined beforehand to diſpatch a boat with proper perſons, tho' without the ſolemn protection of a herald, and ſo to ſound their intentions. The meſſage to be delivered was this:

Meſſage of the Corinthians *to the* Athenian *auxiliaries.*

" YOU are guilty of injuſtice, ye men of Athens, in beginning war " and violating treaties: For you hinder us from taking due ven- " geance upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms againſt us. If " you are certainly determined to hinder our courſe, either againſt " Corcyra or any other place whither we are willing to go, and ſo " violate treaties, take us firſt who are here in your power, and treat " us as enemies."

The

The perſons ſent thus delivered their meſſage: And the whole company of the Corcyréans who heard it ſhouted out immediately to "apprehend and put them to death." But the Athenians returned this anſwer:

"WE neither begin war, ye men of Peloponneſus, nor violate *Their anſwer.*
"treaties. We are come hither auxiliaries to theſe Corcyréans our
"allies. If therefore you are deſirous to ſail to any other place,
"we hinder you not. But, if you go againſt Corcyra or any other
"place belonging to it, we ſhall endeavour to oppoſe you, to the
"utmoſt of our power."

UPON receiving this anſwer from the Athenians, the Corinthians prepared for their return home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent. But the Corcyréans were employed in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, driving towards them by favour of the tide and the wind, which blowing freſh the night before had ſcattered them all about; and, as if they too had the victory, erected an oppoſite trophy at Sybota in the iſland. The reaſons, upon which each ſide thus claimed the victory, were theſe—The Corinthians erected a trophy, becauſe they had the better of the engagement till night, and ſo were enabled to pick up moſt of the ſhatters and the dead; they had, further, taken a number of priſoners not leſs than a thouſand, and had diſabled about ſeventy ſhips of the enemy.—The Corcyréans did the ſame; becauſe they alſo had diſabled about thirty; and, upon the coming up of the Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and dead bodies driving towards them; and becauſe the Corinthians tacking about had retired from them the night before, ſo ſoon as they deſcried the Athenian ſhips; and when they came to offer them battle at Sybota, durſt not come out againſt them. In this manner did both ſides account themſelves victorious.

The Corinthians, in their paſſage homewards, by ſtratagem ſeized Anactorium, which lieth in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It belonged in common to the Corcyréans and themſelves. They put it entirely into the hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then retired to their own home. Eight hundred of their Corcyréan priſoners, who were ſlaves, they ſold at public ſale. Two hundred and fifty they reſerved in ſafe cuſtody, and treated them with extraordinary good uſage, that after their ranſom they might ſerve them in their deſign of gaining Corcyra: For the majority of them were perſons of the greateſt authority in that *ſtate*. Thus therefore is Corcyra preſerved in the war of the Corinthians; and the ſhips of the Athenians after ſuch ſervice left them. But *this* was the *firſt* ground of war to the Corinthians againſt the Athenians, becauſe they had aſſiſted the Corcyréans in a naval engagement againſt themſelves, who were in treaty with them.

II. *The affair of* Potidæa.

IMMEDIATELY after this tranſaction, other miſunderſtandings alſo happened between the Athenians and Peloponneſians, tending to a war. For, all the ſchemes of the Corinthians aiming at revenge, the Athenians jealous of their enmity ſent an order to the inhabitants of Potidæa ſituated upon the iſthmus of Pallene, (and tho' a Corinthian colony yet allied with and tributary to them) " to demoliſh that part of their wall which faceth the Pallene, to give " them hoſtages, to ſend away the *epidemiurgi*, and not to receive " *thoſe* magiſtrates for the future, who were annually ſent them from " Corinth." They were apprehenſive of a revolt at the inſtigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and their ſeducing into the ſame defection the other dependents of Athens in Thrace. Theſe ſteps the Athenians thought proper to take with the people of Potidæa, immediately after the ſea-fight of Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifeſtly at variance with them, and Perdiccas ſon of Alexander king of the Macedonians was now become their enemy, who before

before had been their ally and friend. His enmity was occaſioned by an alliance the Athenians had formed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were jointly in oppoſition againſt him. Alarmed at this, he ſent proper perſons to Lacedæmon to ſtir up againſt them a Peloponneſian war, and to draw over the Corinthians into his intereſt, in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He had alſo been tampering with the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans to perſuade them to revolt at the ſame time; concluding, that if he could bring about a junction of the adjacent people, he might venture a war againſt them with greater probability of ſucceſs. The Athenians perceived his ſcheme, and were deſirous to prevent the revolt of the cities. They had begun an expedition againſt his territories with a fleet of thirty ſhips and a thouſand heavy-armed, under the command of Archeſtratus the ſon of Lycomedes aſſociated with ten others in this ſervice. They gave particular orders to the commanders to take hoſtages from the Potidæans and to demoliſh their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities that they might not revolt. The Potidæans had already ſent embaſſadors to the Athenians, to diſſuade them if poſſible from the execution of any new deſigns againſt them: And had at the ſame time diſpatched an embaſſy to Lacedæmon along with the Corinthians, inſtructed to procure a promiſe of redreſs if there ſhould be occaſion. But, when their long negotiation at Athens proved quite ineffectual, and the fleet was gone out to ſea both againſt Macedonia and themſelves; when, farther, the regency at Lacedæmon had given a promiſe to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians ſhould attempt any thing againſt Potidæa; upon this encouragement, without loſs of time, they revolt in conjunction with the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all combined by an oath of mutual defence and ſupport. Perdiccas, farther, prevaileth with the Chalcideans to abandon and demoliſh all their towns upon the ſea-coaſt, and then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that town by a junction of all their ſtrength. And, to theſe

Revolt of Potidæa.

theſe people thus abandoning their own homes he made a ceſſion of that part of Mygdonia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for their ſubſiſtence during the war with the Athenians. Having thus demoliſhed their own cities, they went to another place of reſidence, and were employed in preparations for the war.

The thirty ſhips of the Athenians, arriving on the coaſts of Thrace, find Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. The commanders, judging it impoſſible with their preſent ſtrength to act againſt Perdiccas and the revolted cities both, turn their courſe towards Macedonia, purſuing the firſt deſign of the expedition. Landing there, they joined in the war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who with an army had made an irruption from the inland country.

In the mean time, Potidæa being now in revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedonian coaſts, the Corinthians, anxious for the ſecurity of that place, and making the danger their own, diſpatched thither ſome volunteers of their own people and other Peloponneſians taken into their pay, in all ſixteen hundred [7] heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed. The command of this body of men was given to Ariſteus the ſon of Adimantus; ſince, out of their own private affection to him who had ever been a ſteddy friend to Potidæa, moſt of the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken the ſervice: and the time of their arrival in Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidæa.

An expreſs ſoon arrived at Athens with the news of the revolt of the cities, and when afterwards they heard of the arrival of that body under Ariſteus, they ſend away two thouſand of their heavy-armed

7 The *heavy-armed* wore a complete ſuit of armour, and engaged with broad ſhields and long ſpears. They were the flower and ſtrength of the Grecian armies, and had the higheſt rank of military honour. The *light-armed* were deſigned for skirmiſhes and fighting at a diſtance: Their weapons were arrows, darts, or ſlings. The *targeteers* mentioned often in this hiſtory, were a middle ſort of ſoldiery, armed with targets or narrow ſhields and ſpears, neither large nor heavy.

and

and forty ſhips, under the command of Callias the ſon of Calliades and four collegues, to reduce the revolted. Theſe, arriving firſt of all in Macedonia, find the former thouſand employed in beſieging Pydne, having a little before got poſſeſſion of Therme. They ſat down with them for a time to carry on the ſiege of Pydne; but afterwards, making with Perdiccas a compoſition and alliance the beſt they could in their preſent exigency, ſince Potidæa and the arrival of Ariſteus were very urgent points, they evacuate Macedonia. They marched next to Beræa; and turning from thence, after having firſt made an unſucceſsful attempt upon the place, they marched by land towards Potidæa. Their army conſiſted of three thouſand heavy-armed of their own, without including a large body of auxiliaries, and ſix hundred Macedonian horſe who had ſerved with Philip and Pauſanias: Seventy ſhips at the ſame time ſailed along the coaſt. And thus, by moderate marches, they came up in three days to Gigonus, and there encamped.

Battle in the iſthmus of the Ballene.

The Potidæans with the body of Peloponneſians commanded by Ariſteus, expecting the Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus *within* the iſthmus, and had a market kept for them without the city. The command of the infantry had been given to Ariſteus by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdiccas: For now again he had abruptly broke with the Athenians and joined the Potidæans, deputing Iolaus to command in his abſence. It was the deſign of Ariſteus, by encamping the body under his own command *within* the iſthmus, to obſerve the motions of the Athenians if they advanced, whilſt *without* the iſthmus the Chalcideans and allies and two hundred horſe belonging to Perdiccas ſhould continue at Olynthus, who, when the Athenians came forwards againſt them, were to throw themſelves in their rear, and thus ſhut up the enemy between the two bodies. But Callias the general of the Athenians, in concert with his collegues, detaches the Macedonian horſe, and a few of their allies to Olynthus to prevent any ſally from thence;

thence; and then, breaking up their camp, they marched directly for Potidæa. But, when they were advanced as far as the iſthmus and ſaw their enemies drawn up in order to fight, they alſo formed; and in a little time they came to an action. The wing under Ariſteus, Corinthians and the very flower of their ſtrength, who engaged with him, ſoon compelled their enemies to turn their backs, and purſued execution to a great diſtance: But the reſt of the army, compoſed of Potidæans and Peloponneſians, were defeated by the Athenians and chaced to the very walls of Potidæa. Ariſteus, returning from his purſuit, perceived the rout of the reſt of the army, and knew not whither with the leaſt hazard to retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidæa. But at laſt, he determined to embody together thoſe he had about him, and, as Potidæa lay at the ſmalleſt diſtance, to throw himſelf into it with all poſſible ſpeed. This with difficulty he effected, by plunging into the water near the abutments of the pier amidſt a ſhower of miſſive weapons, with the loſs indeed of ſome of his men, but the ſafety of the larger number.

Thoſe who ſhould have come to ſuccour the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is at no greater diſtance than * ſixty ſtadia and ſituated in view, at the beginning of the battle when [8] the colours were elevated, advanced indeed a little way as deſigning to do it, and the Macedonian horſe drew up againſt them as deſigning to ſtop them. But, as the victory was quickly gained by the Athenians and the colours were dropped, they retired again within the walls, and the Macedonians marched away to the Athenians; ſo that the cavalry of

* *About ſix miles.*

8 The elevation of the colours or enſigns was the ſignal of joining battle, and they were kept up during the whole continuance of it: The depreſſion of them, was a ſignal to deſiſt, or the conſequence of a defeat. The depreſſion of the colours, in this inſtance, was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as ſacred to Minerva the tutelary Goddeſs of Athens. See *Potter's Archæologia Græca*, vol. ii. c. 9.

neither

neither ſide had any ſhare in the action. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a ſuſpenſion of arms to the Potidæans for fetching off their dead. There were killed of the Potidæans and allies very near three hundred, and of the Athenians one hundred and fifty with Callias their general.

The blockade of Potidæa *begun.*

The Athenians without loſs of time, throwing up a work againſt the wall which faceth the iſthmus, blockaded the place on that ſide, but the wall towards the Pallene they left as they found it. For they thought their number was by no means ſufficient to keep the guard within the iſthmus, and to paſs over to the Pallene-ſide, and block it up alſo there. They were apprehenſive, that thus divided the Potidæans and their allies might fall upon them. And the Athenians at home, hearing there was no work on the Pallene-ſide, ſend thither a thouſand and ſix hundred heavy-armed of their own people under the command of Phormis the ſon of Aſopius, who arriving upon the Pallene, and having landed his men at Aphytis, marched forwards to Potidæa, advancing ſlowly and laying waſte the country as he moved along. And, as no body ventured out to give him oppoſition, he alſo threw up a work againſt that ſide of the wall which faceth the Pallene. By theſe methods was Potidæa cloſely blocked up on either ſide, and alſo by the ſhips which lay before it at ſea.

Perfected.

The blockade being thus perfected, Ariſteus, deſtitute of any means of ſaving the place, unleſs ſome relief ſhould arrive from Peloponneſus or ſome miracle ſhould happen, propoſed it as his advice that "all excepting five hundred men ſhould lay hold of the firſt favourable wind to quit the place, that the proviſions might for a longer time ſupport the reſt;" declaring "his own readineſs to be one of thoſe who ſtayed behind." Though he could not prevail with them, yet willing in this plunge to do what could be done, and to manage affairs abroad in the beſt manner he was able, he made his eſcape by ſea undiſcovered by the Athenian guard. Continuing now amongſt the Chalcideans, he made what military efforts he

could, and killed many of the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuſcade he formed before that city; and endeavoured to prevail with the Peloponneſians to ſend up a timely relief. Phormio, alſo, after compleating the works round Potidæa, with his ſixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and Bottiæa: And ſome fortreſſes he took by ſtorm.

The hiſtory proceedeth.

THESE were the reciprocal cauſes of diſſenſion between the Athenians and Peloponneſians. The Corinthians were enraged at the blockade of Potidæa, a colony of their own, in which were ſhut up both Corinthians and other Peloponneſians. The Athenians reſented the proceedings of the Peloponneſians in ſeducing to a revolt a city in alliance with and tributary to them, and ſiding openly by a voluntary expedition with the warring rebels of Potidæa. Yet a war open and avowed had not yet broke out between them: Hoſtilities were ſuſpended for a time. Hitherto it was merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians.

A Congreſs of the league at Lacedæmon.

But, when once the blockade of Potidæa was formed, the Corinthians could hold no longer. In *it* their own people were ſhut up, and they were at the ſame time in anxiety about the place. They ſummoned their allies to repair immediately to Lacedæmon, and thither they went themſelves with loud accuſations againſt the Athenians, that "they had violated the treaty, and injured Peloponneſus." The Æginetæ indeed, from a dread of the Athenians, did not openly diſpatch their embaſſy; but underhand they had a great ſhare in fomenting the war, aſſerting that "they were reſtrained in the privilege of governing themſelves, which had been allowed them by the treaty."

The Lacedæmonians, ſummoning to appear before them not barely their allies but whoever had any manner of charge to prefer againſt the Athenians, aſſembled in grand council as uſual, and commanded them to ſpeak: Others who were preſent laid open their reſpective complaints,

complaints, but the Megaréans preferred the largeſt accuſations, in particular that " they had been prohibited the uſe of all the harbours in the Athenian dominions and the market of Athens, contrary to treaty." The Corinthians were the laſt who ſtood forth. Having firſt allowed ſufficient time to others to exaſperate the Lacedæmonians, they preferred their own charge, as followeth -----

Speech of the Corinthian embaſſy.

" THAT faith, ye Lacedæmonians, which ever both in public
" conduct and in private life you ſo punctually obſerve, rendereth
" what others, what we ourſelves may have to ſay, more difficult to
" be believed. By it, you have gained indeed the reputation of pro-
" bity, but contract a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote oc-
" currences. For, though we have frequently ſuggeſted to you,
" what wrongs we were apprehenſive of receiving from the Athe-
" nians, yet have you not deigned to make enquiry into the grounds
" of thoſe ſuggeſtions, but rather have ſuſpected our ingenuity as
" ſpeaking from ſelfiſh views and private reſentments. And it is not
" to prevent our ſufferings, but now, when we already feel their
" weight, that you convene theſe confederates together: Before
" whom, we ought to be indulged in a larger ſhare of diſcourſe, as
" we have by much the largeſt ſhare of complaints to utter; wronged
" as we have been by the Athenians, and by you neglected.

" If indeed by treachery lurking and unobſerved they had violated
" the peace of Greece, thoſe who had not diſcerned it might juſtly
" have demanded explicit proofs. But now, what need can there be
" of multiplying words, when ſome you already ſee enſlaved;
" againſt others, and thoſe not the meaneſt of your allies, the ſame
" fate intended; and the aggreſſors fully prepared to receive you, if
" at length a war ſhould be declared? With other views, they had
" not clandeſtinely laid hands on Corcyra and forcibly detained it
" from us, nor had they dared to block up Potidæa: of which
" places, this latter lieth the moſt convenient for extending our

" power in Thrace, the former could ſupply Peloponneſus with the
" greateſt navy. But to your account theſe events are to be charged,
" who after the invaſion of the Medes firſt ſuffered the ſtrength of
" Athens to be increaſed, and afterwards their *long-walls* to be
" erected. Ever ſince, you have connived at liberty overthrown,
" not only in whatever communities they have proceeded to enſlave,
" but *now* where even your own confederates are concerned. For
" not to the men who rivet on the chains of ſlavery, but to ſuch as
" though able yet neglect to prevent it, ought the ſad event with
" truth to be imputed; eſpecially, when aſſuming ſuperior virtue
" they boaſt themſelves the deliverers of Greece.

" With much ado are we now met together in council, but not
" even now upon the plain and obvious points. We ought not to
" be any longer debating *whether* we have been injured, but by what
" meaſures we ſhould avenge ourſelves. The aggreſſors, having long
" ſince planned out their proceedings, are not about to make but
" are actually making attacks upon thoſe, who are yet come to no
" reſolution. Nor are we unexperienced by what ſteps, what gra-
" dual advances, the Athenians break in upon their neighbours.
" Imagining themſelves to be ſtill undiſcovered, they ſhew them-
" ſelves the leſs audacious becauſe you are inſenſible. But when
" once they know you alarmed and on your guard, they will preſs
" more reſolutely forwards. For you, Lacedæmonians, are the only
" people of Greece, who ſit indolently at eaſe, protecting not with
" preſent but with promiſed ſuccour: You alone pull down, not the
" commencing but the redoubled ſtrength of your foes. You have
" indeed enjoyed the reputation of being ſteddy, but are indebted
" for it more to report than fact. We ourſelves know, that *the*
" *Perſian* had advanced from the ends of the earth quite into Pe-
" loponneſus, before you exerted your dignity in reſiſtance. Now
" alſo you take no notice of the Athenians, not remote as he was
" but ſeated near you; and, inſtead of invading them, chuſe rather

" to

" to lye upon your defence againſt their invaſions; and, to expoſe
" yourſelves more to the hazards of war againſt a grown augmented
" power. And all this while you know, that *the Barbarian* was
" guilty of many errors in his conduct: And the very Athenians fre-
" quently, in their conteſts with us, have been defeated more through
" their own blunders than the vigour of your reſiſtance: For their
" confidence in you hath cauſed the deſtruction of ſome, who upon
" that very confidence were taken unprepared.

" Let no one in this aſſembly imagine, that we ſpeak more from
" malice than juſt grounds of complaint. Complaint is juſt towards
" friends who have failed in their duty; accuſation is againſt enemies
" guilty of injuſtice. And ſurely, if ever any people had, we have
" good reaſon to think we have ample cauſe to throw blame upon
" our neighbours; eſpecially, when ſuch great embroilments have
" aroſe, of which you ſeem to have no manner of feeling, nor ever
" once to have reflected, in regard to the Athenians, with what ſort
" of people, how far, and how in every point unlike yourſelves,
" you muſt ſoon contend. *They* are a people fond of innovations,
" quick not only to contrive, but to put their ſchemes in effectual
" execution: *Your* method is, to preſerve what you already have, to
" know nothing further, and when in action to leave ſomething
" needful ever unfiniſhed. *They* again are daring beyond their
" ſtrength, adventurous beyond the bounds of judgment, and in ex-
" tremities full of hope: *Your* method is, in action to drop below
" your power, never reſolutely to follow the dictates of your judg-
" ment, and in the preſſure of a calamity to deſpair of a deliver-
" ance. Ever active as *they* are, *they* ſtand againſt *you* who are ha-
" bitually indolent: ever roaming abroad, againſt *you* who think it
" miſery to loſe ſight of your homes. *Their* view in ſhifting place
" is to enlarge their poſſeſſions: *You* imagine, that in foreign at-
" tempts you may loſe your preſent domeſtic enjoyments. *They*,
" when once they have gained ſuperiority over enemies, puſh for-

" ward

" ward as far as they can go; and if defeated, are diſpirited the leaſt
" of all men. More than this, *they* are as laviſh of their lives in
" the public ſervice as if thoſe lives were not their own, whilſt their
" reſolution is ever in their power, ever ready to be exerted in the
" cauſe of their country. Whenever in their ſchemes *they* meet
" with diſappointments, they reckon they have loſt a ſhare of their
" property: When thoſe ſchemes are ſucceſsful, the acquiſition
" ſeemeth ſmall in compariſon with what they have farther in deſign:
" If they are baffled in executing a project, invigorated by reviving
" hope, they catch at freſh expedients to repair the damage. *They*
" are the only people, who inſtantaneouſly project and hope and ac-
" quire; ſo expeditious are they in executing whatever they deter-
" mine. Thus, through toils and dangers they labour forwards ſo
" long as life continueth, never at leiſure to enjoy what they already
" have, through a conſtant eagerneſs to acquire more. *They* have
" no other notion of a feſtival than of a day whereon ſome needful
" point ſhould be accompliſhed; and inactive reſt is more a torment
" to them than laborious employment. In ſhort, if any one abridg-
" ing their characters ſhould ſay, *they* are formed by nature never
" to be at quiet themſelves nor to ſuffer others to be ſo, he deſcribeth
" *them* juſtly.

" When ſuch a *ſtate* hath taken the liſts of oppoſition againſt you,
" do ye dally, O Lacedæmonians? Do you imagine that thoſe people
" will not continue longeſt in the enjoyment of peace, who timely
" prepare to vindicate themſelves, and manifeſt a ſettled reſolution
" to do themſelves right whenever they are wronged? You indeed
" are ſo far obſervers of equity as never to moleſt others, and ſtand
" on your guard merely to repel damage from yourſelves; --- points,
" you would not without difficulty ſecure, though this neighbouring
" *ſtate* were governed by the ſame principles as you are: But *now*,
" as we have already ſhewn you, your cuſtoms compared with them
" are quite obſolete; whereas thoſe which progreſſively improve

" muſt,

" muſt, like all the works of art, be ever the beſt. Were indeed
" the continuance of peace enſured, unvarying manners would cer-
" tainly be preferable: But, ſuch people as are liable to frequent vi-
" ciſſitudes of foreign conteſt, have need of great addreſs to vary
" and refine their conduct. For this cauſe, the manners of the
" Athenians, improved by a long tract of experience, are formed
" in reſpect of yours upon a model entirely new. Here therefore be
" the period fixed to that ſlow-moving policy you have hitherto
" obſerved. Haſten to the relief of others, to that of the Potidæans,
" as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica without loſs of
" time, that you may not leave your friends and your relations in the
" mercy of their moſt inveterate foes, and conſtrain *us* through your
" ſloth to ſeek redreſs from a new alliance. Such a ſtep, if taken
" by us, could neither ſcandalize the gods who take cognizance of
" ſolemn oaths, nor men who own their obligation: For treaties are
" not violated by thoſe who left deſtitute by ſome have recourſe to
" others, but by ſuch as being ſworn to give it, withhold their aſ-
" ſiſtance in the time of need. Yet, if you are willing and ready
" to perform your parts, with you we firmly abide. In changing
" *then* we ſhould be guilty of impiety; and we never ſhall find
" others ſo nicely ſuited to the diſpoſition of our own hearts. Upon
" theſe points form proper reſolutions; and exert yourſelves, that
" the honour of Peloponneſus be not impaired under your gui-
" dance, who have received from your anceſtors this great pre-
" eminence."

To this effect the Corinthians ſpoke. And it happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian embaſſy was at Lacedæmon, negotiating ſome other points; who, ſo ſoon as they were advertiſed of what had been ſaid, judged it proper to demand an audience of the Lacedæmonians. It was not their deſign to make the leaſt reply to the accuſations preferred againſt them by the complainant-ſtates, but in general

general to convince them, that " they ought not to form any ſudden reſolutions, but to conſider matters with ſedate deliberation." They were further deſirous " to repreſent before them the extenſive power of their own *ſtate*, to excite in the minds of the elder a recollection of thoſe points they already knew, and to give the younger information in thoſe of which they were ignorant;" concluding, that " ſuch a repreſentation might turn their attention more to pacific meaſures than military operations." Addreſſing themſelves therefore to the Lacedæmonians, they expreſſed their deſire to ſpeak in the preſent aſſembly, if leave could be obtained. An order of admittance being immediately ſent them, they approached, and delivered themſelves as followeth:

Speech of the Athenian *embaſſy.*

" IT was not the deſign of this our embaſſy, to enter into diſputa-
" tions with your confederates, but to negotiate the points for which
" our *ſtate* hath employed us. Yet, having been advertiſed of the
" great outcry raiſed againſt us, hither we have repaired: not to
" throw in our plea againſt the accuſations of the complainant-ſtates:
" for *you* are not the judges before whom either *we* or *they* are
" bound to plead: but, to prevent your forming raſh and prejudicial
" reſolutions, upon concerns of high importance, through the inſti-
" gations of theſe your confederates. Our view is, farther, to con-
" vince you, notwithſtanding the long comprehenſive charge exhi-
" bited againſt us, that we poſſeſs with credit what we have hitherto
" obtained, and that the *ſtate* of Athens is deſerving of honour
" and regard.

" And what need is there here to go back to remote antiquity,
" where hearſay tradition muſt eſtabliſh thoſe facts, to which the
" eyes of the audience are utter ſtrangers? This we ſhall wave:
" and call forth firſt to your review the Perſian invaſions and thoſe
" incidents of which you are conſcious, without regarding that cha-
" grin which the remembrance of them will conſtantly excite in
" you.

" you. Our atchievements there were attended with the utmoſt
" danger: The conſequence was public benefit, of which you re-
" ceived a ſubſtantial ſhare: and though the glory of that acquiſi-
" tion may not be all our own, yet of a beneficial ſhare we ought not
" to be deprived. This ſhall boldly be averred; not with a view
" of ſoothing you but doing juſtice to ourſelves, and giving you to
" know againſt *what* a State, if your reſolutions now are not diſ-
" creetly taken, you are going to engage. For we aver, that we
" alone adventured to engage *the Barbarian* in that moſt dangerous
" field of Marathon. And when, upon the ſecond invaſion, we
" were not able to make head by land, we threw ourſelves on ſhip-
" board with all our people to fight in conjunction with you by ſea
" at Salamis; which prevented his ſailing along the coaſts of Pelo-
" ponneſus, and deſtroying one by one your cities, unable to ſuc-
" cour one another againſt that formidable fleet. The truth of this
" *the Barbarian* himſelf hath undeniably proved: For, thus defeated
" at ſea, and unable to gather together again ſo large a force, he
" haſtily retired with the greateſt part of his army. In this ſo
" wonderful an event, where beyond diſpute the preſervation of
" Greece was atchieved at ſea, the three moſt advantageous inſtru-
" ments were contributed by us —— the largeſt number of ſhip-
" ping —— a perſon of the greateſt abilities to command —— and
" the moſt intrepid courage. For of the number of ſhips amount-
" ing in all to four hundred, very near two thirds were our own.
" Themiſtocles was the commander, to whom principally it was
" owing that the battle was fought in the ſtraits, which was un-
" deniably the means of that great deliverance: And you yourſelves
" paid him [9] extraordinary honour on that very account, more than
" ever

9 Herodotus relates, that after the great victory at Salamis " the Grecians ſailed to " the Iſthmus, to beſtow the prize upon " him who had deſerved beſt of Greece by " his behaviour in the war. But upon their " arrival, when the commanders gave in " their

" ever to any ſtranger who hath appeared amongſt you. We our-
" ſelves ſhewed further, on this occaſion, the moſt daring courage;
" ſince, though none before marched up to our ſuccour, and every *ſtate*
" already enſlaved had opened the road againſt us, we bravely de-
" termined to abandon even Athens, to deſtroy our own effects, nor,
" like the generality of thoſe who were yet undemoliſhed, to de-
" ſert the common cauſe, or diſperſing ourſelves to become uſeleſs
" to our allies, but —— to embark at once, to face the urgent
" danger, without the leaſt reſentment againſt you for your preced-
" ing backwardneſs of aid. So that we aver the ſervice we then did
" you to be no leſs than what we afterwards received. For to our
" aid indeed at laſt you came, from cities yet inhabited, from cities
" you ever deſigned ſhould ſtill be inhabited, when once you were
" alarmed for your own ſafety much more than for ours. So long
" as we were ſafe, your preſence was in vain expected: But we,
" launching forth from a city no longer our own, and hazarding our
" all for a place we almoſt deſpaired of recovering, effected our own

" their billets on the altar of Neptune, in
" which they had wrote the name of him
" who had behaved beſt, and of him who
" was ſecond, each of them had given the
" preference to his own ſelf, but moſt of
" them agreed in awarding the ſecond
" place to Themiſtocles. Thus, whilſt
" each competitor was only honoured with
" his own ſingle voice for the firſt place,
" Themiſtocles was clearly adjudged to de-
" ſerve the ſecond. Envy prevented the
" Grecians from proceeding to a juſt de-
" claration, and they broke up and de-
" parted, leaving the point undecided.
" Themiſtocles however was celebrated
" and honoured as the man, who in pru-
" dence far ſurpaſſed all the Grecians then
" alive. Thus denied the honour due to
" him for having undoubtedly excelled
" them all in the affair of Salamis, he im-
" mediately repaired to Lacedæmon, deſi-
" rous to have juſtice done him there.
" The Lacedæmonians received him no-
" bly, and honoured him abundantly.
" They gave indeed to Eurybiades the
" crown of olive, as firſt in valour; but
" for wiſdom and dexterity they beſtowed
" a ſecond crown of olive on Themiſtocles.
" They preſented him further with the firſt
" chariot in Sparta. And after ſo much ap-
" plauſe, he was conducted in his return to
" the frontier of Tegea, by three hundred
" picked Spartans, who compoſed the royal
" guard. He was the only perſon ever known
" to have received ſuch a compliment from
" the Spartans." Herodotus in *Urania*.

" pre-

" preſervation, and with it in a great meaſure yours. Had we,
" overcome with fear, gone over early to *the Mede*, as others did,
" to ſave our lands; had we afterwards not dared, as men undone
" beyond recovery, to throw ourſelves on board; you never had
" been obliged to fight at ſea, as not having ſufficient ſtrength to do
" it; but the invader without a ſtruggle would have leiſurely deter-
" mined the fate of Greece.

" Do we then deſerve, Lacedæmonians, that violence of envy
" with which the Grecians behold us, for the courage we manifeſted
" then, for our judicious reſolution, and the ſuperior power we now
" enjoy? That power, ſuperior as it is, was by no means the effect
" of violent encroachments. You would not abide with us to glean
" away the relicks of the Barbarian war. To us the aſſociated *ſtates*
" were obliged to have recourſe, and intreat us to lead them to its
" completion. Thus, by the neceſſary exigence of affairs obliged
" to be in action, we have advanced our power to what it now is;
" at firſt, from a principle of *fear*; then, from the principle of *ho-*
" *nour*; and at length, from that of *intereſt*. When envied by
" many, when obliged to reduce to their obedience ſome who had
" revolted, when you no longer well-diſpoſed towards us, were ac-
" tuated by jealouſy and malice; we thought it not conſiſtent with
" our own ſecurity, to endanger our welfare by giving up our power,
" ſince every revolt from us was an acceſſion of ſtrength to you.
" No part of mankind will fix any reproach on men, who try every
" expedient to ward off extremities of danger. Nay, it is your own
" method alſo, Lacedæmonians, to manage the *ſtates* of Peloponne-
" neſus as ſuits your own intereſt beſt, and to preſcribe them law.
" And, had you abided with us, and perſevered in that invidious ſu-
" periority as we have done, we are well convinced, that you would
" ſoon have grown no leſs odious to your allies; and ſo obliged,
" either to have ruled with rigour, or to have riſked the loſs of
" your all. It followeth therefore, that we have done nothing to

" raiſe ſurprize, nothing to diſappoint the human expectation, in ac-
" cepting a ſuperiority voluntarily aſſured, in firmly maintaining it
" thus accepted, upon thoſe moſt prevailing principles of *honour*,
" and *fear*, and *intereſt*.

" The maxim, by which we have acted, was not firſt broached
" by us, ſince it hath been ever allowed, that inferiors ſhould be
" controuled by their ſuperiors. To be the latter, we thought our-
" ſelves deſerving: You thought ſo too till now, when private inter-
" eſts engaging your attention you begin to cry out for juſtice, which
" no people ever yet ſo ſtudiouſly practiſed, as, when able to carry a
" point by ſtrength, to check their inclination and let it drop.
" And worthy, farther, are they of applauſe, who, purſuing the
" dictates of human nature in gaining rule over others, obſerve juſtice
" more ſteddily than their ſcope of power requireth from them.
" And ſo far we have reaſon to conclude, that were our power
" lodged in other hands, plain evidence would ſoon decide with
" what peculiar moderation we uſe it: Though, ſo hard indeed is
" our lot, that calumny and not applauſe hath been the conſequence
" of ſuch our lenity. In ſuits of contract againſt our dependents
" we are often worſted; and, though ever ſubmitting to fair and
" impartial trials in our own courts, we are charged with litigiouſ-
" neſs. Not one of them reflecteth, that thoſe who are abſolute in
" other places, and treat not their dependents with that moderation
" which we obſerve, are for that very reaſon exempted from re-
" proach: For, where lawleſs violence is practiſed there can be no
" room for appeals to juſtice. But our dependents accuſtomed to
" conteſt with us upon equal footing, if they ſuffer never ſo little
" damage where they fancy equity to be along with them, either by
" a judicial ſentence or the deciſion of reigning power, expreſs no
" gratitude for the greater ſhare of property they yet enjoy, but reſent
" with higher chagrin the loſs of ſuch a pittance, than if at firſt
" we had ſet law aſide and ſeized their all with open violence: Even,

" in

" in this caſe, they could not preſume to deny, that inferiors ought
" to ſubmit to their ſuperiors. But mankind, it ſeemeth, reſent the
" acts of injuſtice more deeply than the acts of violence: Thoſe,
" coming from an equal, are looked upon as rapines; Theſe, com-
" ing from a ſuperior, are complied with as neceſſities. The far
" more grievous oppreſſions of *the Mede* they bore with patience,
" but our government they look upon as ſevere: It may be ſo: For
" to ſubjects the *preſent* is always grievous. If you therefore by our
" overthrow ſhould gain the aſcendent over them, you would ſoon
" perceive that good diſpoſition towards you, which a dread of us
" hath occaſioned, to be vaniſhing away; eſpecially, ſhould you
" exert your ſuperiority according to the ſpecimens you gave during
" your ſhort command againſt *the Mede*. For the inſtitutions eſta-
" bliſhed here amongſt yourſelves have no affinity with thoſe of other
" places: And more than this, not one Spartan amongſt you, when
" delegated to a foreign charge, either knoweth how to apply his
" own, or make uſe of thoſe of the reſt of Greece.

" From your reſolutions therefore with great deliberation, as on
" points of no ſmall importance. Hearken not ſo far to the opi-
" nions and calumnies of foreign *ſtates*, as to embroil your own do-
" meſtic tranquillity. Reflect in time on the great uncertainty of
" war, before you engage in it. Protracted into long continuance,
" it is generally uſed to end in calamities, from which we are now
" at an equal diſtance; and, to the lot of which of us they will
" fall, lieth yet to be determined by the hazardous event. Men,
" who run eagerly to arms, are firſt of all intent on doing ſome ex-
" ploits, which ought in point of time to be ſecond to ſomething
" more important; and, when ſmarting with diſtreſs, they have re-
" courſe to reaſon. But ſince *we* are by no means guilty of ſuch
" raſhneſs ourſelves, nor as yet perceive it in *you*, we exhort you,
" whilſt healing meaſures are in the election of us both, not to break
" the treaty, not to violate your oaths, but to ſubmit the points in
" conteſt

" conteſt to fair arbitration, according to the articles ſubſiſting be-
" tween us. If not, we here invoke the Gods, who take cogni-
" zance of oaths, to bear us witneſs, that we ſhall endeavor to re-
" venge ourſelves upon the authors of a war, by whatever methods
" *yourſelves* ſhall ſet us an example."

Theſe things were ſaid by the Athenian embaſſy. And, when the Lacedæmonians had thus heard the accuſations of their allies againſt the Athenians, and what the Athenians had urged in their turn, ordering all parties to withdraw, they proceeded to ſerious conſultation amongſt themſelves. The majority agreed in the opinion, that " the Athenians were already guilty of injuſtice, and that a war ought to be immediately declared." But Archidamus their King, eſteemed a man of good underſtanding and temper, ſtanding forth expreſſed his own ſentiments, thus ----

Speech of Archidamus.

" I HAVE learned myſelf by the experience of many wars, and
" I ſee many of you, ye Lacedæmonians, as great proficients in
" years as I am, that no one ſhould be fond of an enterprize becauſe
" it is new, which is a vulgar weakneſs, judging it thence both ad-
" viſeable and ſafe. The war, which is at preſent the ſubject of
" your conſultation, you will find, if examined diſcreetly, to bode
" a very long continuance. Againſt Peloponneſians, it is true, and
" borderers upon ourſelves we have ever a competent force in readi-
" neſs, and by expeditious ſteps can advance againſt any of them.
" But, againſt a people whoſe territories are far remote, who are
" farther moſt expert in naval skill, who with all the expedients of
" war are moſt excellently provided, with wealth both private and
" public, with ſhipping, with horſes, with arms, and with men,
" far beyond what any other *ſtate* in Greece can ſingly pretend to,
" who more than this have numerous dependent *ſtates* upon whom
" they levy tribute --- where is the neceſſity ſanguinely to wiſh for

" war

" war againſt ſuch a people? and, wherein is our dependence, if
" thus unprepared we ſhould declare it againſt them? Is it on our
" naval force? But in that we are inferior: And if to *this* we ſhall
" apply our care and advance ourſelves to an equality with them,
" why this will be a work of time. Or, is it on our wealth? In
" *this* we are yet much more deficient; and neither have it in any
" public fund, nor can readily raiſe it from private purſes. But, the
" confidence of *ſome* may perhaps be buoyed up with our ſuperio-
" rity in arms and numbers, ſo that we may eaſily march into
" their territory and lay it waſte: Yet, other territories and of large
" extent are ſubject to their power, and by ſea they will import all
" neceſſary ſupplies. If, further, we tempt their dependents to a re-
" volt, we ſhall want a naval ſtrength to ſupport them in it, as the
" majority of them are ſeated upon iſlands. What therefore will be
" the event of this our war? For, if we are unable either to over-
" power them at ſea, or divert thoſe revenues by which their navy
" is ſupported, we ſhall only by acting prejudice ourſelves. And in
" ſuch a ſituation, to be forced to give it up will be a blemiſh on
" our honour; eſpecially, if we ſhall be thought to have been the
" authors of the breach. For let us not be puffed up with idle
" hope, that this war muſt ſoon be over, if we can lay their terri-
" tory waſte: I have reaſon on better grounds to apprehend, that
" we ſhall leave it behind us a legacy to our children. It is by no
" means conſiſtent with the ſpirit of Athenians, either to be ſlaves
" to their ſoil, or like unpractiſed ſoldiers to ſhudder at a war. Nor
" again, on the other hand, am I ſo void of ſenſibility, as to adviſe
" you to give up your confederates to their outrage, or wilfully to
" connive at their encroachments; but only, not yet to have recourſe
" to arms, to ſend embaſſadors to prefer our complaints, without be-
" traying too great an eagerneſs for war, or any tokens of puſilla-
" nimity. By pauſing thus, we may get our own affairs in readi-
" neſs, by augmenting our ſtrength through an acceſſion of allies,

" either

" either Grecian or Barbarian, whereſoever we can procure ſupplies
" of ſhips or money. And the leaſt room there cannot be for cen-
" ſure, when a people in the ſtate we are at preſent, expoſed to all
" the guiles of the Athenians, endeavor to ſave themſelves not
" merely by Grecian but even by Barbarian aid. And at the ſame
" time, let us omit no reſource within the reach of our own ability.
" If indeed, upon our ſending an embaſſy, they will hearken to
" reaſon, that will be the happieſt for us all. If not; after two or
" three years delay, then better provided, we may, if it be thought
" expedient, take the field againſt them. But in good time perhaps,
" when they ſee our preparations and the intent of them clearly ex-
" plained by our own declarations, they may make each requiſite
" conceſſion, before their territory is deſtroyed by ravage, and whilſt
" yet they may ſave their property from utter devaſtation. Regard
" their territory, I beſeech you, in no other light than as an hoſtage
" for their good behaviour, and the more firmly ſuch the better
" may be its culture. Of this we ought to be ſparing as long as poſ-
" ſible, that we drive them not into deſperate fury, and render more
" unpracticable their defeat. For if, thus unprovided as we are and
" worked up to anger by the inſtigations of our confederates, we at
" once begin this ravage, reflect whether we ſhall not taint its repu-
" tation and the more embroil Peloponneſus: Since accuſations as
" well of *ſtates* as private perſons it is poſſible to clear away: But in
" a war, begun by general concurrence for the ſake of a ſingle party,
" which it is impoſſible to ſee how far it will extend, we cannot at
" pleaſure deſiſt, and preſerve our honour.
" Let no one think it a mark of puſillanimity, that many as we
" are we do not ruſh immediately upon one ſingle *State*. That
" State has as large a number of dependents who contribute to its
" ſupport: And a war is not ſo much of arms as of money, by
" which arms are rendered of ſervice; and the more ſo, when a
" landed power is contending againſt a naval. Be it therefore our
" earlieſt

" earlieſt endeavour to provide amply for this, nor let us prema-
" turely be too much fermented by the harangues of our allies. Let
" us, to whoſe account the event, whatever it be, will be princi-
" pally charged ----- Let us, with ſedate deliberation, endeavor in
" ſome degree to forſee it; and, be not in the leaſt aſhamed of that
" ſlow and dilatory temper, for which the Corinthians ſo highly re-
" proach you. For through too great precipitancy you will come
" more ſlowly to an end, becauſe you ſet out without proper prepa-
" rations. The *ſtate* of which we are the conſtituents, hath ever
" been free and moſt celebrated by fame: And *that* reproach can at
" moſt be nothing but the inborn ſedateneſs of our minds. By this
" we are diſtinguiſhed, as the only people who never grow inſolent
" with ſucceſs, and who never are abject in adverſity. And when
" again they invite us to hazardous attempts by uttering our praiſe, the
" delight of hearing muſt not raiſe our ſpirits above our judgment.
" If any, farther, endeavor to exaſperate us by a flow of invective,
" we are not by that to be provoked the ſooner to compliance.
" From tempers thus evenly balanced it is, that we are warm in the
" field of battle, and cool in the hours of debate: The former, be-
" cauſe a ſenſe of duty hath the greateſt influence over a ſedate diſ-
" poſition, and magnanimity the keeneſt ſenſe of ſhame: And, good
" we are at debate, as our education is not polite enough to teach
" us a contempt of laws, and by its ſeverity giveth us ſo much good
" ſenſe as never to diſregard them. We are not a people ſo imper-
" tinently wiſe, as to invalidate the preparations of our enemies by
" a plauſible harangue, and then abſurdly proceed to a conteſt; but
" we reckon the thoughts of our neighbors to be of a ſimilar caſt
" with our own, and that hazardous contingencies are not to be de-
" termined by a ſpeech. We always preſume that the projects of
" our enemies are judiciouſly planned, and then ſeriouſly prepare to
" defeat them. For we ought not to found our ſucceſs upon the
" hope that they will certainly blunder in their conduct, but that

" we have omitted no proper ſtep for our own ſecurity. We ought
" not to imagine, there is ſo mighty difference between man and
" man; but, that he is the moſt accompliſhed, who hath been re-
" gularly trained through a courſe of needful induſtry and toil.
" Such is the diſcipline which our fathers have handed down to
" us; and by adhering to it, we have reaped conſiderable advantages.
" Let us not forego it now, nor in a ſmall portion of only one day
" precipitately determine a point, wherein ſo many lives, ſo vaſt an
" expence, ſo many ſtates, and ſo much honour are at ſtake. But,
" let us more leiſurely proceed, which our power will warrant us
" in doing more eaſily than others. Diſpatch embaſſadors to the
" Athenians, concerning Potidæa; diſpatch them, concerning the com-
" plaints our allies exhibit againſt them; and the ſooner, as they have
" declared a readineſs to ſubmit to fair deciſions. Againſt men, who
" offer this, we ought not to march, before they are convicted of
" injuſtice. But, during this interval, get every thing in readineſs
" for war. Your reſolutions thus will be moſt wiſely formed, and
" ſtrike into your enemies the greateſt dread."

Archidamus ſpoke thus. But Sthenelaïdas, at that time one of the *Ephori*, ſtanding forth the laſt on this occaſion, gave his opinion as followeth:

Speech of Sthenelaïdas.

" THE many words of the Athenians for my part I do not un-
" derſtand. They have been exceeding large in the praiſe of them-
" ſelves; but as to the charge againſt them, that they injure our al-
" lies and Peloponneſus, they have made no reply. If, in truth,
" they were formerly good againſt the Medes, but are now bad
" towards us, they deſerve to be doubly puniſhed; becauſe, ceaſing
" to be good, they are grown very bad. We continue the ſame
" perſons both *then* and *now*, and ſhall not, if we are wiſe, paſs
" over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait any longer to revenge
" them,

" them, ſince they are paſt waiting for their ſufferings. But —
" other people, forſooth, have a great deal of wealth, and ſhips,
" and horſes — We too have gallant allies, whom we ought not
" to betray to the Athenians, nor refer them to law and pleadings,
" ſince it was not by pleadings they were injured: But we ought,
" with all expedition and with all our ſtrength, to ſeek revenge.
" *How* we ought to deliberate when we have been wronged, let no
" man pretend to inform me: It would have better become *thoſe*,
" who deſigned to commit ſuch wrongs, to have deliberated a long
" time ago. Vote then the war, Lacedæmonians, with a ſpirit be-
" coming Sparta. And, neither ſuffer the Athenians to grow ſtill
" greater, nor let us betray our own confederates; but, with the
" Gods on our ſide, march out againſt theſe authors of injuſtice."

The queſtion put.

Having ſpoke thus, by virtue of his office as preſiding in the college of *Ephori* [1], he put the queſtion in the Lacedæmonian council. But, as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he ſaid " he could not " amidſt the ſhout diſtinguiſh the majority;" and, being deſirous that each of them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might ſhew they were more inclined to war, he proceeded thus — " To whom-
" ſoever of you, Lacedæmonians, the treaty appeareth broke and the
" Athenians to be in the wrong, let him riſe up and go thither," pointing out to them a certain place: " But, whoever is of the con-
" trary opinion, let him go yonder." They roſe up, and were divided; but a great majority was on that ſide which voted the treaty broke.

Carried.

1 The college of *Ephori* (or *inſpectors*) at Sparta conſiſted of five. They were annually elected by the people from their own body, and were deſigned to be checks upon the regal power. They never forgot the end of their inſtitution, and in fact quite lorded it over the kings. In a word, the whole adminiſtration was lodged in their hands, and the kings were never ſovereigns but in the field at the head of the troops. One of the Ephori had the honour to give its ſtile to the year, in the ſame manner as the firſt Archon did at Athens.

Upon this, calling in their confederates, they told them, " They " had come to a reſolution that the Athenians were guilty of in- " juſtice; but they were deſirous to put it again to the vote in a " general aſſembly of all their confederates, that by taking their " meaſures in concert, they might briskly ply the war, if deter- " mined by common conſent."

The Lacedæmonians *jealous of the* Athenian *power.*

Matters being brought to this point, they departed to their reſpective homes, and the Athenian embaſſadors, having ended their negotiations, ſtay'd not long behind. This decree of the Lacedæmonian council that " the treaty was broke," was paſſed in the fourteenth year of the treaty concluded for thirty years after the conqueſt of Eubœa. But the Lacedæmonians voted this treaty broke and a war neceſſary, not ſo much out of regard to the arguments urged by their allies, as from their own jealouſy of the growing power of the Athenians. They dreaded the advancement of that power, as they ſaw the greateſt part of Greece was already in ſubjection to them.

Digreſſion.

NOW the method, by which the Athenians had advanced their power to this invidious height, was This —— [2]

After that the Medes, defeated by the Grecians both at land and ſea, had evacuated Europe, and ſuch of them, as eſcaped by ſea, were utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians who commanded the Grecians at Mycale returned home, drawing away with him all the confederates of Peloponneſus. But the Athenians, with the confederates of Ionia and Helleſpont, who were now revolted from *the King*, continuing in thoſe parts laid ſiege to Seſtus

2 The ſeries of hiſtory on which Thucydides now enters, though not ſtrictly within the compaſs of his ſubject, yet moſt needful to give it light, and to ſhew how preſent events are connected with, and how far they reſulted from preceding, is excellent in its kind. He ſtates important facts in the cleareſt moſt orderly manner, he opens before us the ſource of the Athenian power, and by a neat and conciſe enumeration of notable events, conducts it to that height, which excited the jealouſy of other ſtates, and was the true political cauſe of the ſucceeding war.

then

then held by the Medes; and, preſſing it during the winter-ſeaſon, the Barbarians at length abandoned the place. After this they ſeparated, ſailing away from the Helleſpont, every people to their own reſpective countries.

Policy of Themiſtocles.

But the Athenian community, when the Barbarians had evacuated their territory, immediately brought back again from the places of refuge their wives and children and all their remaining effects, and vigorouſly applied themſelves to rebuild the city of Athens and the walls: For but a ſmall part of theſe was left ſtanding; and their houſes, moſt of them had been demoliſhed, and but few preſerved by way of lodgings for the Perſian nobles. The Lacedæmonians, informed of their deſign, came in embaſſy to prevent it; partly, to gratify themſelves, as they would behold with pleaſure every city in Greece unwalled like Sparta; but more, to gratify their confederates, inviting them to ſuch a ſtep from a jealouſy of the naval power of the Athenians, now greater than at any time before, and of the courage they had ſo bravely exerted in the war againſt the Medes. They required them to deſiſt from building their walls, and rather to join with them in levelling every fortification whatever without Peloponneſus. Their true meaning and their inward jealouſy they endeavoured to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence, that "then *the Barbarian*, ſhould he again invade them, would find no ſtrong-hold from whence to aſſault them, as in the laſt inſtance he had done from Thebes;" alledging farther, that "Peloponneſus was a place of ſecure retreat and certain reſource for all." To theſe repreſentations of the Lacedæmonians the Athenians by the advice of Themiſtocles made this reply, that "they would ſend embaſſadors to them to debate this affair;" and ſo without farther explanation diſmiſſed them. Themiſtocles next adviſed, that "he himſelf might be diſpatched forthwith to Lacedæmon, and by no means haſtily to ſend away the others who were to be joined in the commiſſion with him, but to detain them till the walls were carried up

to

to a height neceſſary at leaſt for a defence; that the work ſhould be expedited by the joint-labour of all the inhabitants without exception, of themſelves, their wives and their children, ſparing neither public nor private edifice from whence any proper materials could be had, but demoliſhing all." Having thus adviſed them, and ſuggeſted farther what conduct he himſelf deſigned to obſerve, he ſets out for Lacedæmon. Upon his arrival there, he demanded no public audience, he protracted matters, and ſtudied evaſions. Whenever any perſon in the public adminiſtration demanded the reaſon why he aſked not an audience, his anſwer was, that " he waited for the arrival of his collegues, who were detained by urgent buſineſs, he expected they would ſpeedily be with him, and was ſurprized they are not yet come." As they had a good opinion of Themiſtocles, they eaſily acquieſced in ſuch an anſwer. But other Perſons afterwards arriving and making clear affirmation that " the wall is carrying on and already built up to a conſiderable height," they had it no longer in their power to be incredulous. Themiſtocles, knowing this, exhorts them, " not raſhly to be biaſſed by rumours, but rather to ſend away ſome truſty perſons of their own body, who from a view might report the truth." With this propoſal they comply; and Themiſtocles ſendeth ſecret inſtructions to the Athenians how to behave towards theſe delegates; — " to detain them, though with as little appearance of deſign as poſſible, and by no means to diſmiſs them before they received again their own embaſſadors:" For his collegues were by this arrived, Abronychus the ſon of Lyſicles, and Ariſtides * the ſon of Lyſimachus, who brought him an aſſurance that the wall was ſufficiently compleated. His fear was, that the Lacedæmonians, when they had diſcovered the truth, would put them under arreſt. The Athenians therefore detained the delegates according to inſtruction. And Themiſtocles, going to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, there openly declared, " that Athens was now ſo far walled, as to be ſtrong enough

* *The Juſt.*

enough for the defence of its Inhabitants: For the future, when the Lacedæmonians or confederates ſent embaſſadors thither, they muſt addreſs themſelves to them as to a people who perfectly knew their own intereſt and the intereſt of Greece; ſince, when they judged it moſt adviſeable to abandon their city and go on ſhip-board, they aſſerted their native courage without Lacedæmonian ſupport; and, in all ſubſequent meaſures taken in conjunction, had ſhewn themſelves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the field: At preſent therefore they judge it moſt expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, and thus to render it a place of greater ſecurity for their own members and for all their allies: It would not be poſſible, with ſtrength inferior to that of a rival-power, equally to preſerve and evenly to ballance the public welfare of Greece." —From hence he inferred, that "either all cities of the *ſtates* which formed the Lacedæmonian league ſhould be diſmantled, or it be allowed that the things now done at Athens were juſt and proper." The Lacedæmonians, upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance of reſentment againſt the Athenians: —They had not ſent their embaſſy directly to prohibit, but to adviſe them to deſiſt upon motives of general good: at that time alſo, they had a great regard for the Athenians, becauſe of the public ſpirit they had ſhewn againſt *the Mede*: —— But however, thus baffled as they were in their political views, they were inwardly provoked; and the embaſſadors on each ſide returned home without farther embroilments.

By this conduct the Athenians in a ſmall ſpace of time walled their city around: And the very face of the ſtructure ſheweth plainly to this day that it was built in haſte. The foundations are laid with ſtones of every kind, in ſome places not hewn ſo as properly to fit but piled on at random. Many pillars alſo from ſepulchral monuments and carved ſtones were blended promiſcuouſly in the work. For the circuit of it was every where enlarged beyond the compaſs of the city; and for this reaſon, collecting the materials from every place without diſtinction, they loſt no time. The-

The Piræus.

** Archon.*

Themiſtocles alſo perſuaded them to finiſh the Piræus: For it was begun before this, during that year, in which he himſelf [3] was * chief magiſtrate at Athens. He judged the place to be very commodious, as formed by nature into three harbours; and, that the Athenians, grown more than ever intent on their marine, might render it highly conducive to an enlargement of their power. For he was the firſt perſon, who durſt tell them, that they ought to graſp at the ſovereignty of the ſea; and immediately began to put the plan in execution. And by his direction it was, that they built the wall round the Piræus of that thickneſs which is viſible to this day. For two carts carrying the ſtone paſſed along it by one another: Within was neither mortar nor mud; but the entire ſtructure was one pile of large ſtones, hewn ſquare to cloſe their angles exactly, and grappled firmly together on the outſide with iron and lead; though in height it was not carried up above half ſo far as he intended. He contrived it to be, both in height and breadth, an impregnable rampart againſt hoſtile aſſaults; and he deſigned, that a few, and thoſe the leaſt able of the people, might be ſufficient to man it, whilſt the reſt ſhould be employed on board the fleet. His attention was chiefly confined to a navy; plainly, diſcerning, in my opinion, that the forces of *the King* had a much eaſier way to annoy them by ſea than by land. He thence judged the Piræus to be a place of much greater importance than the upper-city. And this piece of advice he frequently gave the Athenians, that "if ever they were preſſed hard by land, they ſhould retire down thither, and with their naval force make head againſt all opponents." In this manner the Athenians,

3 The number of the *Archons* or *Rulers* was nine. They were annually elected by lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic deſcent, irreproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly ſound in body. The firſt of the nine gave its ſtile to the year, and was therefore called *Eponymus* or the *Namer*: The ſecond was ſtiled *King*: The third *Polemarch*: The other ſix in common *Theſmothetæ*. All the civil and religious affairs of the ſtate belonged to their department.

without

without loſing time, after the retreat of the Medes fortified their city, and prepared all the neceſſary means for their own ſecurity.

Pauſanias the ſon of Cleombrotus was ſent out from Lacedæmon, as commander in chief of the Grecians, with twenty ſail of ſhips from Peloponneſus, joined by thirty Athenian and a number of other allies. They bent their courſe againſt Cyprus, and reduced moſt of the towns there. From thence they proceeded to Byzantium garriſoned by the Medes, and blockaded, and carried the place under his directions. Pauſanias.

But, being now grown quite turbulent in command, the other Grecians, eſpecially the Ionians and all who had lately recovered their liberty from the *royal* yoke, were highly chagrined. They addreſſed themſelves to the Athenians, requeſting them "from the tie of conſanguinity to undertake their protection, and not to leave them thus largely expoſed to the violence of Pauſanias." This requeſt was favourably heard by the Athenians, who expreſſed their willingneſs to put a ſtop to ſuch grievances, and to reſettle the general order, to the beſt of their power.—But during this, the Lacedæmonians recalled Pauſanias, that he might anſwer what was laid to his charge. Many of the Grecians had carried to them accuſations againſt him for an unjuſt abuſe of his power, ſince in his behaviour he reſembled more a tyrant than a general. And it ſo fell out, that he was recalled juſt at the time when the confederates, out of hatred to him, had ranged themſelves under the Athenian orders, excepting thoſe troops which were of Peloponneſus. Upon his return to Lacedæmon, he was convicted upon trial of miſdemeanors towards particulars, but of the heavieſt part of the charge he is acquitted: For the principal accuſation againſt him was an attachment to the Mediſh intereſt; and it might be judged too clear to ſtand in need of proof. Him therefore they no longer intruſt with the public command, but appoint in his ſted Dorcis with ſome collegues to command what little force of their own remained. To theſe the confederates would

no longer yield the ſupreme command; which ſo ſoon as they perceived, they returned home. And here, the Lacedæmonians deſiſted from commiſſioning any others to take upon them that poſt; fearing, leſt thoſe who ſhould be ſent might by their behaviour ſtill more prejudice the Lacedæmonian intereſt, a caſe they had reaſon to dread from the behaviour of Pauſanias. They were now grown deſirous to rid themſelves of the Mediſh war; they acknowledged the Athenians had good pretenſions to enjoy the command, and at that time were well-affected towards them.

The Athenians having in this manner obtained the ſupreme command, by the voluntary tender of the whole confederacy in conſequence of their averſion to Pauſanias; they fixed by their own authority the quotas whether of ſhips or money which each *ſtate* was to furniſh againſt *the Barbarian*. The colour pretended was, "to revenge the calamities they had hitherto ſuffered, by carrying hoſtilities into the dominions of *the King*." This gave its firſt riſe to the Athenian office of * *General* [4] *Receivers of Greece*, whoſe buſineſs it was to collect this tribute: For the contribution of this money was called by that title. The firſt tribute levied in conſequence of this amounted to † four hundred and ſixty talents. Delos was appointed to be their treaſury; and the ſittings were held in the temple there.

The Athenians *General Receivers of* Greece.

* Hellenotamiæ.

† 89125 *l. Sterling.*

How they enlarg'd their power.

Their command was thus at firſt over free and independent confederates, who ſat with them at council, and had a vote in public

4 This nice and difficult point was adjuſted by Ariſtides, to the general ſatisfaction of all the parties concerned. Greece conferred upon him this moſt important truſt, he was called to this delicate commiſſion by the united voice of his country; "Poor (ſays Plutarch) when he ſet about it, but poorer when he had finiſhed it." The Athenian ſtate was now furniſhed with a large annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy the foreign enemies of Greece, but even thoſe Greeks who ſhould at any time preſume to oppoſe the meaſures of Athens. They ſoon found out that their own city was a more convenient place for keeping this treaſure than the iſle of Delos, and accordingly took care to remove it thither.

reſolu-

reſolutions. The enlargement of their authority was the reſult of wars and their own political management during the interval between the invaſion of the Medes and the preſent war, when the conteſts were either againſt *the Barbarian*, or their own allies endeavouring at a change, or thoſe of the Peloponneſians who interfered on every occaſion on purpoſe to moleſt them. Of theſe I have ſubjoined a particular detail, and have ventured a digreſſion from my ſubject, becauſe this piece of hiſtory hath been omitted by all preceding writers. They have either confined their accounts to the affairs of Greece prior in time, or to the invaſions of the Medes. Hellanicus is the only one of them, who hath touched it in his Attic hiſtory; though his memorials are ſhort, and not accurately diſtinguiſhed by proper dates. But this, at the ſame time, will moſt clearly ſhew the method, in which the Athenian empire was erected.

In the firſt place, under the command of [5] Cimon ſon of Miltiades, they laid ſiege to Eïon a town upon the Strymon poſſeſſed by the Medes, which they carried, and ſold all found within it for ſlaves.——They afterwards did the ſame by Scyros an iſland in the Ægean ſea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in it a colony of their own people.——They had, farther, a war with the Caryſthians ſingly, in which the reſt of the Eubœans were unconcerned, who at length ſubmitted to them upon terms.——After this they made war upon the Naxians who had revolted, and reduced them by a ſiege. This was the firſt confederate-ſtate, which was enſlaved to Cimon.

5 Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, open, and ingenuous, upright in his political conduct like Ariſtides, and though an able politician yet not ſo miſchievouſly refined as to diſcard honeſty and ſincerity from public meaſures. His father Miltiades, after performing moſt ſignal ſervices to his country, was heavily fined, thrown into priſon because unable to pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards paid the fine, is now going alſo to perform great ſervices to the ſtate, is afterwards baniſhed, but recalled, and again employed in foreign commands, dying at laſt in the ſervice of his country, highly regretted not only at Athens, but throughout Greece.

gratify their aſpiring ambition; though afterwards all the reſt, as opportunity occurred, had the ſame fate.

The occaſions of ſuch revolts were various; though the principal were deficiencies in their quotas of tribute and ſhipping, and refuſals of common ſervice. For the Athenians exerted their authority with exactneſs and rigour, and laid heavy loads upon men, who had neither been accuſtomed nor were willing to bear oppreſſion. Their method of command was ſoon perverted; they no longer cared to make it agreeable, and in general ſervice diſallowed an equality, as it was now more than ever in their power to force revolters to ſubmiſſion. But theſe points the confederates had highly facilitated by their own proceedings. For, through a reluctancy of mingling in frequent expeditions, a majority of them, to redeem their perſonal attendance, were rated at certain ſums of money, equivalent to the expence of the ſhips they ought to have furniſhed. The ſums paid on theſe occaſions to the Athenians, were employed by them to increaſe their own naval force; and the tributaries thus drained, whenever they preſumed to revolt, had parted with the needful expedients of war, and were without reſource.

Battle of Eurymedon. After theſe things it happened, that the Athenians and their confederates fought againſt the Medes both by land and ſea, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon the ſon of Miltiades commanded; and the Athenians were victorious the very ſame day in both elements. They took and deſtroyed the ſhips of the Phœnicians, in the whole about two hundred.

Thaſus. Later in time than this happened a revolt of the Thaſians, ariſing from diſputes about places of trade on the oppoſite coaſts of Thrace and the mines which they poſſeſſed there. The Athenians with a ſufficient force ſailed againſt Thaſus; and, after gaining a victory by

Amphipolis. ſea, landed upon the iſland.——About the ſame time, they had ſent a colony, conſiſting of about ten thouſand of their own and confederate people, towards the Strymon, who were to ſettle in a place called

called then the *Nine-ways*, but now Amphipolis. They became maſters of the *Nine-ways* by diſpoſſeſſing the Edonians. But advancing farther into the midland parts of Thrace, they were all cut off at Drabeſcus of Edonia by the united force of the Thracians, who were all enemies to this new ſettlement now forming at the *Nine-ways*.—But the Thaſians, defeated in battle and beſieged, implored the ſuccour of the Lacedæmonians, and exhorted them to make a diverſion in their favour by breaking into Attica. This they promiſed unknown to the Athenians, and were intent on the the performance, but were prevented by the ſhock of an earthquake. The [6] Helots, farther, had ſeized this opportunity, in concert with the neighbouring Thuriatæ and Æthéans, to revolt and ſeize Ithome. Moſt of the Helots were deſcendants of the ancient Meſſenians then reduced to ſlavery, and on this account all of them in general were called Meſſenians. This war againſt the revolters in Ithome gave full employ to the Lacedæmonians. And the Thaſians, after holding out three years blockade were forced to ſurrender upon terms to the Athenians:——They were "to level their walls, to give up

Earthquake at Sparta.

Inſurrection of the Helots.

Thaſus.

6 Helots was the name given in general to the ſlaves of the Lacedæmonians. The firſt of the kind were the inhabitants of Helos in Meſſenia, who were conquered and enſlaved by the Lacedæmonians; and all their ſlaves in ſucceeding times had the ſame denomination. The tillage of the ground, the exerciſe of trades, all manual labour and every kind of drudgery was thrown upon them. They were always treated by their Spartan maſters with great ſeverity, and often with the utmoſt barbarity; at their caprice, or ſometimes for reaſons of ſtate, they were wantonly put to death or inhumanly butchered. There is a remarkable inſtance of the latter in the fourth book of this hiſtory. According to Plutarch it was a common ſaying in Greece, That a freeman at Sparta was the freeſt, and a ſlave the greateſt ſlave in the world.—Thus miſerably oppreſſed, no wonder they ſeized an opportunity of revolt. The earthquake here mentioned was ſo violent, that (according to Plutarch) it demoliſhed all the houſes in Sparta, except five. The Helots roſe at once effectually to demoliſh thoſe Spartans too, who were not buried in the ruins. But Archidamus had already, by way of precaution, ſounded an alarm, and got them together in a body. The Helots thus prevented marched off, and ſeized Ithome, where they made a long and obſtinate reſiſtance.

their

their ſhipping, to pay the whole arrear of their tribute, to advance it punctually for the future, and to quit all pretenſions to the continent and the mines."

Siege of Ithome.

The Lacedæmonians, as their war againſt the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of time, demanded the aſſiſtance of their allies, and amongſt others of the Athenians. No ſmall number of theſe were ſent to their aid, under the command of Cimon. The demand of aſſiſtance from *them* was principally owing to the reputation they then were in for their ſuperior skill in the methods of approaching and attacking walls. The long continuance of the ſiege convinced them of the neceſſity of ſuch methods, though they would fain have taken it by ſtorm. The firſt open enmity between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians broke out from this expedition. For the Lacedæmonians, when the place could not be carried by ſtorm, growing jealous of the daring and innovating temper of the Athenians, and regarding them as aliens, leſt by a longer ſtay they might be tampering with the rebels in Ithome, and ſo raiſe them freſh embaraſſments, gave a diſmiſſion to them alone of their allies. They ſtrove indeed to conceal their ſuſpicions, by alledging " they have no longer any need of their aſſiſtance." The Athenians were convinced, that their diſmiſſion was not owing to this more plauſible colour, but to ſome latent jealouſy. They reckoned themſelves aggrieved; and, thinking they had merited better uſage from the hands of the Lacedæmonians, were ſcarcely withdrawn, than in open diſregard to the league ſubſiſting between them againſt *the Mede*, they clapped up an alliance with *their* old enemies the Argives: And in the ſame oaths and ſame alliance the Theſſalians alſo were comprehended with them both.

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of the ſiege, unable to hold out any longer, ſurrendered to the Lacedæmonians on the following conditions — that " a term of ſecurity be allowed them to quit Peloponneſus, into which they never ſhall return again; that, if any

any one of them be ever found there, he ſhould be made the ſlave of whoever apprehended him." The Pythian oracle had already warned the Lacedæmonians " to let go the ſuppliants of Jupiter Ithometes." The men therefore with their wives and children went out of Ithome, and gained a reception from the Athenians, who acted now in enmity to the Lacedæmonians, and aſſigned them Naupactus for their reſidence, which they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozoli.

The Megaréans alſo deſerted the Lacedæmonian and went over to the Athenian alliance, becauſe the Corinthians had warred upon them in purſuance of a diſpute about ſettling their frontier. Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built up for the Megaréans the *long walls* that reach down from Megara to Niſæa, and took their guard upon themſelves. This was by no means the leaſt occaſion of that violent enmity now beginning to ariſe between Corinthians and Athenians. Megara.

Inarus the ſon of Pſammetichus, a Libyan, and king of the Libyans bordering upon Egypt, taking his rout from Maræa a city beyond the Pharos, had ſeduced the greateſt part of Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. He himſelf was conſtituted their leader, and he brought over the Athenians to aſſociate in the enterprize. They happened at that time to be employed in an expedition againſt Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ſhips of their own and their allies: But, relinquiſhing Cyprus, they went upon this new deſign. Being arrived on that coaſt and ſailed up the Nile, they were maſters of that river and two thirds of the city of Memphis, and were making their attack upon the remaining part which is called the *White-wall*. It was defended by the Perſians and Medes who had reſorted thither for refuge, and by thoſe Egyptians who had ſtood out in the general defection. ----- Egypt.

The Athenians, further, having made a deſcent at Haliæ, a battle enſued againſt the Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory

was

was on the Corinthian ſide.--- And afterwards, the Athenians engaged at ſea near Cecryphaléa with a fleet of Peloponneſians, and compleatly gained the victory. ---- A war alſo breaking out after this between
Ægina. the Æginetæ and Athenians, a great battle was fought at ſea by theſe two contending parties near Ægina. Both ſides were joined by their reſpective confederates; but the victory remained with the Athenians; who, having taken ſeventy of their ſhips, landed upon their territory, and laid ſiege to the city, under the command of Leocrates the ſon of Stroebus. The Peloponneſians, then deſirous to relieve the Æginetæ, tranſported over to Ægina three hundred heavy-armed, who before were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and Epidaurians. In the next place they ſecured the promontory of Geranéa. The Corinthians now with their allies made an incurſion into the diſtrict of Megara, judging it impoſſible for the Athenians to march to the relief of the Megaréans, as they had ſo large a force already abroad in Ægina and in Egypt; or, if they were intent on giving them relief, they muſt of neceſſity raiſe their ſiege from Ægina. The Athenians however recalled not their army from Ægina, but marched away all the old and young that were left in Athens to the aid of Megara, under the command of Myronides: And having fought a drawn battle againſt the Corinthians, both ſides retired, and both ſides looked upon themſelves as not worſted in the action. The Athenians however, upon the departure of the Corinthians, as being at leaſt ſo far victorious, erected a trophy. The Corinthians at their return heard nothing but reproaches from the ſeniors in Corinth; ſo, after beſtowing an interval of about twelve days to recruit, they came back again; and, to lay their claim alſo to the victory, ſet about erecting a trophy of oppoſition. Upon this, the Athenians ſallying with a ſhout out of Megara, put thoſe who were buſy in erecting this trophy to the ſword, and routed all who endeavoured to oppoſe them. The vanquiſhed Corinthians were forced to fly; and no ſmall part of their number, being cloſely purſued and driven from any certain

tain route, were chaced into the ground of a private perſon, which happened to be encompaſſed with a ditch ſo deep as to be quite impaſſable, and there was no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front them, and then forming their light-armed in a circle round them, ſtoned every man of them to death. This was a calamitous event to the Corinthians: But the bulk of their force got home ſafe again from this unhappy expedition.

Long-walls at Athens.

About this time alſo the Athenians began to build the *long-walls* reaching down to the ſea, both towards the Phalerus and towards the Piræus.

Phocians *and* Dorians.

The Phocians were now embroiled with the Dorians from whom the Lacedæmonians are deſcended. Having made ſome attempts on Bœon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken one of thoſe places, the Lacedæmonians marched out to ſuccour the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their natives and ten thouſand of their allies, commanded by Nicomedes the ſon of Cleombrotus in the right of Pleiſtonax ſon of Pauſanias their king who was yet a minor; and, having forced the Phocians to ſurrender upon terms the town they had taken, were preparing for their return. Now, in caſe they attempted it by paſſing over the ſea in the gulf of Criſſa, the Athenians having got round with a ſquadron were ready to obſtruct it. Nor, did they judge it ſafe to attempt it by way of Geranéa, as Megara and Pegæ were in the hands of the Athenians; for the paſs of Geranéa is ever difficult, and now was conſtantly guarded by the Athenians; and, ſhould they venture this route, they perceived that the Athenians were there alſo ready to intercept them. They determined at laſt to halt for a time in Bœotia, and watch for an opportunity to march away unmoleſted. Some citizens of Athens were now clandeſtinely practiſing with them, to obtain their concurrence in putting a ſtop to the *democracy* and the building of the *long-walls*. But the whole body of the Athenian people ruſhed out into the field againſt them, with

with a thouſand Argives and the reſpective quotas of their allies, in the whole amounting to fourteen thouſand. They judged them quite at a loſs about the means of a retreat; and the deſign alſo to overthrow their popular government began to be ſuſpected. Some Theſſalian horſemen came alſo up to join the Athenians, in purſuance of treaty, who afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the Lacedæmonians.

Battle of Tanagra. They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the victory reſted with the Lacedæmonians and allies; but the ſlaughter was great on both ſides. The Lacedæmonians afterwards took their route through the diſtrict of Megara; and, having cut down the woods, returned to their own home through Geranéa and the Iſthmus.

Battle of Oenophyta. On the ſixty ſecond day after the battle of Tanagra, the Athenians had again taken the field againſt the Bœotians, under the command of [7] Myronides. They engaged them, and gained a complete victory at [8] Oenophyta; in conſequence of which, they ſeized all the territories of Bœotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians of Opus one hundred of their richeſt perſons for hoſtages; and ----- had now completed their own *long-walls* at Athens.

7 Plutarch in his *Apothegms* relates, that when Myronides was putting himſelf at the head of the Athenians on this occaſion, his officers told him, "they were not all come out yet into the field," he replied briskly, "All are come out that will fight," and marched off.

8 This battle is repreſented by ſome, as more glorious to the Athenians than even thoſe of Marathon or Platæa. In the latter they fought accompanied by their allies againſt Barbarians; but here, with their own ſingle force, they defeated a far more numerous body of the choiceſt and beſt diſciplined troops in Greece. Plato hath marked it in his *Funeral Oration*, and told us thoſe who fell in this battle were the firſt who were honoured with a public interment in the Ceramicus. "Theſe brave "men, (ſays he, as tranſlated by Mr. Weſt) "having fought againſt Grecians for the "liberties of Grecians, and delivered thoſe, "whoſe cauſe they had undertaken to de"fend, were the firſt after the Perſian "war, upon whom the commonwealth "conferred the honour of being buried in "this public cœmetery."

Soon

Soon after, the Æginetæ ſurrendered to the Athenians upon terms. Ægina. --- They "demoliſhed their fortifications, gave up their ſhipping, and ſubmitted to pay an annual tribute for the future."

The Athenians, farther, in a cruize infeſted the coaſt of Peloponneſus, under the command of Tolmidas the ſon of Tolmæus. They burnt a dock of the Lacedæmonians, took Chalcis a city belonging to the Corinthians, and landing their men engaged with and defeated the Sicyonians. Chalcis.

During all this interval, the army of Athenians and allies continued in Egypt, amidſt various incidents and events of war. ----- At firſt, the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt. Upon this, * the *king* diſpatcheth to Lacedæmon Megabazus a Perſian *noble*, furniſhed with great ſums of money, in order to prevail upon the Lacedæmonians to make an incurſion into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall their troops from Egypt: When Megabazus could not prevail, and ſome money had been ſpent to no manner of purpoſe, he carried back what was yet unexpended with him into Aſia. He then ſendeth Megabazus the ſon of Zopyrus a Perſian *noble* againſt them with a numerous army, who marching by land fought with and defeated the Egyptians and their allies; then, drove the Grecians out of Memphis; and at laſt ſhut them up in the iſle of Proſopis. Here he kept them blocked up for a year and ſix months; till, having drained the channel by turning the water into a different courſe, he ſtranded all their ſhips, and rendered the iſland almoſt continent. He then marched his troops acroſs, and took the place by a land-aſſault. And thus a war, which had employed the Grecians for ſix continued years, ended in their deſtruction. Few only of the numbers ſent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got ſafe away to Cyrene; the far greater part were entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced to the obedience of the *king*: Amyrtéus alone held out, who reigned in the *fenny* parts. The large extent of the fens prevented his reduction; and, beſides, the Egyptians of the fens are the moſt re- Egypt.

* Artaxerxes Longimanus.

markable of all for military valour. Inarus king of the Libyans, the author of all theſe commotions in Egypt, was betrayed by treachery, and faſtned to a croſs. Beſide this, fifty triremes from Athens and the reſt of the alliance, arriving upon the coaſt of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up to Medaſium a mouth of the Nile, quite ignorant of their fate. Theſe ſome forces aſſaulted from the land, whilſt a ſquadron of Phœnicians attacked them by ſea. Many of the veſſels were by this means deſtroyed, but ſome few had the good fortune to get away. And thus the great expedition of the Athenians and allies into Egypt was brought to a concluſion.

Theſſaly. But farther, Oreſtes ſon of Echecratidas king of the Theſſalians, being driven from Theſſaly, perſuaded the Athenians to undertake his reſtoration. The Athenians, in conjunction with the Bœotians and Phocians now their allies, marched up to Pharſalus of Theſſaly. They became maſters of the adjacent country, ſo far as they could be whilſt keeping in a body; for the Theſſalian cavalry prevented any detachments. They took not that city, neither carried any one point intended by the expedition, but were obliged to withdraw and carry Oreſtes back again with them, totally unſucceſsful.

Sicyon. Not long after this, a thouſand Athenians going on board their ſhips which lay at Pegæ, for Pegæ was now in their poſſeſſion, ſteered away againſt Sicyon, under the command of [9] Pericles the ſon

9 Here the name of Pericles firſt occurs, and a hint ſhould be given to thoſe who are not well acquainted with him to mark a perſon, that was a true patriot, a conſummate ſtateſman, a great general, and a moſt ſublime ſpeaker. He was born of one of the moſt illuſtrious families in Athens. He was educated in the beſt manner, and learned his philoſophy or the knowledge of nature from Anaxagoras, whoſe doctrines agreed ſo little with the ſuperſtitious practices and tempers of the Athenians, that the maſter and all his diſciples were charged with atheiſm, for which many of them were proſecuted, and the divine Socrates moſt injuriouſly put to death. He engaged early in public affairs, gained the aſcendant over all his competitors, became at length and continued to his death, maſter of the affections and liberties too of the Athenian people, and though maſter yet guardian and increaſer of the latter. In ſhort,

ſon of Xantippus. They made a deſcent, and in a battle defeated thoſe of the Sicyonians who endeavoured to make head againſt them. From thence, they ſtrengthened themſelves by taking in ſome Achæans; and, ſtretching acroſs the gulph, landed in a diſtrict of Acarnania, and laid ſiege to Oenias; yet, unable to carry it, they ſoon quitted, and withdrew to their own homes.

Cyprus. Three years after this, a peace to continue for five years was clapped up between Peloponneſians and Athenians. Upon this, the Athenians now at leiſure from any war in Greece, engaged in an expedition againſt Cyprus with a fleet of two hundred ſhips of their own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty of theſe were afterwards detached to Egypt, at the requeſt of Amyrtæus king of the fenny part; but the reſt of them blocked up Citium. Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent famine, they were compelled to quit the blockade of Citium: And, being come up to the height of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time an united force of Phœnicians and Cyprians and Cilicians both by land and ſea. They gained the victory in both engagements; and, being rejoined by the detachment they had ſent to Egypt, returned home.

The holy war. After this, the Lacedæmonians, engaged in that which is known by the name of the *holy* war; and, having recovered the temple at Delphi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no ſooner were they withdrawn, than the Athenians marched out in their turn, retook it, and delivered it into the hands of the Phocians.

Bœotia. At no great interval of time from hence, the Athenians took the field againſt the Bœotian exiles, who had ſeized Orchomenus and Chæronæa and ſome other cities of Bœotia. Their force, ſent out upon this ſervice, conſiſted of a thouſand heavy-armed of their own,

ſhort, according to writers of the beſt authority and the graveſt hiſtorians, he was one of the moſt able and moſt diſintereſted miniſters that Athens ever had, Athens the moſt democratical ſtate that ever exiſted, ſo fertile in every thing great and glorious, and ſo over-run at the ſame time with faction, licentiouſneſs, and wild tumultuary caprice.

with

with proportional quotas from their allies, and was commanded by Tolmidas the ſon of Tolmæus. Having taken and enſlaved Chæronæa, they placed a freſh garriſon in it, and ſo withdrew. But upon their march, they are attacked at Coronéa by a body of men, conſiſting of the Bœotian exiles ſallying out of Orchomenus joined by Locrians and the exiles from Eubœa and others of their partizans. After a battle, the victory remained with the latter, who made great ſlaughter of the Athenians, and took many priſoners. Upon this, the Athenians evacuated Bœotia, and to get the priſoners releaſed conſented to a peace. The Bœotian exiles, and all others in the ſame circumſtances, were by this re-ſettled in their old habitations, and recovered their former liberty and rights.

Battle of Coronéa.

Eubœa.

It was not a great while after theſe laſt occurrences, that Eubœa revolted from the Athenians. And Pericles was no ſooner landed upon that iſland with an Athenian army to chaſtiſe them, than news was brought him, that "Megara alſo had revolted; that the Peloponneſians were going to make an incurſion into Attica; that the Athenian garriſon had been put to the ſword by the [1] Megaréans, excepting thoſe who had thrown themſelelves into Niſæa; and, that the Megaréans had effected this revolt by a junction of Corinthians and Sicyonians and Epidaurians." Upon hearing this, Pericles re-embarked with the utmoſt expedition, and brought back his army

1 This revolt of Megara, a little republic almoſt ſurrounded by the dominions of Athens, leagued cloſely with her and under her protection, gave riſe to that *decree* which excluded the Megaréans from the ports and markets of Athens. Others add, that they ſlew an Athenian herald, who was ſent to expoſtulate with them on this account. Could ſuch outrages be pocketed by Athenians? Could Pericles diſſuade the people of Athens from ſhewing reſentment? They decreed farther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the *generals of the ſtate* ſhould ſwear at their election, to make an incurſion twice a year into the Megaris. We ſhall ſoon ſee that the Peloponneſians made it a pretext for the enſuing war, and that Pericles juſtified the decree, and perſuaded the Athenians to hazard a war rather than repeal it. This is the true hiſtory of the point, though comedy and raillery and libelling, ſtrangely vary the account.

from

from Eubœa. And ſoon after the Peloponneſians, marching into Attica as far as Eleuſis and Thria, laid the country waſte, under the command of [2] Pleiſtionax the ſon of Pauſanias king of Sparta: And then, without extending the ravage any farther, they withdrew to their own homes. Now again, the Athenians tranſported a military force into Eubœa, under the command of Pericles, and ſoon compleated its reduction. The tranquillity of the reſt of the iſland was re-eſtabliſhed upon certain conditions; but they wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Heſtiæa, and repeopled it with a colony of their own. — And, not long after their return from Eubœa, they concluded a peace for thirty years with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, in purſuance of which they reſtored them Niſæa and Chalcis and Pegæ and Træzene; all which places, though belonging to the Peloponneſians, were in the hands of the Athenians. *Peace of Eubœa.*

In the ſixth year of this peace, [3] a war broke out between the Samians and Mileſians about Priene. The Mileſians, having the worſt Samian *war.*

2 As Pleiſtionax on this occaſion evacuated Attica on a ſudden, he was baniſhed from Sparta, as having been bribed by the Athenians to quit their territory. Diodorus Siculus relates, that he did it by the advice of Cleandridas his guardian, who attended him in the field on account of his youth; and, that Pericles afterwards paſſing his accounts at Athens, charged "ten talents properly laid out for the ſervice of the ſtate," which paſſed without farther explanation or exception.

3 Pericles here performed a great and ſignal ſervice to his country. The motives to this war are, according to our hiſtorian, ſufficiently ſtrong, upon the ſcheme now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the ſovereignty of Athens by ſea. Yet the comic poets and writers of memoirs and private hiſtory, give another account of the affair, which it is ſurprizing to find the authors of the *Univerſal Hiſtory* incline to think as well founded as what is given by Thucydides, that "Pericles engaged the republic in this war, merely to gratify the reſentment of Aſpaſia, who was a native of Miletus, againſt the Samians." As this Aſpaſia hath had all the honour of Pericles his merit imputed to herſelf, and he hath ſuffered a weight of reproach in her behalf, the reader will accept a ſhort account of this famous lady. She is allowed on all hands to have been a woman of the greateſt beauty and the firſt genius; but averred by ſome to have been a libertine, a proſtitute, a bawd, nay every thing ſcandalous and vile. Pericles was dotingly fond of her, and got divorced from a wife, whom

worſt in the diſpute, had recourſe to the Athenians, to whom they bitterly exclaimed againſt the Samians. Nay, even ſome private citizens of Samos joined with them in this outcry, whoſe ſcheme it was to work a change in the government. The Athenians therefore, putting to ſea with a fleet of forty ſail, landed upon Samos, where they ſet up a democracy; and exacted from them fifty boys and as many grown men for hoſtages, whom they depoſited at Lemnos. They had farther, at their departure, left a garriſon behind to ſecure that iſland. But a body of Samians, who would not ſubmit to the new form of government, and therefore had refuged themſelves upon the continent, having gained the correſpondence of the moſt powerful perſons abiding in Samos, and the alliance of Piſſuthnes ſon of Hyſtaſpes at that time governor at Sardis, and collected a body of ſeven hundred auxiliaries, paſſed over by night into Samos. They firſt exerted their efforts againſt the *popular* party, and got a majority of them into their power: In the next place, they conveyed away the hoſtages from Lemnos by ſtealth; they openly declared a revolt; and delivered up the Athenian garriſon with their officers whom they had ſeized to Piſſuthnes; and then, immediately prepared to renew their war againſt Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with them in the revolt.

whom he did not love, to marry her. She taught him, it is ſaid, his refined maxims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even compoſed the ſpeeches, on which ſo great a ſhare of his reputation was founded. The beſt men in Athens frequented her houſe, and brought their wives to receive leſſons from her of œconomy and right deportment. Socrates himſelf was her pupil in eloquence, and gives her the honour of that *funeral oration* which he delivers in the *Menexenus* of Plato. There muſt have been ſome ground even for complimenting her in this extraordinary manner. And, after every abatement, what muſt we think of a lady, who was in ſuch high eſteem with the greateſt men that ever lived at Athens, who taught force to orators, grace to philoſophers, and conduct to miniſters of ſtate; in a word, who had Pericles for her lover, and Socrates for her encomiaſt? See Bayle's *Dictionary* under *Pericles*, and *Univerſal Hiſtory*, vol. vi. p 415. note.

No

No ſooner were the Athenians informed of this, than they put out againſt Samos with ſixty ſail, though ſixteen of them were detached for other ſervices. Some of the latter were ſtationed upon the coaſt of Caria to obſerve the motions of a Phœnician fleet, and the reſt were ordered to Chios and Lesbos to give there a ſummons of aid. The remaining forty four, commanded by [4] Pericles and nine colegues, engaged near the iſle of Tragia with the Samian fleet conſiſting of ſeventy ſail, twenty of which had land-ſoldiers on board, and the whole was now on the return from Miletus; and here the Athenians gained a ſignal victory. Afterwards, forty ſail arrived from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty five from the Chians and Lesbians. With this acceſſion of force, they landed upon the iſland, overthrew the Samians in battle, inveſted their city with a triple wall, and at the ſame time blocked it up by ſea.

But Pericles, drawing off ſixty of the ſhips from this ſervice, ſteered away with all poſſible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, upon receiving advice that "a Phœnician fleet is coming up againſt them." Steſagoras alſo and others had before been ſent from Samos with five ſhips to meet that fleet. In this interval, the Samians launched out in a ſudden ſally, fell upon the [5] unfortified ſtation of the

4 The Athenians in the aſſembly of the people choſe ten *generals* every year, according to the number of their tribes. They were ſometimes, as in the preſent inſtance, all ſent out in the ſame employ. They rolled, and each in his turn was *general* of the day. Thucydides ſeldom gives more than the name of one, whom we may conclude to have been the perſon of the greateſt weight and influence amongſt them, in fact a *general in chief*. Philip of Macedon was uſed to joke upon this multiplicity of generals, "For my part (ſaid he) I have never "had the good-fortune to find more than "one general in my life; and yet the Athe-"nians find ten freſh ones every year." Not but that theſe generals were often re-elected and continued years in commiſſion. Pericles 'tis plain did ſo: and in latter times Phocion is ſaid to have been elected five and forty times. Their power was great not only in the field but at Athens. Every point that had relation to war came under their department. Pericles in a foreign employ was always firſt of the generals, and within the walls of Athens, was the firſt or rather abſolute miniſter of ſtate.

5 When the Grecians continued long on

the Athenians, ſunk the veſſels moored at a diſtance by way of guard, and engaging thoſe which put out againſt them victorioufly executed their purpoſe, were maſters of their own ſea for fourteen days continuance, and made whatever importations or exportations they pleaſed: But, as Pericles then returned, they were again [6] blocked up by ſea. He afterwards received freſh ſupplies from Athens, forty ſhips under Thucydides and Agnon and Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, beſide thirty others from Chios and Lesbos. And, though after this the Samians ventured a ſhort engagement at ſea, yet they now found all farther reſiſtance impracticable, ſo that in the ninth month of the ſiege they ſurrendered on the following terms--- "To demoliſh their walls; to give hoſtages; to deliver up their ſhipping; and, to re-imburſe by ſtated payments the expences of the war." [7]---- The Byzantines alſo came in, upon the engagement of being held only to ſuch obedience, as had formerly been required of them.

Not

a ſtation, or were apprehenſive of being attacked by an enemy, they fortified their naval ſtation and camp, towards the land with a ditch and rampart, and towards the ſea with a paliſade. At other times, a number of their ſhips lay out more to ſea, by way of guard or watch to the reſt, which were generally dragged aſhore, whilſt the ſoldiers lay round them in their tents. Sometimes they were only moor'd to the ſhore, or rode at anchor, that they might be ready upon an alarm. See *Potter*'s *Archæologia*, Vol II. c. 20.

6 The manner of doing this, was "to "environ the walls and harbour with ſhips, "ranged in order from one ſide of the "ſhore to the other, and ſo cloſely joined "together by chains and bridges, on which "armed men were placed, that without "breaking their order, there could be no "paſſage from the town to the ſea." *Potter*'s *Archæologia*, Vol. II. c. 21.

7 Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied with Athens herſelf, and had well nigh defeated her grand plan of being miſtreſs of the ſea, Pericles was received upon his return with all the honours a grateful people could give him, and was pitched upon to make the funeral oration for thoſe ſlain in the war. He performed his part with high applauſe. The ladies in particular were loud in their acclamations, and were eagerly employed in careſſing and crowning him with garlands. But for a ſmart piece of raillery from one of them, on this occaſion, and his ſmarter repartee, the reader may conſult the *Univerſal Hiſtory*, Vol. VI. p. 429. the note. In the

latter

Not many years intervened between this period of time and the riſe of thoſe differences above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidæa, and all occurrences whatever, on which the pretences of *this* Peloponneſian war were grounded. All theſe tranſactions in general, whether of Grecians againſt Grecians or againſt the *Barbarian*, fell out in the compaſs of fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the commencement of this preſent war; during which period the Athenians had eſtabliſhed their dominion on a ſolid baſis, and had roſe to a high exaltation of power. The Lacedæmonians were ſenſible of it, yet never oppoſed them, except by ſome tranſient efforts; and, for the moſt part of the time, were quite eaſy and indifferent about it. That people had never been known in a hurry to run to arms: Their wars were indiſpenſably neceſſary; and ſometimes they were entangled in domeſtic broils. Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern till the Athenian power was manifeſtly eſtabliſhed, and encroachments were made upon their own alliance. Then indeed they determined to be no longer patient: They reſolved upon a war, in which their utmoſt force ſhould be exerted, and the Athenian power, if poſſible, demoliſhed. *Recapitulation.*

ON theſe motives was formed the public reſolution of the Lacedæmonians---- That "the treaty was violated, and the Athenians "were guilty of injuſtice." They had alſo ſent to Delphi, to enquire of the God, "Whether their war would be ſucceſsful?" He is reported to have returned this anſwer, That "if they warred with "all their might, they ſhould at laſt be triumphant, and he himſelf "would fight on their ſide, invoked and uninvoked." *Continuation of the hiſtory.*

They had now again ſummoned their confederates to attend, and deſigned to put it to a general ballot, "Whether the war ſhould be "undertaken?" The embaſſadors from the ſeveral conſtituents of *Another congreſs at* Lacedæmon,

latter part of that note, the authors ſeem willing both to deny and to allow Pericles the merit of having ſerved his country in the reduction of Samos.

their alliance arrived, and aſſembled in one general council. Others made what declarations they pleaſed, the majority inveighing againſt the Athenians and inſiſting upon war: But the Corinthians (who had beforehand requeſted every *ſtate* apart to ballot for war) alarmed for Potidæa, leſt for want of ſome ſpeedy relief it might be utterly deſtroyed, being preſent alſo at this council, ſtood forth the laſt of all, and ſpoke to this effect:

Speech of the Corinthians.

" WE can no longer, ye confederates, have any room to complain " of the Lacedæmonians, ſince their own reſolution is already en- " gaged for war, and they have ſummoned us hither to give our " concurrence. For it is the duty of a governing and leading *ſtate*, " as in private concerns they obſerve the equitable conduct, ſo ever " to keep their view intent upon the general welfare, ſuitably to that " ſuperior degree of honour and regard, which in many points they " pre-eminently receive.

" For our parts, ſo many of us as have quitted Athenian friend- " ſhip for this better aſſociation, we require no farther trials to awaken " our apprehenſions. But thoſe amongſt us, who are ſeated up in " the inland parts, at a diſtance from the coaſt, ſhould now be con- " vinced, that unleſs they combine in the defence of ſuch as are " in lower ſituations, they will ſoon be obſtructed in carrying out " the fruits of their lands, and again in fetching in thoſe neceſſary " ſupplies which the ſea beſtoweth upon an inland-country. Let " them by no means judge erroneouſly of what we urge as not in " the leaſt affecting them; but look upon it as a certainty, that if " they abandon the guard of the maritime ſituations, the danger will " ſoon advance quite up to them, and they of courſe no leſs than " we are concerned in the iſſue of our preſent determinations. For " this reaſon they ought, without the leaſt heſitation, to make the " timely exchange of peace for war.

" It

" It is indeed the duty of the prudent, ſo long as they are not in-
" jured, to be fond of peace. But it is the duty of the brave, when
" injured, to throw up peace, and to have recourſe to arms; and,
" when in theſe ſucceſsful, to lay them down again in peaceful
" compoſition; thus, never to be elevated above meaſure by mili-
" tary ſucceſs, nor delighted with the ſweets of peace to ſuffer in-
" ſults. For he who, apprehenſive of loſing this delight, ſits indo-
" lently at eaſe, will ſoon be deprived of the enjoyment of that de-
" light which intereſteth his fears; and he, whoſe paſſions are in-
" flamed by military ſucceſs, elevated too high by a treacherous con-
" fidence, hears no longer the dictates of his judgment. Many are
" the ſchemes which, though unadviſedly planned, through the
" more unreaſonable conduct of an enemy turn out ſucceſsful: But
" yet more numerous are thoſe, which, though ſeemingly founded
" on mature counſel, draw after them a diſgraceful and oppoſite
" event. This proceeds from that great inequality of ſpirit, with
" which an exploit is projected, and with which it is put into actual
" execution. For, in council we reſolve, ſurrounded with ſecurity;
" in execution we faint, through the prevalence of fear.

" We now, having been groſly injured, and in abundant inſtances
" aggrieved, are taking up arms; and, when we have avenged our-
" ſelves on the Athenians, ſhall at a proper time lay them down
" again. Succeſs, upon many conſiderations, we may promiſe our-
" ſelves: In the firſt place, as we are ſuperior in numbers and mi-
" litary skill: In the next, as we all advance with uniformity to ac-
" compliſh our deſigns. A naval force, equal to that in which
" their ſtrength conſiſts, we ſhall be enabled to equip, from com-
" petent ſtores we ſeparately poſſeſs, and the funds laid up at Delphi
" and Olympia [8]. If we take up thoſe upon intereſt for immediate

8 In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Jupiter at Olympia. The wealth repoſited in theſe places muſt have been very large, conſidering the great veneration univerſally paid theſe Deities, and the numerous and valuable offerings ſent annually to theſe famous temples.

ſervice,

" ſervice, we are able, by enlarging their pay, to draw away all the
" foreigners who man their fleets. The Athenian power is not
" ſupported by a natural but a purchaſed ſtrength. And our own is
" leſs liable to be injured by the ſame method, as we are ſtrong in
" our perſons more than in our wealth. Should we gain the vic-
" tory but in one ſingle engagement at ſea, in all probability we
" have done their buſineſs; or, in caſe they continue the ſtruggle,
" we ſhall then have a longer ſpace to improve our naval practice:
" And when once we have gained an equality of ſkill, our natural
" courage will ſoon ſecure us the triumph. For that valiant ſpirit,
" which we enjoy by nature, it is impoſſible for them to acquire by
" rules: But that ſuperiority, with which at preſent their ſkill
" inveſts them, we may eaſily learn to overmatch by practice.

" Thoſe ſums of money, by which theſe points are chiefly to be
" compaſſed, we will reſpectively contribute. For would it not in
" reality be a grievous caſe, when their dependents are never back-
" ward to ſend in thoſe ſums which rivet ſlavery on themſelves, if
" we who want to be revenged on our foes, and at the ſame time to
" ſecure our own preſervation —— if we ſhould refuſe to ſubmit to
" expences, and ſhould ſtore up our wealth to be plundered by them,
" to purchaſe oppreſſions and miſeries for ourſelves?

" We have other expedients within our reach to ſupport this
" war, —— a revolt of their dependents; and, in conſequence of
" that, a diminution of their revenue, the eſſence of their ſtrength;
" erecting forts within their territory; and many others not yet to
" be foreſeen. For war by no means yields to the direction of a
" pre-determined plan; but of itſelf, in every preſent exigence,
" confines and methodizeth its own courſe. In war, who moves
" along with a temper in proper command, hath got the ſureſt
" ſupport: But he, who hath loſt his temper, is for that reaſon
" more liable to miſcarry.

" Let

" Let us remember, that if any one ſingle *ſtate* amongſt us had " a conteſt with its foes about a frontier, there would be need of " perſeverance. But now, the Athenians are a match for us all " united, and quite too ſtrong for any of us ſeparately to reſiſt: So " that unleſs we ſupport one another with our collective forces, un- " leſs every nation and every ſtate unanimouſly combine to give a " check to their ambition, they will oppreſs us, apart and diſunited, " without a ſtruggle. Such a triumph, how grating ſoever the bare " mention of it may be to any of your ears, yet be it known, can " end in nothing elſe but plain and open ſlavery. To hint in mere " words ſo baſe a doubt, that ſo many *ſtates* may be enſlaved by *one*, " is diſgrace to Peloponneſus. In ſuch a plunge, we ſhould either " be thought juſtly to have deſerved it, or through cowardice to " ſuffer it, the degenerate offspring of thoſe anceſtors who were the " deliverers of Greece. And yet, we have not ſpirit enough re- " maining to defend our own liberty. We ſuffer one ſingle *ſtate* to " erect itſelf into a tyrant, whilſt we claim the glory of pulling " down monarchs in particular ſocieties. We know not by what " methods to extricate ourſelves from theſe three, the greateſt of " calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or ſloth. For exempt from " theſe in fact you are not, by taking up the plea of *contempt* of " your enemies, for which ſuch numbers have ſuffered. The many " misfortunes ariſing from this have changed the ſenſe of the word, " and cauſed it to ſtand for arrant *folly*.

" But on the paſt what neceſſity is there to enlarge? or, to blame " any farther than may be neceſſary for the preſent? To prevent " worſe events for the future, we ought by immediate efforts, with " toil and perſeverance, to ſeek for redreſs. Through toil to acquire " virtues, is hereditary to Peloponneſians. This cuſtom is not to be " dropped, though now in wealth and power you have made ſome " petty advancements: For it never can become you to let go in " affluence what was gained in want. It becomes you rather, upon

" many

" many accounts, with manly confidence to declare for war. The
" oracle of a God preſcribeth it; —— that God himſelf hath pro-
" miſed his aſſiſtance; —— and the reſt of Greece is ready to join
" you in the conteſt, ſome from a principle of fear, and ſome from
" a principle of intereſt. Neither on *you* will the firſt breach of
" the peace be charged. The God, who adviſeth war, plainly
" judgeth *that* to be already broke: You will only act, to redreſs
" its violation. For the breach is not to be charged on thoſe,
" who arm to revenge it; but on thoſe, who were the firſt
" aggreſſors.

" Since then war, conſidered in every light, appears honourable
" in regard to you, ye Lacedæmonians; ſince we, with united
" voices, encourage you to it, as moſt ſtrongly requiſite for our ge-
" neral and ſeparate intereſts, —— defer no longer to ſuccour the Po-
" tidæans, Dorians by deſcent, and beſieged by Ionians, (the reverſe
" was formerly the caſe!) and to fetch again the liberty of others.
" The buſineſs will admit of no longer delay, when ſome already
" feel the blow; and others, if it once be known that we met here
" together, and durſt not undertake our own defence, will in a very
" little time be ſenſible of the ſame. Reflect within yourſelves, confe-
" derates, that affairs are come to extremities, that we have ſuggeſted
" the moſt adviſeable meaſures, and —— give your ballot for war.
" Be not terrified at its immediate dangers; but animate yourſelves
" with the hope of a long laſting peace to be procured by it. For a
" peace produced by war is ever the moſt firm; but, from tranquillity
" and eaſe to be averſe to war, can by no means abate or diſſipate our
" danger. With this certain concluſion, that a *ſtate* in Greece is ſtarted
" up into a tyrant, and aims indifferently at the liberty of us all,
" her arbitrary plan being partly executed and partly in agitation —
" let us ruſh againſt, and at once pull her down. Then ſhall we
" paſs the remainder of our lives exempt from dangers, and ſhall
" immediately recover liberty for thoſe Grecians, who are already
" enſlaved."

In

In this manner the Corinthians ſpoke: and the Lacedæmonians, when they had heard them all deliver their ſeveral opinions, gave out the ballots to all the confederates that were preſent, in regular order, both to the greater and leſſer *ſtates*: and the greateſt part of them ballotted for war. But, though thus decreed, it was impoſſible for them, as they were quite unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It was agreed therefore, that "every *ſtate* ſhould get in readineſs "their ſeveral contingents, and no time to be loſt." However, in leſs than a year, every thing needful was amply provided; and, before its expiration, an irruption was made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. But even this interval was employed in ſending embaſſies to Athens charged with accuſations, that reaſons ſtrong as poſſible for making war might appear on their ſide, if *thoſe* ſhould meet with diſregard.

A war voted.

Differed.

Embaſſies.

I. BY the firſt embaſſadors therefore whom the Lacedæmonians ſent, they required the Athenians —— "To drive away the *pollution* of "the Goddeſs." And the *pollution* was this ——

Cylon. There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had been victor at the Olympic games, a perſon of noble deſcent, and of great conſequence in his own perſon. He married a daughter of Theagenes a Megaréan, who in thoſe days was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, aſking advice at Delphi about a ſcheme he had projected, was directed by the God — "To ſeize the citadel of Athens upon the greateſt feſtival of Jupiter." In purſuance of this, being ſupplied with a party of men by Theagenes, and having obtained the concurrence of his own friends, upon the day of the Peloponneſian Olympics he ſeized the citadel as inſtrumental to his tyranny. He imagined *that* to be the greateſt feſtival of Jupiter, and to bear a particular relation to himſelf, who had been an Olympic victor. But whether the greateſt feſtival meant was to be held in Attica, or any other place, he had never conſidered, nor had the oracle declared. There is a feſtival of

Jove obſerved by the Athenians, which is called *the greateſt feſtival of* Jupiter *the propitious.* This is celebrated without the city, in full concourſe of the people, where many ſacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the country. Concluding however, that he had the true ſenſe of the oracle, he put his enterprize in execution. The Athenians, taking the alarm, ran out of the country in one general confluence to put a ſtop to theſe attempts, and inveſting the citadel quite blocked them up. But in proceſs of time, being wearied out with the tediouſneſs of the blockade, many of them departed, leaving the care of it to the nine Archons, with a full power of "acting in whatever manner they ſhould judge moſt expedient:" For, at that time, moſt parts of the public adminiſtration were in the management of the Archons. The party with Cylon, thus cloſely inveſted, were reduced very low through ſcarcity of bread and water. Cylon therefore and his brother privately eſcape. But the reſt, reduced to extremities, and ſome of them had already periſhed by famine, ſit themſelves down as *ſuppliants* by the altar in the citadel. The Athenian guard, having ordered them to ariſe as they ſaw them juſt ready to expire in the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation led them out and ſlew them. But ſome of the number, who had ſeated themſelves at the *venerable Goddeſſes*, at the very altars, they murdered in [9] the act of removal. And for this action, not only the perſons concerned in it but their deſcendants alſo were called *the ſacrilegious and accurſed of the Goddeſs.* The Athenians indeed baniſhed thoſe ſacrilegious perſons out of the city: Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian, drove them

9 When theſe *ſuppliants* were ordered to come out, they tied a ſtring round the altar in the citadel, and keeping hold of it were come as far as the altars of the *venerable Goddeſſes.* Juſt there the ſtring happened to break, upon which the Archons ruſhed in to ſeize them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her protection. Some of the number ſat inſtantly down for freſh protection at the altars of the *venerable Goddeſſes*: It was an unavailing reſource, and they were immediately ſlain upon the ſpot. *Plutarch* in *Solon.*

out

out again, when he was at Athens on account of a ſedition; nay, on this occaſion they not only drove away the living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, and caſt them out: Yet, in proceſs of time, they returned again, and ſome of their poſterity are ſtill in Athens.

This was the *pollution* which the Lacedæmonians required them to drive away; with a face indeed of piety, as vindicating the honour of the Gods; but knowing at the ſame time that Pericles the ſon of Xantippus was tainted with it by the ſide of his mother; and thence concluding that, if he could be removed, the Athenians would more eaſily be brought to an accommodation with them. They could not carry their hopes ſo far as actually to effect his baniſhment, but to raiſe againſt him the public odium, as if the war was partly owing to the misfortune they ſuffered in him. For, carrying with him the greateſt ſway of any Athenian then alive, and preſiding entirely in the adminiſtration, he was moſt ſteddy in oppoſition to the Lacedæmonians, diſſuading the Athenians from any conceſſion, and exciting them to war.

The Athenians in return required the Lacedæmonians "to drive away the *pollution* contracted at Tænarus." For the Lacedæmonians ſome time ago, having cauſed their ſupplicant Helots to riſe out of Neptune's temple at Tænarus, had led them aſide, and ſlew them. And to this action they themſelves impute the great earthquake, which happened afterwards at Sparta.

They further required them "to drive away the *pollution* of the Chalciæcan Pallas," the nature of which was this:——

When Pauſanias the Lacedæmonian, upon his being firſt recalled by the Spartans from his command in Helleſpont and brought to his trial before them, was acquitted of the charge of male-adminiſtration, but was no longer intruſted with the public commiſſion; fitting out an Hermionian trireme on his own private account, he arriveth in Helleſpont, without any authority from the Lacedæmonians. He Pauſanias.

gave out, that he did it for the ſervice of the Grecian war; but his intention was, to carry on his negotiations with *the king*, which, aſpiring to the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. He had formerly conferred an obligation upon *the king*, from which the whole of his project took its date. When, after the return from Cyprus, during his firſt appearance there, he took Byzantium which was poſſeſſed by the Medes, and in it ſome favourites and relations of *the king* were made his priſoners, he releaſeth them all, to ingratiate himſelf with *the king*, without the privity of the other confederates, giving it out in public that they had made their eſcape. He tranſacted this affair by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, to whoſe keeping he had intruſted Byzantium and the priſoners. He alſo diſpatched Gongylus to him with a letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards diſcovered, were theſe:

" PAUSANIAS, general of Sparta, deſirous to oblige you, " ſends away theſe his priſoners of war. And by it I expreſs my " inclination, if you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, " and to put Sparta and the reſt of Greece into your ſubjection. I " think I have power ſufficient to effectuate theſe points, could my " ſcheme be communicated with you. If therefore any of theſe " propoſals receive your approbation, ſend down to the coaſt ſome " truſty perſon, through whom for the future we may hold a cor- " reſpondence."

Thus much was contained in the letter; and, on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, and ſends away Artabazus the ſon of Pharnacus down to the coaſt, with an order to take upon him the government of Daſcylis, having firſt diſmiſſed Megabates who was the governor. To him he intruſted a letter for Pauſanias at Byzantium, with an injunction to forward it with all poſſible expedition, and to let him ſee his ſignet; and that, if Pauſanias ſhould charge him

him with any affairs, he ſhould execute them with all poſſible diligence and fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all the other injunctions with exactneſs, and forwarded the letter, which brought this anſwer ——

" THUS ſaith king Xerxes to Pauſanias.--- The kindneſs done
" me in thoſe perſons, whom from Byzantium you delivered ſafe
" on the other ſide the ſea, ſhall be placed to your account in our
" family, eternally recorded: and, with the other contents of your
" letter I am delighted. Let neither night nor day relax your earneſt
" endeavors to effectuate thoſe points you promiſe me: Nor ſtop at
" any expence of gold or ſilver or greatneſs of military force, if
" ſuch aid be any where requiſite. But confer boldly with Artabazus,
" a truſty perſon, whom I have ſent to you, about mine and your
" own concerns, that they may be accompliſhed in the moſt honour-
" able and moſt advantageous manner for us both."

Upon the receipt of this letter, Pauſanias, who before had been in high credit with the Grecians, through the luſtre of his command at Platæa, was elevated much more than ever, and could no longer adjuſt his demeanor by the modes and cuſtoms of his native country. He immediately dreſſed himſelf up in Perſian attire, and quitting Byzantium travelled through Thrace, attended with Perſian and Egyptian guards; and refined his table into Perſian elegance. His ambition he was unable any longer to conceal, but by ſhort ſketches manifeſted too ſoon, what greater ſchemes he had formed in his mind for future accompliſhment. He then ſhewed himſelf difficult of acceſs, and let his anger looſe ſo violently and ſo indiſcriminately upon all men, that no one could approach him. And this was not the leaſt motive to the confederacy for going over to the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians, informed of this, recalled him the firſt time upon the account of ſuch behavior; and, when he was returned again in

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the Hermionian veſſel without their permiſſion, he plainly appeared to have re-aſſumed his former practices. And when forced to remove from Byzantium by the oppoſition raiſed againſt him by the Athenians, he went not back to Sparta; but withdrawing to Colonæ of Troas, information was given that "he was negotiating with the Bar-" barians, and had fixed his reſidence there for very bad deſigns." Upon this they could no longer be patient, but the *Ephori* diſpatched him a herald and the *Scytale* [1], with an order ---- "Not to ſtay be-" hind the herald; if he did, war was proclaimed againſt him by " the Spartans." And he, deſirous to clear himſelf as much as poſſible from ſuſpicion, and confident that with money he could baffle any accuſation, returned the ſecond time to Sparta. The firſt treatment he met with there was, to be thrown into priſon by order of the *Ephori*: For the *Ephori* have ſo large an authority even over a *king*. But afterwards, by ſome private management, he procured his enlargement, and offers to ſubmit to a trial againſt any who were willing to accuſe him. The Spartans indeed had no poſitive evidence againſt him, not even his private enemies, nor the general community ---- none, to ſupport them in proceeding capitally againſt a perſon of the royal deſcent, and at that time inveſted with the regal dignity:

1 The *Scytale* is a famous inſtrument peculiar to the Lacedæmonians, and uſed by them for the cloſe conveyance of orders to their miniſters abroad. *It* was a long black ſtick, and the contrivance was this--" When the magiſtrates gave commiſſion " to any general or admiral, they took two " round pieces of wood exactly equal to " one another; one of theſe they kept, " and the other was delivered to the com-" mander; to whom when they had any " thing of moment to communicate, they " cut a long narrow ſcroll of parchment, " and rolling it about their own ſtaff, one " fold cloſe upon another, they wrote their " buſineſs upon it; then taking it off, diſ-" patched it away to the commander, who " applying it to his own ſtaff, the folds ex-" actly fell in one with another, as at the " writing; and the characters, which, be-" fore it was wrapped up, were confuſedly " disjoined and unintelligible, appeared very " plain." *Potter*'s *Archæologia*, Vol. II. c. 13.

If it be asked (ſays the Scholiaſt) how Pauſanias came to have the Scytale with him now, as he was abroad without the public commiſſion? the anſwer is, He had kept it ever ſince his former employments.

dignity: For, being uncle to Pleiſtarchus the ſon of Leonidas, their king though yet in minority, he was regent-guardian. But, by his diſregard of the laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian manners, he afforded them ſtrong reaſons to ſuſpect, that he would never conform to the equality then in vogue. They called to remembrance thoſe other paſſages of his behavior, in which he had at any time deviated from the inſtitutions of his country; and that further upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians offered as the choiceſt part of the Perſian ſpoils, he had formerly preſumed, by his own authority, to place this inſcription ——

> For Perſia's hoſts o'erthrown, and Græcia freed,
> To Phœbus THIS Pauſanias hath decreed,
> Who led the Grecians to the glorious deed.

Theſe verſes indeed the Lacedæmonians immediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in their ſted the names of the ſeveral *ſtates*, which had joined in the overthrow of the *Barbarian* and in making this oblation. This therefore was now recollected to the prejudice of Pauſanias; and, in his preſent ſituation, it was interpreted, from the circumſtances of his late behavior, as an argument that he had been equally guilty long before. They had moreover got an information, that he was tampering with the Helots, which in fact was true: For he promiſed them their liberty and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would riſe at his command and co-operate with him in the whole of his project. But even this would not prevail: They diſdained to place ſo much confidence in the informations given by Helots, as to run into irregularities to puniſh him. They adhered to the cuſtom ever obſerved amongſt them, never to be haſty in forming a ſentence never to be recalled againſt a citizen of Sparta, without unqueſtionable evidence. At length, they obtained the fulleſt conviction, as it is ſaid, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion of his,

and

and the perſon moſt in his confidence, who was to convey to Artabazus the laſt letters he wrote to *the king*. This man, alarmed by the recollection that no perſon ſent on theſe errands before him had ever returned again, having already counterfeited the ſeal, to the end that if he was deceived in his ſuſpicions, or Pauſanias ſhould demand them again to make any alteration, he might avoid diſcovery, breaks open the letters. He found by them, that he was going on the errand his fears foreboded, and that his own murther was expreſly injoined. He carried upon this the packet to the *Ephori*, who were now more than ever convinced, but ſtill were deſirous to hear themſelves, from the mouth of Pauſanias, an acknowledgment of the truth. They therefore contrived, that this perſon ſhould go to ſanctuary at Tænarus as a ſuppliant, and refuge in a cell built double by a partition. In the inner part of this cell he hid ſome of the *Ephori*: And, Pauſanias coming to him and demanding the reaſon of his *ſupplication*, they heard diſtinctly all that paſſed. The man complained bitterly to him about the clauſe in the letters relating to himſelf, and expoſtulated with him about every particular --- "why "he, who had been ſo truſty to him during the whole courſe of his "negotiations with *the king*, ſhould now be ſo highly honoured, as to "be murthered upon an equal rank with the meaneſt of his tools?" Pauſanias confeſſed the truth of all that he alledged; begged him, "not to be exaſperated with what at preſent appeared;" aſſured him, "he ſhould not be hurt if he would leave his ſanctuary;" and earneſtly intreated him, "with all poſſible ſpeed to go the journey, "and not to obſtruct the ſchemes that were then in agitation." The *Ephori*, having exactly heard him, withdrew: And now, beyond a ſcruple convinced, they determined to apprehend him in the city. But it is reported, that at the inſtant fixed for his arreſt, as he was walking along, and beheld the countenance of one of the *Ephori* approaching towards him, he immediately diſcovered his buſineſs; and another of them out of kindneſs intimating the matter by a nod, he took

took to his heels, and fled away faſter than they could purſue him. The *Chalciæcan* happened to be near, and into a little houſe within the verge of that temple he betook himſelf, and ſat quietly down to avoid the inclemency of the outward air. They, who had loſt the ſtart, came too late in the purſuit. But afterwards, they ſtripped the houſe of its roof and doors; and, watching their opportunity when he was within, they encompaſſed him round about, [2] immured him within, and placing a conſtant guard around kept him beſet that he might periſh with hunger. When he was ready to expire, and they found in how bad a ſtate he lay within the houſe, they led him out of the verge yet breathing a little; and, being thus brought out, he immediately died. They next intended to caſt his body into the Cæada, where they are uſed to throw their malafactors; but afterwards changed their minds, and put him into the ground ſomewhere thereabouts. But the God at Delphi warned the Lacedæmonians afterwards by an oracle "to remove his body to the place where he "died:" --- And now it lies in the area before the temple, as the inſcription on the pillars ſheweth ---- "and, as in what they had "done they had violated the laws of ſanctuary, to reſtore two bodies "to the *Chalciæcan* for that one." To this they ſo far conformed, as to dedicate there two ſtatues of braſs, as atonements for Pauſanias.

(The Athenians, upon the principle that the God himſelf had judged this a *pollution*, required of the Lacedæmonians, by way of retaliation, to clear themſelves of it.)

The Lacedæmonians at that time ſent embaſſadors to Athens, to accuſe Themiſtocles alſo of carrying on the ſame treaſonable correſpondence with *the Mede* as Pauſanias, which they had diſcovered from the papers which had been evidence againſt Pauſanias, and demanded that "he ſhould be equally puniſhed for it." The Athe- Themiſtocles.

2 Alcithea, the mother of Pauſanias, is ſaid to have brought the firſt ſtone on this occaſion: Such was the ſpirit of the ladies at Lacedæmon.

nians complied with this demand. But, as he then happened to be under the *oſtraciſm* [3], and reſiding chiefly at Argos, though he frequently viſited other parts of Peloponneſus, they ſend a party along with the Lacedæmonians, who readily joined in his purſuit, with orders to ſeize him wherever they could find him. Themiſtocles, adviſed in time, flieth out of Peloponneſus into Corcyra, to which people he had done a ſignal kindneſs [4]. The Corcyréans expreſſing their fear of giving him refuge, leſt it might expoſe them to the reſentment both of Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them to the oppoſite continent. Now, purſued by thoſe who were appointed to do it, and who had by enquiry diſcovered his route, he is compelled by mere diſtreſs to turn in to Admetus king of the Moloſſians [5], who was by no means his friend. It happened that Admetus was not at home; and, Themiſtocles the *ſuppliant* addreſſing

3 The *Oſtraciſm* was a compliment of an extraordinary kind paid by the people of Athens to ſuperior merit. When a perſon had done them great ſervices, and they grew apprehenſive they might poſſibly ſhew him too much gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, they baniſhed him for ten years. On ſome particular day, each citizen gave in the name of a perſon, wrote upon an *oſtracum* (a ſhell, or piece of tile), whom he deſired ſhould be ſent into retirement. Six thouſand of theſe votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens within ten days. The moſt diſintereſted patriot, and moſt ſucceſsful commander received, for the moſt part, this public acknowledgment of their ſervices. At length, a ſcoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honourably diſtinguiſhed by the public voice. The Athenians thought afterwards they had profaned the oſtraciſm by treating him like a Themiſtocles, an Ariſtides, or a Cimon, and therefore aboliſhed this ſtrange injurious privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to triumph over its beſt friend public ſpirit. Other republics in Greece had ſomething of the ſame nature amongſt them. Authors vary much about the circumſtances of the *oſtraciſm*, I have mentioned thoſe points only which are univerſally agreed.

4 At the time of the Perſian invaſion, the Corcyréans had refuſed to join in the common cauſe of Greece. The Grecians therefore had afterwards a deſign to fall upon and deſtroy them. But Themiſtocles interpoſed, and ſaved them by remonſtrating, that by ſuch proceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calamities, than it would have ſuffered under the deſpotic power of Xerxes.

5 Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themiſtocles

himſelf

himſelf to the wife, is by her directed to take their child in his hand, and ſit himſelf down upon the hearth. Admetus returning ſoon after, he tells him who he was, and conjures him --- "though "he had formerly oppoſed him in a ſuit he had preferred to the "people of Athens, not to take revenge upon an exile ---- To make "him ſuffer now, would be taking thoſe advantages over a man in "diſtreſs, which he ought to diſdain --- The point of honour con-"ſiſted in equals revenging themſelves upon equal terms --- He had, "it is true, ſtood in oppoſition to him, but merely in a point of in-"tereſt, and not where life was at ſtake --- But if he now gave him "up" (telling him by whom, and why he was perſecuted) "he de-"prives him of the only reſource he had left to preſerve his life." Admetus, having heard him, bids him riſe together with the child whom he held as he ſat down: For this was the moſt pathetic form of ſupplication. And when, not long after, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians arrived, and preſſed him earneſtly to do it, he refuſeth to give him up, and ſends him under a guard, as he had declared his intention to go to *the king*, to the other ſea by a journey over land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to Alexander. He here met with a trading-veſſel bound to Ionia; and going on board, is driven by a ſtorm into the Athenian fleet, which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his danger, he diſcovereth himſelf to the maſter (for not one perſon on board ſuſpected who he was) and telleth him the occaſion of his flight; and, unleſs he will undertake his preſervation, threatens "to inform againſt him, as one who had been bribed to further his "eſcape; --- preſerved he ſtill might be, provided no perſon was ſuf-"fered, during the voyage, to ſtir out of the veſſel: --- If he would "comply, the favour ſhould be acknowledged with effectual grati-"tude." ----- The maſter of the veſſel promiſeth his ſervice, and keeping out at ſea a day and a night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards landeth him at Epheſus. Themiſtocles, to recompence his care, made him a handſome preſent in money (for there he received

ceived thoſe ſums, which he had ordered ſecretly to be conveyed thither from his friends at Athens, and from Argos;) and, travelling upwards from thence, in company with a Perſian of the maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be delivered to king Artaxerxes the ſon of Xerxes, who had lately mounted the throne, the purport of which was this: ——

" I THEMISTOCLES am coming to you, who of all the Gre-
" cians have done the greateſt miſchiefs to your family, ſo long as I was
" obliged by neceſſity to reſiſt the invaſion of your father. Yet the
" good ſervices I did him were much more numerous, when my own
" preſervation was ſecured, and his retreat became full of hazards.
" My former generoſity calls for a requital;" (here he inſerted the meſſage he had ſent to Xerxes about the retreat from Salamis; and, that out of regard to him, he had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, which was mere fiction;) " and now, able to perform
" great ſervices for you, I am near at hand, having been perſecuted
" by the Grecians for my friendſhip to you. I beg only a year's
" reſpite, that I may notify to you in perſon thoſe points which are
" the ſubject of my journey hither."

The king, it is ſaid, was ſurprized at the [6] ſpirit of the man, and ordered him to act as he deſired. The time of reſpite he had thus

6 The boldneſs and intrepidity of Themiſtocles hath been the ſubject of admiration, in throwing himſelf on the protection of the Perſian monarch, who had fixed a price on his head. And yet he was ſo high in his eſteem, that the night after firſt giving him audience, he cried aloud thrice in his ſleep, " I have got Themiſtocles the Athenian." He afterwards acknowledg'd himſelf two hundred talents (near 40000 *l.* Sterling) in his debt; " For ſo much I promiſed the man that brought you to me." Themiſtocles ſoon gave him a ſpecimen of his fine underſtanding. He was deſired by the king to ſpeak his mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: He anſwered by his interpreter, that " diſcourſe like a Perſian carpet had in it a variety of figures, which never appeared to advantage unleſs it was quite unfolded, but were not to be apprehended,

thus obtained he ſpent in making all poſſible progreſs in the Perſian language, and in learning the manners of the country. When the year was elapſed, appearing at court, he became a favourite with *the king*, a greater than any Greek had ever been before, as well on account of the former luſtre of his life, as the hope he ſuggeſted to him of enſlaving Greece; but above all, by the ſpecimens he gave of his fine underſtanding. —— For, in Themiſtocles the ſtrength of nature was moſt vigorouſly ſhewn; and by it, he was ſo highly diſtinguiſhed above the bulk of mankind, as to deſerve the greateſt admiration. By the mere force of his natural genius, without any improvement from ſtudy either in his youth or more advanced age, he could give the beſt advice upon ſudden emergencies with the leaſt heſitation, and was happy in his conjectures about the events of the future. Whatever he undertook, he was able to accompliſh; and wherein he was quite unexperienced, he had ſo prompt a diſcernment that he never was miſtaken. In a matter of ambiguity, he foreſaw with extraordinary acuteneſs the better and the worſe ſide of the queſtion. Upon the whole, 'by the force of natural genius, he was moſt quick at all expedients, and at the ſame time excellent, beyond competition, at declaring inſtantly the moſt adviſeable meaſures of acting upon every occurrence. ——But, being ſeized with a fit of ſickneſs, his life is at an end. Some indeed report, that he put an

hended, when wrapped up in the ſpiece." By this ingenious plea he obtained a year's reſpite to learn the Perſian language, that he might be enabled to deliver explicitly his own ſentiments to the king in his own words and method. He became afterwards ſo great a favourite, that the moſt engaging promiſe in future times, that the Perſian monarch could make to a Greek whom he had a mind to inveigle into his ſervice, was, that "he ſhould live with him as Themiſtocles did with Artaxerxes." And yet, no attachment to his royal friend ever made him an enemy to his country; nor did his diſintereſted patriotiſm, of which never man had more, ever render him ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his bounty, he lived the remainder of his life in pomp and affluence, and was uſed to ſay humourouſly to his children, "We had been undone, my children, if we had not been undone."

end

end to his own life by taking poiſon, when he judged it impoſſible to perform what he had promiſed *the king*. His monument however is at Magneſia in Aſia, in the forum. Of this province he was governor through the bounty of *the king*, who aſſigned him Magneſia, (which yielded him * fifty talents yearly,) for his bread, Lampſacus for his wine, (which place was in the greateſt repute for wine,) and Myus for his meat. His bones are ſaid to have been conveyed home by his relations, in purſuance of his own deſire, and to have been interred in Attica without the privity of the Athenians. For it was againſt law to bury him there, as he had been out-lawed for treaſon [7].

* 9687 *l.* 10*s. Sterling.*

Such an end had the lives of Pauſanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themiſtocles the Athenian, who in their own age made the greateſt figure of any Grecians.

The Lacedæmonians, by their firſt embaſſy, had injoined, what was as amply in turn required of them, to do as hath been above
II. recited, concerning the expulſion of the *ſacrilegious*. But, coming

7 Some authors have related, that his countrymen afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in the Piræus. Plutarch however disbelieves the fact, and thinks it merely a preſumption formed on the following verſes of Plato the comic poet.

To thee, Themiſtocles, a tomb is due,
Plac'd in the moſt conſpicuous point of view;
Merchants from every port with juſt acclaim
Should ſhout thy honour, and confeſs thy fame;
Each fleet return'd or ſetting out ſhould join
In owning all the naval glory thine;
It ſhould command, high rais'd, yon watry plain,
And point that fight which gave us all the main.

I cannot end this note about Themiſtocles, without begging the reader to accept a tranſlation of an epigram in the *Anthologia*, which appears to have been written with ſpirit worthy of this illuſtrious Athenian.

Be Greece the monument; and crown the height
With all the trophies of the naval fight.
Let Perſia's Mars and Xerxes ſwell the baſe;
Such forms alone Themiſtocles can grace.
Next, like a column of majeſtic ſize,
His acts inſcrib'd, let Salamis ariſe.
Swell every part, and give the hero room,
For nothing ſmall ſhould ſcandalize the tomb.

a ſecond time to the Athenians, they commanded them — " to quit the blockade of Potidæa;" and — " to permit Ægina to govern itſelf at its own diſcretion;" and, above all other points inſiſt upon this, declaring moſt expreſly that in *this* caſe war ſhould not be made. — " If they would revoke their decree concerning the Megaréans, in which they had been prohibited from entering any harbour whatever in the dominion of Athens, and from the Attic markets."

But the Athenians liſtened to none of theſe demands, nor would revoke the decree, but reproached the Megaréans for tilling land that was ſacred, land not mark'd out for culture, and for giving ſhelter to runaway ſlaves.

III. At laſt, the final embaſſadors arrived from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias and Meleſippus and Ageſander, who, waving all other points which they had formerly required, ſaid thus — " The Lace- " dæmonians are deſirous of peace, and peace there may be, if you " will permit the Grecians to govern themſelves at their own " diſcretion."

Conſultation of Athens.

The Athenians ſummoned an aſſembly, where every one was invited to deliver his opinion. They determined, after deliberate conſultation on all the points in conteſt, to return one definitive anſwer. Several others ſpoke on this occaſion, and were divided in their ſentiments; ſome inſiſting on the neceſſity of a war; others, that peace ſhould not be obſtructed by *that* decree, which ought to be repealed. At length, Pericles the ſon of Xantippus ſtanding forth, who was at that time the leading man at Athens, and a perſon of the greateſt abilities both for action and debate, adviſed them, thus: ———

Speech of Pericles.

" I FIRMLY perſevere, Athenians, in the ſame opinion that I " have ever avowed —— to make no conceſſions to the Lacedæmo- " nians — though at the ſame time ſenſible, that men never execute " a war with that warmth of ſpirit through which they are firſt im-

" pelled

" pelled to undertake it, but ſink in their ardor as difficulties
" increaſe. I perceive it, however, incumbent upon me, to perſiſt
" in the ſame unvaried uniform advice: and I require thoſe amongſt
" you who are influenced by it, as they concur in the meaſures,
" either to unite their efforts for redreſs, if any ſiniſter event ſhould
" follow; or elſe, upon a ſeries of ſucceſs, to make no parade of
" their own diſcernment. It is uſual enough for incidents unfore-
" ſeen to baffle the beſt-concerted ſchemes; ſince human intentions
" are by nature fallible. And hence it comes to paſs, that whatever
" falls out contrary to our expectations, we are accuſtomed to throw
" all the blame upon fortune.

" The treacherous deſigns of the Lacedæmonians, formerly,
" againſt us were viſible to all; nor are they, this very moment, leſs
" clear than ever. For, notwithſtanding that expreſs ſtipulation —
" That, upon controverſies between us, we ſhould reciprocally do
" and ſubmit to juſtice, each party remaining in their preſent poſ-
" ſeſſions — yet, they have never demanded juſtice, nor accept the
" offer of it from us. Their allegations againſt us they are deter-
" mined to ſupport by arms, and not by evidence: And here they
" come, no longer to remonſtrate, but actually to give us law.
" They command us — to quit the blockade of Potidæa, to permit
" Ægina to govern itſelf by its own model, and to repeal the decree
" againſt the Megaréans — Nay, this their laſt and peremptory
" embaſſy authoritatively injoins us — to reſtore the Grecians to their
" former independence. But, let not one of you imagine that we
" excite a war for a trifling concern, if we refuſe to repeal that
" decree againſt the Megaréans, The ſtreſs they lay upon it, that,
" if it be repealed, a war ſhall not enſue, is nothing but a colour:
" Nor think there will be any ground for ſelf-accuſation, though for
" ſo trifling a concern you have recourſe to arms; ſince that con-
" cern, trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof and demon-
" ſtration of Athenian ſpirit. If, for inſtance, you condeſcend to

" this

" this demand, you will immediately be injoined ſome other conde-
" ſcenſion of greater conſequence, as if this your compliance was
" owing to the prevalence of your fear. But, if at once you ſtre-
" nuouſly refuſe to hearken to them, you will convince them in a
" manner clearly to be underſtood, that they muſt treat with you
" for the future, as with men who are their equals.

" From the preſent criſis I exhort you therefore to form a reſolu-
" tion, either timely to make your ſubmiſſion before you begin to
" ſuffer; or, if we ſhall determine for war (which to me ſeemeth
" moſt expedient), without regarding the pretext of it, be it impor-
" tant or be it trifling, to refuſe every the leaſt conceſſion, nor to
" render the tenure of what we now poſſeſs precarious and uncertain.
" For not only the greateſt, but the moſt inconſiderable demand, if
" authoritatively injoined by equals upon their neighbours, before ju-
" ſtice hath decided the point, hath the very ſame tendency to make
" them ſlaves. But, from the poſture in which the affairs of both
" parties are at preſent, that we may risk a war with a proſpect of
" ſucceſs as fine and as inviting as our rivals can ----- ſuffer me di-
" ſtinctly to ſet the reaſons before you, and be convinced of their
" weight. ——

" The Peloponneſians are a people, who ſubſiſt by their bodily la-
" bour, without wealth either in the purſes of individuals, or in any
" public fund. Again, in wars of long continuance, or wars by ſea,
" they are quite unpractiſed; ſince, the hoſtilities in which they
" have been embroiled with one another have been ſhort and tran-
" ſient, in conſequence of their poverty. Such people can neither
" compleatly man out a fleet, nor frequently march land-armies
" abroad, abandoning the care of their domeſtic concerns, even
" whilſt from theſe they muſt anſwer a large expence, and more
" than this, are excluded the benefit of the ſea. Funds of money
" are a much ſurer ſupport of war, than contributions exacted by
" force. And men, who ſubſiſt by the labour of their hands, are

" more ready to advance a ſervice with their bodies than with their
" money; ſince, the former though expoſed they ſtrongly preſume
" will ſurvive the danger, but the latter they apprehend muſt be too
" ſpeedily exhauſted, eſpecially if the war run out into a greater
" length than they expect, which will probably be the caſe. In a
" ſingle battle, it is true, the Peloponneſians and their confederates
" are able to make head againſt united Greece; but they are not
" able to ſupport a war of continuance againſt an enemy in all re-
" ſpects provided better than themſelves; ſince, by one general coun-
" cil they are not guided, but execute their momentary ſchemes in
" ſudden and haſty efforts; ſince farther, having all of them an
" equality of ſuffrage, and being of different deſcents, each of them
" is intent on the advancement of a ſeparate intereſt. In ſuch cir-
" cumſtances no grand deſign can ever be accompliſhed. Some of
" them are eager to obtain a ſpeedy vengeance on a foe; others are
" chiefly intent on preſerving their ſubſtance from unneceſſary waſte.
" It is long before they can meet together to conſult; and then, with
" great precipitancy they form their public determinations, as the
" largeſt part of their time is devoted to domeſtic concerns. Each
" thinks it impoſſible, that the public welfare can be prejudiced by
" his own particular negligence, but that others are intent on watch-
" ing for himſelf to ſhare the benefit; and, whilſt this error univer-
" ſally prevaileth amongſt all the ſeveral members, the general wel-
" fare inſenſibly drops to ruin. But the greateſt obſtruction to them
" will be a ſcarcity of money, which as they can but ſlowly raiſe,
" their ſteps muſt needs be dilatory; and the urgent occaſions of war
" can never tarry.

" As for any forts they can erect within our territory, or their ap-
" plication to a navy, it is beneath us to form any apprehenſions
" from thence. To effectuate the former, would be difficult for a
" people of equal ſtrength, in a ſeaſon of tranquillity: Much more
" ſo muſt it be, upon the lands of an open enemy, and when we
" are

" are impowered to put the ſame expedients in execution againſt
" them. And, if they ſhould fix a garriſon in Attica, they might
" by excurſions or deſertions from us annoy ſome part of our ter-
" ritory; but, whatever works they can raiſe will be inſufficient to
" block us up, to prevent our deſcents upon their coaſts, and making
" reprizals upon them by our fleets, wherein we are ſuperior. For,
" we are better qualified for land-ſervice by the experience we have
" gained in that of the ſea, than they for ſervice at ſea by their ex-
" perience at land. To learn the naval ſkill they will find to be by
" no means an eaſy taſk. For even you, who have been in conſtant
" exerciſe ever ſince the Perſian invaſion, have not yet attained to a
" maſtery in the ſcience. How then ſhall men, brought up to til-
" lage and ſtrangers to the ſea, whoſe practice farther will be ever in-
" terrupted by us, through the continual annoyance which our larger
" number of ſhipping will give them, effect any point of éclat?
" Againſt ſmall ſquadrons they might indeed be ſometimes adven-
" turous, emboldening their want of ſkill by multiplying their num-
" bers: But, when awed by ſuperior force, they will of neceſſity
" deſiſt; and ſo, by practice interrupted the growth of their ſkill
" will be checked, and in conſequence of it their fears be increaſed.
" The naval, like other ſciences, is the effect of art. It cannot be
" learned by accident, nor uſefully exerciſed at ſtarts; or rather,
" there is nothing which ſo much requireth an uninterrupted
" application.

" If, farther, they ſhould ſecrete the funds laid up at Olympia
" and Delphi, and endeavour by an increaſe of pay to ſeduce from
" our ſervice the foreigners, who are on board our fleets; — in caſe
" we were not their equals in ſtrength, and they themſelves and ſuch
" foreigners could entirely apply themſelves to the work: — This
" then might be terrible indeed. But nought would it avail them
" now, whilſt — what is our peculiar advantage — we have com-
" manders Athenian-born and ſeamen to man our fleets, in larger

" number and of greater ſkill than all the reſt of Greece together. " Beſides, in ſo dangerous a criſis, not one of theſe foreigners " would think of bartering an exile from his own ſettlement, and " a deſertion to that ſide where the proſpect of victory is not near " ſo inviting, for an enlargement of his pay of few days con- " tinuance.

" The ſtate of the Peloponneſians I judge to be ſuch, or very nearly " ſuch as I have deſcribed it; whereas, our own is exempt from " thoſe defects which I have pointed out in them, and enjoys other " great advantages far beyond their competition. Grant, that they " may invade our territories by land: We too ſhall make deſcents " upon theirs. And — whether is the greateſt damage, only ſome " part of Peloponneſus, or all Attica put to fire and ſword — will " admit of no compariſon. In the former caſe, they will have no " other land to repair the damage, but what they muſt earn by dint " of arms: Whilſt we have large tracts already in our power, both " in the iſlands and on the main. —— Of vaſt conſequence indeed is " the dominion of the ſea. But — conſider it with attention. For, " were we ſeated upon an iſland, which of us would be ſubdued " with greater difficulty? —— And now, you ought to think, that " our preſent ſituation is as nearly as poſſible the ſame; and ſo, to " evacuate your lands and houſes here, to confine your defence to " the ſea, and to Athens itſelf; and not, exaſperated againſt the Pe- " loponneſians for the ſake of thoſe, to hazard a battle againſt ſupe- " rior numbers. Should we be thus victorious, we muſt fight it over " again with another body not inferior; and ſhould we be vanquiſh- " ed, at that inſtant we loſe all our dependents, the very eſſence " of our ſtrength. For, the moment we ceaſe to be able to awe " them by our forces, they will be no longer obedient to our com- " mands. We ought not to wail and lament for the loſs of our " houſes or our lands, but for the lives of our people: Becauſe lands " and houſes can never acquire men, but are by men acquired.

" Durſt

" Durſt I preſume on a power to perſuade, I would exhort you,
" to march out yourſelves, with your own hands to execute the
" waſte, and let the Peloponneſians ſee that for things of ſuch va-
" lue you will never think of compliance. I have many other in-
" ducements to hope for victory, if, intending this war alone, you
" will forbear the ambition of enlarging your dominions, and not
" plunge into voluntary ſuperfluous hazards. For, in truth, I am
" more afraid of our own indiſcretions than the ſchemes of the
" enemy. But the explanation, of what at preſent I only hint at,
" ſhall be reſerved till due occaſions offer in the courſe of action.
" Let us now diſmiſs the embaſſadors with the following anſwer —
" That, we will open our market and harbours to the Megaréans,
" provided the Lacedæmonians in their prohibitions of foreigners will
" except us and our confederates: For neither was that act in us,
" nor will this in them be contrary to treaty.——
" That, we will ſuffer the *ſtates* to govern themſelves at their own
" diſcretion, if they were poſſeſſed of that right when the treaty
" was made, and ſo ſoon as ever *they* relax the neceſſity they lay
" upon the *ſtates* in their own league, of governing themſelves by
" that model, which ſuits beſt the Lacedæmonian intereſt, and allow
" them the choice of their own polity. ——
" That, farther, we are willing to ſubmit to a judicial determina-
" tion, according to treaty. ——
" That, a war ſhall not begin, but will retaliate upon thoſe
" that do.
" Such an anſwer is agreeable to juſtice, and becomes the dig-
" nity of the Athenian *ſtate*. But you ought to be informed, that
" a war unavoidably there will be; that, the greater alacrity we
" ſhew for it, the more ſhall we damp the ſpirits of our enemies in
" their attacks; and, that the greateſt dangers are ever the reſource
" of the greateſt honours to communities as well as individuals. It
" was thus, that our fathers withſtood the Medes, and ruſhing to
" arms

" arms with reſources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning all their
" ſubſtance, by reſolution more than fortune, by courage more than
" real ſtrength, beat back the *Barbarian*, and advanced this *State* to
" its preſent ſummit of grandeur. From them we ought not to de-
" generate, but by every effort within our ability avenge it on our
" foes, and deliver it down to poſterity, unblemiſhed and un-
" impaired."

Final anſwer of the Athenians.

In this manner Pericles ſpoke; and the Athenians, judging that what he adviſed was moſt for their intereſt, *decreed* in conformity to his exhortation. They returned a particular anſwer to the Lacedæmonians, according to his directions, nay in the very words of his motion; and in fine concluded — that " they would do nothing upon command, but were ready to ſubmit the points in conteſt to a judicial determination, according to treaty, upon a fair and equal footing". Upon this, the embaſſadors departed; and here all negotiations came to a concluſion.

Such were the the pretexts and diſſenſions on both ſides previous to the war, and which took their firſt riſe from the buſineſs of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Theſe however never interrupted their commercial dealings nor mutual intercourſe, which ſtill were carried on without the intervention of heralds, but not without ſuſpicions. For ſuch incidents manifeſtly tended to a rupture, and muſt infallibly end in war. [8]

8 As the Athenians were a free people, they made uſe of their liberty on all occaſions to aſperſe, calumniate, and ridicule the great men amongſt them. They were at this time exhibited on the ſtage by name; and Ariſtophanes, whoſe plays were acted during the Peloponneſian war, hath ridiculed the co-temporary ſtateſmen and commanders with the utmoſt petulancy and virulence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to reſtrain this licentiouſneſs of their comic poets; but it may not be amiſs in the courſe of the *notes* to quote occaſionally ſome paſſages from him, to ſhew my countrymen, how much writing libels differs from writing hiſtory; and, that where liberty is abuſed, no public merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the malice of faction, or the petulance of buffoons.

Our

Our hiſtorian hath laid open the true and pretended cauſes of the Peloponneſian war. Let us now ſee, how affairs were repreſented on the ſtage of Athens. His comedy of *The Acharnians* was exhibited by Ariſtophanes at Athens in the ſixth year of this war, after the death of Pericles. The decree againſt Megara is the ground-work of it: One *Dicæopolis* of the borough of Acharnæ is the droll of the play, and amply ridicules it to a ſet of his neighbours ——

" Do not be angry, *ſays he*, if though a " beggar I preſume to talk to Athenians " about affairs of ſtate, and for once play " the tragedian. It is the province of tra- " gedy to give a juſt repreſentation of " things; and I am going to ſpeak in a " very juſt manner of very ſad things in- " deed. Cleon will not be able to catch " me this bout, for traducing my country- " men in the hearing of ſtrangers. We are " here by ourſelves, and to-day is the feſti- " val of Bacchus. The ſtrangers are not " yet come, nor the tributes, nor the con- " federates from other ſtates: We are here " ſnug by ourſelves, all of us true-blooded " Athenians. Thoſe odd creatures the ſo- " journers I look upon as the chaff of " Athens. And now to ſpeak ſincerely, I " hate the Lacedæmonians from the bot- " tom of my ſoul; and I heartily wiſh that " Neptune, the God adored at Tænarus, " would give them an earthquake, and " tumble down all their houſes upon their " heads. They have made ſad work with " me, all my vineyards are quite deſtroyed " by the rogues. But, my dear friends and " countrymen here preſent, why do we " blame the Lacedæmonians for this? And " mind, Sirs, I caſt no aſperſions upon our " own *ſtate*; I aim at no body employed " in the affairs of the adminiſtration, but " at a parcel of ſad raſcals, ſcurvy, low, " infamous ſcoundrels, who are eternally " bringing informations againſt a Mega- " réan pair of paniers. If they once ſet " eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a ſuck- " ing-pig, a ſprig of parſley, or a grain of " ſalt, they ſwear at once they belonged to " Megaréans, and were ſold that very day. " Theſe things however, though the ge- " neral practice, are of ſmall ſignification. " A parcel of jolly fellows, deep in their " cups, ſtole away from Megara that jade " Simætha. The Megaréans, exaſperated " at the loſs of their wench, made repri- " zals by carrying off a brace of ſtrum- " pets, that belonged to Aſpaſia. And thus " this curſed war, which plagues all Greece, " took its riſe from three ſtrumpets. Ay, " on account of three whores Olym- " pian Pericles began to ſtorm, he light- " en'd, thunder'd, rous'd all Greece to " arms; he made new laws as faſt as ſo " many ballads, that the poor dogs of Me- " gara muſt be found neither in the fields, " nor the markets, nor by ſea, nor by " land. Upon this, being juſt ready to " ſtarve, away they go to Lacedæmon, to " get the decree reverſed which had been " made on account of three whores. It " would not do, embaſſy after embaſſy had " no avail, and then immediately roſe all " this clattering of ſhields."

Calumny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and in another comedy of Ariſtophenes we find *another* let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice with Phidias in ſecreting ſome of the gold iſſued from the public treaſury for the ſtatue of Minerva in the citadel, the workmanſhip of that celebrated artiſt. In his comedy called *The Peace*, Mercury ſays —— " Ye " wiſe husbandmen attend to my words, " if

" if you have a mind to know how things " came into this ſad confuſion. Phidias " was the firſt cauſe of it by cheating the " public. Then Pericles helped it for- " wards, for fear he ſhould ſhare the fate " of Phidias. He ſtood in awe of your " tempers; he was afraid of falling under " your cenſure; ſo, to prevent his own " perſonal danger, he ſet the whole com- " munity in a flame, by lighting up firſt " that little ſpark of the decree againſt " Megara. He then blew up that ſpark " into this mighty war, *the ſmoke of* " which hath fetched tears from all the " eyes of Greece, from Grecians on both " ſides."

Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. The fine taſte of the patron and fine execution of the artiſt have been univerſally acknowledged. An accuſation however was preferred againſt Phidias by one of his workmen, that he had ſecreted ſome gold. By the advice of Pericles he had laid it on ſo artfully, that it might be taken off without prejudicing the ſtatue. The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to anſwer weight. It ſeems however that Phidias was baniſhed; becauſe, as the enemies of Pericles attacked him at the ſame time, for impiety in the perſons of his beloved Aſpaſia and his preceptor in philoſophy Anaxagoras, and for a cheat in that of his favourite artiſt, he had only influence enough to ſave the former, by pleading earneſtly for her and ſoftening his plea with abundant tears.

Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a third ſtory of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this —Alcibiades, then a youth, ſaw him in a very penſive and melancholy mood, and demanded the reaſon of it. Pericles told him, " great ſums of public mo- " ney had paſſed through his hands, and he " knew not how to make up his accounts." " Contrive then, replied Alcibiades, to give " no account at all." And in purſuance of this advice he is ſaid to have involved the *ſtate* in the Peloponneſian war. But is not Thucydides more to be depended upon than a whole hoſt of writers of ſcandal, memoirs, private hiſtory and ſatire? If we liſten to the latter, there never was and never will be any truth in hiſtory; there never was, nor is there this moment any true worth or merit in the world. A buffoon can degrade a hero, a ſpiteful ſatiriſt cloud every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and ſlander.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE SECOND.

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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK II.

HENCE inſtantly commenceth the War between the Peloponneſians and Athenians, and the Confederates on both ſides ---- during which, they had no kind of intercourſe with one another without the herald; and now, once engaged, carried it on without intermiſſion. The particular incidents of it are orderly related by the *Summer* and the *Winter*. Before Chriſt, 431. *The war beginneth.*

The Thirty-years Peace, which was made after the conqueſt of Eubœa, had now laſted fourteen: But in the fifteenth year, when Chryſis had been forty-eight years *Prieſteſs* at Argos, when Æneſias was *Ephorus* at Sparta, and Pythodorus ten months *Archon* at Athens, in the ſixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the very beginning of the ſpring ---- a body of Thebans, ſomewhat above three Platæa *ſurprized by the* Thebans.

hundred, under the command of Pythangelus the ſon of Phylidas and Diemporus the ſon of Onetoridas, two of the rulers of Bœotia, about the firſt ſleep got into [1] Platæa of Bœotia with their arms, which place was then in alliance with the Athenians. They were induced to this attempt, and had the gates opened to them by Nauclides and aſſociates, citizens of Platæa, who had formed a deſign, for the ſake of aggrandizing themſelves, to deſtroy all their fellow-citizens, averſe to their ſchemes, and to gain the city for the Thebans. But the affair was managed by Eurymachus the ſon of Leontiades a perſon of the greateſt authority amongſt the Thebans. For the Thebans, foreſeeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while peace was actually ſubſiſting and the war not yet declared, a ſtrong deſire to get poſſeſſion of Platæa, which had been at eternal enmity with them. No regular watch was as yet kept in it, which was a means of facilitating their entrance. When they had gained admiſſion, they drew themſelves up in order of battle on the public forum, contrary to the ſcheme propoſed by the conſpirators, of marching immediately to the houſes of their enemies, and putting them to the ſword. Their own deſign was, publickly to offer ſome fair propoſals, and gain the city by an amicable compoſition. With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud; that --- " All who were willing to en-
" ter into league, according to the ancient cuſtom of all Bœotians [2],
" ſhould

1 Platæa was a city and petty ſtate in Bœotia, on the confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been ſo firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, that it drew upon them the laſting rancour of the Thebans, who had joined the Perſians when they invaded Greece, and perſuaded them to burn down Platæa. The Platæans engaged with the Athenians on the ſide of Greece, in the famous battle fought within their own territory. The Athenians, to ſhew their gratitude, gave them a place in the fine battle-piece painted in the Pæcile in honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Athens, and ever after concluded their religious ſolemnities with a prayer for the proſperity of the Platæans.

2 Bœotia was one large republic formed by the union of ſeveral little *ſtates*. The ſovereignty (as Thucydides informs us, book the *fifth*) was lodged in four *councils*, compoſed of deputies ſent from every city in the

" ſhould come and join their arms with them." By this method, they thought the city would eaſily be brought to an accommodation.

The Platæans, when they found that the Thebans were already got in and had ſurprized the town, being in great conſternation, and thinking the enemy more numerous than they really were, for the night prevented a view of them, came ſoon to a compoſition; and accepting what terms they offered, made no reſiſtance; eſpecially, as they found that violence was offered to no man. Yet, by means of the parley, they had diſcovered that the Thebans were few in number; and judged, ſhould they venture an attack, they might eaſily overpower them: --- for the bulk of the Platæans had not the leaſt inclination to revolt from the Athenians. It was at length concluded, that this point ſhould be attempted, after having conferred together, by digging thro' the partition-walls of one another's houſes, to avoid the ſuſpicion which going through the ſtreets might have occaſioned. Then along the ſtreets they ranged carriages without the oxen, to ſerve them inſtead of a rampart, and made a proper diſpoſition of every thing neceſſary for immediate execution. When they had got every thing ready in the beſt manner they were able, watching till night began to vaniſh and the firſt dawn appear, they marched from their houſes towards the Thebans, that they might fall upon them before the full light ſhould embolden their reſiſtance, and give them equal advantages in the fight, and that they might be more intimidated by being charged in the dark, and ſenſible of diſadvantage from their ignorance of the city. The attack was immediately begun, and both ſides ſoon came to action. The Thebans,

The Platæans *ſubmit, but are ſoon in an inſurrection.*

the union. Theſe were the *ſtates-general*, and ſat at Thebes, the principal city of Bœotia. The executive and military powers were lodged in eleven perſons, choſen annually, and ſtiled *Rulers* of Bœotia, in whoſe election each city had a ſhare. They rolled, and at the battle of Delium Pagondas was in the chief command, in right of Thebes. Platæa had no ſhare in this union, but was cloſely allied with and under the protection of Athens.

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM

when

when they found themſelves thus circumvented, threw themſelves into an oval, and wherever aſſaulted, prevented impreſſion. Twice or thrice they beat them back with ſucceſs; but, when the aſſaults were again with a loud noiſe repeated, when the very women and menial ſervants were ſhouting and ſcreaming from the houſes all around, and throwing ſtones and tiles amongſt them, incommoded further by the rain which had fallen plentifully that night, they were ſeized with fear, and abandoning their defence fled in confuſion about the city. The greateſt part of them running in the dark and the dirt, knew not any of the paſſages by which they could get out (for this affair happened upon the change of the moon) and were purſued by men who knowing them all prevented their eſcape, ſo that many of them periſhed. The gates by which they entered, and which only had been opened, one of the Platæans had barr'd faſt by thruſting the point of a ſpear into the ſtaple inſtead of a bolt, ſo that they could not poſſibly get out there. Thus purſued about the city, ſome of them got upon the walls, and threw themſelves over, but moſt of theſe were killed by the fall: Some of them found a gate unguarded, and a woman ſupplying them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in pieces unperceived, tho' few only eſcaped by this means, for they were ſoon diſcovered. Others were ſeparately ſlain in the different quarters of the city. But the greateſt part, and chiefly thoſe who had kept in a body, threw themſelves into a great houſe contiguous to the walls, the doors of which happened to be open, imagining the doors of this houſe to be the city-gates and a certain paſſage to a place of ſafety. When the Platæans ſaw them thus ſhut up, they conſulted together, whether they ſhould fire the houſe and burn them all in their incloſure, or reſerve them for ſome other puniſhment. But at laſt, theſe and all the other Thebans yet ſurviving, who were ſcattered about the city, agreed to give up their arms, and ſurrender themſelves to the Platæans priſoners at diſcretion. Such was the iſſue of this attempt on Platæa.

The

The other Thebans, who ought during night to have come up with all their ſtrength to reinforce the firſt body, in caſe they miſcarried, and were ſtill upon the march, when the news of this defeat met them, advanced with all poſſible expedition. Platæa is diſtant from Thebes about * ſeventy ſtadia, and the rain which fell that night had retarded their march; for the river Aſopus was ſo much ſwelled by it that it was not eaſily fordable. It was owing to the march in ſuch a heavy rain and the difficulty of paſſing this river, that they came not up till their men were either ſlain or made priſoners. When the Thebans were convinced of that event, they caſt their attention towards the Platæans, who were ſtill *without*: For the people of Platæa were ſcattered about the adjacent country with their implements of huſbandry, becauſe annoyance in time of peace was quite unexpected. They were deſirous to catch ſome of theſe as exchange for their own people within the city, if any were yet living and priſoners there. On this they were fully bent; but, in the midſt of their project, the Platæans, who ſuſpected the probability of ſome ſuch deſign, and were anxious for their people yet *without*, diſpatched a herald to the Thebans, repreſenting to them — "the injuſtice of the attempt already made; ſince, treaties ſubſiſting, they had endeavoured to ſurprize the city;" and then warned them, "to deſiſt from any violence to thoſe *without*. If not, they poſitively declared, they would put all the priſoners yet alive to the ſword; whereas, in caſe they retired peaceably out of their territory, they would deliver them up unhurt." This account the Thebans give, and ſay farther, it was ſworn to. The Platæans diſown the promiſe of an immediate diſcharge of the priſoners, which was reſerved for terms to be agreed upon in a ſubſequent treaty, and flatly deny that they ſwore. The Thebans however retired out of their territory, without committing any violence. But the Platæans, when they had with expedition fetched into the city all their effects of value that were out in the fields, immediately put all their priſoners to the ſword.

Platæa *recovered and ſecured.*

* *About* 7 Engliſh *miles.*

ſword. The number of thoſe that were taken was one hundred and eighty. Eurymachus was amongſt them, with whom the traitors had concerted the ſurprize. And this done, they diſpatched a meſſenger to Athens; and reſtored to the Thebans their dead under truce. And then, they regulated the affairs of the city in the manner moſt ſuitable to their preſent ſituation.

The news of the ſurprizal of Platæa had ſoon reached the Athenians, who immediately apprehended all the Bœotians then in Attica, and diſpatched a herald to Platæa with orders, — "to proceed no farther againſt the Theban priſoners, till they ſhould ſend their determination about them;" —— for they were not yet informed of their having been actually put to death. The firſt meſſenger had been ſent away, immediately upon the irruption of the Thebans — the ſecond, ſo ſoon as they were defeated and made priſoners — as to what happened afterwards, they were utterly in the dark. Thus ignorant of what had ſince been done, the Athenians diſpatched away their herald, who upon his arrival found them all deſtroyed. Yet, after this the Athenians, marching a body of troops to Platæa, carried thither all neceſſary proviſions, left a garriſon in the place, and brought away all the hands that would be uſeleſs in a ſiege, with the women and children.

Meaſures on both ſides for war.

After this buſineſs of Platæa, and ſo manifeſt a breach of peace, the Athenians made all neceſſary preparations for immediate war. The Lacedæmonians alſo and their confederates took the ſame meaſures. Nay, both ſides were intent on diſpatching [3] embaſſies to * *the king*,

* Artaxerxes Longimanus.

[3] By this means the inteſtine quarrels of Greece were going to throw a power into the hands of the Perſian monarch, which he could not obtain by force. Each party could cringe to the common enemy, in order to obtain ſubſidies from him to enable them to diſtreſs each other. And thus the balance of power reſted at laſt in his hands, and he became for a time ſupreme arbiter of Greece. Ariſtophanes, in his comedy of *The Acarnians*, hath deſcribed theſe embaſſies and the Perſian monarch too with exceſſive buffoonry, but quite too low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard upon the

king, and to ſeveral other Barbarian *powers*, wherever they had hope of forming ſome effectual intereſt for themſelves, and ſpared no pains to win thoſe *ſtates* over to their alliance, which had hitherto been independent. In the Lacedæmonian league, beſides the ſhips already furniſhed out for them in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to prepare a new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the ſeveral *ſtates*, that the whole number of their ſhipping might be mounted to five hundred.—They were farther to get a certain ſum of money in readineſs; but in other reſpects to remain quiet; and till their preparations could be compleated, never to admit more than one Athenian veſſel at a time within their ports.—The Athenians made a careful ſurvey of the ſtrength of their own alliance, and ſent preſſing embaſſies to the places round about Peloponneſus, to Corcyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and to Zacynthus; plainly ſeeing, that if theſe were in their intereſt, they might ſecurely attack Peloponneſus on all ſides.—The minds of both parties were not a little elated, but were eager after and big with war. For it is natural to man, in the commencement of every important enterprize, to be more than uſually alert. The young men, who were at this time numerous in Peloponneſus, numerous alſo at Athens, were for want of experience quite fond of the rupture. And all the reſt of Greece ſtood attentively at gaze on this contention between the two principal *ſtates*. Many oracles were toſſed about, the ſoothſayers ſung abundance of predictions, amongſt thoſe who were upon the point to break, and even in the cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had been lately ſhook with an earthquake, which it had never been be-

the Athenian embaſſadors for lengthening out the time of their employ as much as poſſible for the lucre of the ſalary paid them by the ſtate, which is there mentioned at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice, or public rapine —— this exorbitant ſalary of 15 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$ a day to an embaſſador from the republic of Athens to the great king of Perſia?

fore in the memory of the Greeks. It was ſaid and indeed believed, that this was a prognoſtic of ſomething extraordinary to happen; and all other accidents of an uncommon nature whatever were ſure to be wreſted to the ſame meaning.

Greece in general beſt affected to the Lacedæmonians.

The generality of Greece was indeed at this time much the beſt affected to the Lacedæmonians, who gave out the ſpecious pretence, that "they were going to recover the liberty of Greece." Every one made it both his private paſſion and his public care, to give them all poſſible ſuccour both in word and act; and every one thought, that the buſineſs certainly flagged in thoſe places where he himſelf was not preſent to invigorate proceedings. So general an averſion was there at this time formed againſt the Athenians, when ſome were paſſionately deſirous to throw off their yoke, and others apprehenſive of falling under their ſubjection.—With ſuch preparations and ſuch diſpoſitions did they run into the war.

League of Sparta.

The *ſtates* in league with either party, upon the breaking out of the war, were theſe.—In confederacy with the Lacedæmonians, were all Peloponneſians within the Iſthmus, except the Argives and Achæans, for theſe had treaties ſubſiſting with both parties. But of the Achæans, the Pellenians ſingly were the firſt who went over, tho' they were afterwards joined by all the reſt. Without Peloponneſus, were the Megaréans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. Of theſe they were ſupplied with ſhipping by the Corinthians, Megaréans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eléans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with horſe by the Bœotians, Phocians, Locrians: and the other *ſtates* furniſhed them with foot. This

Of Athens.

was the confederacy of the Lacedæmonians.—With the Athenians, were the Chians, Leſbians, Platæans, the Meſſenians of Naupactus, moſt of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, Zacynthians, and other ſtates tributary to them in ſo many nations: Namely, the maritime

maritime people of Caria, the [4] Dorians that border upon the Carians, Ionia, Helleſpont, the cities on the coaſt of Thrace, all the iſlands ſituated to the eaſt between Peloponneſus and Crete, and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of theſe, they were ſupplied with ſhipping by the Chians, Leſbians, Corcyréans; the reſt ſupplied them with foot and with money. This was the alliance on both ſides, and the ability for the war.

The former take the field.

The Lacedæmonians, immediately after the attempt on Platæa, ſent circular orders to the *ſtates* both within and without Peloponneſus, to draw their quotas of aid together, and get every thing in readineſs for a foreign expedition, as intending to invade Attica. When all was ready, they aſſembled on the day appointed, with two thirds of the force of every *ſtate*, at the Iſthmus. When the whole army was thus [5] drawn together, Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded in the expedition, convened the commanders from all the auxiliary *ſtates*, with all thoſe that were in authority, and moſt fitting to be preſent, and addreſſed them, as follows ——

Speech of Archidamus.

" PELOPONNESIANS and allies, many are the expedi-
" tions in which our fathers have been engaged both within and
" without Peloponneſus. Even ſome of us, who are more advanced
" in years, are by no means unexperienced in the buſineſs of war.
" Yet, never before did we take the field with a force ſo great as
" the preſent. But, numerous and formidable in arms as we may
" now appear, we are however marching againſt a moſt powerful
" *ſtate*. Thus is it incumbent upon us, to ſhew ourſelves not inferior
" in valour to our fathers, nor to ſink below the expectations of the

4 Theſe were the Dorians, who were ſeated in the iſlands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the *Scholiaſt*.

5 Plutarch informs us, that the number amounted to ſixty thouſand men.

" world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed attentively on our mo-
" tions. —— Their good-will to us, their hatred of the Athenians,
" make them wiſh for our ſucceſs in all our undertakings. It is
" therefore our buſineſs, without placing too great a confidence in
" ſuperior numbers, or truſting to the preſumption that our enemies
" dare not come out to fight us — for no reaſons like theſe, to relax
" our diſcipline, or break the regularity of our march — but, the
" commander of every confederate body and every private ſoldier
" ought to keep within himſelf the conſtant expectation, of being
" engaged in action. Uncertain are the turns of war; great events
" ſtart up from a ſmall beginning, and aſſaults are given from indig-
" nation. Nay, frequently an inferior number engaging with cau-
" tion hath proved too hard for a more numerous body, whom
" contempt of their enemy expoſeth to attacks for which they are
" not prepared. Upon hoſtile ground, it is always the duty of ſol-
" diers to be reſolutely bold, and to keep ready for action with pro-
" per circumſpection. Thus, will they be always ready to attack
" with ſpirit, and be moſt firmly ſecured againſt a ſurprize.

" We are not marching againſt a people, who are unable to de-
" fend themſelves, but excellently well qualified for it in every
" reſpect; ſo that we may certainly depend upon their advancing
" againſt us to give us battle; — not yet perhaps in motion, ſo long
" as no enemy appears; but moſt aſſuredly ſo, when once they ſee
" us in their territory, waſting and deſtroying their ſubſtance. All
" men muſt kindle into wrath, when uncommon injuries are unex-
" pectedly done them, when manifeſt outrage glares before them.
" Reflection then may indeed have loſt its power, but reſentment
" moſt ſtrongly impels them to reſiſtance. Something like
" this may more reaſonably be looked for from Athenians, than
" from other people. They eſteem themſelves worthy to command
" others, and their ſpirit is more turned to make than to ſuffer depre-
" dations. Againſt ſo formidable a people are we now to march;

and

" and by the event, whatever it be, ſhall we acquire the greateſt " glory or diſgrace, for our anceſtors and ourſelves. — Let it therefore " be the buſineſs of every man to follow his commander, obſervant " in every point of diſcipline and the rules of war, and obeying with " expedition the orders you receive. The fineſt ſpectacle and the " ſtrongeſt defence is the uniform obſervation of diſcipline by a nu- " merous army."

A fruitleſs meſſage to Athens.

When Archidamus had finiſhed his oration and diſmiſſed the aſ- ſembly, the firſt thing he did was ſending to Athens Meleſippus a Spartan the ſon of Diacritus, to try, whether the Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, ſince they found an army upon the march againſt them. But they would not allow him to come into the city, nor grant him a public audience. For the advice of Pericles had before this gained the general aſſent, that " no herald or embaſſy ſhould be received from the Lacedæmonians, ſo long as they were in the field againſt them." They ſend him back therefore unheard, and ordered him " to quit their territories that very day; that further, the Lacedæmonians ſhould retire within their own frontier; and then, if they had any thing to tranſact with them, ſhould ſend their embaſſadors for the purpoſe." They even commiſſion ſome perſons to guard Meleſippus back, that he might have no conference with any perſon whatever. When he was brought to the borders and received his diſmiſſion, he parted from them with theſe words —— " This day is the beginning of great " woes to the Grecians." Upon his return to the camp, Archidamus was convinced that the Athenians were inflexible as ever, ſo that he immediately diſlodged and advanced with his army into their territories. —— The Bœotians ſent their quota of foot and their horſe to join the Peloponneſians in this expedition, but with the reſt of their forces they marched towards Platæa, and laid the country waſte.

Whilſt

The behaviour of Pericles, *and advice.*

Whilſt the Peloponneſians were yet aſſembling at the Iſthmus, or yet on the march, before they had entered Attica, Pericles the ſon of Xantippus, who with nine others had been appointed to command the Athenian forces, when he ſaw an irruption from the Peloponneſians unavoidable, had conceived a ſuſpicion that Archidamus, whom the hoſpitable [6] intercourſe had made his friend, from a principle of good-nature willing to oblige him, would leave his lands untouched, or, might be ordered to do ſo by the policy of the Lacedæmonians, as they had already demanded an *excommunication* on his account; by which means he muſt certainly incur the public jealouſy. He declared therefore to the Athenians, in a general aſſembly of the people --- That, " tho' Archidamus was his friend, he ſhould not be " ſo to the prejudice of the *ſtate*; and that, if the enemy ſpared his " lands and houſes in the general ravage, he made a free donation of " them to the public; ſo that for any accident of that nature he " ought not to fall under their cenſure." He then exhorted all who were preſent, as he had done before ---- " to prepare vigorouſly for " war, and to withdraw all their effects from out of the country, --- " by no means to march out againſt the enemy, but keep within the " walls and mind only the defence of the city; ----- to fit out their " navy, in which their ſtrength principally conſiſted, and keep a " tight rein over all their dependants. By the large tributes levied

6 The tie of *hoſpitality* was ſacred and inviolable amongſt the Ancients. It was a neceſſary exertion of humanity at firſt from the want of inns and lodging-houſes, and was frequently improved into friendſhip and endearment. This between Pericles and Archidamus was merely of a private nature, between the royal family of Sparta, and a principal one in the republic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public hoſt of the Spartan ſtate, and entertained their embaſſadors and public miniſters. The ſtate of Athens had likewiſe in all places a public hoſt who lodged their miniſters. Yet amongſt private perſons it was a frank diſintereſted tie; when once they had eat ſalt together, or ſat at the ſame table, they regarded themſelves as under mutual obligations, which ſmall points ought not to aboliſh. They who ſwerved from this laudable cuſtom through caprice or ingratitude were looked upon as infamous execrable perſons.

" upon

" upon thoſe, *he ſaid*, their power was chiefly to be ſupported, ſince " ſucceſs in war was a conſtant reſult from prudent meaſures and " plentiful ſupplies. --- [7] He exhorted them by no means to let their " ſpirits droop, ſince beſides their certain revenue, ſix hundred talents " were annually paid them by their tributary ſtates, and they had ſtill in " the citadel ſix thouſand talents of ſilver coined." Their primary fund was nine thouſand ſeven hundred talents out of which had been taken what defrayed the expence of refitting the gates of the citadel, of other public works, and the exigencies of Potidæa.-- "That, beſides this, they " had gold and ſilver uncoined both in public and private repoſitories, " many valuable vaſes deſtined for religious uſes and their public ſo- " lemnities, and the Perſian ſpoils, the whole value of which would " not amount to leſs than five hundred talents."--He mentioned further, " the great wealth that was ſtored up in other temples, which they " had a right to uſe; and if this right ſhould be denied them, they " might have recourſe to the golden ornaments of the *Goddeſs* her- " ſelf." He declared, " that her image had about it to the weight " of forty talents of gold without alloy, all which might be taken off " from the ſtatue. --- That, for the preſervation of their country, it " might lawfully be employed;" but added, " that it ought after- " wards to be amply replaced." In this manner did he render them confident that their funds of money would ſuffice. ---- He told them further, that " they had thirteen thouſand men that wore heavy ar- " mour, excluſive of thoſe that were in garriſons, and the ſixteen " thouſand on the guard of the city,"--for ſo large a number, draughted from the youngeſt and oldeſt citizens and ſojourners, who wore the

7 The account here given ſheweth Athens at this time to have been a very opulent *ſtate*. Reduced to Engliſh money it ſtands thus. ----- The tribute paid them annually amounted to 116250 *l.* ſterling. The fund yet remaining in the citadel was 1,162500 *l.* ſterling. They had expended lately on their public works 3700 talents which is equal to 716875 *l.* ſterling. The weight of the gold on the ſtatue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, computing the talent only at 65 *l.* Troy, to avoid fractions, and the gold at 4 *l.* ſterling an ounce, amounts in value to 124800 *l.* ſterling.

heavy

heavy armour, was employed in this ſervice upon the firſt invaſion of their enemies. For the length of the Phalerian-wall to the place where it joined the circle of the city was * thirty five ſtadia, and that part of the circular-wall which was guarded was † forty three in length; but that which lay between the long-wall and the Phalerian had no guard. The long-walls continued down to the Piræus are * forty ſtadia, but the outermoſt of them only was guarded. The whole compaſs of the Piræus, including Munichia, is † ſixty ſtadia, but then only one half of this had a guard. [8] ---- He then aſſured them, that "they had, including the archers that were mounted, twelve hundred horſemen, ſixteen hundred archers, and three hundred triremes fit for ſea." ---- So great in general, and no leſs in any one article, were the military proviſions of the Athenians, when the Peloponneſians had formed the deſign of invading them, and both ſides began the war. ---- Theſe, and ſuch like arguments, was Pericles continually employing, to convince them that they were well able to carry on a ſucceſsful war.

* *About* 3½ Engliſh *miles.*

† *About* 4 *miles.*

* *About* 4 Engliſh *miles.*

† *About* 6 Engliſh *miles.*

Regarded by the Athenians.

The Athenians heard him with attention, and followed his advice. They withdrew from the country their children, their wives, all the furniture of their houſes there, pulling down with their own hands the timber of which they were built. Their flocks and their labouring cattle they ſent over into Eubœa and the adjacent iſlands. But this removal was a very grievous buſineſs to them, ſince it had been the ancient cuſtom of many of the Athenians to reſide at large in the country.

This method of living had been more habitual to the Athenians, than to any other Greeks, from their firſt commencement as a people. From the time of Cecrops and their firſt ſeries of Kings down to Theſeus, Attica had been inhabited in ſeveral diſtinct towns, each of

8 The whole compaſs of the walls of Athens was 178 ſtadia, or above 22 Attic miles. But, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the Attic mile conſiſted of but 805 paces, whereas the Engliſh is 1056. Hence, the compaſs of Athens appears to have been about 17 Engliſh miles.

which

which had its own *Archons* [9] and its own *Prytanéum*; and, unleſs in times of danger, had ſeldom recourſe to the regal authority, ſince juſtice was adminiſtred in every ſeparate *borough*, and each had a council of its own. Sometimes they even warred againſt one another; for inſtance, the Eleuſinians, when they ſided with Eumolpus againſt Erectheus. But when the regal power devolved upon Theſeus, a man of an extenſive underſtanding, and who knew how to govern, in ſeveral reſpects he improved the whole territory; and beſides, diſſolving all the councils and magiſtracies of the petty boroughs [1], he removed them to the *metropolis*, as it is at preſent, and conſtituting one grand Senate and Prytanéum, made *it* the point of union in which all concentred. Their private properties he left to them entire, but made them reſt contented with Athens alone for their city; which, when all its ſubjects were now jointly contributing to its ſupport, was quickly enlarged, and delivered ſo by Theſeus to the ſucceeding Kings. In memory of this, from the days of Theſeus quite down to the preſent time, the Athenians have held an anniverſary ſolemnity to the *Goddeſs*, which they call the *Synæcia* or *Cohabitation*. Before this, that which is now *the Citadel*, and that part which lies on the ſouth-ſide of the citadel, was all the city. The temples built either within the citadel or without ſufficiently ſhew it. For in the ſouth-part of the city, particularly, ſtand the Temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian-feaſts are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Antheſterion [2]: which

9 That is --- Magiſtrates of its own, and a common-hall, in which thoſe Magiſtrates performed the duties of their office in adminiſtring juſtice, and offering ſacrifices, and where they had their diet at the public expence.

1 The number of the *boroughs* in Attica was one hundred ſeventy four.

2 The Engliſh reader may perhaps call this a hard word, but I hope will not be frightned. The names of other Attic months will occur in the ſequel, which I ſhall leave as I find them, becauſe no exact correſpondence hath been found out between the Attic months which were lunar and thoſe now in uſe. Monſieur *Tourreil*, the

which cuſtom is ſtill retained to this day by the Ionians of Attic deſcent. All the other ancient temples are ſeated in the ſame quarter. Near it alſo is the fountain, now called the *Enneakrounos* or *Ninepipe*, from the manner in which it was embelliſhed by the * Tyrants; but formerly, when all the ſprings were open, called *Callirrhoë*; and which, as near at hand, they preferred on the moſt ſolemn occaſions. And that ancient cuſtom is to this day preſerved, by making uſe of the ſame water in connubial and many other religious rites. And further, it is owing to ſuch their ancient reſidence in the citadel, that it is *eminently* called by the Athenians to this very day, *The City*.

* *The* Piſiſtratidæ.

In the manner above-mentioned, were the Athenians for a long

the celebrated French tranſlator of Demoſthenes, hath made it a very ſerious point. "I have long doubted (ſays he) "whether in my tranſlation I ſhould give "the months their old Greek names, or "ſuch as they have in our language. The "reaſon that made me balance is the im-"poſſibility of computing the months ſo "that they ſhall anſwer exactly to our "French.—— My firſt determination was "to date in our own manner; I choſe to "be leſs exact, rather than frighten the "greateſt part of my readers by words to "which they are not accuſtomed. For "what French ears would not be appalled "at the words, *Thargelion*, *Boedromion*, "*Elaphebolion*," &c? He then gives reaſons for retaining the Greek ones, and adds, "I declare then once for all, that I "am far from pedantically affecting the "terms of an old calendar conceived in a "language barbarous to numbers of people, "who, ſhocked at the ſound, would perhaps impute to me a taſte, which thank "God I have not. I proteſt that to my "ear, no leſs than to theirs, the French "name of the word would be more pleaſing and would ſound better. But neither "falſe delicacy nor vicious complaiſance "hath been able to prevail with me to expoſe myſelf to reproaches, for knowingly "leading others into miſtake, and uſing "words appropriated to Roman and ſolar "months, which have no correſpondence "with the lunar and Attic." He ſays a deal on the ſubject ſo little affecting his countrymen, that ſince his death they have again thrown all the greek terms into the margin, and placed in the text the incongruous modern ones for the ſake of familiar ſounds. If the Engliſh reader be as delicate he may read *April* or *May* at his option. The ableſt chronologers are unable to exchange them into currency with any tolerable exactneſs. A great deal of learning might be alſo diſplayed about the days of the month and the Grecian method of counting them: But, as it is exceeding eaſy to tranſlate theſe right, learning may be excuſed in a point where no light is wanting.

ſeries

ſeries of time ſcattered about the country, in towns and communities at their own diſcretion. And, as not only the more ancient, but even the latter Athenians quite down to the preſent war, had ſtill retained the cuſtom of dwelling about the country with their families, the general removals into the city, after they were formed into one body, were attended with no ſmall embaraſſment; and particularly *now*, when they had been refitting their houſes, and reſettling themſelves after the Perſian invaſion. It gave them a very ſenſible grief and concern to think, that they muſt forſake their habitations and temples, which, from long antiquity, it had been their forefathers and their own religious care to frequent; that they muſt quite alter their ſcene of life, and each abandon as it were his native home. When they were come into the city, ſome few had houſes ready for their reception, or ſheltered themſelves with their friends and relations. The greater part were forced to ſettle in the leſs frequented quarters of the city, in all the buildings ſacred to the Gods and Heroes, except thoſe in the citadel, the Eleuſinian, and any other from whence they were excluded by religious awe. There was indeed a ſpot of ground below the citadel, called the *Pelaſgic*, which to turn into a dwelling-place, had not only been thought profaneneſs, but was expreſly forbid by the cloſe of a line in a Pythian oracle, which ſaid,

—— "Beſt is Pelaſgic empty."

Yet this ſudden urgent neceſſity conſtrained them to convert it to ſuch an uſe. To *me*, I own, that oracle ſeems to have carried a different meaning from what they gave it. For the calamities of Athens did not flow from the profane habitation of this place, but from the war which laid them under a neceſſity of employing it in ſuch a manner. The oracle makes no mention of the war, but only hints that its being ſome time inhabited would be attended with public

misfortune. Many of them, further, were forced to lodge themſelves within the turrets of the walls, or wherever they could find a vacant corner. The city was not able to receive ſo large a conflux of people. But afterwards, the *Long-walls*, and a great part of the Piræus, were portioned out to them for little dwellings. At the ſame time they were buſied in the military preparations, gathering together the confederate-forces, and fitting out a fleet of one hundred ſhips to infeſt Peloponneſus. In affairs of ſuch great importance were the Athenians engaged.

Slow advance of the enemy into Attica.

The Peloponneſian army, advancing forwards, came up firſt to Oënoe, through which they deſigned to break into Attica. Encamping before it, they made ready their engines and all other neceſſaries for battering the walls. For Oënoe, being a frontier-town between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about, ſince the Athenians were uſed, upon the breaking out of war, to throw a garriſon into it. The enemy made great preparations for aſſaulting it, and by this and other means ſpent no little time before it.

Archidamus *cenſured.*

This delay was the occaſion of drawing very heavy cenſures on Archidamus. He had before this been thought too dilatory in gathering together the confederate-army, and too much attached to the Athenians, becauſe he never declared warmly for the war. But after the army was drawn together, his long ſtay at the Iſthmus, and the ſlow marches he had made from thence, expoſed him to calumny, which was ſtill heightened by the length of the ſiege of Oënoe: For, in this interval of delay, the Athenians had without moleſtation withdrawn all their effects from the country, tho' it was the general opinion, that, had the Peloponneſians advanced with expedition, they might undoubtedly have ſeized them, were it not for theſe dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. Under ſuch a weight of reſentment did Archidamus ſtill lie with his army before Oënoe. His remiſſneſs was ſaid to be owing to his preſumption, that the Athenians, if their territory was ſpared, would make ſome conceſſions,

ſions, and that they dreaded nothing more than to ſee it deſtroyed. But after their aſſault on Oënoe, and the ſucceſſive miſcarriage of all the methods employed to take it, the Athenians ſtill reſolutely refraining from the leaſt ſhew of ſubmiſſion, they broke up the ſiege and marched into Attica, in the height of ſummer, when the harveſt was ripe, about eighty days after the Thebans had miſcarried in the ſurprize of Platæa. They were ſtill commanded by Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and having formed their camp began their devaſtations. They firſt of all ravaged Eleuſis and the plain of Thriaſia. Near Rheiti they encountered, and put to flight a party of Athenian horſe. Then they advanced further into the country through Cecropia, leaving mount Ægaleon on their right, till they came to Acharnæ, the greateſt of all thoſe which are called *The Boroughs* of Athens. They ſat down before it, and having fortified their camp, continued a long time there, laying all the adjacent country waſte.

The deſign of Archidamus in ſtopping thus before Acharnæ, keeping there his army ready for battle, and not marching down this firſt campaign into the plains, is ſaid to be this. —— He preſumed that the Athenians who flouriſhed at that time in a numerous youth, and who never before had been ſo well prepared for war, would probably march out againſt him, and would not ſit quiet, whilſt their lands were ravaged before their eyes. But when he had advanced to Eleuſis and the plain of Thriaſia without any reſiſtance, he had a mind to try whether laying ſiege to Acharnæ would provoke them to come out. This place ſeemed further to him a convenient ſpot for a long encampment. Beſides, he could not perſuade himſelf, that the Acharnians, ſo conſiderable a body amongſt the citizens of Athens (for three thouſand of them now wore the heavy armour) could ſee with patience their own properties ruined by hoſtile devaſtation, without inciting all their fellow-citizens to ruſh out to battle. And if the Athenians would not come out againſt them

them this campaign, he might another campaign with greater ſecurity extend his devaſtation even to the very walls of Athens. He thought it not likely that the Acharnians, when all their lands had been ruined in this manner, would chearfully run into hazards to prevent the loſſes of others, and that hence [3] much diſſenſion might be kindled up amongſt them. Of theſe imaginary ſchemes was Archidamus full, whilſt he lay before Acharnæ.

The Athenians *loſe their temper.*

The Athenians, ſo long as the enemy remained about Eleuſis and the plain of Thriaſia, conceived ſome hopes that they would advance no farther. They put one another in mind, that Pleiſtoanax ſon of Pauſanias king of the Lacedæmonians, when fourteen years before this war he invaded Attica with an army of Peloponneſians, came only as far as to Eleuſis and Thrias, and then retreated without penetrating any farther — that, upon this account he had been baniſhed Sparta, becauſe it looked as if he had been bribed to ſuch an unſeaſonable retreat. But when they ſaw the enemy advanced to Achar-

3 Ariſtophanes wrote his comedy of *The Acharnians* upon this plan, and abundantly ridiculed the public conduct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Though it was not brought upon the ſtage till the ſixth year of the war, it amply ſhews us, how the Acharnians reſented their being thus expoſed to the ravage of the enemy; and how the wits, that lived upon the public paſſions, helped ſtill more to exaſperate them, and miſ-repreſented the meaſures of the ableſt politicians, and who perfectly well underſtood and aimed at the general welfare of the whole community, as weak, corrupt, and miſchievous. No care to redreſs, and no commiſeration for the Acharnians, as *Dicæopolis* hints, who was one of that *borough* —— "And what? it "will be ſaid, Can this poſſibly be help-"ed? Be helped, do you ſay? why not? "Tell me, if you can. Suppoſe only, "that a Lacedæmonian had ſtood acroſs "in his ſkiff to Seriphus, and after kil-"ling a favourite lap-dog got off again "ſafe: —— Would ye now in this caſe "ſit ſtill? Quite the contrary. You "would immediately be putting out to ſea "with three hundred ſail of ſhips; Athens "would roar with the tumult of ſoldiers; "the captains of veſſels would be ſhout-"ing, pay delivering, and our gold flying "about. What a buſtle would there be in "the long *portico!* what diſtributing of "proviſions, skins, thongs, casks full of "olives, onions in nets, *&c. &c. &c.* "all the decks would be crowded with "ſeamen. What a daſhing of oars, muſic "ſounding, boatſwains bawling; nothing "but hurry and confuſion! Such, I am "well aſſured, would then be the caſe."

næ,

næ, which was diſtant but * ſixty ſtadia from Athens, they thought their incurſions were no longer to be endured. It appeared, as it reaſonably might, a heavy grievance, to have all their lands thus ravaged within their ſight; —— a ſcene like this the younger ſort never had beheld, nor the elder but once — in the Perſian war. The bulk of the people but eſpecially the younger part were for ſallying out and fighting, and not to ſtand tamely looking upon the inſult. Numbers of them aſſembled together in a tumultuous manner, which was the riſe of great confuſion, ſome loudly demanding to march out againſt the enemy, and others reſtraining them from it. The ſoothſayers gave out all manner of predictions, which every hearer interpreted by the key of his own paſſions. The Acharnians, regarding themſelves as no contemptible part of the Athenian body, becauſe their lands had been waſted, in a moſt earneſt manner inſiſted upon a ſally. The whole city was in a ferment, and all their reſentments centred on Pericles. They quite forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly plamed out for them — They reproached him as a general that durſt not head them againſt their enemies, and regarded him as author of all the miſeries which the city endured.

* *About* 6 Engliſh *miles.*

Inveigh againſt Pericles.

Pericles, ſeeing their minds thus chagrined by the preſent ſtate of their affairs, and in conſequence of this intent upon unadviſeable meaſures, but aſſured within himſelf of the prudence of his own conduct in thus reſtraining them from action, called no general aſſembly of the people, nor held any public conſultation, leſt paſſion which was more alive than judgment ſhould throw them into indiſcretions. He kept ſtrict guard in the city, and endeavoured as much as poſſible to preſerve the public quiet. Yet he was always ſending out ſmall parties of horſe, to prevent any damage that might be done near the city, by adventurous ſtragglers from the army. By this means, there happened once at Phrygii a ſkirmiſh between one troop of the Athenian horſe accompanied by ſome Theſſalians, and the horſemen of Bœotia, in which the Athenians and Theſſalians maintained

His conduct on this occaſion.

tained their ground, till ſome heavy-armed foot reinforced the Bœotian horſe. Then they were forced to turn about, and ſome few both Theſſalians and Athenians were ſlain. However they fetched off their bodies the ſame day without the enemy's leave, and the next day the Peloponneſians erected a trophy.—The aid ſent now by the Theſſalians was in conſequence of an ancient alliance between them and the Athenians. Theſe auxiliaries conſiſted of Lariſſéans, Pharſalians, Paraſians, Cranonians, Peiraſians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. Thoſe from Lariſſa were commanded by Polymedes and Ariſtonous, each heading thoſe of his own faction; thoſe from Pharſalus by Menon; and thoſe from the reſt of the cities had their reſpective commanders.

The Peloponneſians, when the Athenians made no ſhew of coming out againſt them, broke up from Acharnæ, and laid waſte ſome other of the Athenian *boroughs*, which lay between the mountains Parnethus and Briliſſus.

During the time of theſe incurſions, the Athenians ſent out the hundred ſhips they had already equipped, and which had on board a thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers and four hundred archers, to infeſt the coaſt of Peloponneſus. The commanders in the expedition were Carcinus ſon of Xenotimus, Proteas ſon of Epicles, and Socrates ſon of Antigenes. Under their orders, the fleet ſo furniſhed out weighed anchor and ſailed away.

The enemy evacuates Attica.

The Peloponneſians, continuing in Attica till proviſions began to fail them, retired not by the ſame route they came in, but marched away through Bœotia. And paſſing by Oropus, they waſted the tract of ground called Piraïce, which was occupied by the Oropians, who were ſubject to Athens. On their return into Peloponneſus, the army was diſperſed into their ſeveral cities.

Meaſures taken at Athens.

After their departure, the Athenians ſettled the proper ſtations for their guards both by land and ſea, in the ſame diſpoſition as they were to continue to the end of the war. They alſo made a decree,

decree, that " a thouſand talents ſhould be taken from the fund of treaſure in the citadel and laid up by itſelf; that this ſum ſhould not be touched, but the expence of the war be defrayed from the remainder — and, that if any one moved or voted for converting this money to any other uſe, than the neceſſary defence of the city, in caſe the enemy attacked it by ſea, he ſhould ſuffer the penalty of death." Beſide this, they ſelected conſtantly every year an hundred of their beſt triremes, with the due number of able commanders. Theſe alſo they made it capital to uſe upon any other occaſion, than that *extremity* for which the reſerve of money was deſtined.

The Athenians *act offenſively at ſea.*

The Athenians on board the fleet of one hundred ſail on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, being joined by the Corcyréans in fifty ſhips and by ſome other of their confederates in thoſe parts, hovered for a time and infeſted the coaſt, and at length made a deſcent and aſſaulted Methone a town of Laconia, whoſe walls were but weak and poorly manned. It happened that [4] Braſidas the ſon of Tellis a Spartan had then the command of a garriſon ſomewhere near Methone. He was ſenſible of the danger it was in, and ſet forwards with one hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The Athenian army was then ſcattered about the country, and their attention directed only to the walls; by which means, making a quick march through the midſt of their quarters, he threw himſelf into Methone, and with the loſs of but a few who were intercepted in the paſſage,

4 Here the name of *Braſidas* firſt occurs, and I muſt beg the reader to note him, as one who is to make no ordinary figure in the ſequel. Trained up through the regular and ſevere diſcipline of Sparta, he was brave, vigilant, and active. He was ſecond to none of his countrymen, in thoſe good qualities which did honour to the Spartans; and was free from all the blemiſhes, which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw upon them, ſuch as haughtineſs of carriage, ferocity of temper, and an arrogance which ſtudied no deference or condeſcenſion to others. He ſerves his country much by his valour and military conduct, and more by his gentle, humane, and engaging behaviour. In a word, the diſtinguiſhing excellencies both of the Spartan and Athenian characters ſeem to have been united in this *Braſidas*.

effectually ſecured the town. For this bold exploit, he was the firſt man of all who ſignalized themſelves in this war, that received the public commendation at Sparta. Upon this the Athenians re-embarked and ſailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town of Elis, they ravaged the country for two days together. A body of picked men of the lower Elis, with ſome other Eléans, that were got together from the adjacent country, endeavour'd to ſtop their devaſtations, but coming to a ſkirmiſh were defeated by them. But a ſtorm ariſing, and their ſhips being expoſed to danger on the open coaſt, they went immediately on board, and ſailing round the cape of Icthys, got into the harbour of Pheia. The Meſſenians in the mean time, and ſome others who had not been able to gain their ſhips, had marched overland and got poſſeſſion of the place. Soon after the ſhips, being now come about, ſtood into the harbour, took them on board, and quitting the place put out again to ſea. By this time a great army of Eléans was drawn together to ſuccour it, but the Athenians were ſailed away to other parts of the coaſt, where they carried on their depredations.

About the ſame time, the Athenians had ſent a fleet of thirty ſail to infeſt the coaſt about Locris, and at the ſame time to guard Eubœa. This fleet was commanded by Cleopompus the ſon of Clinias, who making ſeveral deſcents, plundered many maritime places, and took Thronium. He carried from thence ſome hoſtages, and at Alope defeated a body of Locrians, who were marching to its relief.

Clear Ægina. The ſame ſummer, the Athenians tranſported from Ægina all the inhabitants, not only the men but the children and the women, reproaching them as the principal authors of the preſent war. And judging they might ſecurely keep poſſeſſion of Ægina, which lay ſo near to Peloponneſus, if they peopled it with a colony of their own—with this view, not long after, they fixed ſome of their own people in poſſeſſion of it. The Lacedæmonians received the Æginetæ on their expulſion,

expulſion, and aſſigned them Thyræa for their place of reſidence, and the country about it for their ſubſiſtence, not only on account of their own enmity to the Athenians, but the particular obligations they lay under to the Æginetæ, for the ſuccour they had given them in the time of the earthquake and the inſurrection of the Helots. The diſtrict of Thyræa lies between Argia and Laconia, declining quite down to the ſea. Here ſome of them fixed their reſidence, but the reſt were diſperſed into other parts of Greece.

Eclipſe of the ſun.

The ſame ſummer, on the firſt day of the lunar month, at which time alone it can poſſibly fall out, there was an eclipſe of the ſun in the afternoon. The ſun looked for a time like the creſcent of the moon, and ſome ſtars appeared, but the full orb ſhone out afterwards in all its luſtre.

Sitalces.

The ſame ſummer alſo, the Athenians, who had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nymphodorus the ſon of Pythes of Abdera, whoſe ſiſter was married to Sitalces, and who had a great influence over him, made him their *public* friend and invited him to Athens. They hoped by this to gain over Sitalces the ſon of Teres king of Thrace to their alliance. This Teres, father of Sitalces, was the firſt who made the kingdom of Odryſa the largeſt in all Thrace: For the greater part of the Thracians are free and governed by their own laws. But this Teres was not in the leaſt related to Tereus, who married from Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor did they both belong to the ſame part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulia a city of that province, which is now called Phocis, and which in his time was inhabited by Thracians. Here it was that the women executed the tragical buſineſs of Itys; and many poets who make mention of the nightingale, do it by the name of the *Daulian* bird. And it is more probable that Pandion matched his daughter to a perſon at this leſſer diſtance from him, from the view of mutual advantage, than to one ſeated at Odryſæ, which is many days journey further off. But Teres, whoſe name is not the ſame with Tereus, was the firſt king of

Odryſæ, and compaſſed the regal power by violence. This man's ſon Sitalces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, hoping he might gain over to their ſide the cities of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriving at Athens finiſhed the alliance with Sitalces, and made *his* ſon Sadocus an Athenian. He alſo undertook to bring the war now in Thrace to an end, and to perſuade Sitalces to ſend to the Athenians a body of Thracian horſemen and targeteers. He alſo reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians by procuring for him the reſtitution of Therme: Immediately after which, Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio in the expedition againſt the Chalcidéans. Thus was Sitalces the ſon of Teres a Thracian king, and [5] Perdiccas the ſon of Alexander a Macedonian king, brought into the Athenian league.

The Athenians in the fleet of one hundred ſail, ſtill continuing their cruize on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, took Solium a fort belonging to the Corinthians, and delivered the place with the diſtrict of land belonging to it to the Palirenſians, excluſively of other Acarnanians. They took alſo by ſtorm Aſtacus of which Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly away, and added the town to their own aſſociation. Sailing from hence to the iſland Cephallene, they reduced it without a battle. Cephallene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and hath four cities; the Pallenſians, Cranians, Samæans, Pronæans. Not long after this the fleet ſailed back to Athens.

The Athenians *invade* Megara.

In the autumn of this ſummer, the Athenians with all their forces, citizens and ſojourners, made an incurſion into the territories of

5 Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, and both king and people were regarded as Barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to aſſiſt at the Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himſelf, whoſe ſucceſſor Alexander the Great, not many years after, was leader of Greece and conqueror of Aſia, was at this time ballancing between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbour to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals will be ſometimes ſeen in this hiſtory to uſe the monarch of Macedonia very cavalierly.

Megara,

Megara, under the command of Pericles the ſon of Xantippus. —— Thoſe alſo, who had been cruizing about Peloponneſus in the fleet of one hundred ſail (for they were now at Ægina) finding upon their return that all their fellow-citizens were marched in the general expedition againſt Megara, followed them with the fleet, and came up to them. By this means, the army of the Athenians became the largeſt they had ever at any time got together, the city being now in its moſt flouriſhing ſtate, and as yet uninfected with the plague: For there were of Athenian citizens only no leſs than ten thouſand heavy-armed, excluſive of the three thouſand who were now at Potidæa: The ſojourners of Athens who marched out along with them, were not fewer than three thouſand heavy-armed: They had beſides a very large number of light-armed ſoldiers. They laid waſte the greateſt part of the country, and then returned to Athens. Every ſucceeding year of the war, the Athenians conſtantly repeated theſe incurſions into the territory of Megara, ſometimes with their cavalry, and ſometimes with all their united force, till at laſt they made themſelves maſters of Niſæa.

Take poſſeſſion of Atalante.

In the cloſe alſo of the Summer, Atalante, an iſland lying near the Locrians of Opus, 'till now uninhabited, was fortified and garriſoned by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of Opus and other parts of Locris, from annoying Eubœa. —— Theſe were the tranſactions of the Summer, after the departure of the Peloponneſians out of Attica.

An expedition of the Corinthians.

The Winter following, Evarchus the Acarnanian, who had a great deſire to recover Aſtacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry him thither, with a fleet of forty ſhips, and a force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and endeavor to re-eſtabliſh him. He himſelf alſo hired ſome auxiliaries for the ſame purpoſe. This armament was commanded by Euphamidas ſon of Ariſtonymus, Timoxenus ſon of Timocrates, and Eumachus ſon of Chryſis; who ſailing thither executed their buſineſs. They had a mind to endeavor the reduction of

ſome

ſome others of the maritime towns of Acarnania, but miſcarrying in every attempt they made, they returned home. But in their paſſage touching at Cephallene, and debarking upon the lands of the Cranians, they were treacherouſly inveigled into a conference, where the Cranians falling ſuddenly upon them, kill ſome of their men. It was not without difficulty, that they drew the others ſafely off, and gained their own ports.

The public Funeral.

But the ſame Winter, the Athenians, in conformity to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of their country, ſolemnized a public funeral for thoſe who had been firſt killed in this war, in the manner as follows ——

The bones of the ſlain are brought to a tabernacle erected for the purpoſe three days before, and all are at liberty to deck out the remains of their friends at their own diſcretion. But when the grand proceſſion is made, the cypreſs-coffins are drawn on carriages, one for every tribe, in each of which are ſeparately contained the bones of all who belonged to that tribe. One ſumptuous bier is carried along empty for thoſe that are loſt, whoſe bodies could not be found amongſt the ſlain. All who are willing, both citizens and ſtrangers, attend the ſolemnity; and the women who were related to the deceaſed, ſtand near the ſepulchre groaning and lamenting. They depoſit the remains in the public ſepulchre, which ſtands in the fineſt ſuburb of the city; —— for it hath been the conſtant cuſtom *here* to bury all who fell in war, except thoſe at Marathon, whoſe extraordinary valour they judged proper to honour with a ſepulchre on the field of battle. As ſoon as they are interred, ſome one ſelected for the office by the public voice, and ever a perſon in great eſteem for his underſtanding, and of high dignity amongſt them, pronounces over them the decent panegyric ----- and this done, they depart. Through all the war, as the occaſions recurred, this method was conſtantly obſerved. But over theſe, the firſt victims of it, Pericles ſon of Xantippus was appointed to ſpeak. So, when the proper time was come, walking from the ſepulchre, and mounting a lofty pulpit erected

erected for the purpoſe, from whence he might be heard more diſtinctly by the company, he thus began ——

Oration by Pericles.

" MANY of thoſe, who have ſpoken before me on theſe occa-
" ſions, have commended the author of that law which we are now
" obeying, for having inſtituted an oration to the honour of thoſe
" who ſacrifice their lives in fighting for their country. For my part,
" I think it ſufficient, for men who have approved their virtue in
" action, by action to be honoured for it --- by ſuch as you ſee the
" public gratitude now performing about this funeral; and ---- that
" the virtues of many ought not to be endangered by the manage-
" ment of any one perſon, when their credit muſt precariouſly de-
" pend on his oration, which may be good and may be bad. Diffi-
" cult indeed it is, judiciouſly to handle a ſubject, where even pro-
" bable truth will hardly gain aſſent. The hearer, enlightned by a
" long acquaintance, and warm in his affection, may quickly pro-
" nounce every thing unfavourably expreſſed, in reſpect to what he
" wiſhes and what he knows, --- whilſt the ſtranger pronounceth all
" exaggerated, through envy of thoſe deeds, which he is conſcious
" are above his own atchievement. For the praiſes beſtowed on
" others are then only to be endured, when men imagine they can
" do thoſe feats they hear to have been done: They envy what they
" cannot equal, and immediately pronounce it falſe. Yet, as this
" ſolemnity hath received its ſanction from the authority of our an-
" ceſtors, it is my duty alſo to obey the law, and to endeavor to
" procure, ſo far as I am able, the good-will and approbation of all
" my audience.

" I ſhall therefore begin firſt with our forefathers, ſince both juſtice
" and decency require we ſhould on this occaſion beſtow on them
" an honourable remembrance. In this our country they kept them-
" ſelves always firmly ſettled, and through their valour handed it
" down free to every ſince ſucceeding generation. Worthy indeed

" of

" of praiſe are they, and yet more worthy are our immediate fa-
" thers; ſince enlarging their own inheritance into the extenſive *em-*
" *pire* which we now poſſeſs, they bequeathed *that* their work of
" toil to us, their ſons. Yet even theſe ſucceſſes, we ourſelves here
" preſent, we who are yet in the ſtrength and vigor of our days have
" nobly improved, and have made ſuch proviſions for this our
" Athens, that now it is all-ſufficient in itſelf to anſwer every exi-
" gence of war and of peace. I mean not here to recite thoſe mar-
" tial exploits by which theſe ends were accompliſhed, or the reſo-
" lute defences we ourſelves and our fathers have made againſt the
" formidable invaſions of Barbarians and Greeks --- your own know-
" ledge of theſe will excuſe the long detail. But ----- by what me-
" thods we have roſe to this height of glory and power; by what
" polity and by what conduct we are thus aggrandized, I ſhall firſt
" endeavor to ſhew; and then proceed to the praiſe of the deceaſed.
" Theſe, in my opinion, can be no impertinent topics on this occa-
" ſion; the diſcuſſion of them muſt be beneficial to this numerous
" company of Athenians and of ſtrangers.

" We are happy in a form of government which cannot envy the
" laws of our neighbors; --- for it hath ſerved as a model to others,
" but is original at Athens. And this our form, as committed not
" to the *few*, but to the whole body of the people, is called a *de-*
" *mocracy*. How different ſoever in a private capacity, we all enjoy
" the ſame general equality our laws are fitted to preſerve; and ſu-
" perior honours, juſt as we excel. The public adminiſtration is
" not confined to a particular family, but is attainable only by merit.
" Poverty is not an hindrance, ſince whoever is able to ſerve his
" country, meets with no obſtacle to preferment from his firſt ob-
" ſcurity. The offices of the *ſtate* we go through without obſtruc-
" tions from one another; and live together in the mutual endear-
" ments of private life without ſuſpicions; not angry with a neighbor
" for following the bent of his own humour, nor putting on that

" countenance

" countenance of diſcontent, which pains tho' it cannot puniſh -----
" ſo that in private life we converſe together without diffidence or
" damage, whilſt we dare not on any account offend againſt the
" Public through the reverence we bear to the magiſtrates and the
" laws, chiefly to thoſe *enacted* for redreſs of the injured, and to
" thoſe *unwritten*, a breach of which is allowed diſgrace. Our
" laws have further provided for the mind moſt frequent intermiſ-
" ſions of care by the appointment of public recreations and ſacri-
" fices [6] throughout the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar
" pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that puts melancholy
" to flight. The grandeur of this our Athens cauſeth the produce of
" the whole earth to be imported here, by which we reap a familiar
" enjoyment, not more of the delicacies of our own growth, than of
" thoſe of other nations.

" In the affairs of war we excel thoſe of our enemies, who ad-
" here to methods oppoſite to our own. For we lay open Athens
" to general reſort, nor ever drive any ſtranger from us whom either
" improvement or curioſity hath brought amongſt us, leſt any enemy
" ſhould hurt us by ſeeing what is never concealed. We place not
" ſo great a confidence in the preparatives and artifices of war, as in
" the native warmth of our ſouls impelling us to action. In point
" of education, the youth of ſome people are inured by a courſe of
" laborious exerciſe, to ſupport toil and hardſhip like men; but we,
" notwithſtanding our eaſy and elegant way of life, face all the dan-
" gers of war as intrepidly as they. This may be proved by facts,
" ſince the Lacedæmonians never invade our territories, barely with
" their own, but with the united ſtrength of all their confederates.
" But, when we invade the dominions of our neighbours, for the
" moſt part we conquer without difficulty in an enemy's country

6 Beſide the vaſt number of feſtivals, which were celebrated at Athens with pompous proceſſions, coſtly ſacrifices, and ſometimes public games, the *preſidents* in courſe offered up ſacrifices every morning conſtantly for the public welfare.

" thoſe who fight in defence of their own habitations. The ſtrength
" of our whole force no enemy yet hath ever experienced, becauſe
" it is divided by our naval expeditions, or engaged in the different
" quarters of our ſervice by land. But if any where they engage
" and defeat a ſmall party of our forces, they boaſtingly give it out
" a total defeat; and if they are beat, they were certainly over-
" powered by our united ſtrength. What tho' from a ſtate of in-
" activity rather than laborious exerciſe, or with a natural rather
" than an acquired valour, we learn to encounter danger?--this good
" at leaſt we receive from it, that we never droop under the appre-
" henſion of poſſible misfortunes, and when we hazard the danger,
" are found no leſs courageous than thoſe who are continually inured
" to it. In theſe reſpects our whole community deſerves juſtly to be
" admired, and in many we have yet to mention,

" In our manner of living we ſhew an elegance tempered with
" frugality, and we cultivate philoſophy without enervating the
" mind. We diſplay our wealth in the ſeaſon of beneficence, and
" not in the vanity of diſcourſe. A confeſſion of poverty is dif-
" grace to no man; no effort to avoid it is diſgrace indeed. There
" is viſibly in the ſame perſons an attention to their own private
" concerns and thoſe of the public; and in others engaged in the la-
" bours of life, there is a competent skill in the affairs of govern-
" ment. For we are the only people who think him that does not
" meddle in ſtate-affairs —— not indolent, but good for nothing.
" And yet, we paſs the ſoundeſt judgments, and are quick at catch-
" ing the right apprehenſions of things, not thinking that words are
" prejudicial to actions, but rather the not being duly prepared by
" previous debate, before we are obliged to proceed to execution.
" Herein conſiſts our diſtinguiſhing excellence, that in the hour of
" action we ſhew the greateſt courage, and yet debate beforehand the
" expediency of our meaſures. The courage of others is the reſult
" of ignorance; deliberation makes them cowards. And thoſe un-
" doubtedly

" doubtedly muſt be owned to have the greateſt ſouls, who, moſt
" acutely ſenſible of the miſeries of war and the ſweets of peace,
" are not hence in the leaſt deterred from facing danger.

" In acts of beneficence, further, we differ from the many. We
" preſerve friends, not by receiving but by conferring obligations.
" For he, who does a kindneſs, hath the advantage over him, who
" by the law of gratitude becomes a debtor to his benefactor. The
" perſon obliged is compelled to act the more inſipid part, conſcious
" that a return of kindneſs is merely a payment and not an obliga-
" tion. And we alone are *ſplendidly* beneficent to others, not ſo
" much from intereſted motives, as for the credit of pure liberality.
" I ſhall ſum up what yet remains, by only adding —— that our
" Athens in general is the ſchool of Greece; and, that every ſingle
" Athenian amongſt us, is excellently formed by his perſonal qua-
" lifications, for all the various ſcenes of active life, acting with a
" moſt graceful demeanor, and a moſt ready habit of diſpatch.

" That I have not on this occaſion made uſe of a pomp of words,
" but the truth of facts, that height to which by ſuch a conduct
" this *State* hath roſe, is an undeniable proof. For we are now the
" only people of the world who are found by experience to be
" greater than in report ---- the only people who, repelling the at-
" tacks of an invading enemy, exempts their defeat from the bluſh
" of indignation, and to their tributaries yields no diſcontent, as if
" ſubject to men unworthy to command. That we deſerve our
" power, we need no evidence to manifeſt. We have great and
" ſignal proofs of this, which intitle us to the admiration of the pre-
" ſent and of future ages. We want no Homer to be the herald of
" our praiſe; no poet to deck off a hiſtory with the charms of
" verſe, where the opinion of exploits muſt ſuffer by a ſtrict rela-
" tion. Every Sea hath been opened by our fleets, and every land been
" penetrated by our armies, which have every where left behind them
" eternal monuments of our enmity and our friendſhip.

" In the juſt defence of ſuch a *State*, theſe victims of their own
" valour, ſcorning the ruin threatned to it, have valiantly fought and
" bravely died. And every one of thoſe who ſurvive is ready, I am
" perſuaded, to ſacrifice life in ſuch a cauſe. And for this reaſon have
" I enlarged ſo much on national points, to give the cleareſt proof
" that in the preſent war we have more at ſtake than men whoſe
" public advantages are not ſo valuable, and to illuſtrate by actual
" evidence, how great a commendation is due to them who are now
" my ſubject, and the greateſt part of which they have already re-
" ceived. For the encomiums with which I have celebrated the
" *State*, have been earned for it by the bravery of *theſe*, and of men
" like *theſe*. And ſuch compliments might be thought too high and
" exaggerated, if paſſed on any Grecians, but them alone. The fa-
" tal period, to which theſe gallant ſouls are now reduced, is the
" ſureſt evidence of their merit — an evidence begun in their lives
" and compleated in their deaths. For it is a debt of juſtice to pay
" ſuperior honours to men, who have devoted their lives in fighting
" for their countrey, tho' inferior to others in every virtue but that of
" valour. Their laſt ſervice effaceth all former demerits, — it ex-
" tends to the public; their private demeanors reached only to a
" few. Yet, not one of theſe was at all induced to ſhrink from
" danger through fondneſs of thoſe delights which the peaceful afflu-
" ent life beſtows, — not one was the leſs laviſh of his life, through
" that flattering hope attendant upon want, that poverty at length
" might be exchanged for affluence. One paſſion there was in their
" minds much ſtronger than theſe, —— the deſire of vengeance on
" their enemies. Regarding this, as the moſt honourable prize of
" dangers, they boldly ruſhed towards the mark, to glut revenge,
" and then to ſatisfy thoſe ſecondary paſſions. The uncertain event
" they had already ſecured in hope; what their eyes ſhewed plainly
" muſt be done they truſted their own valour to accompliſh,
" thinking it more glorious to defend themſelves and die in the at-
tempt,

" tempt, than to yield and live. From the reproach of cowardice
" indeed they fled, but preſented their bodies to the ſhock of battle;
" when, inſenſible of fear, but triumphing in hope, in the doubt-
" ful charge they inſtantly dropt — and thus diſcharged the duty
" which brave men owe to their country.

" As for you, who now ſurvive them — it is your buſineſs to pray
" for a better fate — but, to think it your duty alſo to preſerve the
" ſame ſpirit and warmth of courage againſt your enemies; not judg-
" ing of the expediency of this from a mere harangue — where any
" man indulging a flow of words may tell you, what you your-
" ſelves know as well as he, how many advantages there are in fight-
" ing valiantly againſt your enemies — but rather, making the daily-
" increaſing grandeur of this community the object of your thoughts
" and growing quite enamoured of it. And, when it really appears
" great to your apprehenſions, think again, that this grandeur was
" acquired by brave and valiant men; by men who knew their duty,
" and in the moments of action were ſenſible of ſhame; who,
" whenever their attempts were unſucceſsful, thought it diſhonour
" their country ſhould ſtand in need of any thing their valour
" could do for it, and ſo made it the moſt glorious *preſent*. Beſtow-
" ing thus their lives on the public, they have every one received a
" praiſe that will never decay, a ſepulchre that will always be moſt
" illuſtrious — not that in which their bones lie mouldering, but
" that in which their fame is preſerved, to be on every occaſion,
" when honour is the employ of either word or act, eternally re-
" membered. This whole earth is the ſepulchre of illuſtrious men;
" nor is it the inſcription on the columns in their native ſoil alone
" that ſhews their merit, but the memorial of them, better than all
" inſcriptions, in every foreign nation, repoſited more durably in
" univerſal remembrance, than on their own tomb. From this very
" moment, emulating theſe noble patterns, placing your happineſs
" in liberty, and liberty in valour, be prepared to encounter all the

" dangers

" dangers of war. For, to be laviſh of life is not ſo noble in thoſe
" whom misfortunes have reduced to miſery and deſpair, as in men
" who hazard the loſs of a comfortable ſubſiſtence, and the enjoy-
" ment of all the bleſſings this world affords, by an unſucceſsful en-
" terprize. Adverſity after a ſeries of eaſe and affluence ſinks
" deeper into the heart of a man of ſpirit, than the ſtroke of death
" inſenſibly received in the vigor of life and public hope.

" For this reaſon, the *parents* of thoſe who are now gone, whoever
" of them may be attending here, I do not bewail, —— I ſhall ra-
" ther comfort. It is well known to what unhappy accidents they
" were liable from the moment of their birth; and, that happineſs
" belongs to men who have reached the moſt glorious period of life,
" as theſe now have who are to you the ſource of ſorrow, — theſe,
" whoſe life hath received its ample meaſure, happy in its conti-
" nuance, and equally happy in its concluſion. I know it in truth
" a difficult taſk, to fix comfort in thoſe breaſts, which will have
" frequent remembrances in ſeeing the happineſs of others, of what
" they once themſelves enjoyed. And ſorrow flows not from the ab-
" ſence of thoſe good things we have never yet experienced, but
" from the loſs of thoſe to which we have been accuſtomed. They
" who are not yet by age exempted from iſſue, ſhould be comforted
" in the hope of having more. The children yet to be born will be
" a private benefit to ſome, in cauſing them to forget ſuch as no
" longer are, and will be a double benefit to their country, in pre-
" venting its deſolation, and providing for its ſecurity. For thoſe
" perſons cannot in common juſtice be regarded as members of equal
" value to the public, who have no children to expoſe to danger for
" its ſafety. —— But you, whoſe age is already far advanced, com-
" pute the greater ſhare of happineſs your longer time hath afforded
" for ſo much gain, perſuaded in yourſelves, the remainder will be
" but ſhort, and enlighten that ſpace by the glory gained by *theſe*.
" It is greatneſs of ſoul alone that never grows old; nor is it wealth

" that

" that delights in the latter ſtage of life, as ſome give out, ſo much
" as honour. ——

" To you, the *ſons* and *brothers* of the deceaſed, whatever num-
" ber of you are here, a field of hardy contention is opened. For
" him, who no longer is, every one is ready to commend, ſo that to
" whatever height you puſh your deſerts, you will ſcarce ever be
" thought to equal, but to be ſomewhat inferior to theſe. Envy
" will exert itſelf againſt a competitor, whilſt life remains; but
" when death ſtops the competition, affection will applaud without
" reſtraint.

" If after this it be expected from me to ſay any thing to *you*, who
" are now reduced to a ſtate of widowhood about female vir-
" tue, I ſhall expreſs it all in one ſhort admonition; —— It is your
" greateſt glory not to be deficient in the virtue peculiar to your ſex,
" and to give the men as little handle as poſſible to talk of your be-
" haviour, whether *well* or *ill*.

" I have now diſcharged the province allotted me by the laws,
" and ſaid what I thought moſt pertinent to this aſſembly. Our
" departed friends have by facts been already honoured. Their
" children from this day till they arrive at manhood ſhall be
" educated at [7] the public expence of the *State*, which hath appointed
" ſo beneficial a meed for theſe and all future relicts of the public
" conteſts. For wherever the greateſt rewards are propoſed for
" virtue, there the beſt of patriots are ever to be found. ——
" Now, let every one reſpectively indulge the decent grief for his
" departed friends, and then retire."

Such was the manner of the public funeral ſolemnized this winter, and with the end of which, the firſt year of this war was alſo ended.

7 The law was, that they ſhould be inſtructed at the public expence, and when come to age preſented with a compleat ſuit of armour, and honoured with the firſt ſeats in all public places.

YEAR

YEAR II.

Before Chriſt 430.

Attica *again invaded.*

IN the very beginning of ſummer, the Peloponneſians and allies with two thirds of their forces, made an incurſion as before into Attica, under the command of Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, and having formed their camp, ravaged the country.——

The plague of Athens.

They had not been many days in Attica before a [8] ſickneſs began firſt to appear amongſt the Athenians, ſuch as was reported to have raged

8 The hiſtorian in the *funeral-oration* hath given us a very exalted idea of the Athenian *ſtate*, and the diſtinguiſhing excellencies of that humane and polite people. The *plague*, which now broke out, enables him to contraſte his pieces, and give his hiſtory a moſt agreeable variety. It is now going to be exceeding ſolemn, ſerious, and pathetic. It is as an *hiſtorian* and not as a *phyſician* that he gives us the relation of it: A relation, which in general hath been eſteemed an elaborate and compleat performance. He profeſſeth to give an accurate detail of it. The accuracy hath generally been allowed, but it hath been blamed as too minute. Lucretius however hath transferred all the circumſtances mentioned by Thucydides into his own poem, l. 6. enlarging ſtill more minutely upon them; and yet, this is the greateſt ornament, and certainly the leaſt exceptionable part, of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, affected to write with the preciſion of a philoſopher; and Thucydides, the hiſtorian, always compoſed with the ſpirit of a poet. Hippocrates hath left ſome *caſes* of the plague, which he hath recited as a phyſician; but not one of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides hath mentioned nothing of his practiſing there, much leſs of his practiſing with ſucceſs. He ſays on the contrary that "all human art was totally unavailing;" and his follower Lucretius, that "Muſſabat tacito medicina timore." The letters of Hippocrates, which mention this affair are certainly ſpurious: The facts they would eſtabliſh are without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath proved to conviction in his *Hiſtoire de la medecine*, l. 3. They make the plague to have broke out firſt in Europe, and to have ſpread from thence into the dominions of the king of Perſia. This is quite contrary to the account of Thucydides, and to the experience of every age. All plagues and infectious diſtempers have had their riſe in Africa. Need I ſay more than that Dr. Mead hath proved it? But whether his account of this plague at Athens be duly ſuccinct, not too minute, ſerious, affecting; and, whether Thucydides hath well managed the opportunity it gave him to moralize

raged before this in other parts, as about Lemnos and other places. Yet a plague ſo great as this, and ſo dreadful a mortality, in human memory could not be parallel'd. The phyſicians at firſt could adminiſter no relief, through utter ignorance; nay, they died the faſteſt, the cloſer their attendance on the ſick, and all human art was totally unavailing. Whatever ſupplications were offered in the temples, whatever recourſe to oracles and religious rites, all were inſignificant; at laſt, expedients of this nature they totally relinquiſhed, overpowered by calamity. It broke out firſt, as it is ſaid, in that part of Æthiopia which borders upon Egypt; it afterwards ſpread into Egypt and Lybia, and into great part of *the king*'s dominions, and from thence it on a ſudden fell on the city of the Athenians. The contagion ſhewed itſelf firſt in the Piræus, which occaſioned a report that the Peloponneſians had cauſed poiſon to be thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no fountains there. After this it ſpread into the upper city, and then the mortality very much increaſed. Let every one, phyſician or not, freely declare his own ſentiments about it; let him aſſign any credible account of its riſe, or the cauſes ſtrong enough in his opinion to introduce ſo terrible a ſcene —— I ſhall only relate what it actually was; and, as from an information in all its *ſymptoms*, none may be quite at a loſs about it, if ever it ſhould happen again, I ſhall give an exact detail of them; having been ſick of it myſelf, and ſeen many others afflicted with it.

This very year, as is univerſally allowed, had been more than any other remarkably free from common diſorders; or, whatever diſeaſes had already ſeized the body, they ended at length in this. But thoſe, who enjoy'd the moſt perfect health, were ſuddenly, without any apparent cauſe, ſeiz'd at firſt with head-aches extremely violent, with inflammations and fiery redneſs in the eyes. Within — the throat

moralize like a man of virtue and good-ſenſe, every reader muſt judge, as every reader will judge for himſelf. The *tranſlator* hath chiefly endeavoured to preſerve that ſolemn air, which [illegible]ought the prime diſtinction of the original.

and tongue began inſtantly to be red as blood; the breath was drawn with difficulty and had a noiſome ſmell. The ſymptoms that ſucceeded theſe were ſneezing and hoarſeneſs; and not long after, the malady deſcended to the breaſt, with a violent cough: But when once ſettled in the ſtomach, it excited vomitings, in which was thrown up all that matter phyſicians call *diſcharges of bile*, attended with exceſſive torture. A great part of the infected were ſubject to ſuch violent hiccups without any diſcharge, as brought upon them a ſtrong convulſion, to ſome but of a ſhort, to others of a very long continuance. The body, to the outward touch was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, but reddiſh, livid, marked all over with little puſtules and ſores. Yet inwardly it was ſcorched with ſuch exceſſive heat, that it could not bear the lighteſt covering or the fineſt linen upon it, but muſt be left quite naked. They longed for nothing ſo much as to be plunging into cold water; and many of thoſe who were not properly attended, threw themſelves into wells, hurried by a thirſt not to be extinguiſhed; and whether they drank much or little, their torment ſtill continued the ſame. The reſtleſsneſs of their bodies and an utter inability of compoſing themſelves by ſleep never abated for a moment. And the body, ſo long as the diſtemper continued in its height, had no viſible waſte, but withſtood its rage to a miracle, ſo that moſt of them periſhed within nine or ſeven days, by the heat that ſcorched their vitals, tho' their ſtrength was not exhauſted; or, if they continued longer, the diſtemper fell into the belly, cauſing violent ulcerations in the bowels, accompanied with an inceſſant flux, by which many, reduced to an exceſſive weakneſs, were carried off. For the malady beginning in the head, and ſettling firſt there, ſunk afterwards gradually down the whole body. And whoever got ſafe through all its moſt dangerous ſtages, yet the extremities of their bodies ſtill retained the marks of its violence. For it ſhot down into their privy-members, into their fingers and toes, by loſing which they eſcaped with

with life. Some there were, who loſt their eyes; and ſome, who being quite recovered, had at once totally loſt all memory, and quite forgot, not only their moſt intimate friends, but even their own ſelves. For as this diſtemper was in general virulent beyond expreſſion, and its every part more grievous than yet had fallen to the lot of human nature, ſo, in one particular inſtance, it appeared to be none of the natural infirmities of man, ſince the birds and beaſts that prey on human fleſh, either never approached the dead bodies, of which many lay about uninterred; or certainly periſhed, if they ever taſted. [9] One proof of this is the total diſappearance then of ſuch birds, for not one was to be ſeen, either in any other place, or about any one of the carcaſes. But the dogs, becauſe of their conſtant familiarity with man, afforded a more notorious proof of this event.

The nature of this peſtilential diſorder was in general --- for I have purpoſely omitted its many varied appearances, or the circumſtances particular to ſome of the infected in contradiſtinction to others---ſuch as hath been deſcribed. None of the common maladies incident to

9 This paſſage is tranſlated cloſe to the letter of the original. It was intended by the Author to ſhew the exceſſive malignancy of the plague, as the very fleſh of the dead bodies was ſo fatally peſtilential to carnivorous animal; — "Either, they never taſted; or, if they taſted, died." One proof of this is preſumptive, ariſing from the diſappearance of all birds of prey. The ſecond was certain, and an object of ſenſible obſervation. Every body could ſee that dogs, thoſe familiar animals who live with and accompany men abroad, either never taſted; or, if hunger at any time forced them to it, they certainly loſt their lives. Lucretius literally tranſlates the *circumſtance* itſelf, but hath enlarged in the *proofs*, and intimates that the diſtemper raged amongſt thoſe animals, even without eating the fleſh of the dead, and was general to every living ſpecies.

Multaque humi cùm inhumata jacerent corpora ſupra
Corporibus, tamen alituum genus atque ferarum
Aut procul abſiliebat, ut acrem exiret odorem:
Aut, ubi guſtârat, languebat morte propinquâ.
Nec tamen omnino temere illis ſolibus ulla
Comparebat avis, nec noctibu' fæcla ferarum
Exibant ſylvis: languebant pleraque morbo,
Et moriebantur: cum primis fida canum vis
Strata viis animam ponebat in omnibus ægram;
Extorquebat enim vitam vis morbida membris.

human nature prevailed at that time; or, whatever diſorder any where appeared, it ended in this. Some died, merely for want of care; and ſome, with all the care that could poſſibly be taken; nor was any one medicine diſcovered, from whence could be promiſed any certain relief, ſince that which gave eaſe to one, was prejudicial to another. Whatever difference there was in bodies, in point of ſtrength or in point of weakneſs, it availed nothing; all were equally ſwept away before it, in ſpite of regular diet and ſtudied preſcriptions. Yet the moſt affecting circumſtances of this calamity were --- that dejection of *mind*, which conſtantly attended the firſt attack; for the mind ſinking at once into deſpair, they the ſooner gave themſelves up without a ſtruggle ---- and, that mutual tenderneſs in taking care of one another, which communicated the infection, and made them drop like ſheep [1]. This latter caſe cauſed the mortality to be ſo great. For if fear withheld them from going near one another, they died for want of help, ſo that many houſes became quite deſolate for want of needful attendance: And, if they ventured, they were *gone*. This was moſt frequently the caſe of the kind and compaſſionate. Such perſons were aſhamed, out of a ſelfiſh concern for themſelves, entirely to abandon their friends, when their menial ſervants, no longer able to endure the groans and lamentations of the dying, had been compelled to fly from ſuch a weight of calamity. But thoſe eſpecially, who had ſafely gone through it, took pity on the dying and the ſick, becauſe they knew by experience what it really was, and were now ſecure in themſelves; for it never ſeized any one a ſecond

1 This paſſage is thus tranſlated upon the authority of Dr. Mead, in his treatiſe on *the Plague*, which convinced me, that the comma ſhould be omitted in the original after ἑτέρῳ, and θεραπείας be governed of ὠφ. Lucretius hath given it a different turn, as if the reſemblance to ſheep was not in their dying faſt, but to the forlorn and ſolitary manner in which thoſe creatures die; and he hath put before it what follows a little after in Thucydides.

Nam quicunque ſuos fugitabant viſere ad ægros,
Vitaï nimiùm cupidi, mortiſque timentes,
Pœnibat paulò pòſt turpi morte malâque
Deſertos, opis expertes, incuria mactans,
Lanigeras tanquam pecudes, et bucera ſæcla.

time

time ſo as to be mortal. Such were looked upon as quite happy by others, and were themſelves at firſt overjoyed in their late eſcape, and the groundleſs hope that hereafter no diſtemper would prove fatal to them. Beſide this reigning calamity, the general removal from the country into the city, was a heavy grievance, more particularly to thoſe who had been neceſſitated to come thither. For as they had no houſes, but dwelled all the ſummer-ſeaſon in booths, where there was ſcarce room to breathe, the peſtilence deſtroyed with the utmoſt diſorder, ſo that they lay together in heaps, the dying upon the dead, and the dead upon the dying. Some were tumbling one over another in the public ſtreets, or lay expiring round about every fountain, whither they had crept to aſſuage their immoderate thirſt. The temples, in which they had erected tents for their reception, were full of the bodies of thoſe who had expired there. For in a calamity ſo outrageouſly violent and univerſal deſpair, things ſacred and holy had quite loſt their diſtinction. Nay, all regulations obſerved before in matters of ſepulture were quite confounded, ſince every one buried wherever he could find a place. Some, whoſe ſepulchres were already filled by the numbers which had periſhed in their own families, were ſhamefully compelled to ſeize thoſe of others. They ſurprized on a ſudden the piles which others had built for their own friends, and burned their dead upon them; and ſome, whilſt one body was burning on a pile, toſſed another body they had dragged thither upon it, and went their way.

Thus did the peſtilence give their firſt riſe to thoſe iniquitous acts which prevailed more and more in Athens. For every one was now more eaſily induced openly to do what for decency they did only covertly before. They ſaw the ſtrange mutability of outward condition, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth pouring ſuddenly on the indigent and neceſſitous; ſo that they thought it prudent to catch hold of ſpeedy enjoyments and quick guſts of pleaſure; perſuaded, that their bodies and their wealth might be their own merely

for

for the day. Not any one continued reſolute enough to form any honeſt or generous deſign, when ſo uncertain whether he ſhould live to effect it. Whatever he knew could improve the pleaſure or ſatisfaction of the preſent moment, *that* he determined to be honour and intereſt. Reverence of the Gods or the laws of ſociety laid no reſtraints upon them; either judging that piety and impiety were things quite indifferent, ſince they ſaw that all men periſhed alike; or throwing away every apprehenſion of being called to account for their enormities, ſince juſtice might be prevented by death; or rather, as the heavieſt of judgments to which man could be doomed, was already hanging over their heads, ſnatching this interval of life for pleaſure, before it fell.

With ſuch a weight of calamity were the Athenians at this time on all ſides oppreſſed. Their city was one ſcene of death, and the adjacent country of ruin and devaſtation. In this their affliction they called to mind, as was likely they ſhould, the following *prediction*, which perſons of the greateſt age informed them had been formerly made,

Two heavy judgments will at once befall,
A Doric war *without*, a plague *within* your wall.

There had indeed been a diſpute before, whether their anceſtors in this prediction read λοιμὸς a *plague*, or λιμὸς a *famine*. Yet in their preſent circumſtances all with probability agreed that λοιμὸς, a *plague*, was the right: For they adapted the interpretation to what they now ſuffered. ---- But in my ſentiments, ſhould they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and a famine happen at the ſame time, they will have recourſe with equal probability to the other interpretation. It was further remembred by thoſe who knew of the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians, that when they inquired of the *God*, "whether they ſhould engage in this war," his anſwer was, that---

"if

" if they carried it on with all their ſtrength, they ſhould be victo-
" rious, and he himſelf would fight on their ſide;" --- and therefore they concluded, that what now befel was the completion of the oracle. ----- The peſtilence broke out immediately upon the irruption of the Peloponneſians, and never extended itſelf to Peloponneſus, a circumſtance which ought to be related. It raged the moſt and for the longeſt time in Athens, but afterwards ſpread into the other towns, eſpecially the moſt populous. --- And this is an exact account of the plague.

Peloponneſians *ſtill in* Attica.

The Peloponneſians, after they had ravaged the inland-parts, extended their devaſtations to thoſe which are called, *The Coaſt*, as far as mount Laurium [2], where the Athenians had ſilver-mines. And here, they firſt ravaged the part which looks towards Peloponneſus, and afterwards that which lies towards Eubœa and Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the command, perſiſted in the ſame opinion as before in the former incurſion, that " the Athenians ought not to " march out againſt them." Yet, whilſt the enemy was up in the country, before they had advanced as far as the coaſt, he had equip'd a fleet of an hundred ſhips to invade Peloponneſus; and, when every thing was ready, he put to ſea [3]. On board theſe ſhips he had embarked

2 The ſilver-mines at Laurium originally belonged to private perſons, but were united to the public domaine by Themiſtocles. A great number of ſlaves were employed in working them, and the produce paid amply for all the labour beſtowed upon them. Whether the *ſtate* was much enriched by them is a queſtion; the undertakers and proprietors of the ſlaves who wrought them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by Xenophon in his treatiſe of *revenue*.

3 Plutarch relates, in the *life* of Pericles, that on this occaſion, when all was ready, " when the forces were ſhipped, and Peri-
" cles himſelf was juſt got on board his tri-
" reme, the ſun was eclipſed. It ſoon
" grew ſo dark, that all men were aſto-
" niſhed at ſo dreadful a prodigy. Pericles,
" ſeeing his own pilot quite terrified and
" confounded, threw a cloke over his face,
" and wrapping him up in it, asked, Whe-
" ther he ſaw any thing dreadful, or any
" thing that portended danger? The pi-
" lot anſwering in the negative, What dif-
" ference then (he went on) between this
" affair and that, unleſs that what hath
" darkned the ſun is bigger than a cloke?"
Pericles had eaſily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras

barked four thouſand heavy-armed Athenians; and in veſſels for tranſporting horſe, now firſt fitted up for this ſervice out of old ſhips, three hundred horſemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined in the expedition with fifty ſail. At the very time this fleet went to ſea from Athens, they left the Peloponneſians on the *coaſt* of Attica. When they were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponneſus, they ravaged great part of the country about it, and making an aſſault on the city itſelf, had ſome hopes of taking it, but did not ſucceed. Leaving Epidaurus, they ravaged the country about Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione; all theſe places are ſituated on the ſea-coaſt of Peloponneſus. But ſailing from hence, they came before Praſiæ, a fort of Laconia ſituated upon the ſea, around which they laid the country waſte; and having taken the fort by aſſault, demoliſhed it. After theſe performances they returned home, and found the Peloponneſians no longer in Attica, but retired within their own dominions.

The whole ſpace of time that the Peloponneſians were upon the lands of the Athenians, and the Athenians employed in their ſea-expedition, the plague was making havoc both in the troops of the Athenians, and within the city. This occaſioned a report, that the Peloponneſians, for fear of the infection, as having been informed by deſerters that it raged in the city, and been witneſſes themſelves of their frequent interments, retired out of their territory with ſome precipitation. Yet they perſever'd in this incurſion longer than they had ever done before, and had made the whole country one continued devaſtation; for the time of their continuance in Attica was about forty days.

Acts of the Athenians.

The ſame ſummer, Ægon the ſon of Nicias, and Cleopompus the ſon of Clinius, joined in the command with Pericles, ſetting them-

Anaxagoras how to account for eclipſes. But whether Plutarch hath placed this incident in right time, is a queſtion: For Thucydides, who is exact in theſe things, mentions no eclipſe of the ſun this ſummer.

ſelves

ſelves at the head of the force which he had employed before, carried them without loſs of time againſt the Chalcidéans of Thrace. But when they were come up to Potidæa, which was ſtill beſieged, they play'd their engines of battery againſt, and left no method unattempted to take it. But the ſucceſs in this attempt did not anſwer expectation, nor indeed was the event in any reſpect the leaſt proportioned to their great preparations: For the plague followed them even hither, and making grievous havoc among the Athenians, deſtroyed the army; ſo that even thoſe ſoldiers who had been there before, and had from the beginning of the ſiege been in perfect health, caught the infection from the troops brought thither by Agnon. —— Phormio, and the body of ſixteen hundred men under his command, had before this quitted Chalcidica, ſo that Agnon ſailed back with the ſhips to Athens, of his four thouſand men the plague having ſwept away one thouſand and fifty in about forty days: But the ſoldiers who were there before, were left to carry on the ſiege of Potidæa.

Sad ſtate of the Athenians.

After the ſecond incurſion of the Peloponneſians, the Athenians, whoſe lands were now a ſecond time laid waſte, who felt the double affliction of peſtilence and war, had entirely changed their ſentiments of things. The blame was univerſally thrown on Pericles, as if at his inſtigation they had engaged in this war, and by him had been plunged in all theſe calamities. They deſired with impatience to make up the breach with the Lacedæmonians; but, tho' they diſpatched an embaſſy for this purpoſe, no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievouſly diſtreſſed, and no method of reſource occurring to their minds, their reſentments fell ſtill heavier on Pericles. He, ſeeing them quite diſpirited with their preſent misfortunes, and intent on ſuch projects as he had reaſon to expect they would, called a general aſſembly of the people, which by ſtill continuing in the command of the army he was authorized to do. He had a mind to encourage them, to ſooth the hot reſentments fermenting in their breaſts,

and bring them into a more calm and confident temper. He preſented himſelf before them, and ſpoke as follows ——

Speech of Pericles.

" I FULLY expected, I freely own it, to become the object of " your reſentments. I am not ignorant of the cauſes of it; and for " this purpoſe have convened *this* aſſembly, to expoſtulate with, " nay even to reprimand you, if without any reaſon you make me " the mark of your diſpleaſure, or cowardly ſink under the weight " of your misfortunes: For it is my firm opinion, that by the full " health and vigor of a *ſtate* the happineſs of its conſtituents is bet- " ter ſecured, than when each ſeparate member is thriving whilſt " the public welfare totters. Be the ſituation of any private perſon " proſperous and fine as his heart can wiſh --- if his country be ruin- " ed, he himſelf muſt neceſſarily be involved in that ruin. But he " that is unfortunate in a flouriſhing community, may ſoon catch " hold of expedients of redreſs. When therefore your country is " able to ſupport the misfortunes of its every member, and yet each " of thoſe members muſt needs be inveloped in the ruin of his " country, why will you not join and unite your efforts to prevent " that ruin ---- and not (as you are now going to do, becauſe con- " founded with your domeſtic misfortunes) baſely deſert the public " ſafety, and caſt the moſt unjuſt of cenſures upon me who ad- " viſed this war, upon your own ſelves alſo who approved this ad- " vice? What --- I am the man that muſt ſingly ſtand the ſtorm " of your anger! ----- I am indeed the man, who I am confident is " not inferior to any one amongſt you in knowing what ought to " be known, and in ſpeaking what ought to be ſpoke, who ſincerely " loves his country, and is ſuperior to all the ſordid views of in- " tereſt. For he, who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate " his own thoughts, is juſt as inſignificant as if he could not think " at all. He that enjoys both theſe faculties in perfection, and yet " is

" is an enemy to his country, will in like manner never ſay any
" thing for his country's good: Or, tho' he love his country, and
" be not proof againſt corruption, he may proſtitute every thing to
" his own avarice. If therefore you judged my qualifications in all
" theſe reſpects to be in ſome moderate degree ſuperior to thoſe of
" other men, and were thus drawn into a war by my advice, there
" can certainly be no reaſon why I ſhould be accuſed of having done
" you wrong. Thoſe indeed, who are already in the faſt poſſeſſion
" of all the ends attainable by war, muſt make a fooliſh choice if
" they run to arms: But, if once under a neceſſity, either through
" tame ſubmiſſion to be inſlaved by a neighbour-power, or by a brave
" reſiſtance to get the maſtery over them ---- he who flies danger in
" ſuch a caſe, is much more worthy of reproach than he who meets
" it with bold defiance.

" I indeed am the man I was, and of the mind I was. It is
" you, whoſe reſolutions have wavered; --- you, who whilſt unhurt
" through my perſuaſion reſolved on war, and repent ſo ſoon as you
" feel its ſtrokes --- who meaſure the ſoundneſs of my advice by the
" weakneſs of your own judgments, and therefore condemn it, be-
" cauſe the preſent diſaſters have ſo entirely engaged the whole of
" your attention, that you have none left to perceive the high im-
" portance of it to the Public. Cruel indeed is that reverſe of for-
" tune which hath ſo ſuddenly afflicted you, dejecting your minds
" and diſpiriting your former reſolutions! Accidents ſudden and un-
" foreſeen, and ſo oppoſite to that event you might reaſonably have
" expected, inſlave the mind; --- which hath been your caſe in all
" the late contingencies, and more particularly ſo in this grievous pe-
" ſtilence. Yet men, who are the conſtituents of ſuch a mighty
" *State*, and whoſe manners have been by education formed for its
" ſupport, ought never to want that inward fortitude which can ſtem
" the greateſt of afflictions, nor by ſelf-deſertion utterly to efface
" their native dignity. The world will always have equal reaſon

" to condemn the perſon, who ſinks from a height of glory by his
" own puſillanimity, and to hate the perſon who impudently pre-
" tends to what he never can deſerve. It muſt be therefore your
" duty to ſuppreſs this too keen a ſenſibility of your own private
" loſſes, and with united fortitude to act in the defence of the public
" ſafety. Let us therefore bravely undergo the toils of this war;
" and, if the toil increaſeth, let our reſolution increaſe with it. And
" let theſe, added to all thoſe other proofs of my integrity I have
" exhibited on other occaſions, ſuffice to convince you, that your
" preſent cenſures and ſuſpicions of me are raſh and groundleſs.

" I ſhall now lay before you a *point*, which, ſo far as I can judge,
" you have as yet never properly conſidered, nor have I in any for-
" mer diſcourſe inſiſted upon —— " the means within your reach of
" riſing to ſupreme dominion." Nor ſhould I meddle even now with
" [4] a point, pompous beyond poetic viſions, did I not ſee you beyond
" meaſure fearful and dejected. You think you are only maſters of
" your own dependents; but I loudly aver, that you are greater
" maſters now both at land and ſea, thoſe neceſſary ſpheres for car-
" rying on the ſervices of life, than any other power; and may be
" greater yet, if ſo inclined. There is not now a king, there is not
" any nation in the univerſal world, able to withſtand that navy,
" which even at this juncture you can lanch out to ſea. Why is not

4 Pericles here is about to convince the Athenians, that they may riſe to ſupreme dominion in conſequence of their naval ſuperiority. It was his ambition to execute the grand extenſive plan which was formed originally by Themiſtocles. And the words, in which he introduceth this topic, are ſo full of energy, that they bear hard upon a tranſlator. He calls it a *point* —— Κομψοδεστέραν ἐχούσι τὴν προσποίησιν. My firſt attempts at them were very faint and imperfect. I was ſoon convinced of it by the greateſt *Genius* of the age, who did me the honour to read over this ſpeech in manuſcript, and who, as he thinks and ſpeaks like Pericles, could not endure that any of his words ſhould be depreciated. I hope now I have expreſſed all the ideas which the orginal words include. Mr. *Hobbes* hath entirely dropped them in his tranſlation.

this

" this extenſive power regarded in ballancing the loſs of your houſes
" and lands, thoſe intolerable damages which you think you have
" ſuffered ? — It is not ſo reaſonable, to grieve and deſpond under
" ſuch petty loſſes, as to deſpiſe them from the thought, that they
" are merely the trappings and embelliſhments of wealth ; to fix the
" firm remembrance within us, that liberty, in defence of which we
" are ready to hazard our all, will eaſily give us thoſe trifles again ;
" and, that by tamely ſubmitting to our enemies, the poſſeſſion of
" all we have will be taken from us. We ought not in either of
" theſe reſpects to degenerate from our fathers. By toil and toil alone
" they gained theſe valuable acquiſitions, defended themſelves in
" the poſſeſſion, and bequeathed the precious inheritance to us.
" And to loſe the advantages we have poſſeſſed, will be much more
" diſgraceful than to have miſcarried in their purſuit. But we ought
" to encounter our enemies, not with valour only but with confi-
" dence of ſucceſs. Valour ſtarts up even in a coward, if he once
" prevails through lucky ignorance ; but *ſuch* a confidence muſt be
" in every mind, which is ſeriouſly convinced of its own ſuperiority,
" as is now our caſe. Nay even when the match is equal, the
" certainty of what muſt be done ariſing from an inward bravery,
" adds the greater ſecurity to courage. Confidence then is not built
" on hope which acts only in uncertainty, but on the ſedate deter-
" mination of what it is able to perform, an aſſurance of which is
" more guarded againſt diſappointments.

" It is further your duty to ſupport the public *character*, (as in it
" to a man you pride yourſelves,) with which its extenſive rule in-
" veſts our community, and either not to fly from toils, or never to
" aim at glory. Think not you have only one point at ſtake, the
" alternative of ſlavery inſtead of freedom ; but think alſo of the
" utter loſs of ſovereignty, and the danger of vengeance for all the
" offences you have given in the practice of it. To reſign it is not
" in your power, —— and of this let *him* be aſſured, who refines

" through

" through fear and hopes to earn indemnity by exerting it no longer.
" In your hands it hath run out into a kind of tyranny. To take
" it up ſeems indeed unjuſt, but to lay it down is exceeding danger-
" ous. And if ſuch daſtardly ſouls could perſuade others, they
" would ſoon bring this *ſtate* to utter ruin, or indeed any other
" where they were members and enjoy'd the chief adminiſtration of
" affairs. For the undiſturbed and quiet life will be of ſhort conti-
" nuance without the interpoſition of a vigilant activity. Slavery is
" never to be endured by a *ſtate* that once hath governed —— ſuch
" a ſituation can be tolerable only to *that* which hath ever been
" dependent.

" Suffer not yourſelves therefore to be ſeduced by men of ſuch
" mean and groveling tempers, nor level your reſentments at me —
" ſince tho' I adviſed the war, it was not begun without your appro-
" bation — if the enemy hath invaded you in ſuch a manner as you
" could not but expect from your own reſolutions never to be de-
" pendent. What tho' beyond our apprehenſions we have ſuffered
" the ſad viſitation of peſtilence? —— Such misfortunes no human
" foreſight will be able to prevent —— tho' I know, that even *this*
" hath in ſome meaſure ſerved to ſharpen your averſion to me. But
" if this be juſt, I claim as my lawful right, the glory of all thoſe
" happy contingencies, which may ever befal you beyond your ex-
" pectation. The evils inflicted by heaven muſt be born with patient
" reſignation; and the evils by enemies with manly fortitude. Such
" rational behaviour hath hitherto been habitual in Athens; let it
" not now be reverſed by you; —— by you, who know to what a
" pitch of excellence this *State* hath roſe in the eſteem of the world,
" by not yielding to adverſity; but, by braving all the horrors of war
" and pouring forth its blood in the glorious cauſe, hath reached the
" higheſt ſummit of power, and ever ſince retained it. The memory
" of this, time itſelf will never be able to efface, even tho' we may
" ſuffer it to droop and periſh in our hands —— as what is human

" muſt

" muſt decline —— Our memory I ſay, who, tho' Grecians our-
" ſelves, gave laws to all other Grecians, ſtood the ſhock of moſt
" formidable wars, reſiſted them all when combined againſt us, con-
" quered them all when ſeparately engaged, and maintained our-
" ſelves in poſſeſſion of the moſt flouriſhing and moſt powerful *State*
" in the world. *Theſe* things let the indolent and ſluggiſh ſoul con-
" demn, but *theſe* let the active and induſtrious ſtrive to emulate, for
" *theſe* they who cannot attain will envy.

" To be cenſured and maligned for a time, hath been the fate of
" all thoſe, whoſe merit hath raiſed them above the common le-
" vel; — but wiſe and judicious is the man, who enjoying the ſupe-
" riority, deſpiſeth the envy. An averſion ſo conceived will never
" laſt. His merit ſoon breaks forth in all its ſplendor, and his glory
" is afterwards handed down to poſterity never to be forgot. You,
" who have ſo clear a proſpect before you, both of what will be
" ſome time glorious and of what at preſent is not diſgraceful, re-
" collect your own worth and ſecure both. Sink not ſo low as to
" petition terms from the Lacedæmonians; nor let them imagine,
" that you feel the weight of your preſent misfortunes. The man,
" whoſe reſolution never ſinks before it, but ſtrives by a brave oppo-
" ſition, to repel calamity, *ſuch* — whether in a public or private
" capacity — muſt be acknowledged to be the worthieſt man."

Pericles a good and able miniſter.

By arguments like theſe did Pericles endeavour to mollify the reſentments of the Athenians againſt himſelf, and to divert their minds from their public calamities. In regard to the public, they ſeemed to be ſatisfied with all that he had urged; they deſiſted from ſoliciting an accommodation with the Lacedæmmonians; and were more hearty than ever for continuing the war. Yet, in their own private concerns, they were grievouſly dejected under their preſent misfortunes. The poor citizens, who had but little, could not bear with patience the loſs of that little. The rich and the great regretted the

loſs

loſs of their eſtates, with their country-ſeats and ſplendid furniture; — but worſt of all, that inſtead of peace they had the ſad alternative of war. However neither poor nor rich abated their diſpleaſure to Pericles, till they had laid upon him a pecuniary fine.[5] And yet, no long time after — ſo unſteddy are the humours of the people — they elected him *general* again, and intruſted him with the adminiſtration of affairs. The keen ſenſe they had at firſt of their own private loſſes ſoon grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not but allow him the moſt capable perſon to provide for all the urgent neceſſities of the public. For the ſupreme authority he enjoyed in times of peace he had exerciſed with great moderation; he was vigilant and active for the good of the community, which never made ſo great a figure as under his adminiſtration; and after war broke out it is plain he beſt knew the reach of its ability to carry it on. He lived two years and ſix months from its commencement: and after his[6] death, his judicious foreſight in regard to this war was more

5 Plutarch (in the *life* of Pericles) ſays authors are not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who incited the people to fine him, is alſo ſaid by ſome to have been *Cleon*, with whoſe genius and character the reader will ſoon become acquainted.

6 As the Hiſtorian is here going to take his leave of Pericles, he adjoins a true repreſentation of his patriot ſpirit, his great abilities, his judicious foreſight, and ſucceſsful adminiſtration. And here, the reader may be informed of ſome points, which Thucydides either thought needleſs when he wrote, or foreign to his ſubject. — Pericles had two ſons by his former wife. The eldeſt of them proved a great vexation to his father, who was unable to ſupport him in his expenſive way of living. Pericles had no large eſtate, and he was not richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by giving ſo many magnificent and laſting proofs of his fine taſte in painting, ſculpture, and building. For the city of Rome received not ſo much decoration from her foundation till the time of the Cæſars, as Athens did from Pericles alone. Yet œconomy was his paſſion at home, as that of his ſon Xantippus was luxury. This ſon however was taken off by the plague, as was afterwards a ſiſter of Pericles, moſt of his intimates and relations, and his other ſon Paralus. This laſt was the heavieſt blow; he felt it deeply: And all

more and more acknowledged. For he had aſſured them they could not fail of ſucceſs, provided they would not meddle by land, but apply themſelves ſolely to their navy, without being ſolicitous to enlarge their territories in this war, or expoſing Athens itſelf to danger. But they had recourſe to ſchemes quite oppoſite to theſe, nay even to ſome that had no connexion at all with this war, wherein private ambition or private intereſt puſhed them to ſuch management as was highly prejudicial to themſelves and their allies. Whenever theſe politic ſchemes ſucceeded, private perſons carried off all the honour and advantage; — whenever they miſcarried, the hardſhips of the war fell more ſeverely on the *State*. The reaſon was this —— Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, and whoſe integrity was undoubtedly proof againſt corruption, kept the

all Athens did all that lay in their power to comfort him, ſince, contrary to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his ſon Pericles, whom he had by Aſpaſia, an Athenian of the full blood. At length, he was ſeized himſelf by the plague; and, after languiſhing a long time, in a manner different to moſt others, died of it. In his laſt moments, he ſhewed to a friend who was viſiting him a charm which the women had hung about his neck, as if he was ſick indeed, when he could ſubmit to ſuch foolery. When ſeveral of them were ſitting round his bed, and, thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the great exploits of his life, the ſhining incidents of his adminiſtration, his victories, and the nine trophies he had erected, he interrupted them with theſe words, "I wonder you "lay ſtreſs upon ſuch actions, in which "fortune claims a ſhare along with me, "and which many others have performed "as well as myſelf, and yet paſs over the "higheſt glory and moſt valuable part of "my character, that no citizen of Athens "ever put on mourning through me." The wonderful man, though engaged for forty years in buſineſs, and conſtantly attacked by every furious, ſeditious and turbulent Athenian, had never amidſt all his power given way to the ſpirit of revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely obſerves, he in ſome meaſure deſerved the lofty title of *Olympian*, too arrogant in any other light for man to wear; ſince gentleneſs of manners and the habits of mercy and forgiveneſs raiſe men to the neareſt reſemblance of the Gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted any man ſo much, and with ſo much reaſon. —— If the reader be willing to hear any more of Aſpaſia, the ſame writer tells us, that after the death of Pericles, ſhe married one Lyſicles, a low and obſcure man and a dealer in cattle, whom however ſhe improved into an Athenian of the firſt claſs.

people in order by a gentle management, and was not ſo much directed by them as their principal director. He had not worked himſelf into power by indirect methods, and therefore was not obliged to ſooth and honour their caprices, but could contradict and diſregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he ſaw them bent on projects injurious or unreaſonable, he terrified them ſo by the force of his eloquence, that he made them tremble and deſiſt; and when they were diſquieted by groundleſs apprehenſions, he animated them afreſh into brave reſolution. The *State* under him, tho' ſtiled a democracy, was in fact a monarchy. His ſucceſſors more on a level with one another, and yet every one affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the people, and ſo to neglect the concerns of the public. This was the ſource of many grievous errors, as muſt unavoidably be the caſe in a great community and poſſeſſed of large dominion — but in particular of the expedition to Sicily; the ill-conduct of which did not appear ſo flagrantly in relation to thoſe againſt whom it was undertaken, as to the authors and movers of it, who knew not how to make the proper proviſion for thoſe who were employed in it. For engaged in their own private conteſts for power with the people, they had not ſufficient attention to the army abroad, and at home were embroiled in mutual altercations. Yet, notwithſtanding the miſcarriage in Sicily in which they loſt their army with the greater part of their fleet, and the ſedition which inſtantly broke out in Athens, they bravely reſiſted for three years together, not only their firſt enemies in the war, but the Sicilians alſo in conjunction with them, the greater part of their dependents revolted from them, and at length Cyrus *the king*'s ſon, who favouring the Peloponneſians ſupplied them with money for the ſervice of their fleet; — nor would at laſt be conquered, till by their own inteſtine feuds they were utterly diſabled from reſiſting longer. So much better than any other perſon was Pericles acquainted with their ſtrength, when he marked out ſuch a conduct to them as would infallibly have enabled the

Athenian

Athenian *State* to have continued the war longer than the Peloponeſians could poſſibly have done.

Proceedings of the Lacedæmonians.

The Lacedæmonians in junction with their allies, the ſame ſummer fitted out a fleet of one hundred ſhips againſt the iſland Zacynthus which lies over-againſt Elis. They are a colony of the Achæans of Peloponneſus, and were then in league with the Athenians. On board this fleet were a thouſand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians; and Cnemus the Spartan commanded in the expedition. Making a deſcent upon the iſland they ravaged great part of the country, — but finding the entire reduction of it impracticable, they re-embarked and returned home.

Their embaſſadors to the king.

In the cloſe of the ſame ſummer, Ariſteus the Corinthian, Aneriſtus, Nicolaus, Protodemus and Timagoras of Tegea, embaſſadors from the Lacedæmonians, and Polis the Argive without any public character, travelling into Aſia, to engage the Perſian king to ſupply them with men and money for carrying on the war, on their journey ſtop firſt in Thrace and addreſs themſelves to Sitalces the ſon of Teres. They had a mind to try if they could prevail upon him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to the relief of Potidæa now beſieged by the Athenians, to deſiſt for the future from giving the latter any aſſiſtance, and to obtain from him a ſafe conduct through his territory for the continuance of their journey beyond the Helleſpont to Pharnaces ſon of Pharnabazus, who would afterwards conduct them in ſafety to the royal court. Learchus the ſon of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the ſon of Philemon, happening at that time to be with Sitalces, on an embaſſy from Athens, perſuade Sadocus the ſon of Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of Athens, to ſeize and deliver them up to them, that they might not go forwards to the *king*, to the prejudice of that community of which he was a member. He hearkening to their advice arreſts them juſt as they were going on ſhip-board to croſs the Helleſpont, after they had travelled through Thrace to the ſpot marked for their embarkation. He executed this

by means of ſome truſty perſons diſpatched purpoſely after them along with Learchus and Ameiniades, and expreſly ordered to deliver them up to the latter: They, ſo ſoon as they had got them in their power, carried them to Athens. Upon their arrival there, the Athenians ſtanding in great fear of Ariſteus, leſt upon eſcape he might do them further miſchief, ſince before this he had been the author of all the projects to their prejudice both at Potidæa and in Thrace, put them to death on the very day of their arrival, unjudged and ſuing in vain to be heard, and caſt them into pits. This cruel uſage of them they juſtified from the example of the Lacedæmonians, who had in the ſame manner put to death and caſt into pits the Athenian merchants and thoſe of their allies, whom they had ſeized in the trading-veſſels upon the coaſts of Peloponneſus. For, in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians had put to death as enemies, all thoſe whom they could take at ſea — not thoſe only who belonged to the *States* in alliance with the Athenians, but even ſuch as were of the yet neutral communities.

War upon the Amphilochians.

About the ſame time in the end of ſummer, the Ambraciots in conjunction with many of the Barbarians, whom they had excited to take up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and made excurſions over all its dependent territory. Their enmity againſt the Argives took its original from hence. —— This Argos was firſt built, and this province of Amphilochia firſt planted by Amphilochus the ſon of Amphiaraus immediately after the Trojan war, who on his return home, being diſſatisfied with the ſtate of affairs in that other Argos, founded this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it the ſame name with the place of his nativity. It ſoon became the largeſt city of Amphilochia, and the inhabitants were moſt powerful of any thereabouts. Yet many generations after, being ſunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia to unite with them. This community of reſidence brought them to their preſent uſe of one common language, the Greek: But the reſt of the

Amphilochians

Amphilochians are ſtill Barbarians. Yet in proceſs of time, the Ambraciots drive the Argives from amongſt them, and keep poſſeſſion of the city for themſelves. Upon this event, the Amphilochians threw themſelves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both together implored the ſuccour of the Athenians, who ſent thirty ſhips to their aſſiſtance under the command of Phormio. Upon Phormio's arrival, they take Argos by ſtorm, made all the Ambraciots ſlaves, and then both the Amphilochians and Acarnanians ſettle themſelves together in the city. To theſe incidents was firſt owing the league offenſive and defenſive between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The chief cauſe of the inveteracy, which the Ambraciots bore to the Argives, was their having made them in this manner ſlaves; and which afterwards impelled them, in the confuſion of this war, to form this invaſion with the junction of the Chaonians and ſome other neighbouring Barbarians. Advancing up to Argos, they were entire maſters of the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to take the town by aſſault; upon which they again returned home and diſperſed to their reſpective nations. — Such were the tranſactions of the ſummer.

On the firſt approach of winter, the Athenians ſent out twenty ſhips to cruize on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, under the command of Phormio; who, fixing his ſtation before Naupactus, kept ſo ſtrict a guard, that nothing durſt paſs in or out from Corinth and the gulf of Criſſa. — Six other ſhips they ſend to Caria and Lycia, under the command of Meleſander, to levy contributions there, and to ſtop the excurſions of the Peloponneſian privateers, harbouring in thoſe parts, from moleſting the courſe of their trading veſſels from Phaſelis, Phœnicia, and the adjacent continent. Meleſander, with the Athenian and confederate force he had on board his ſhips, landed in Lycia, and was defeated in the firſt battle, in which he loſt part of his army and his own life. Phormio. Meleſander.

The

Surrender of Potidæa.

The ſame winter, the Potidæans, as they were no longer able to hold out the ſiege; and as beſides, the irruptions of the Peloponneſians into Attica, had not induced the Athenians to raiſe it; their proviſions being quite ſpent; and amongſt other calamities to which their extremities had reduced them, having been forced to feed upon one another; they held a parley about their ſurrender with the Athenian officers, who [7] commanded in the ſiege, Xenophon the ſon of Euripides, Heſtiodorus the ſon of Ariſtoclides, and Phanomachus the ſon of Callimachus. They, ſenſible of the hardſhips their troops ſuffered by long lying abroad in the winter-ſeaſon, and that the carrying on of the ſiege had already coſt Athens * two thouſand talents, granted them a compoſition. The terms agreed on were theſe —— "That they ſhould quit the place with their wives, their children, "and auxiliaries, every man with one ſuit of clothing, but the "women with two; and with a certain ſum of money to defray the "expence of their departure." —— By virtue of this compoſition, they went away to Chalcis, where every one ſhifted for himſelf. But the Athenians called their *generals* to account for their conduct,

* 38-500 *l. Sterling.*

7 In this ſiege of Potidæa, two perſons ſerved amongſt the heavy-armed as private ſoldiers, one of whom was the glory of human nature; and the other the glory and bane of his country: I mean, the divine Socrates, and at this time young Alcibiades. Plutarch (in the *life* of Alcibiades) ſays, they lay in the ſame tent and fought always ſide by ſide. Once, in a ſharp skirmiſh, both of them diſtinguiſhed themſelves above all their fellow-ſoldiers. Alcibiades at length was wounded and dropped; Socrates ſtood over and defended him, and ſaved both him and his arms from the enemy. Socrates therefore had the juſteſt right to the public reward, as the perſon who had behaved beſt in this action. But when the *generals*, on account of Alcibiades his quality, ſhewed a great deſire to confer honour upon him, Socrates, willing alſo to increaſe his ardor for gallant actions, turned witneſs in his favour, and procured him the wreath and the public preſent of a compleat ſuit of armour. Socrates coveted no recompence for brave exploits but the conſciouſneſs of having performed them, and young Alcibiades was to be nurſed up to virtue. He was capable of every degree either of virtue or vice: And Socrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the former, and give his eager and enterprizing ſoul the juſt direction.

becauſe

becauſe they had ſigned this compoſition without their privity, (for they thought it in their power to have made them ſurrender at diſcretion,) and afterwards ſent to Potidæa ſome of their people whom they ſettled in a colony there. —— Theſe things were done this winter, and ſo ended the ſecond year of this war, the hiſtory of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

YEAR III.

Before Chriſt 429.

EARLY the next ſummer, the Peloponneſians and their allies, omitting the incurſion as before into Attica, marched their forces againſt Platæa. Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians commanded, who having encamped his army, was preparing to ravage the adjacent country. He was interrupted by an embaſſy from the Platæans, who addreſſed themſelves to him in the following manner. ——— *Siege of* Platæa.

" The war, O Archidamus and Lacedæmonians, you are now le- Platæans *addreſs* Archi-
" vying on Platæa, is a flagrant breach of common juſtice, a ble- damus.
" miſh on your honour and that of your fathers. Pauſanias the
" Lacedæmonian ſon of Cleombrotus, when — aided by thoſe Greci-
" ans, who chearfully expoſed themſelves with him to the dangers of
" that battle which was fought on our land —— he had delivered
" Greece from Perſian ſlavery, at a public ſacrifice to Jupiter *the*
" *deliverer* ſolemnized by him on that occaſion in the public forum
" of Platæa, called all the confederates together, and there confer'd
" theſe privileges on the Platæans ---- " That they ſhould have free
" poſſeſſion of the city and territory belonging to it, to be governed
" at their own diſcretion; — that no one ſhould ever unjuſtly make
" war upon them, or endeavour to inſlave them; and in caſe of ſuch
" attempts, all the confederates then preſent ſhould avenge it to the
" utmoſt

" utmoſt of their power." —— Such grateful returns did your fa-
" thers make us in recompence of our valour, and the zeal we ex-
" erted in the common dangers. Yet their generoſity you are now
" reverſing — you, with the Thebans our inveterate foes, are come
" hither to inſlave us. But by the Gods who were then witneſſes to
" the oath they ſwore, by all the tutelary Deities both of your own
" and of our community, we adjure you to do no damage to Platæan
" ground nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and leave us in that
" ſtate of independence, which Pauſanias juſtly eſtabliſhed for us."—
To theſe words of the Platæans Archidamus made this reply—

His anſwer. " What you have urged, ye men of Platæa, is juſt and reaſon-
" able, if it be found agreeable to your actions. Let the declarations
" of Pauſanias be obſerved; be free and independent yourſelves,
" and at the ſame time vindicate their own freedom to others, to
" thoſe who, after participation of the ſame common dangers, made
" that oath in your favour, and yet are now inſlaved by the Atheni-
" ans. To reſcue them and others from that ſlavery have our pre-
" parations been made, this war hath been undertook. You who
" know what liberty is, and are ſuch advocates for it, do you abide
" firmly by your oaths; at leaſt, as we heretofore adviſed you, keep
" at quiet, enjoying only what is properly your own; ſide with
" neither party; receive both in the way of friendſhip, in the way
" of enmity, neither. —— To a conduct like this we never ſhall
" object."

Reply of the Platæans. When the Platæan embaſſadors had heard this reply of Archida-mus, they returned into the *city*, and communicating what had paſſed to the body of the citizens, they carried back in anſwer to him —— " That they could not poſſibly comply with his propoſals,
" without the conſent of the Athenians, becauſe their wives and
" children were in their power ---- that they were apprehenſive a
" compliance

" compliance might endanger their whole community, ſince in ſuch " a caſe, either the Athenians might not confirm the neutrality, or " the Thebans who were comprehended in the ſame neutral oath to " the two principal powers, might again attempt to ſeize their city." — Archidamus to remove their apprehenſions ſpoke as follows —— " Deliver up your city and your houſes to us Lacedæmonians; let us " know the bounds of your territory and the exact number of your " trees, and make as true a calculation as you poſſibly can of all " that belongs to you. Depart yourſelves, and reſide wherever you " pleaſe ſo long as the war continues; at the end of it we will reſtore " every thing again. In the mean time, we will make the beſt uſe " of every thing intruſted to us, and pay you an annual equivalent " for your ſubſiſtence." Upon hearing this, they again returned into the city, and the whole body of the people aſſiſting at a general conſultation, they returned for anſwer — " That they deſired only " to communicate the propoſals to the Athenians, and then with " their approbation would accept them. In the mean time they " begged a ſuſpenſion of arms, and to have their lands ſpared from " depredation." He granted them a truce for the time requiſite to receive an anſwer, and forbore ravaging the country.

The embaſſadors of Platæa, having been at Athens and conſulted with the Athenians, return again with this anſwer to their city. —— " The Athenians ſay, that in no preceding time, ever ſince we en- " tered into confederacy with them, did they ever ſuffer us in any " reſpect to be injured; that neither will they neglect us now, but " ſend us a powerful aid. And you they ſolemnly adjure by the " oaths which your fathers have ſworn, to admit no change or in- " novation in the league ſubſiſting between you and them." — When the embaſſadors had thus delivered the anſwer of the Athenians, after ſome conſultation the Platæans reſolved, " never to deſert them, to bear " any devaſtation of their lands, nay if ſuch muſt be the caſe, to " behold it with patience, and to ſuffer any extremities, to which

" their enemies might reduce them;—— that, further, no perſon " ſhould ſtir out of the city, but an anſwer be given from the " walls,—" That it was impoſſible for them to accept the terms " propoſed by the Lacedæmonians."

This was no ſooner heard than Archidamus the king made this ſolemn appeal to all their tutelary Heroes and Gods.—" Ye Gods " and Heroes, *ſaid he*, who protect this region of Platæa, bear wit- " neſs to us, that it was not till after a violation of oaths already " ſworn, that we have marched into this country, where our fathers " through the bleſſings you ſent down upon their prayers overcame " the Medes, and which you then made that fortunate field whereon " the arms of Greece were crowned with victory—and that what- " ever we ſhall here undertake, our every ſtep ſhall be agreeable to " juſtice. We have offered many honourable conditions to them, " which are all rejected. Grant therefore our ſupplications, that the " firſt tranſgreſſors of juſtice may receive their puniſhment, and " that thoſe who fight with equity, may obtain revenge." After this ſolemn addreſs to the Gods, he rouſed up his army into action.

Conduct of the ſiege.

He firſt of all formed an incloſure round about them with the trees they had fell'd, ſo that no one could get out of the city. In the next place, they raiſed a mount of earth before the place, hoping that it could not long hold out a ſiege againſt the efforts of ſo large an army. Having felled a quantity of timber on mount Cithæron, with it they framed the mount on either ſide, that thus caſed it might perform the ſervice of a wall, and that the earth might be kept from mouldering away too faſt. Upon it they heaped a quantity of matter, both ſtones and earth, and whatever elſe would cement together and increaſe the bulk. This work employed them for ſeventy days and nights without intermiſſion, all being alternately employed in it, ſo that one part of the army was carrying it on, whilſt the other took the neceſſary refreſhments of food and ſleep.

Thoſe

Thoſe Lacedæmonians who had the command over the hired troops of the other *States*, had the care of the work, and obliged them all to aſſiſt in carrying it on. The Platæans, ſeeing this mount raiſed to a great height, built a counterwork of wood, cloſe to that part of the city-wall againſt which this mount of earth was thrown up, and ſtrengthened the inſide of it with bricks, which they got for this uſe by pulling down the adjacent houſes. The wooden caſe was deſigned to keep it firm together, and prevent the whole pile from being weakned by its height. They farther covered it over with ſheep-ſkins and hides of beaſts, to defend the workmen from miſſive weapons, and to preſerve the wood from being fired by the enemy. This work *within* was raiſed to a great height, and the mount was raiſed with equal expedition *without*. Upon this, the Platæans had recourſe to another device. They broke a hole through the wall, cloſe to which the mount was raiſed, and drew the earth away from under it into the city. But this being diſcovered by the Peloponneſians, they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds and ſtuffed with clay, which being of a firm conſiſtence could not be dug away like earth. By this they were excluded, and ſo deſiſted for a while from their former practice. Yet digging a ſubterraneous paſſage from out of the city, which they ſo luckily continued that it undermined the mount, they again withdrew the earth from under it. This practice long eſcaped the diſcovery of the beſiegers, who ſtill heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather leſs, as the earth was drawn away from the bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. However ſtill apprehenſive, that as they were few in number, they ſhould not be able long to hold out againſt ſo numerous beſiegers, they had recourſe to another project. They deſiſted from carrying on the great pile which was to counterwork the mount, and beginning at each end of it where the wall was low, they run another wall in the form of a creſcent along the inſide of a city, that if the great wall ſhould be taken this might afterwards hold out, might

lay the enemy under a neceſſity of throwing up a freſh mount againſt it, and that thus the further they advanced the difficulties of the ſiege might be doubled, and be carried on with increaſe of danger.

When their mount was compleated, the Peloponneſians play'd away their battering-engines againſt the wall; and one of them they worked ſo dextrouſly from the mount againſt the great pile within, that they ſhook it very much, and threw the Platæans into conſternation. Others they applied in different parts againſt the wall, the force of which was broke by the Platæans, who threw ropes around them; they alſo tied large beams together, with long chains of iron at both ends of the beams, by which they hung downwards from two other tranſverſe beams inclined and extended beyond the wall; ---theſe they drew along obliquely, and againſt whatever part they ſaw the engine of battery to be aimed, they let go the beams with a full ſwing of the chains, and ſo drop'd them down directly upon it, which by the weight of the ſtroke broke off the beak of the battering machine. Upon this the Peloponneſians, finding all their engines uſeleſs, and their mount effectually counterworked by the fortification within, concluded it a buſineſs of no little hazard to take the place amidſt ſo many obſtacles, and prepared to draw a circumvallation about it.

But firſt they were willing to try whether it were not poſſible to ſet the town on fire, and burn it down, as it was not large, by help of a brisk gale of wind; for they caſt their thoughts towards every expedient of taking it without a large expence and a tedious blockade. Procuring for this purpoſe a quantity of faggots, they toſſed them from their own mount into the void ſpace between the wall and the inner fortification. As many hands were employed in this buſineſs, they had ſoon filled it up, and then proceeded to toſs more of them into the other parts of the city lying beyond, as far as they could by the advantage which the eminence gave them. Upon theſe they threw fiery balls made of ſulphur and pitch, which caught the faggots,

and

and ſoon kindled ſuch a flame as before this time no one had ever ſeen kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed ſometimes happened, that wood growing upon mountains hath been ſo heated by the attrition of the winds, that without any other cauſe it hath broke out into fire and flame. But this was exceeding fierce; and the Platæans, who had baffled all other efforts, were very narrowly delivered from periſhing by its fury: For it cleared the city to a great diſtance round about, ſo that no Platæan durſt approach it: And if the wind had happened to have blown along with it, as the enemy hoped, they muſt all unavoidably have periſhed. It is now reported, that a heavy rain falling on a ſudden, attended with claps of thunder, extinguiſhed the flames, and put an end to this imminent danger.

The Peloponneſians, upon the failure of this project, marched away part of their army; but, continuing the remainder there, raiſed a wall of circumvallation quite round the city, the troops of every confederate *ſtate* executing a determinate part of the work. Both inſide and outſide of this wall was a ditch, and by firſt digging theſe they had got materials for brick. This work being compleated about the riſing of Arcturus *, they left ſome of their own men to guard half of the wall, the other half being left to the care of the Bœotians; then marched away with the main-army, and diſmiſſed the auxiliary forces to their reſpective cities. —— The Platæans had already ſent away to Athens their wives, their children, their old people, and all the uſeleſs crowd of inhabitants. There were left only in the town during this ſiege four hundred Platæans, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to prepare their food. This was the whole number of them when the ſiege was firſt formed; nor was there any other perſon within the wall, either ſlave or free. --- And in this manner was the city of Platæa beſieged in form.

* *Beginning of* September.

The ſame ſummer, and about the time that the army appeared be- Thrace.
fore Platæa, the Athenians, with a body of their own people, conſiſting of two thouſand heavy-armed, and two hundred horſe-

men,

men, invaded the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans. The corn was in the ear, when this army was led againſt them under the command of Xenophon the ſon of Euripides and two collegues. Coming up to Spartolus, a town in Bottiæa, they deſtroyed the corn, and hoped to get poſſeſſion of the place by the management of a faction they had within. But a contrary party, having ſent in good time to Olynthus, had procured from thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force for their protection. Theſe even made a ſally out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to a battle under the walls of the town. The heavy-armed Chalcideans, with ſome of their auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and retire into Spartolus. The horſe and light-armed Chalcideans get the better of the horſe and light-armed Athenians; but they had with them a ſmall number of targeteers from the province called Cruſis. On the firſt joining of battle other targeteers came to their aſſiſtance from Olynthus. The light-armed of Spartolus ſeeing this reinforcement juſt come up, and reflecting that they had received no loſs before, with reanimated courage again charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the Chalcidean horſe, and the freſh reinforcement. The Athenians retire to the two companies which they had left to guard the baggage. Here they drew up again, and whenever they thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back; when they retreated from the charge, the enemy preſſed upon and infeſted them with miſſive weapons. The Chalcidean horſe rode up where they thought they could break them, and falling in without fear of a repulſe, put the Athenians to flight, and purſued them to a great diſtance. The Athenians fly for refuge to Potidæa; and afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their dead, return with their ſhattered army to Athens. In this action they loſt four hundred and thirty men, and all their commanders. The Chalcideans and Bottiæans erected a trophy, and having taken proper care of their dead, ſeparated to their own cities.

Not

Not long after this, in the ſame ſummer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the total reduction of Acarnania, and to compaſs a general defection there from the Athenians, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to ſupply them with ſhipping from their confederate-cities, and to ſend a thouſand heavy-armed into Acarnania. They told them, that -- "if they would join them with a land and a "naval force at the ſame time, it would be impoſſible for the Acar- "nanians to ſuccour one another by ſea; that hence they might eaſily "get all Acarnania into their power, from whence they might be- "come maſters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, and a ſtop would then "be made to the Athenian cruizes on the coaſts of Peloponneſus; "nay, that there was even a hope of reducing Naupactus." --- This ſcheme was pleaſing to the Lacedæmonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet their admiral) to ſail thither with a few ſhips, having on board the heavy-armed; and circulated orders to their confederates to fit out their ſhips, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. The Corinthians were thoſe who ſhewed moſt zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own; and the ſhipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places, was prepared with all poſſible expedition; but that of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was already at Leucas, and waiting for the reſt. Cnemus and the thouſand heavy-armed performed their voyage undiſcovered by Phormio, who commanded the Athenian fleet of twenty ſail, ſtationed round Naupactus, and immediately landed his men for the deſtined ſervice. Beſides the thouſand Peloponneſians he brought with him, he was now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, of the Grecians; —— of the Barbarians, by a thouſand Chaonians not ſubject to a regal government, but commanded by Photius and Nicanor, men of thoſe families which had a right to command by annual election. With the Chaonians came the Theſprotians, who alſo had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the Meloſſians and Antitanians. The Paravæans were headed by their own king Oroædus, Ambraciots.

Ordœus, who had alſo the command of a thouſand Oreſtians, ſubjects of Antiochus, which ſerved with his troops by the permiſſion of Antiochus. Perdiccas ſent alſo a thouſand Macedonians, of which the Athenians were ignorant, but theſe were not yet come up.

With theſe forces Cnemus began his march, without waiting the arrival of the ſhips from Corinth, and paſſing through Argia they deſtroyed Limnæa, a village unfortified. They march next for Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, judging that if they firſt took *this*, all other places would readily ſubmit. The Acarnanians, finding a large army broke in amongſt them by land, and more enemies coming to attack them by ſea, gave up all view of ſuccouring one another, and ſtood ſeparately on their own defence. They ſent information to Phormio, and requeſted him to come up to their relief. He ſent them word, "he could not poſſibly leave Naupactus without a "guard, when a fleet was ready to ſail from Corinth." The Peloponneſians and their allies, dividing themſelves into three bodies, advanced towards the city of the Stratians, with a deſign to appear before it, and if it did not ſurrender at once, to ſtorm it without loſs of time. The Chaonians and the reſt of the Barbarians marched in the middle; to the right were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries; to the left Cnemus with his Peloponneſians, and the Ambraciots; each body at ſo great a diſtance from the reſt, that ſometimes they were out of one another's ſight. The Grecians, in their march, kept firm within ranks, and guarded all their motions, till they came up to the ſpot fit for their incampment. But the Chaonians, confident of their own bravery, and valuing themſelves as the moſt martial people in that part of the world, could not bear the delay of incamping, but with the reſt of the Barbarians *ruſhing* eagerly forwards, thought to take the town at a ſhout, and carry all the honour. The Stratians finding them thus advanced, thought, that could they maſter *them* thus detached, the Grecians would become more averſe to attack them. With this view, they place ambuſcades

in

in the approaches of the city; and when the enemy was near, ruſh up at once from the places of ambuſh, and out of the city, charging them on all ſides. The Chaonians are thrown into conſternation, and many of them are ſlain. The reſt of the Barbarians, when they ſaw them give way, durſt not keep their ground, but fled immediately. Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any thing of this engagement, ſo haſtily had thoſe advanced, and were ſuppoſed to have done it only to encamp with greater expedition. But when the Barbarians came running back to them in diſorderly rout, they received them into ſhelter, and all cloſing *firm together* ſtood quiet the reſt of the day. The Stratians durſt not directly aſſault them, becauſe the other Acarnanians were not yet come up to their aſſiſtance, but were continually ſlinging at them from a diſtance, thus haraſſing them abundantly, but unable, without better weapons, to make them diſlodge: The Acarnanians only could have attacked them with effectual vigour.

By the favour of a dark night, Cnemus withdrew his army by a quick march to the river Anapus, which is eighty ſtadia * diſtant from Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to fetch off the dead. And the Oeniadæ coming up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went to take refuge amongſt them, before the Acarnanians could draw their ſuccours together, and from thence the forces which compoſed his army marched to their own homes. But the Stratians erected a trophy on account of their victory over the Barbarians.

* *About eight miles.*

Battle at ſea off Naupactus

The fleet of Corinth and the other confederate ſtates, that was to ſail from the gulf of Criſſa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and prevent the Acarnanians on the coaſt from ſuccouring thoſe within the land, never arrives: For about the time of the action at Stratus, they had been compelled to fight the Athenian ſquadron of twenty ſhips, ſtationed at Naupactus under the command of Phormio. Phormio had watched their coming out of the gulf, intending to attack ſo ſoon as ever they got out to ſea. The Corinthians and their allies ſailed

out indeed, yet not ſo well prepared to fight by ſea, as to forward the land-expedition on Acarnania. They never imagined that the Athenians with their twenty ſhips durſt preſume to attack them who had forty ſeven. Yet when they ſaw them ſteering the ſame courſe on the oppoſite ſhore, they kept firſt along their own coaſt, and afterwards from Patræ of Achaia ſtretched over to the oppoſite ſide in order to make for Acarnania. But now again they deſcried them ſtanding directly againſt them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and found they had obſerved their anchoring the night before. Thus are they compelled to come to an engagement in the midſt of the open ſea [8]. The ſhips of every *ſtate* were under the command of thoſe who had been appointed by their principals: Over the Corinthians were Machon, Iſocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponneſians drew up their ſhips in form of a circle, as large as they poſſibly could, without leaving open a paſſage for the ſhips of the enemy. The heads of the ſhips ſtood to ſea, the ſterns were turned inwards. Within were ranged the ſmall veſſels that attended the fleet, and five ſhips that were prime ſailors, which were to ſtart out at narrow paſſages, wherever the enemy ſhould begin the attack. The Athenians drawing up their ſhips in a line, and ſailing quite round them, bruſhed along by them in their paſſage, and making ſucceſſive feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a ſmaller compaſs. Phormio had beforehand given ſtrict orders not to engage

8 Phormio was watching to catch them in the open ſea, ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ, as Thucydides words it above. They were now out of the gulf, ſtretching acroſs the ſea, in the midſt of which Phormio came up to them, and engaged, κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. The ſea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Criſſa, is indeed a narrow ſea, or πόρθμος, but then it was open ſea in regard to the gulf within the capes, and gave Phormio all the advantages which more expert ſeamen knew how to uſe. As the Peloponneſian fleet ſtood out from Patræ in Achaia, and the Athenian from Chalcis in Ætolia, the ſituation of thoſe two places eaſily guides to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of honour by this action, which Plutarch, in his piece about *the glory of the Athenians*, reckons up amongſt the moſt remarkable exploits related by our Hiſtorian.

without

without the ſignal: For he hoped the enemy could not long preſerve that order of battle like a land-army, but that the ſhips muſt fall foul upon one another, and the ſmall veſſels within give them no little embarraſſment; that further, the wind would blow out of the gulf, as was uſual every morning; in expectation of which he continued to ſail round about them, and then they could not poſſibly keep firm in their ſtations for any time. He thought farther, that the time of engagement was intirely in his own power, as his ſhips were beſt ſailors, and that it was moſt adviſeable to begin at ſuch a juncture. As ſoon as that wind began to riſe, and the greater ſhips, now contracted into a narrow circle, were diſordered both by the wind and the ſmaller veſſels within, one falling foul upon another, the poles applied to puſh them off again; amidſt the noiſe cauſed by this confuſion, calling out to *take care*, and curſing one another, they could no longer hear the orders of their commanders or their maſters; and the ſea beginning to run ſo high as to render uſeleſs the oars of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they left the unmanageable ſhips to the pilots art. Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the ſignal. The Athenians engage, and at the firſt ſhock ſink one of the admiral-ſhips, and ſeveral more afterwards in the different parts of the engagement. They purſued their ſucceſs with ſo much fury, that amidſt the general diſorder not one durſt think of reſiſting, but all, with the greateſt precipitation, fled towards Patræ and Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians purſuing, and taking twelve of their ſhips, and having ſlaughtered moſt of the crews, draw off to Molychrium; and having erected a trophy on the promontory, and conſecrated a ſhip to Neptune, returned to their ſtation at Naupactus.

The Peloponneſians, without loſs of time, crept along the coaſt with the remnant of their fleet ſaved at Patræ and Dyme, to Cyllene a dock belonging to the Eleans; whither, after the battle of Stratus, arrive alſo from Leucas, Cnemus and the ſhips of that ſtation,

which ought to have been joined by theſe other. The Lacedæmonians ſend thither Timocrates, Braſidas and Lycophron to aſſiſt Cnemus in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready for a more ſucceſsful engagement, and not to leave the dominion of the ſea to ſuch a ſmall number of ſhips. For their late defeat appeared to them quite unaccountable, eſpecially as this was the firſt trial they had of an engagement at ſea; nor could they think it ſo much owing to their want of skill in naval affairs, as to a want of courage, never balancing the long experience of the Athenians with their own ſhort application to theſe matters. Theſe perſons therefore they ſent away in anger, who, coming to Cnemus, iſſued their circular orders to the *ſtates* for new quota's of ſhipping, and refitted what was already there for another engagement. Phormio alſo ſends meſſengers to Athens with an account of theſe preparations, and to report the victory they had already gained; requeſting a further reinforcement of as many ſhips as they could expeditiouſly diſpatch, ſince he was in daily expectation of another fight.

Twenty ſhips were the number they agree to ſend him, but they ordered him who was to carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of the Athenians, had perſuaded them to appear before Cydonia, aſſuring them that this place, which had been an enemy to them, ſhould ſoon be their own. This he inſinuated merely to gratify the Polychnitæ, who bordered upon the Cydonians. The commander therefore with theſe ſhips went to Crete, and joining the Polychnitæ, ravaged the territory of the Cydonians; by which, together with adverſe winds and weather unfit for ſea, no little time was unſeaſonably waſted away.

Preparations for a ſecond engagement.

The Peloponneſians at Cyllene, during the time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in Crete, having got every thing in readineſs for another engagement, ſailed along the coaſt to Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponneſians were come to forward their attempts. Phormio likewiſe, with the twenty ſhips which had fought

fought the former battle, ſailed up to cape Molychrium, and lay at anchor juſt without it. This cape belonged to the Athenian alliance, but [9] the other cape over-againſt it belonged to the Peloponneſians. The arm of ſea which divides them is about * ſeven ſtadia over; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Criſſa. The Peloponneſians with a fleet of ſeventy-ſeven ſhips rode alſo at anchor under the cape of Achaia, which is not far diſtant from Panormus, where their land-forces lay. When they had here a fight of the Athenians, both parties lay for ſix or ſeven days over-againſt each other, intent on the needful preparations for engaging. The ſcheme on each ſide was this: —— The Peloponneſians, ſtruck with their former defeat, would not ſail from without the capes into the open ſea: —— The Athenians would not enter into the ſtraits, judging it would be an advantage to the enemy to fight in a narrow compaſs. At length Cnemus, Braſidas, and the other Peloponneſian commanders, deſirous to come ſoon to an engagement, before the Athenian ſquadron ſhould receive a reinforcement, called firſt their ſoldiers together, and ſeeing ſome of them not yet recovered from the terror occaſioned by the former defeat and by no means eager to fight again, endeavour'd to animate and rouſe up their courage by the following harangue ——

* *About three quarters of a mile.*

Speech of the Peloponneſian commanders.

" IF the former engagement, ye men of Peloponneſus, affects any " of you with ſad apprehenſions about the event of another, know " that it by no means affords you any reaſonable ground for ſuch de- " ſponding thoughts. That was owing, as you well know, to a de- " ficiency in all needful preparations; for you were not then fitted " out for ſervice of ſea, but for the ſervice of land. We then were " diſtreſſed in ſeveral reſpects by the adverſe turns of fortune; and " in ſome, we who fought for the firſt time at ſea run into errors

9 The cape on the Peloponneſian ſide was called Rhium, or the Rhium of Achaia; the oppoſite cape Antirrhium, or Molychrium.

" through

" through want of ſkill. It thus happened that we were defeated,
" but not through any cowardice of our own. There can be no
" reaſon for men, who were not conquered by ſuperior courage,
" but who can explicitly account for the means of their defeat, to
" let their ſpirits be ſunk by a calamity merely accidental; but they
" ought to reflect, that though fortune may diſconcert the human
" enterprizes, yet that men can never be deſerted by their own va-
" lour; and where true valour is, they ought not to catch a plea
" from want of experience to palliate what ſigns of cowardice they
" betray. Inferior ſkill in you is by no means a balance for your ſu-
" perior valour. The expertneſs of your enemies which you ſo much
" dread, if it be accompanied with valour, will indeed direct them
" in a performance of their duty, amidſt all the hazards of war;
" but if it wants true valour, thoſe hazards will be too hard for all
" human art. For fear baniſheth the remembrance of what ought
" to be done; and art without ſtrength is quite unavailing. Place
" therefore your own ſuperior valour in the balance againſt their ſu-
" perior ſkill; and remove the apprehenſions flowing from your de-
" feat by the recollection that you were not prepared to fight. You
" have now the advantage of a larger number of ſhips, and an op-
" portunity of fighting on your own coaſts, in ſight of a land-army
" of your own. Victory is generally obtained by thoſe, who are
" moſt in number and beſt provided. So that, upon cloſe exami-
" nation, no reaſon appears why we ſhould dread the event. Our
" former miſcarriages make not againſt us; nay, the paſt commiſ-
" ſion of them will inſtruct us now. Let every maſter therefore
" and every mariner act his part with manly reſolution; let each take
" care to perform his duty, nor quit the poſt to which he is appoint-
" ed. We ſhall take care to order the engagement, in no worſe a
" manner than our predeceſſors have done; and ſhall leave no man
" any reaſon to excuſe his cowardice. Yet — if any one will be a
" coward, he ſhall certainly receive the puniſhment he deſerves;

" but

" but the valiant ſhall be honoured with rewards proportioned to " their merit."

In ſuch terms did their commanders animate the Peloponneſians. But Phormio, — who began to apprehend a depreſſion of ſpirits in his own men, ſince he plainly ſaw that by keeping their ſhips cloſe together they were afraid of the numerous ſhips of the enemy — had a mind by calling them together, to reinſpire them with courage, and give them an exhortation ſuitable to their preſent condition. He had hitherto in all his diſcourſes inſiſted, and induced them to give him credit, that — " no number of ſhips could be got together large enough to make head againſt them." And his ſeamen had long ſince been elated with this preſumption, that " as they were Athenians, they ought not to avoid any fleet of the Peloponneſians, however numerous." But, when he ſaw them intimidated by the formidable object before their eyes, he thought it high time to endeavour to revive their ſinking courage. The Athenians being gathered round him, he harangued them thus ——

Speech of Phormio.

" I HAVE obſerved, my fellow-ſoldiers, that the number of " your enemies hath ſtruck you with fear. — I have therefore called " you together, as I cannot bear to ſee you terrified with what is by " no means dreadful. Theſe enemies of yours, whom you have " already conquered, who in no wiſe think themſelves a match for " you, have got together a great number of ſhips and a ſuperior " force. In the next place they come confidently to attack you " with the vain preſumption, that valour is only peculiar to them- " ſelves. Their confidence is occaſioned by their ſkill in the ſervice " of the land. Their frequent ſucceſſes there induce them to ſup- " poſe that they muſt alſo for certainty be victorious at ſea. If they " have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their excellence at land, " you have more to form preſumptions in your own favour, ſince in

" natural

" natural courage they are not in the leaſt ſuperior to us, and if larger
" degrees of ſkill give either ſide an advantage, we have hence an
" argument to be more confident of ſucceſs. The Lacedæmonians,
" now at the head of their league, merely to preſerve their own
" reputation, have dragged numbers hither to fight againſt their will;
" otherwiſe, they durſt never have attempted to engage us a ſe-
" cond time, after receiving ſo ſignal a defeat. Frighten not your-
" ſelves with extravagant ſuſpicions of their courage —— but rather
" ſtrike a panic into them; a panic, for which they have more am-
" ple reaſon, as you have already gained a victory over them, and as
" they are certain you would not give them another opportunity to
" fight, unleſs you had ſome grand deſign to execute. An enemy,
" that like them exceeds in number, in action depends more on their
" ſtrength than on their conduct. They who are far inferior in
" ſtrength of numbers, and dare, tho' uncompelled, to fight, muſt do
" it through the prevalence of ſome extenſive views. This they can-
" not but know, and hence dread more this our diminutive than they
" would an equal force. Large armies defeated, through defect of ſkill
" or ſometimes through defect of courage, by an inferior force, are
" caſes that have often happened. Yet neither of theſe defects can
" be imputed to us. For my own part, I ſhall not willingly hazard
" the event within the gulf, nor will I ſail into it. For I am not
" ignorant that want of ſea-room is very improper for a few ſhips
" that ſail beſt and are beſt managed, againſt a number which thoſe
" on board them know not how to govern. In ſuch a ſituation, no
" one can pour down to an attack in the proper manner for want of
" having a clear view of the enemy; nor, if he is forced to ſheer
" off, can he do it with ſafety. There is no room to break through,
" or to tack at pleaſure, which is the buſineſs of ſhips that are better
" ſailors; but the fight muſt of neceſſity be the ſame with a battle
" at land, and in this caſe the greater number of ſhips muſt have
" the advantage. I ſhall take the greateſt care I am able to pre-
" vent

" vent theſe inconveniences. And you I expect to ſtand regularly
" to your poſts on board every ſhip. Receive your orders with ala-
" crity, eſpecially as we lie ſo near our enemy; and above all things
" when we come to action, obſerve the rules of diſcipline without
" hurry and noiſe: For theſe are matters of great importance in
" every ſcene of war, and of not the leaſt in a naval engagement; —
" and charge your enemies with a ſpirit worthy of your former at-
" chievements. Great indeed are the points you are now to decide,
" the hopes of the Peloponneſians of making a figure at ſea are now
" either to be totally demoliſhed, or the power of the ſea muſt be-
" come precarious to the Athenians, even near their own homes.
" Once more I call to your remembrance, that great part of theſe
" enemies you have already conquered — and the courage of ene-
" mies once conquered is ſeldom equal to what it was, when un-
" conſcious of defeat."

Second engagement at ſea.

In this manner Phormio encouraged his men. — But the Peloponneſians, when they found that the Athenians would not ſail into the gulf and ſtraits, had a mind to compel them to it againſt their inclinations. At break of day they began to move, their ſhips being ranged in lines conſiſting of four, and ſtood along their own coaſts within the gulf, the right wing leading the courſe in the ſame order, as they had lain at anchor. In this wing they had ranged twenty of their beſt ſailors, with a view that if Phormio ſhould imagine they had a deſign upon Naupactus, and he himſelf ſhould haſten to its ſuccour, the Athenians might not be able to outſail them and eſcape their outermoſt ſquadron which compoſed the right wing, but be ſurrounded on all ſides. He, juſt as they expected, being alarmed for that place, which he knew was defenceleſs, no ſooner ſaw them under ſail, than againſt his will and in no little hurry he got on board, and ſailed along his own coaſt — the land-forces of the Meſſenians marching along the adjacent ſhore to be ready with their aſſiſtance.

The Peloponneſians ſeeing them move along in a line ſhip after ſhip, and that they were now within the gulf and near the ſhore, which was what they chiefly wanted, — on a ſignal given at once altered their courſe, pouring down directly upon the Athenians, all as faſt as their ſhips could advance, in full expectation of intercepting the whole fleet. Eleven of the Athenian ſhips, which were a-head of the reſt, being too quick for the wing of the Peloponneſians and their ſhifting of their courſe towards the open ſea, ran ſafely off. [1] Yet intercepting all the reſt, they run them aground and ſo diſabled them. The Athenians on board, who could not eſcape by ſwimming, were ſlaughtered to a man: Some of theſe empty ſhips they got off again and carried away in tow; and one they had already took with the whole crew on board. The Meſſenians got down to the ſuccour of ſome of them. They waded with their arms through the water, and climbing on board and fighting from the decks ſaved ſome which were already in tow. — In this manner did the Peloponneſians defeat and deſtroy the Athenian ſhips.

Their twenty ſhips which were of the right wing, gave chace to the eleven Athenian, which on the ſhifting of the courſe, had ran off amain. But all theſe, excepting one ſhip, out-ſailed them and got ſafe into Naupactus. Having gained their harbour, they tacked about under the temple of Apollo and ſtood ready to defend themſelves, in caſe the enemy ſhould make an attempt upon them

1 The Latin tranſlators, whoſe chief aim is a grammatical conſtruction, have made a ſlip here in point of chorography; they ſay, "*Subterfugerunt* or *fugerunt in apertum mare.*" But it is ſurprizing that Mr. *Hobbes* ſhould be guilty of ſo much inadvertence, as to make eleven Athenian ſhips "get out into open ſea." The Peloponneſians made their tack *towards* the open ſea, on purpoſe to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, which gave opportunity to the foremoſt ſhips in the Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Naupactus, for the ſake of ſecuring which they had thought themſelves obliged, though contrary to their judgment and inclination, to come within the capes. Had they run out to ſea, they never could have reached Naupactus, but would have run directly from it.

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ſo near the ſhore. Soon after, they appeared, ſailing along and ſinging their pæan, as having gained a victory. One ſhip belonging to Leucas was ſhot far a-head of the reſt giving chace to that only ſhip of the Athenians which was left behind. It happened that a trading-veſſel was then lying out at anchor before the harbour. The Athenian ſhip came up firſt with this veſſel, and fetching a compaſs round her, runs directly againſt the Leucadian that was chacing, and inſtantly ſinks her. By this accident, ſo ſudden and unexpected, the Peloponneſians are thrown into conſternation; and having beſides followed the chace without any regular order, as ſecure of victory, ſome of the ſhips now dropping their oars, ſtopp'd further motion. This was an unlucky expedient when ſo near the enemy; but their deſign was to wait for the greater number of ſhips that were yet behind. Some of them, being ignorant of the coaſt, ran upon the ſhelves and were ſtranded. When the Athenians ſaw them ſuffer theſe diſtreſſes, their courage began to revive. Shouting out aloud with one voice, they encouraged one another to attack. The miſcarriages of which they were this moment ſenſible, and their irrecoverable diſorder, prevented the others from making any long reſiſtance. And they ſoon were forced to run back again towards the ſtation of Panormus, from whence they came. The Athenians chacing them thither, took the ſix ſhips that were moſt behind, and recovered their own, which were in the enemy's hands by having been run aſhore, and afterwards brought off in tow. Some men beſides they killed, and made ſome priſoners.

On board the Leucadian, which was ſunk near the trading-veſſel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian, who, when the ſhip received the ſtroke that ſunk her, immediately ſlew himſelf [2], and floated afterwards

2 We have here a notable proof of the peculiar ſpirit and genius of the *Spartans*. They regarded the land as their own element, in which they were ſuperior to the reſt of the world. And yet now they were convinced, that without practice at ſea, they ſhould never be able to pull down the power of Athens. Their firſt attempts are aukward

terwards into the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians, returning thither again, erected a trophy near the place from whence they had purſued this victory. They took up their dead, and the ſhattered pieces of their ſhips, whatever they found on their own coaſts, and by a truce gave permiſſion to the Peloponneſians to fetch off theirs.

The Peloponneſians alſo erected a trophy, in token of a victory gained by forcing aſhore and damaging ſome of the enemy's ſhips. The ſhip they took they conſecrated on the Rhium of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this, being in ſome dread of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all of them, except the Leucadians, ſailed away by favour of the night into the gulf of Criſſa and Corinth. The Athenians, in the twenty ſhips from Crete, that ought to have been up with Phormio before the engagement, not long after the above retreat of the other ſhips, arrived at Naupactus. And here this ſummer ended.

Attempt to ſurprize the Piræus.

Before the ſeparation of the fleet that withdrew into Corinth and the gulf of Criſſa, Cnemus, Braſidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponneſians, by the advice of the Megaréans, formed a deſign, in the beginning of this winter, to make an attempt upon the Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. It was not guarded or ſecured in the uſual manner; nor was this judged requiſite, as the naval power of Athens was become ſo extenſive. Their project was, that every mariner carrying with him an oar, a cuſhion, and a leathern-thong, ſhould march over-land from Corinth, to the ſea on which Athens is ſituated, and that making the beſt of their way to Megara, and drawing out the forty ſhips that lay there in the Niſæan dock, they ſhould immediately ſtand into the Piræus. For there was not

aukward and unſucceſsful. The art ſhewn by the Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and ſinking a ſhip at one ſtroke, put them all to a ſtand; and, it ſeems, made ſo ſudden and ſtrong an impreſſion on Timocrates, whoſe paſſion it was to die fighting, and with wounds all *before*, that he could not endure the thought of periſhing in a whole skin, and therefore ſnatched the moment, and killed himſelf for fear he ſhould be drowned.

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ſo much as one ſhip appointed to its guard; nor was there the leaſt ſuſpicion at Athens that the enemy would attempt in this manner to ſurpriſe them: For, openly, and in a regular train, they durſt not attempt it; nor could a project which required deliberate procedure have eſcaped diſcovery. But no ſooner had they reſolved upon, than they ſet out to execute the preſent ſcheme. Arriving in the night, they drew the ſhips out of the Niſæan dock; but inſtead of making directly for the Piræus, as they at firſt intended, diſmayed with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is ſaid, forced by a contrary wind to ſteer another courſe, they went over to that promontory * of Sa- * Budorus.
lamis which faceth Megara. Upon this promontory was a fort, and three ſhips were ſtationed below to prevent all importation and exportation at Megara. This fort they aſſaulted, and carried the three ſhips, tho' empty, away with them. Other parts of Salamis they plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of this invaſion.

The lights [3], that ſignify the approach of enemies, were however held up and waved towards Athens, which cauſed as great a conſternation there, as was known during all the ſeries of the war. Thoſe in the city imagined the enemy to be already within the Piræus. Thoſe in the Piræus concluded the city of the Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy was only not within their port, which indeed they might eaſily have been, had they not been hindered by their own fears and a contrary wind. At break of day, the Athenians ran down in general concourſe to the Piræus. They got their ſhips afloat, and leaping on board with the utmoſt expedition and uncommon tumult, ſailed away for Salamis, but left what land-forces they had to guard the Piræus. When the Peloponneſians had notice

3 Theſe (according to the *Scholiaſt*) were lighted torches, which perſons on the walls reared aloft in air, to notify to neighbouring and confederate places, that they diſcerned the approach of enemies, in order to put them on their guard. The ſame thing was alſo done at the approach of friends, to notify that ſuccour was at hand. In the latter caſe, they held the lights ſteady and unmoved; in the former, they waved them to and fro, as an indication of fear.

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of the approach of this ſuccour, having now over-run great part of Salamis, and got many priſoners, and a large booty, beſide the three ſhips ſtationed at Budorus, they made the beſt of their way back to Niſæa. They were afraid of truſting too much to their ſhips, which having been long laid up were become leaky. After thus getting back to Megara, they returned again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, finding they were gone from Salamis, ſailed home again. But ever after this they guarded the Piræus in a ſtricter manner, barring up the mouth of the haven, and omitting no method of ſecuring it effectually for the future.

Sitalces *with a vaſt army invades* Macedonia.

About the ſame time, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces the Odryſian, ſon of Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army againſt Perdiccas, the ſon of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace, to inforce the execution of two engagements, one made to and the other by himſelf. For Perdiccas, who had entered into ſome engagement to him, for reconciling him to the Athenians when he was formerly preſſed hard with war, and for not reſtoring his brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to his throne, had not yet performed that engagement. And he himſelf was under an engagement to the Athenians, ſince the late alliance offenſive and defenſive made between them, that he would finiſh the war for them againſt the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both theſe accounts, he undertook the preſent expedition, carrying along with him Amyntas the ſon of Philip, to reſtore to him the kingdom of Macedonia, with the Athenian ambaſſadors commiſſioned to attend him on this occaſion, and Agnon an Athenian general: Though the Athenians had obliged themſelves by treaty to accompany the expedition with a fleet by ſea, and a numerous land-army.

Beginning the march himſelf from Odryſæ, he ſummons to attend him firſt all his Thracian ſubjects that live within the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, quite down to the Helleſpont and Euxine ſea; next, the Getæ beyond mount Hæmus, and as many other nations

tions as lay between the river Iſter and along quite down to the Euxine. The Getæ, and the nations ſo ſituated, border upon the Scythians, wearing the ſame habiliments of war, and all like them drawing the bow on horſeback. He procured alſo to join him many of the free Thracians that live upon the mountains, and make uſe of ſcimetars, who are diſtinguiſhed by the name of Dians, and dwell moſt of them about Rhodope. Some of theſe he took into pay, but ſome of them voluntarily attended. He had levies alſo from amongſt the Agrianians, Leæans, and the other nations of Pæonia ſubject to himſelf. Theſe were the furtheſt people in his dominions, reaching up to the Graæans and Leæans of Pæonia and the river Strymon, which driving its ſource from mount Scomius waters the Graæans and Leæans, and is the boundary of his empire from thoſe Pæonians who ſtill are free. Towards the Triballians, who are alſo a free people, the boundary is formed by the Trerians and Tilatæans. Theſe live to the north of mount Scomius, and reach weſterly as far as the river Oſcius, which riſeth out of the ſame mountain with the Neſtus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain adjoining to the Rhodope.

The kingdom of Odryſæ is of this large extent along the coaſt, reaching from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the river Iſter in the Euxine ſea. The ſhorteſt cut round its coaſt requireth four days and as many nights for a trading-veſſel of the round-built, ſailing directly before the wind. A good walker will alſo be eleven days in going the neareſt way by land from Abdera to the Iſter. So large was its extent along the coaſt. But towards the continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the Leæans and the Strymon, for ſo far does it run upwards from the ſea, would coſt an expeditious walker thirteen days continued journey. The yearly tribute exacted from this tract of Barbaric land, and his cities in Greece, by Seuthes, who ſucceeding Sitalces in theſe dominions very much improved the revenue, amounted to four hundred talents of ſilver *, tho' it might be

* 7894 l. *ſterling.*

be paid either in ſilver or gold. The preſents conſtantly made to him either of gold or ſilver were not leſs in value, beſides gifts of veſtments both figured and plain, and all kinds of furniture, which were not only made to him, but to all his officers and the noble Odryſians. The cuſtom obſerved by them and general to all the Thracians, " of " receiving rather than beſtowing," was contrary to that which prevails in the Perſian court, where it was a greater ſhame to be asked and to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as their power was great, this practice continued long in vogue amongſt them; for nothing could be obtained by him who brought no preſent: And this afforded a large increaſe of power to his kingdom. It had the greateſt revenue, and was in other reſpects the moſt flouriſhing of all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf of Ionia and the Euxine ſea. But in military ſtrength and numerous armies, it was the ſecond, tho' at a great diſtance from the Scythians. For there is no one nation in Europe, nor even in Aſia, that in theſe points can in any degree be a match for them; or when ſtanding ſingly, nation againſt nation, is able to make head againſt the Scythians, united and in good harmony with one another. Yet, at the ſame time, in every point of conduct, and management of all the neceſſary affairs of life, they fall vaſtly ſhort of other people.

Sitalces therefore, who was king of ſo large a country, got his army together; and, when every thing was ready, marched againſt Macedonia. He firſt of all paſſed thro' his own dominions; then over Cercine a deſert mountain, the boundary between the Sintians and Pæonians. He went over it by a paſſage he had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly himſelf, in an expedition againſt the Pæonians. In their march from Odryſæ over this mountain, they left the Pæonians on their right, but on their left the Sintians, and Mædians. On their deſcent from it, they arrived at Doberus a city of Pæonia. He loſt none of his army in the march, but by ſickneſs; notwithſtanding which it was very much increaſed: For many of

of the free Thracians came daily in without invitation, and followed for the ſake of plunder; ſo that the whole number is ſaid at laſt to have amounted to a hundred and fifty thouſand. Of theſe, the greater part were foot, but about a third of them were horſe. The greateſt ſhare of the horſe was provided by the Odryſians, and next to them by the Getæ. Of the foot, the free Thracians that came from about mount Rhodope, and uſed ſcimitars, were the moſt valiant: All the reſt that followed were a mixt crowd, formidable only in their number. All theſe therefore were got together at Doberus, and preparing to break in to the lower Macedonia, ſubject to Perdiccas, under the ridge of the mountains. For in the general name of Macedonians are compriſed the Lynceſtians and Helimiotians and other nations lying upwards, allied to and dependent upon the reſt, yet governed as diſtinct kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime Macedonia was firſt obtained by Alexander, father of Perdiccas, and his anceſtors the Temenidæ, who derived their original from Argos. Theſe, by a ſucceſsful war, had driven the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards fixed their reſidence at Phagres under mount Pangæus, on the other ſide the Strymon, and at other places; for which reaſon, the tract of ground lying under Pangæus towards the ſea is ſtill called the gulf of Pieria. From the region called Bottia they alſo expelled the Bottiæans, who now live upon the confines of the Chalcideans. And further, they ſeized in Pæonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of land running along from the mountains down to Pella and the ſea; and got poſſeſſion of that which is called Mygdonia lying between the Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of what is now called Eordia (of whom the greateſt part were deſtroyed, but a ſmall number dwell now about Phyſca); and out of Almopia, the Almopians. Theſe Macedonians alſo conquered other nations, of which they are ſtill in poſſeſſion, as Anthemus, Greſtonia and Biſaltia, and a large part of the territories belonging to the other Macedonians. But this whole tract of country

hath the general name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, ſon of Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces formed this invaſion.

The Macedonians, unable to make head againſt the numerous army by which they were invaded, retired within the walled and fortified places of the country, which at this time were not many. But Archelaus, ſon of Perdiccas, ſucceeding his father in the kingdom, built thoſe fortreſſes which are now there, opened the roads, and made many other regulations both in the military way about horſes and arms, and in other public matters, more than all the eight preceding kings put together. The Thracian army from Doberus broke firſt into that part of the country, which was formerly in the poſſeſſion of Philip. They took Eidomene by ſtorm; and got Gortynia, Atalante, and ſome other places by compoſition, which were readily brought to capitulate, out of their regard for Amyntas, whoſe ſon Philip now appeared amongſt them. They alſo laid ſiege to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. They afterwards advanced into the other Macedonia, lying to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Within theſe, they did not advance into Bottiæa and Pieria; but ravaged Mygdonia, Greſtonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never once thought of being able to make head againſt them with their foot; but, ſending for horſe from their allies in the upper Macedonia, wherever by the advantage of ground a few could encounter with many, they made frequent attacks upon the Thracian army. They made ſo ſtrong an impreſſion, that nothing could reſiſt ſuch excellent horſemen and ſo completely armed. For this reaſon, the enemy incloſed them about with their numerous forces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous for them to fight againſt ſuch manifold odds of numbers; ſo that at laſt they were forced to give over theſe skirmiſhes, judging it imprudent to run any hazards againſt ſo large an inequality of ſtrength.

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, imparted to him the motives of the war. And, as the Athenians were not yet come up with their fleet, becauſe diffident of his punctuality to the engagement between

tween them, and had only ſent him preſents and embaſſadors, he detached part of his army againſt the Chalcideans and Bottiæans; where, by driving them into their fortreſſes, he ravaged the country. During his ſtay in theſe parts, the ſouthern Theſſalians, Magnetians, and other people ſubject to the Theſſalians, and the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, grew apprehenſive that his army might be turned againſt them, and prepared for their defence. Under the ſame apprehenſions were the northern Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit the plains, the Panæans, the Odomantians, the Droans, and the Derſæans, who are all of them free and independent. He farther gave occaſion for a rumour that ſpread amongſt the Grecians, enemies to Athens, that this army, brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance with them, would invade them all in their turns. Yet, without advancing any further, he was at one and the ſame time continuing his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottiæa, and Macedonia. But unable to execute any of thoſe points for which he formed this invaſion, when his army began to want proviſions, and to ſuffer by the rigor of the winter's cold, he is perſuaded by Seuthes the ſon of Sparadoxus, and his own couſin-german, who had a greater influence over him than any other perſon, to march back again with the utmoſt expedition. This Seuthes had been ſecretly gained by Perdiccas, who promiſed to give him his ſiſter, and a large dower with her. Thus perſuaded, after a ſtay upon the whole of but thirty days, and eight of theſe in Chalcidica, he retired precipitately into his own dominions. Perdiccas, according to promiſe, ſoon after gives his ſiſter Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And to this end came this grand expedition of Sitalces [4].

The

4 Sitalces, and his ſon Sadocus, who, as Thucydides relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not eſcaped the buffoonery of Ariſtophanes in his comedy of *The Acharnians*. Act I. Sc. 4. "*Crier*. Embaſſador to Sitalces, come into court. "*Embaſſ.* Here. *Dicæopolis*. Oh! here's "another knave ſummoned to make his "appearance. *Embaſſ.* We ſhould not "have ſtay'd ſo long in Thrace ——

Phormio.

The ſame winter, the Athenians at Naupactus, after the ſeparation of the Peloponneſian fleet, coaſting from thence under the command of Phormio, appeared before Aſtacus. Making there a deſcent, they pierced into the midland parts of Acarnania with four hundred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the fleet, and four hundred Meſſenians; and expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places the diſaffected part of the inhabitants; and having re-eſtabliſhed at Coronta Cynes the ſon of Theolytus, embarked again on board their ſhips. They judged it not adviſeable, in the winter-ſeaſon, to undertake any thing againſt the Oeniadæ, the only people of Acarnania who had perſiſted in continual hoſtilities againſt them. For the river Achelous, that takes its riſe from mount Pindus, and runs through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and all the plain of Acarnania, paſſing above by the city of Stratus, and diſcharging itſelf into the ſea near the Oeniadæ, renders all the adjacent country one continued moraſs, and by a ſtagnation of water makes it impracticable for an army in the winter-ſeaſon. Moſt of the iſles of the Echinades lie over-againſt the Oeniadæ, not greatly diſtant from the mouth of the Achelous; inſomuch that the river, being great, cauſeth a continual afflux of ſand, and by it ſome of theſe iſlands are already joined to the main-land; and it is expected that all the reſt in a ſhort time will be ſo too: For the current is large and rapid, and brings down with it great quantities of ſand. The iſles ſtand thick; and ſtopping, bind faſt together from farther diſſipation, the ſands

" *Dicæopolis.* I believe you, unleſs you had " been well paid for it. *Embaſſ.* Had not " a great ſnow fallen and covered all the " country, and all the rivers at the ſame " time been froze over. When Theognis " was contending here for glory, we were " drinking all the time with Sitalces. He " is an honeſt heart, and loves Athenians " dearly. In good truth, he is dotingly " fond of you all: He is for ever writing " upon the walls, *O rare Athenians!* And " his ſon, whom we made an Athenian, " longs mightily for ſome of your dainty " ſauſages, and hath preſſed his father to " ſuccour his dear countrymen. He, at a " ſolemn ſacrifice, ſwore he would; and " hath got ſuch a numerous army at his " heels, that the Athenians cry out —— " What a vaſt ſwarm of gnats is coming " along here!"

brought

brought down by the current. They lie not in a line, but in an alternate ſituation one from another, preventing the ſtrait courſe of the waters forwards into the ſea. They are further uncultivated, and of no large extent. The tradition is —— that Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of this land to Alcmæon the ſon of Amphiaraus, when a vagabond, after the murder of his mother, telling him, "that he "never ſhould be freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he "found a place for his reſidence, which at the time he ſlew his mo-"ther had never been ſeen by the ſun, and then was not land;" becauſe every other part of the earth was polluted by the parricide. After great perplexities, he at length, as it is ſaid, diſcovered theſe riſing heaps of ſand at the mouth of the Achelous, and thought enough caſt up to ſuffice for his ſupport, after the long courſe of wandering about to which he had been neceſſitated ever ſince he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his reſidence in the parts about the Oeniadæ, he grew powerful, and left to the whole country the name of Acarnania from his ſon Acarnas. This account of Alcmæon we have given exactly as we have received it from tradition.

The Athenians and Phormio weighing from Acarnania, and touching again at Naupactus, very early in the ſpring returned to Athens. Thither they brought all the freemen whom they had made priſoners in the late naval engagements (theſe were afterwards exchanged man for man), and the ſhips taken from the enemy.

And thus the winter ended, and with it the third year of the war, the hiſtory of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE THIRD.

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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK III.

YEAR IV.

IN the ſucceeding ſummer, the Peloponneſians and allies, when the corn was full-grown, made incurſion into Attica under the command of Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, and having fixed their camp ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry at all convenient places ſkirmiſhed with them as uſual, and checked the greater number of the light-armed from advancing before the heavy-armed, and infeſting the parts adjacent to the city. Having continued here 'till proviſions began to fail, they retired, and were diſbanded to their reſpective cities. *Before* Chriſt 428. Attica *again invaded.*

Upon this irruption of the Peloponneſians, Leſbos immediately revolted from the Athenians, excepting Methymné. They were well *Revolt of* Leſbos

inclined to ſuch a ſtep before the war broke out, but were diſcountenanced by the Lacedæmonians, and now were neceſſitated to make their revolt ſooner than they intended. They would have been glad to have deferred it, till they had compleated the works they were about for ſecuring their harbour, perfecting their walls and the ſhips then upon the ſtocks—till they had received what they wanted from Pontus, both archers and corn, and whatever they had already ſent for thither.

The reaſon was —— the people of Tenedos then at enmity with them, thoſe of Methymné, and even ſome perſons of Mitylene underhand, who in a civil broil had received the hoſpitable protection at Athens, had ſent the Athenians advice — "That they are compelling all Leſbos to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing "in readineſs for a revolt by the aid of the Lacedæmonians and "their kindred Bœotians; and if timely prevention be not given, "Leſbos will be loſt."

The Athenians, at preſent miſerably diſtreſſed by the plague and a war now grown very briſk and vigorous, knew that the acceſſion of Leſbos to their enemies, poſſeſſed as it was of a naval force and freſh in ſtrength, muſt be a terrible blow, and would not liſten at firſt to the accuſations ſent, chiefly from the earneſtneſs of their own wiſhes, that they might be groundleſs. But when they had in vain diſpatched an embaſſy to the Mitylenéans to put a ſtop to the forced reſort of the Leſbians thither and their other preparations, their fears were increaſed, and they became intent on ſome expedient of timely prevention — and order thither on a ſudden forty ſail that lay ready fitted out for a cruize on Peloponneſus. Cleïppides ſon of Deinias, with two collegues, had the command of this fleet. Information had been given them, that the feſtival of Apollo Maloeis was ſoon to be celebrated without the city, at which ſolemnity the whole people of Mitylene are obliged to aſſiſt. — It was therefore hoped, that they might ſurprize them on this occaſion, and by one ſudden aſſault compleat

compleat the work. Should it ſo fall out, it would be a happy turn;—But, if this miſcarried, they were to order the Mitylenéans to deliver up their ſhipping and demoliſh their works, and in caſe they refuſed, to make inſtant war.

With theſe inſtructions the fleet went to ſea. And the Athenians ſeized ten triremes belonging to the Mitylenéans, which happened at that time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary quota in purſuance of treaty, and caſt into priſon all the crews. But a certain perſon paſſing over from Athens to Eubœa, and haſtening by land to Geræſtus, finds a veſſel there ready to put off, on board of which he gets a quick paſſage to Mitylene, and on the third day after his ſetting out from Athens, gives notice to the Mitylenéans that ſuch a fleet was coming to ſurprize them. Upon this, they adjourned their feſtival, and patching up their half-finiſhed walls and harbours as well as they could, ſtood ready on their guard. Not long after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the alarm had been given, the commanders notified to them the injunctions they brought; with which as the Mitylenéans refuſed to comply, they ranged themſelves for action.

The Athenian fleet before Mitylene.

The Mitylenéans, unprepared as they were and thus ſuddenly neceſſitated to make ſome reſiſtance, advanced on board their ſhips a little beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a parley with the commanders, from a view, if it were poſſible upon eaſy conditions, to rid themſelves of that fleet for the preſent. And the Athenian commanders readily accorded, from the apprehenſion, they had not ſufficient ſtrength to ſupport the war againſt all Leſbos.

Hoſtilities having thus ceaſed for a time, the Mitylenéans diſpatched their agents to Athens, and amongſt the number one of thoſe perſons who had ſent intelligence of their motions, but had now repented of the ſtep — to procure if poſſible the recalment of

the fleet, by aſſurances, that they were not bent on any innovations. But in the mean time, undiſcovered by the Athenian fleet, which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to the north of the city, they ſend away a trireme to carry an embaſſy to Lacedæmon; for they had no room to believe they ſhould ſucceed in their negotiation at Athens. This embaſſy, after a laborious and dangerous voyage arriving at Lacedæmon, began to ſolicit a ſpeedy ſuccour.—— And when their agents returned from Athens, totally unſucceſsful, the Mitylenéans and all the reſt of Leſbos, excepting Methymne, prepare for war. This laſt place ſent in aid to the Athenians, as did alſo the Imbrians and Lemnians, and ſome few other of their allies.

The Mitylenéans once indeed made a general ſally with all their people againſt the ſtation of the Athenians. Hereupon a battle enſued, after which the Mitylenéans, tho' by no means worſted, yet durſt not continue all night in the field, but diffident of their own ſtrength retreated behind their walls. After this they kept themſelves quiet, unwilling to run any more hazards, till they had got ſome additional ſtrength from Peloponneſus, and were in other reſpects better provided. By this time Meleas a Lacedæmonian and Hermæondas a Theban are arrived among them, who had been diſpatched on ſome buſineſs before the revolt, and unable to compaſs their return before the Athenian fleet came up, had now in a trireme got in undiſcovered ſince the battle. It was the advice of theſe to diſpatch another trireme and embaſſy in company with *them*, which is accordingly done. But the Athenians, as the Mitylenéans remained in ſo quiet a poſture, became more full of ſpirits than before, and ſent ſummons of aid to their confederates, who came in with more than ordinary alacrity, as they ſaw ſuch an appearance of weakneſs on the ſide of the Leſbians. Having now formed a ſtation on the ſouth-ſide of the city, they fortified by a wall two camps, which inveſted the place on both ſides, whilſt their ſhipping was ſo ſtationed as to ſhut up

up both the harbours. By this means the communication by ſea was quite cut off from the Mitylenéans. Of the land indeed the Mitylenéans and other Leſbians, who had now flocked to their aid, were for the moſt part maſters. The quantity which the Athenians had occupied by their camps was but inconſiderable, as the ſtation of their ſhipping and their market was held chiefly at Malea: And in this poſture ſtood the war againſt Mitylene. ——

Athenians *cruize on the coaſt of* Peloponneſus.

About the ſame time this ſummer, the Athenians ſend out thirty ſail of ſhips againſt Peloponneſus, under the command of Aſopius the ſon of Phormio, in purſuance of ſome ſolicitations they had received from the Acarnanians to ſend them either a ſon or ſome relation of Phormio to command in thoſe parts. Theſe ſhips ſailing along the coaſts of Laconia ravaged all the maritime places. After this, Aſopius ſends back the greateſt part of his ſhips to Athens, but with a reſerve of twelve proceeds himſelf to Naupactus. And raiſing afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, he leads them againſt the Oeniadæ. With his ſhips he ſailed up the Achelous, and the army marching by land laid the country waſte. But when this was found ineffectual, he diſmiſſeth the land-force, and ſtretching over *himſelf* to Leucas, and having made a deſcent upon Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat— by thoſe of the adjacent country, who ran together for mutual aid, ſupported by a ſmall party that lay there for guards, — with the loſs of his own life and a part of his army. After this, the Athenians ſtayed only to take up their dead by favour of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and then ſteered homewards.

Mitylenéan *embaſſadors repair to* Olympia.

The embaſſadors of Mitylene, who were ſent in the firſt ſhip, having been ordered by the Lacedæmonians to repair to Olympia, that their applications might be addreſſed, and reſolutions formed about them, in the grand reſort of their whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that Olympiad, in which Dorieus the Rhodian

was

was a * ſecond time victor. So, when the ſolemnity was ended, and an [1] audience was granted them, they ſpoke as follows ——

* Olympiad 88.

Their ſpeech.

" YE men of Lacedæmon and you their Confederates, we are " ſenſible of that method of procedure, which hath hitherto pre- " vailed amongſt the Grecians — Revolters whilſt a war is on foot, " and deſerters from a former alliance, they readily receive, and ſo " long as their own intereſt is furthered by it, abundantly careſs " them: Yet, judging them traitors to their former friends, they re- " gard them as perſons who ought not to be truſted. To judge in " this manner is certainly right and proper, where thoſe who revolt " and thoſe from whom they break aſunder happen to be equal to " one another in turn of principle, in benevolent affection, and well " matched together in expedients of redreſs and military ſtrength, " and no juſt reaſon of revolt ſubſiſts. —— But the caſe is quite dif- " ferent between us and the Athenians. And we ought not to be

[1] In this manner for private ends, and through party-feuds, was a moſt noble and ſacred inſtitution abuſed. All Grecians in general paid their attendance at the Olympic Games; and were obliged by all the ties of honour and religion to ſuſpend their animoſities and quarrels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the preſent inſtance, they are going to contrive the means of annoying one another, ſo ſoon as that ſolemnity is over, which was calculated to teach them union and concord and a ſteddy attachment to the intereſts of Greece their common mother. The policy however of the preſent proceeding is remarkable. The Athenians who aſſiſted at the games could ſuſpect no- thing from the preſence of the Mitylenæans, who were equally bound in duty to attend. The Lacedæmonians and allies had thus an opportunity of aſſembling together to receive complaints, and to encourage revolts from Athens, without danger of ſuſpicions or a detection of their counſels, till they were ripe for execution. " The Lacedæmonians, (it is a remark " which will afterwards occur in this hiſ- " tory,) amongſt one another and in pay- " ing all due regard to the laws of their " country, gave ample proofs of honour " and virtue. But in regard to the reſt of " mankind, they reputed as honourable " the things which pleaſed them, and as " juſt the things which promoted their " intereſt."

" treated

" treated with cenſure and reproach, from the appearance of having
" deſerted them in extremities, after having been honourably re-
" garded by them in the ſeaſon of tranquillity. This our conduct to
" juſtify and approve, eſpecially as we come to requeſt your alliance,
" our words ſhall firſt be employed, as we know that friendſhip can
" be of no long continuance in private life, nor public aſſociations
" have any ſtability, unleſs both ſides engage with an opinion of re-
" ciprocal good-faith, and are uniform in principle and manners.
" For out of diſſonancy of temper, diverſities of conduct continually
" reſult.

" An alliance, it is true, was formerly made between us and the
" Athenians, when you withdrew yourſelves from the Median war,
" and they ſtayed behind you, to compleat what was yet to be
" done. We grant it — we made an alliance with the Athenians —
" not to inſlave the reſt of Greece to Athenians, but to deliver
" Greece from the Barbarian yoke. And whilſt they led us on in
" juſt equality, ſo long with alacrity we followed their guidance.
" But when once we perceived that they relaxed in their zeal againſt
" the *Mede*, and were grown earneſt in rivetting ſlavery upon al-
" lies, we then began to be alarmed. It was impoſſible, where ſo
" many parties were to be conſulted, to unite together in one body
" of defence, and thus all the allies fell into ſlavery, except our-
" ſelves and the Chians. We indeed, left in the enjoyment of our
" own laws and of nominal freedom, continued ſtill to follow them
" to war: But, from the ſpecimens we had hitherto ſeen of their be-
" haviour, could no longer regard theſe Athenians as truſty and
" faithful leaders. For it was not in the leaſt probable, that after
" inſlaving thoſe who were comprehended in the ſame treaty with
" ourſelves, they would refrain from treating ſuch as yet were free
" in the ſame tyrannic manner, whenever opportunity ſerved. Had
" we all indeed been left in the free exerciſe of our own laws, we
" ſhould then have had the ſtrongeſt proof that the Athenians acted

" upon

" upon honeſt uninnovating principles. But now, when they have
" laid their yoke upon the greater number, tho' they ſtill continue
" to treat us as their equals, yet undoubtedly it highly grates them;
" and they cannot long endure, when ſuch numbers couch beneath
" their power, that our *State* alone ſhould ſtand up and claim equa-
" lity. No; it cannot be! For the more their power hath ſwelled
" in bulk and ſtrength, by ſo much are we become more deſolate.
" The only ſecure pledge of a laſting alliance is that mutual awe,
" which keeps the contracting parties in proper balance. For then,
" if any be diſpoſed to make incroachments, he finds he cannot act
" upon advantage, and is effectually deterred. Our preſervation hi-
" therto hath not been owing to their honeſty but their cunning.
" Their ſcheme hath been gradually to advance their empire by all
" the ſpecious colourings of juſtice, by the road of policy rather than
" of ſtrength. And thus, we have been reſerved to juſtify their
" violence, and to be quoted as a proof, that unleſs thoſe whom they
" have inſlaved had deſerved their fate, a *State* upon an equal footing
" with themſelves would never have marched in conjunction with
" them to execute their vengeance. By the ſame ſtrain of policy,
" their firſt ſtep was to lead out thoſe that were ſtrongeſt againſt the
" weaker parties, deſigning to finiſh with them, when left deſtitute
" of any outward reſource, by the prior reduction of the reſt.
" Whereas, if they had begun with us, the confederate body re-
" maining yet poſſeſſed of its ſtrength and able to make a ſtand,
" their inſlaving project could not have equally ſucceeded. They
" were beſides under ſome apprehenſion of our naval force, leſt
" uniting with yours or any other *State*, ſuch an acceſſion might have
" endangered the whole of their plan. Some reſpite alſo was
" gained, from the reſpect we have ever ſhewn to their whole com-
" munity and to the ſeries of magiſtrates who have preſided
" amongſt them. We knew however that we could not long
" hold out, had not this war come timely to our relief. We
" ſaw

" ſaw our own fate in the examples which had been made
" of others.

" What friendſhip therefore, what aſſurance of liberty could ſub-
" ſiſt, when receiving each other with the open countenance, ſuſpi-
" cion lay lurking within? — when, in war apprehenſive of our
" power to us they paid their court; and we, from the ſame prin-
" ciple, paid our court to them in the ſeaſon of tranquillity? The
" bond of union, which mutual good-will cements in others, was
" in us kept faſt by fear. For through the prevalence of fear and
" not of friendſhip, we have thus long perſiſted in alliance. And
" whichever ſide ſecurity had firſt emboldened, that ſide would firſt
" have began incroachments upon the other. Whoever therefore
" chargeth us with injuſtice for revolting, whilſt they were only me-
" ditating our ruin and before we actually felt the miſeries deſigned
" us: — that perſon chargeth us without a reaſon. For had our ſi-
" tuation been ſuch, that we could have formed equal ſchemes to
" their prejudice and diſconcerted all their projects, what neceſſity
" did we lie under to reſign our equality and receive their law?
" But, as the power of attempting was ever within their reach, we
" ought certainly to lay hold of every proper expedient to ward off
" the blow.

" Such are the reaſons, ye men of Lacedæmon and you their
" confederates, ſuch the grievances which induced our revolt; ——
" reaſons ſo clear, that all who hear them muſt juſtify our con-
" duct — grievances ſo heavy, that it was time to be alarmed, and
" to look for ſome expedient of ſafety. We long ſince ſhewed our
" inclination to find this expedient, when during the *peace*, we
" ſent to you to negotiate a revolt, but by you rejected were ob-
" ſtructed in our ſcheme. And now, no ſooner did the Bœotians
" invite, than we without a pauſe obeyed the call. Now we have
" determined to make a double revolt — one from the Grecians, no
" longer in concert with the Athenians to force the load of oppreſ-

" ſion upon them, but with you to vindicate their freedom——
" another from the Athenians, that we may not in the train of af-
" fairs be undone by them, but timely vindicate our own ſafety.
" Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too precipitate and unpre-
" pared. — But this lays the ſtronger obligation upon you to admit
" us to alliance, with the utmoſt expedition to ſend us ſuccours,
" that you may ſhew your readineſs to redreſs the oppreſſed, and at
" the ſame inſtant annoy your foes. Such a juncture for this was
" never known before. What with the plague and the exorbitant
" expence of the war, the Athenians are quite exhauſted. Their
" fleet is divided, ſome to cruize upon your coaſt, others to make
" head againſt us. It is not probable, they can have now the com-
" petent reſerve of ſhipping, ſhould you invade them a ſecond time
" this ſummer both by land and ſea; ſo that, either they muſt be
" unable thus divided to make head againſt you, if you ſingly
" attack them; or, the union of us both they will not be able
" to face.
" Let no one amongſt you imagine, that this will be endangering
" your own domeſtic welfare for the ſake of foreigners with whom
" you have no connexion. For tho' Leſbos lies apparently at a great
" diſtance from you, yet the conveniencies of it will lie near at hand
" for your ſervice. For the war will not be made in Attica, as ſuch
" an one ſuppoſeth, but in thoſe parts whence Attica deriveth its
" ſupport. Their revenue ariſeth from the tribute paid by their
" dependents. And that revenue will be increaſed, if they can
" compaſs the reduction of us. For then not a ſoul will dare to re-
" volt, and their own will be enlarged by the addition of our
" ſtrength, and more grievous burdens will be laid upon us, as being
" the laſt who have put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with
" proper alacrity you undertake our ſupport, you will gain over a
" *State* poſſeſſed of a conſiderable navy, that acquiſition you ſo
" greatly want; and you will more eaſily be enabled to demoliſh
" the

" the Athenians, by withdrawing their dependents from them:
" For then, every one of that number will with aſſurance and con-
" fidence revolt — and you yourſelves be cleared of the bad impu-
" tation you at preſent lie under, of rejecting thoſe who fly to you
" for protection. If added to this, you manifeſt your views to re-
" eſtabliſh the general freedom, you will ſo conſiderably ſtrengthen
" the ſinews of war, that all reſiſtance will be unavailing.
" Reverencing therefore as you ought, theſe hopes which Greece
" hath conceived of you; — Reverencing further Olympian Jove, in
" whoſe temple we now ſtand, like ſupplicants diſtreſſed and ſuing for
" redreſs —— Grant to the Mitylenéans the honour of your alliance,
" and undertake their protection. Reject not the intreaties of men,
" who have now indeed their lives and properties expoſed to dangers
" merely their own, but whoſe deliverance from their preſent plunge
" will reflect ſecurity and advantage upon all; and who, if you now
" continue to be deaf to their intreaties, muſt drop into ſuch a ruin,
" as will at length involve you all. At this criſis ſhew yourſelves to
" be the men, which the voice of Greece united in your praiſe and
" our dreadful ſituation require you to be."

They are admitted into the Peloponneſian league.

In this manner the Mitylenéans urged their plea; and the Lacedæmonians and confederates, having liſtned with attention, and owned themſelves convinced, admitted the Leſbians into their alliance, and decreed an incurſion into Attica. To put this in execution, orders were iſſued to the confederates then preſent, expeditiouſly to march with two thirds of their forces to the Iſthmus. The Lacedæmonians themſelves arrived there firſt, and got machines ready at the Iſthmus to convey their ſhips over-land from Corinth to the ſea of Athens, that they might invade them at the ſame time both by land and ſea. *They* indeed were eager and intent on the enterprize: But the other confederates were very ſlow in aſſembling together, as they were buſy in getting in their harveſt, and began to be ſadly tired of the war.

The Athenians *make a ſhew of their ſtrength.*

When the Athenians found that ſuch preparations were made againſt them, as an avowed inſult on their imagined weakneſs, they had a mind to convince their foes that ſuch imaginations were erroneous, and that they were well able, without countermanding their fleet from before Leſbos, to make head againſt any force that could come from Peloponneſus. Accordingly, they manned out an hundred ſhips, obliging all as well ſojourners as citizens (thoſe excepted of the firſt and ſecond claſs [2]) to go on board. Shewing themſelves firſt before the Iſthmus, in great parade they diſplayed their force,

2 The original is, "except thoſe who were worth five hundred *medimns*, and the *Horſemen* or *Knights*." The Athenians were ranged into claſſes by Solon. Plutarch hath deſcribed the manner in *the life of Solon*, as thus tranſlated in Potter's *Antiquities of* Greece, v. i. p. 14.

'Solon finding the people variouſly affected, ſome inclined to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the poor men groaning under the burden of their oppreſſion, endeavoured as far as was poſſible to compoſe all their differences, to eaſe their grievances, and give all reaſonable perſons ſatisfaction. In the proſecution of this deſign he divided the Athenians into four ranks, according to every man's eſtate; thoſe, who were worth five hundred *medimns* of liquid and dry commodities, he placed in the firſt rank, calling them *Pentacoſiomedimni*. The next were the Horſemen, or *Ippeis*, being ſuch as were of ability to furniſh out a horſe, or were worth three hundred *medimns*. The third claſs conſiſted of thoſe that had two hundred *medimns*, who were called *Zeugitæ*. In the laſt he placed all the reſt, calling them *Thetes*, and allowed them not to be capable of bearing any office in the government, only gave them a liberty to give their votes in all public aſſemblies; which, tho' at the firſt it appeared inconſiderable, was afterwards found to be a very important privilege; for it being permitted every man, after the determination of the magiſtrates to make an appeal to the people aſſembled in convocation, hereby it came to paſs, that cauſes of the greateſt weight and moment were brought before them. And thus he continued the power and magiſtracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet neither expoſed the inferior people to their cruelty and oppreſſion, nor wholly deprived them of having a ſhare in the government. And of this equality he himſelf makes mention in this manner:

What power was fit I did on all beſtow,
Nor rais'd the poor too high, nor preſs'd too low;
The rich that rul'd and every office bore,
Confin'd by laws they could not preſs the poor:
Both parties I ſecur'd from lawleſs might,
So none prevail'd upon another's right.

Mr. CREECH.

and

and then made deſcents at pleaſure all along the coaſt. The Lacedæmonians ſeeing them thus ſtrong beyond what they had imagined, concluded, that the Leſbians had purpoſely amuſed them with fictions; and being perplexed how to act, as their confederates were not yet come up to join them, and as information was brought them, that the firſt Athenian ſquadron conſiſting of thirty ſail was laying waſte the territory round about their city, they retired to their own homes.

Afterwards they ſet about the equipment of a fleet to be ſent to Leſbos; and ordered the confederate-cities to ſend in their contingents, the whole amounting to forty ſail; and further appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who was ready to put himſelf at the head of the expedition. The Athenians departed off the coaſt with their hundred ſail, when they ſaw their enemies had retreated.

During the time this fleet was out at ſea, tho' the Athenians at the commencement of the war had as large if not a larger number of ſhips, yet they never had their whole navy ſo compleatly fitted out for ſervice and with ſo much pomp as now. One hundred of their ſhips were ſtationed for guards round Attica and Eubœa and Salamis; and another hundred were coaſting all along Peloponneſus, beſide thoſe that were at Potidæa, and in other parts, —— inſomuch that the whole number employed this ſummer amounted to two hundred and fifty ſail. The expence of this, with that of Potidæa, quite exhauſted their treaſure. For the pay of the heavy-armed who were ſtationed at Potidæa, was two drachmas a day, each of them receiving a * drachma for himſelf and another for his ſervant. The number of the firſt body ſent thither was three thouſand, and not fewer than thoſe were employed during the whole ſiege; — but the ſixteen hundred who came with Phormio were ordered away before its concluſion. The whole fleet alſo had the ſame pay. In this manner was their public treaſure now for the firſt time exhauſted — and ſuch a navy, the largeſt they ever had, compleatly manned.

* 7 d. ½.

The

Proceedings in Leſbos.

The Mitylenéans, during the time the Lacedæmonians lay at the Iſthmus, with a body of their own and auxiliaries marched by land againſt Methymne, expecting to have it betrayed to them. Having aſſaulted the place and being diſappointed in their expectations, they marched back by way of Antiſſa and Pyra and Ereſſus. In each of theſe places they halted for a while, to ſettle affairs in as firm order as poſſible, and to ſtrengthen their walls, and then without loſs of time returned to Mitylene.

Upon their departure, the Methymnéans marched out againſt Antiſſa. The Antiſſéans with a party of auxiliaries ſallying out to meet them, gave them a terrible blow, ſo that many of them were left dead upon the ſpot, and thoſe who eſcaped made the beſt of their way back.

The Athenians *ſend a reinforcement under* Paches.

The Athenians — adviſed of theſe incidents, and that further the Mitylenéans were quite maſters of the country, and that their own ſoldiers were not numerous enough to bridle their excurſions — about the beginning of autumn, ſend a reinforcement of a thouſand heavy-armed of their own people commanded by Paches the ſon of Epicurus. Theſe, having rowed themſelves the tranſports which brought them, arrive; and build a ſingle wall in circle quite round Mitylene, and on the proper ſpots of ground ſtrengthned it by erecting forts. Thus was Mitylene ſtrongly beſieged on all ſides, both by ſea and land —— And by this time it began to be winter.

Blockade of Mitylene.

A tax at Athens.

But the Athenians, wanting money to carry on the ſiege, determined now to tax themſelves, and by their firſt [3] contribution

3 It was a voluntary contribution: The original *term* implieth it. The manner was no doubt the ſame as was obſerved in ſucceeding times, when the neceſſities of the *ſtate* called for an extraordinary ſupply. On ſuch occaſions, the *preſidents* of the *aſſembly* laid before the Athenians the preſent want of money, and exhorted them with chearfulneſs and generoſity to contribute towards the national ſupport. Such as were willing roſe up in turn, ſaying, "I contribute ſo much," and naming the ſum. Such as, tho' rich, were niggardly and ſtrangers to all public ſpirit, ſat ſilent on theſe occaſions, or as faſt as they could ſtole out of the aſſembly.

raiſed

raiſed * two hundred talents for the preſent ſervice; and at the ſame time diſpatched twelve ſhips under the command of Lyſicles and four collegues to levy money abroad. He, intent on raiſing contributions, made a viſit for this purpoſe to ſeveral places; and, having landed at Myus in Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of Mæander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was attacked on his route by the Carians and Anæitans, where himſelf and a great part of his army periſhed. * 3875*l.*

Platæa.

The plan of an eſcape.

This winter, the Platæans — for they were ſtill blocked up by the Peloponneſians and Bœotians — finding themſelves much diſtreſſed by the failure of their proviſions, giving up all hope of ſuccour from the Athenians, and quite deſtitute of all other means of preſervation, formed a project now in concert with thoſe Athenians who were ſhut up with them in the blockade, "firſt of all to march out of the town in company, and to compaſs their eſcape, if poſſible, over the works of the enemy." The authors of this project were Theænetus the ſon of Timides a ſoothſayer, and Eumolpidas the ſon of Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. But afterwards, half of the number, affrighted by the greatneſs of the danger, refuſed to have a ſhare in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to the number of about two hundred and twenty, reſolutely adhered to attempt an eſcape, in the following manner ——

They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall. The meaſure of this they learned from the rows of brick, where the ſide of the wall facing them was not covered over with plaiſter. Several perſons were appointed to count the rows at the ſame time; ſome of them might probably be wrong, but the greater part would agree in the juſt computation; eſpecially, as they counted them ſeveral times over, and were beſides at no great diſtance, ſince the part marked out for the deſign was plainly within their view. In this method, having gueſſed the meaſure of a brick from its thickneſs, they found out what muſt be the total height for the ladders.

The

The work of the Peloponneſians was of the following ſtructure.—It was compoſed of two circular walls; one, towards Platæa; and the other, outward, to prevent any attack from Athens. Theſe walls were at the diſtance of ſixteen feet one from the other; and this intermediate ſpace of ſixteen feet was built into diſtinct lodgments for the guards. Theſe however, ſtanding thick together, gave to the whole work the appearance of one thick intire wall, with battlements on both ſides. At every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the ſame breadth with the whole work, reaching from the face of the inward wall to that of the outward; ſo that there was no paſſage by the ſides of a turret, but the communication lay open through the middle of them all. By night, when the weather was rainy, they quitted the battlements, and ſheltering themſelves in the turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head, there they continued their watch. Such was the form of the work, by which the Platæans were incloſed on every ſide.

Put in execution.

The enterprizing body, when every thing was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a night tempeſtuous with wind and rain, and further at a dark moon, marched out of the place. The perſons, who had been authors of the project, were now the conductors. And firſt, they paſſed the ditch which ſurrounded the town; then they approached quite up to the wall of the enemy, undiſcovered by the guards. The darkneſs of the night prevented their being ſeen, and the noiſe they made in approaching was quite drowned in the loudneſs of the ſtorm. They advanced alſo at a great diſtance from one another, to prevent any diſcovery from the mutual claſhing of their arms. They were further armed in the moſt compact manner, and wore a covering only on the left foot, for the ſake of treading firmly in the mud. At one of the intermediate ſpaces between the turrets they got under the battlements, knowing they were not manned. The bearers of the ladders went firſt and applied them to the wall. Then twelve light-armed with only

only a dagger and a breaſt-plate ſcaled, led by Ammeas the ſon of Choræbus, who was the firſt that mounted. His followers, in two parties of ſix each, mounted next on each ſide of the turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins ſucceeded them. Behind came others holding the bucklers of thoſe above them, thus to facilitate their aſcent, and to be ready to deliver them into their hands, ſhould they be obliged to charge. When the greater part of the number was mounted, the watchmen within the turrets perceived it. For one of the Platæans, in faſtening his hold, had thrown down a tile from off the battlements, which made a noiſe in the fall; and immediately was ſhouted an alarm. The whole camp came running towards the wall, yet unable to diſcover the reaſon of this alarm, ſo dark was the night, and violent the ſtorm. At this criſis the Platæans, who were left behind in the city, ſallied forth and aſſaulted the work of the Peloponneſians, in the part oppoſite to that where their friends were attempting to paſs, from them to divert as much as poſſible the attention of the enemy. Great was the confuſion of the enemy yet abiding in their poſts, for not one durſt leave his ſtation to run to the place of alarm, but all were greatly perplexed to gueſs at its meaning. At laſt the body of three hundred, appointed for a reſerve of ſuccour upon any emergency, marched without the work to the place of alarm. Now the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were held up towards Thebes. On the other ſide, the Platæans in the city held up at the ſame time from the wall many of theſe torches already prepared for this very purpoſe, that the ſignals given of the approach of foes might be miſtaken by their enemies the Thebans, who judging the affair to be quite otherwiſe than it really was, might refrain from ſending any ſuccour, till their friends who had ſallied might have effectuated their eſcape, and gained a place of ſecurity.

In the mean time, thoſe of the Platæans, who having mounted firſt, and by killing the guards had got poſſeſſion of the turrets on

either hand, poſted themſelves there to ſecure the paſſage, and to prevent any manner of obſtruction from thence. Applying further their ladder to theſe turrets from the top of the wall, and cauſing many of their number to mount, thoſe now upon the tutrets kept off the enemies, running to obſtruct them both above and below, by diſcharging their darts; whilſt the majority, rearing many ladders at the ſame time, and throwing down the battlements, got clean over at the intermediate ſpace between the turrets. Every one, in the order he got over to the outward ſide, drew up upon the inner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with their darts and javelins, kept off thoſe who were flocking towards the work to hinder their paſſage. When all the reſt were landed upon the outſide of the work, thoſe upon the turrets coming down laſt of all, and with difficulty, got alſo to the ditch. By this time the reſerve of three hundred was come up to oppoſe them, by the light of torches. The Platæans by this means, being in the dark, had a clear view of them, and, from their ſtand upon the brink of the ditch, aimed a ſhower of darts and javelins at thoſe parts of their bodies which had no armour. The Platæans were all obſcured, as the glimmering of lights made them leſs eaſy to be diſtinguiſhed; ſo that the laſt of their body got over the ditch, tho' not without great difficulty and toil. For the water in it was froze, not into ice hard enough to bear, but into a watery congelation, the effect not of the northern but eaſtern blaſts. The wind blowing hard, had cauſed ſo much ſnow to fall that night, that the water was ſwelled to a height not to be forded without ſome difficulty. However, the violence of the ſtorm was the greateſt furtherance of their eſcape.

Succeſsful. The paſs over the ditch being thus completed, the Platæans went forwards in a body, and took the road to Thebes, leaving on their right the temple of Juno built by Andocrates. They judged it would never be ſuppoſed, that they had taken a route which led directly towards their enemies: And they ſaw at the ſame time the Peloponneſians

ſians purſuing with torches along the road to Athens, by Cythæron and * the *Heads of the Oak.* For † ſix or ſeven ſtadia they continued their route towards Thebes, but then turning ſhort, they took the road to the mountains by Erythræ and Hyſiæ; and having gained the mountains, two hundred and twelve of the number completed their eſcape to Athens. Some of them indeed turned back into the city, without once attempting to get over; and one archer was taken priſoner at the outward ditch.

* Dryoſcephalæ.
† *Above half a mile.*

The Peloponneſians deſiſted from the fruitleſs purſuit, and returned to their poſts. But the Platæans within the city, ignorant of the real event, and giving ear to the aſſurances of thoſe who turned back, that "they are all to a man cut off," diſpatch a herald as ſoon as it was day to demand a truce for fetching off the dead; but learning hence the true ſtate of the affair, they remained well-ſatisfied. And in this manner theſe men of Platæa, by thus forcing a paſſage, wrought their own preſervation.

About the end of this winter, Salæthus the Lacedæmonian was diſpatched in a trireme from Lacedæmon to Mitylene; who being landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, and having paſſed the Athenian circumvallation by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent of water, gets undiſcovered into Mitylene. His commiſſion was, to tell the governors of the place, that "at the ſame time an incur-" ſion will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty ſail be ſent " to their relief, according to promiſe; that he himſelf was diſ-" patched beforehand, to aſſure them of theſe, and to take all pro-" per care of other points." Upon this the Mitylenéans reſumed their ſpirits, and grew more averſe to any compoſition with the Athenians. Salæthus.

The winter was now paſt, and in this manner ended the fourth year of the war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory.

YEAR V.

Before Chriſt 427.

Alcidas *goes to the relief of* Mitylene.

Attica *invaded.*

IN the beginning of the enſuing ſummer — after that the Peloponneſians had diſpatched Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two ſhips under his command to the relief of Mitylene, with the moſt preſſing orders — they and their confederates invaded Attica. Their deſign was, by this diverſion to give the Athenians ſo much employ on all ſides, that they might be unable to give any obſtruction to their ſquadron bound for Mitylene. This preſent invaſion was led by Cleomenes, who was his father's brother, in the right of Pauſanias ſon of Pleiſtionax the king, but yet in his minority. They now utterly deſtroyed thoſe parts of Attica that had been ravaged already. Whatever again began to flouriſh, and whatever had been ſpared in former incurſions now fell before their fury. And this incurſion, next to the ſecond, was the ſharpeſt they ever made upon the Athenians. For, having continued their ſtay ſo long, as to give time to their ſquadron to arrive at Leſbos, and ſend them news of their ſucceſs, they had leiſure to extend their devaſtations over almoſt all the country. But when all their expectations ended in diſappointment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew, and were diſbanded to their reſpective cities.

The Mitylenéans *mutiny and ſurrender.*

In the mean time the Mitylenéans, when they ſaw nothing of the ſquadron from Peloponneſus (which was loitering in the courſe) and their proviſions began to fail, are neceſſitated to capitulate with the Athenians, upon this occaſion — Salæthus, who had alſo himſelf given up all hopes of relief, cauſeth the *populace*, who before were light-armed, to put on heavy-armour, with a deſign to make a ſally on the Athenians. But they, ſo ſoon as they had received their armour, would no longer obey their governors, but aſſembling together in bodies, ordered thoſe in authority either publicly to produce what proviſions they had and divide equally among them, or otherwiſe they would imme-

immediately make their own terms with the Athenians, and give up the city. Thoſe in command being ſenſible that they had not force ſufficient to hinder this, and that their own danger would be extreme, ſhould they by ſtanding out be excluded the capitulation, join with them in procuring the following terms from Paches and the Athenians —

" That it ſhould be ſubmitted to the people of Athens to deter-
" mine as they pleaſe in relation to the Mitylenéans.

" That the Mitylenéans ſhould immediately receive their army into
" the city—and diſpatch an embaſſy to Athens to know their pleaſure.

" That ſufficient reſpite ſhould be indulged for this, during which
" Paches ſhould put no one Mitylenéan in chains, ſhould make none
" a ſlave, ſhould put none to death."

Theſe were the terms of the ſurrender. — But thoſe of the Mitylenéans, who had been moſt active in all the negotiations with the Lacedæmonians, were thrown into the utmoſt conſternation, and being quite in deſpair when the army took poſſeſſion of the place, ſeat themſelves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, having ordered them to ariſe, with a promiſe of protecting them from inſults, ſends them over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleaſure of the Athenians. Having further detached ſome triremes to Antiſſa, he took it in, and made all other diſpoſitions he judged expedient in regard to his army.

Alcidas arrives too late.

The Peloponneſians on board the ſquadron of forty ſhips, who ought to have made the utmoſt expedition, but inſtead of that had loitered upon the coaſt of Peloponneſus, and made the reſt of the voyage in a leiſurely manner, had proceeded ſo far as Delos, before their motions were known at Athens. Being advanced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they receive the firſt intelligence that Mitylene was taken. But being deſirous of certain information, they ſailed forwards to Embatus of Erythræa. Mitylene had been taken about ſeven days before they came up to Embatus. Here aſſured of the

the truth, they conſulted what was now to be done; and Teutiaplus, an Eléan, gave his opinion thus——

Advice of Teutiaplus.

"TO you, O Alcidas and as many other Peloponneſians as are "joined with me in the preſent command, I freely declare it to be "my own opinion, that we ſhould ſail to Mitylene, as we are, be- "fore the enemy is apprized of our arrival. It is probable, as they "are ſo lately poſſeſſed of the city, we ſhall find it very remiſly "and imperfectly guarded: and towards the ſea intirely neglected, "as on that ſide they cannot in the leaſt expect the approach of an "enemy, and our ſtrength in that element is ſuperior. It is proba- "ble alſo that their land-force is diſperſed, in that negligent manner "which victory indulgeth, into the ſcattered houſes of refreſhment. "If therefore we can come upon them by ſurprize and by night, I "hope by the aſſiſtance of our friends within, if really within we "have a friend remaining, to give a new turn to our affairs. Let us "not be ſtaggered at the danger of the attempt, but remember, that "all the turns of war are owing to ſome ſuch reverſe as this: "which, that commander who is moſt on his guard againſt, and who "can diſcern and ſeize ſuch critical moments for aſſaulting his ene- "mies, muſt be moſt frequently ſucceſsful."

Of the Ionian *exiles.*

He gave his opinion thus, but it had no effect upon Alcidas. Some other perſons, exiles from Ionia, and ſome Leſbians who were alſo on board, adviſed him further—"That ſince he ſeemed to "be diſcouraged by the apparent danger of that attempt, he ſhould "ſeize ſome city in Ionia, or Cyme in Ætolia: that, by favour of "ſuch a hold for war, they might bring about the revolt of Ionia: "That in ſuch a ſtep ſucceſs might juſtly be hoped, as his preſence "would be highly acceptable there: That, if they could cut off the "very great revenue which accrued thence to the Athenians, the loſs, "added to the expence of endeavouring a recovery, muſt drain their "treaſure.—

" treaſure. — That they further thought they could prevail on Piſ-
" ſuthnes, to join with them in the war."

But Alcidas would not liſten to theſe propoſals, and got a majority to ſupport his own opinion — " That, ſince it was too late to ſuc-
" cour Mitylene, they ſhould without loſs of time return to Pelo-
" ponneſus." Weighing therefore from Embatus, he put again to ſea; and touching at Myoneſus of the Teians, he there butchered in cold blood a number of priſoners, whom he had taken in the voyage. Putting afterwards into Epheſus, he was attended there by an embaſſy from the Samians of Anæa repreſenting to him — " That it
" was no honourable method of vindicating the liberty of Greece,
" to butcher men who had not ſo much as lift up the hand againſt
" him, who were not enemies in heart, but of mere neceſſity de-
" pendent on the Athenians: — that, unleſs he chang'd his conduct,
" he would bring over but few of his enemies into friendſhip, but
" turn a far greater number of friends into enemies." — He was wrought upon by this remonſtrance, and ſet all the Chians and others, whom he had yet reſerved, at liberty. For thoſe, who had at any time deſcried this ſquadron, had never thought of flying, but boldly approached it as certainly Athenian. They really had no ground to imagine, that whilſt the Athenians were maſters of the ſea, a Peloponneſian fleet ſhould dare to put over to Ionia.

Determination of Alcidas.

From Epheſus, Alcidas made the beſt of his way, or rather fled outright; for he had been diſcovered by the *Salaminian* and the *Paralus*, whilſt he lay at anchor near Claros. Theſe veſſels happened at that time to be on a courſe from Athens. He was now apprehenſive of a chace, and ſo ſtretched out to ſea; determining, if poſſible, not to make any land again till he had reached Peloponneſus. Notice of him came firſt to Paches and the Athenians from Erythræa; it was then repeated from all parts. For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, the ſight of the Peloponneſians on that coaſt, had ſtruck a panic;

He quits the coaſt of Ionia.

a panic; leſt, tho' their intention was not to continue there, they ſhould at once aſſault and deſtroy their cities. The *Salaminian* [4] alſo and *Paralus*, after they had deſcried him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the tidings. Paches ſet upon the chace with warmth, and purſued it as far as the iſle of Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reaching him, he turned back again for his poſt; and ſince he had not been able to come up with them by ſea, thought a great point was carried, in not finding them refuged in any harbour, where they muſt have been under a neceſſity to fortify their ſtation, and oblige him to a regular procedure and attack.

Purſued by Paches.

In ſailing back he touched at Notium of the Colophonians, in which at this time the Colophonians reſided, the upper city having been taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians, who had broke in by favour of an inteſtine ſedition. It was taken about the time, that the Peloponneſians made their ſecond incurſion into Attica. But in Notium a ſecond ſedition broke out, between thoſe who reſorted thither for refuge and the old inhabitants. The latter having obtained an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from Piſſuthnes kept within a part ſeparated by a traverſe wall, and the management of affairs was in the hands of ſome Colophonians of the upper city, who were in the Mediſh intereſt, and had been received amongſt them as an aid. But the former, who had reſorted hither for refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Paches for protection. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians within the tranſverſe wall, to come out to a conference, aſſuring him, "if they came to no agreement, he "would replace him within both ſafe and ſound." Upon this Hippias

4 Theſe two veſſels ſeem to have been the packets or yachts of the *State* of Athens. Their force was ſmall in compariſon of the ſhips of war, as they were chiefly deſigned for nimbleneſs and expedition. They carried embaſſadors to and fro, went on all public errands whether of a civil or religious nature, and tranſported magiſtrates and generals to and from their poſts. They were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, who beſides receiving more pay, eſteemed it alſo a greater honour to ſerve on board theſe veſſels, which were ſacred.

came

came out: And Paches immediately put him under an arreſt, but laid no bonds upon him. This done, he on a ſudden aſſaults the wall; by favour of the ſurprize carries it; and puts all the Arcadians and Barbarians within to the ſword. After this, he replaceth Hippias within, in the ſame ſtate he had promiſed; but when he had him there, immediately apprehends him again and ſhoots him to death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the hands of the Colophonians, excluding thoſe only who were in the intereſt of the Mede. In proceſs of time, the Athenians having ſent leaders thither on purpoſe, and declared Notium an Athenian colony, ſettled in it the Colophonians that were any where to be found, under the accuſtomed regulations.

Paches *ſends his priſoners to* Athens.

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, compleated the reduction of Pyrra and Ereſſus; and having apprehended Salæthus the Lacedæmonian, who had been concealed in the city, ſends him to Athens along with thoſe citizens of Mitylene from Tenedos, whom he had kept in ſafe cuſtody there, and all others who appeared to have been concerned in the revolt. As an eſcort to theſe he ſends away alſo the greater part of his army. With the remainder he himſelf ſtayed behind to regulate the affairs of Mitylene and the reſt of Leſbos, to the beſt of his diſcretion.

The bloody decree againſt Mitylene.

When the authors of the revolt and Salæthus were arrived at Athens, the Athenians inſtantly put Salæthus to death. He made them many fruitleſs propoſals to ſave his life; and amongſt the reſt, that the ſiege of Platæa ſhould be raiſed, which was ſtill beſieged by the Peloponneſians. They next entered into conſultation, what ſhould be done with the revolters; and in the warmth of anger decreed — "That not only thoſe who were now at Athens ſhould "be put to death, but the ſame ſentence ſhould extend to all the "men of Mitylene who were adult; and the women and children "be ſold for ſlaves." They were exaſperated againſt them not only becauſe they had revolted, but becauſe they had done it without the

provocation which others had received in the rigour of their government. The Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetuosity to this their resentment, as they had dared to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the Rebels. For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt had not been made without much previous deliberation. — In short, they dispatch a trireme to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to see it put in immediate execution upon the Mitylenéans.

Resumed. The day following, repentance on a sudden touched their hearts, moved by the reflexion, that they had passed a savage and monstrous decree in dooming a whole city to that destruction, which was due only to the authors of the guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenéan ambassadors then residing at Athens, and such of the Athenians, as inclining to mercy had a mind to save them, than they addressed themselves to the magistrates, begging the decree might be again debated. Their request was more easily granted, as the magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the city were desirous to have a second opportunity of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of the people is again convened, and various opinions were offered by different persons, till Cleon the son of Cleanetus, who in the former assembly had proposed and carried the murdering sentence, who in all other respects was the most violent of all the citizens, and at this time had by far the greatest influence over the people, stood forth again and spoke as follows ——

Speech of Cleon. " UPON many other occasions my own experience hath con-
" vinced me, that a democracy is incapable of ruling over others;
" but I see it with the highest certainty now in this your present re-
" pentance concerning the Mitylenéans. In security so void of ter-
" ror, in safety so exempt from treachery, you pass your days within
" the walls of Athens, that you are grown quite safe and secure
" about your dependents. Whenever, soothed by their specious in-
" treaties, you betray your judgment or relent in pity, not a soul
" amongst

" amongſt you reflects that you are acting the daſtardly part, not in
" truth to confer obligations upon thoſe dependents, but to endanger
" your own welfare and ſafety. It is then quite remote from your
" thoughts, that your rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that
" they are ever intent on projects to ſhake off your yoke —— *that*
" yoke, to which they ever reluctantly ſubmitted. It is not for-
" giveneſs on your part, after injuries received, that can keep them
" faſt in their obedience, ſince this muſt be ever the conſequence
" of your own ſuperior power and not of gratitude in them.

" Above all, I dread that extremity of danger to which we are
" expoſed, if not one of your decrees muſt ever be carried into act,
" and we remain for ever ignorant —— that the community which
" uniformly abides by a worſe ſet of laws, hath the advantage over
" another, which is finely modelled in every reſpect, except in
" practice; — that, modeſt ignorance is a much ſurer ſupport than
" genius which ſcorns to be controled; — and that, the duller part
" of mankind in general adminiſter public affairs much better
" than your men of vivacity and wit. The laſt aſſume a pride in
" appearing wiſer than the laws; in every debate about the public
" good they aim merely at victory, as if there were no other points
" ſufficiently important, wherein to diſplay their ſuperior talents —
" and by this their conduct they generally ſubvert the public welfare:
" The former, who are diffident of their own abilities, who regard
" themſelves as leſs wiſe than the laws of their country —— tho'
" unable to detect the ſpecious orator, yet being better judges of
" equity than champions in debate, for the moſt part inforce the
" rational conduct. This beyond denial is our duty at preſent;
" we ſhould ſcorn competitions in eloquence and wit, nor wilfully
" and contrary to our own opinion miſlead the judgment of this full
" aſſembly.

" For my part, I perſiſt in my former declarations, and I am ſur-
" prized at the men who propoſed to have the affair of Mitylene

" again debated, who endeavour to protract the execution of juſtice,
" in the intereſt of the guilty more than of the injured. For by this
" means the ſufferer proceeds to take vengeance on the criminal with
" the edge of his reſentment blunted; when revenge, the oppoſite
" of wrong, the more nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, ge-
" nerally inflicts the moſt condign puniſhment. But I am more ſur-
" priſed at him, whoever he be, that ſhall dare to contradict, and
" pretend to demonſtrate that the injuries done by the Mitylenéans
" are really for our ſervice, and that our calamities are hardſhips on
" our dependents. He certainly muſt either preſume upon his own
" eloquence, if he contends to prove that what was plainly decreed
" was never decreed; or, inſtigated by lucre will endeavour to ſeduce
" you by the elaborate and plauſible artifice of words. In ſuch con-
" tentions, the *State* indeed awards the victory to whom ſhe pleaſeth,
" but ſhe ſuſtains all the damage herſelf. You are anſwerable for
" this, Athenians!--- You! who fondly dote on theſe wordy com-
" petitions: You! who are accuſtomed to be ſpectators of ſpeeches
" and hearers of actions. You meaſure the poſſibility of future ef-
" fects by the preſent eloquence of your orators; you judge of ac-
" tions already paſt, not by the certain conviction of your own eyes,
" but the fallible ſuggeſtions of your ears, when ſoothed by the in-
" veigling inſinuating flow of words. You are the beſt in the world
" to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuſe to follow the dic-
" tates of the approved judicious ſpeaker, ---- ſlaves as you are to
" whatever trifles happen always to be in vogue, and looking down
" with contempt on tried and experienced methods. The moſt ear-
" neſt wiſh that the heart of any of your body ever conceived is, to
" become a ſpeaker; if that be unattainable, you range yourſelves in
" oppoſition againſt all who are ſo, for fear you ſhould ſeem in judg-
" ment their inferiors. When any thing is acutely uttered, you are
" ready even to go before it with applauſe, and intimate your own
" pre-conception of the point, at the ſame time dull at diſcerning
" whither

" whither it will tend. Your whole paſſion, in a word, is for things
" that are not in reality and common life; but of what paſſeth di-
" rectly before your eyes you have no proper perception. And
" frankly, you are quite infatuated by the luſt of hearing, and re-
" ſemble more the idle ſpectators of contending ſophiſts, than men
" who meet to deliberate upon public affairs. From ſuch vain
" amuſements endeavouring to divert you, I boldly affirm, that
" no one city in the world hath injured you ſo much as Mitylene.

" Thoſe, who unable to ſupport the rigor of your government,
" or who compelled to do it by hoſtile force, have revolted from
" you, I readily abſolve. But for a people who inhabit an iſland, a
" fortified iſland; who had no reaſon to dread the violence of our
" enemies, except by ſea; who even at ſea, by the ſtrength of their
" own ſhipping, were able to guard themſelves againſt all attacks,
" who enjoyed their own model of government, and were ever
" treated by us with the higheſt honour and regard ----- for ſuch a
" people to revolt in this manner, is never to be forgiven. Is not
" their whole procedure one ſeries of treachery? Have they not ra-
" ther made war upon than revolted againſt us? For revolt can
" only be aſcribed to thoſe who have ſuffered violence and outrage.
" Have they not further ſought out our implacable foes, and begged
" to participate with them in our deſtruction? This certainly is a
" much greater aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their own do-
" meſtic ſtrength they had rebelled againſt us. They would not be
" deterred by the calamities of their neighbours, who have fre-
" quently before this revolted, and been puniſhed for it by a total re-
" duction; nor would they ſo far acquieſce in preſent felicity, as not
" to hazard the dangerous reverſe of miſery. Audacious in regard
" to the future, preſumptuous above their ſtrength but below their
" intention, they made war their choice, and in preferring violence
" to the juſt obſervance of duty have placed their glory. For, tho'
" uninjured

" uninjured and unprovoked, the firſt moment they ſaw a probability
" of prevailing, they ſeized it and rebelled.

" It is the uſual effect of proſperity, eſpecially when felt on a ſud-
" den, and beyond their hope, to puff up a people into inſolence of
" manners. The ſucceſſes of mankind, when attained by the ra-
" tional courſe, are generally of much longer continuance than when
" they anticipate purſuit. And in a word, men are much more ex-
" pert at repelling adverſity than preſerving proſperity. By this ought
" we long ago to have adjuſted our conduct towards the Mitylenéans,
" never diſtinguiſhing them above others with peculiar regard; and
" then, they never would have been that inſolent people we have
" found them now. For ſo remarkably perverſe is the temper of
" man, as ever to contemn whoever courts him, and admire whoever
" will not bend before him.

" Let condign puniſhment therefore be awarded to their demerits.
" Let not the guilt be avenged upon the heads of the *few*, and the
" bulk of offenders eſcape unpuniſhed. The whole *people* to a man
" have rebelled againſt us, when it was in their power to have been
" ſheltered here, and now again to be reinſtated in their former
" ſeats. But, they judged the danger would be leſſened by the
" general concurrence with the *few*, and ſo all revolted in concert.

" Extend further your regards to the whole body of your depen-
" dents; for if you inflict the ſame puniſhments on thoſe who re-
" volt by compulſion of enemies, and who revolt on pure deliberate
" malice, which of them, do you think, will not ſeize the leaſt
" pretext to throw off your yoke; when, if he ſucceeds, his liberty
" is recovered, and, tho' he fails, the hurt is ſo eaſy to be cured?
" Beſides this, our lives and fortunes will be endangered upon every
" ſingle attempt which ſhall be made. Suppoſe we ſucceed, we only
" recover an exhauſted ruinated city, but ſhall for the future be de-
" prived of the revenue ariſing from it, the eſſence of our ſtrength:

" But,

" But, if we cannot prevail, we ſhall enlarge the number of enemies " we already have: And at a time when we ought to be employed " in reſiſting our preſent adverſaries, we ſhall be intangled in wars " againſt our own dependents. We ought not therefore to encou- " rage the hope, whether raiſed by the force of intreaty, or pur- " chaſed by the force of corruption, that their errors are but the er- " rors of men, and ſhall therefore be forgiven. The damage they " have done was not involuntary, but they have been deliberate de- " termined villains: Forgiveneſs is only for thoſe who erred not by " deſign.

" Moved by the ardency and zeal of my former plea, you made " the decree; and now I earneſtly conjure you, not to repent of your " own determinations, not to plunge yourſelves in inextricable diffi- " culties, through pity, through delight of hearing, and ſoft for- " bearance, the three moſt prejudicial obſtacles of power. It is juſt " to ſhew pity to thoſe who are its proper objects, and not to men " who would never have felt compaſſion for us, nor to foes who of " neceſſity muſt be implacable. The orators, thoſe delights of your " ears, will have room in debates of leſſer moment to catch at your " applauſe, but ſhould be ſilenced here, where they only can give " the public a ſhort-liv'd pleaſure, whilſt they embroil it with per- " plexities not eaſy to be ſurmounted, and themſelves alone in requi- " tal of ſpeaking well will be well rewarded for it. Forbearance, " further, may be ſhewn to thoſe who are willing to be, and will for " the future prove themſelves our friends; but not to ſuch invete- " rate ſouls as theſe, who, if ſuffered to live, will live only to wreak " their malice againſt you.

" I ſhall wave enlargements, and give you only one ſhort aſſu- " rance, that if you hearken to my admonitions, you will at the " ſame time do juſtice to the Mitylenéans and ſervice to yourſelves; " but, if you reſolve in any other manner, you will receive no " thanks from them, and will eſtabliſh the cleareſt evidence for your

" own

" own condemnation. For, if theſe men had reaſon to revolt, it
" follows that you have tyrannically ruled them. Grant the injuſtice
" of ſuch a rule, but yet that you have preſumed to be guilty of it;
" —— why then, upon the mere motive of intereſt, you ought now
" to chaſtiſe them beyond what is right, or immediately to forego
" your power, and dropping yourſelves down into impotent ſecurity,
" to ſet about the practice of humanity and virtue. But, adieu to
" this vain expedient! and at once reſolve to make them feel that
" weight of miſery they deſigned for us. Convince them that thoſe
" who have eſcaped it, can feel as ſtrong reſentments as thoſe who
" projected the fatal blow. Determine now, by recollecting with
" yourſelves what kind of uſage you would have received from
" them, had *they* ſucceeded in their plots, *they!* the uninjured, un-
" provoked aggreſſors. It is an allowed truth, that men, who
" without the leaſt provocation have recourſe to acts of malice, will
" be ſated with nothing leſs than complete deſtruction, as they muſt
" ever be terrified at the ſight of a ſurviving foe. For he who ſuf-
" fers from a quarter whence he never deſerved it, will not ſo ea-
" ſily lay down his reſentments, as when mutual enmity hath kindled
" the contention. Be not therefore traitors to your own ſelves. Fi-
" gure to yourſelves, as ſtrongly as you can, the miſeries they de-
" ſigned you; remember how you wiſhed for nothing in this world
" ſo much as to have them in your power, and now retaliate upon
" them. Relent not at the ſcene of horror imagination may preſent
" to your fancy, but fix your remembrance faſt on that weight of
" miſery, which was juſt now ſuſpended over your own heads.
" Puniſh theſe wretches according to their deſerts; make them a
" notable example to the reſt of your dependents, that death muſt
" be the portion of whoever dares revolt. For when once they
" are certain of this, your arms will no more be recalled from your
" foreign enemies, to be employed in the chaſtiſement of your own
" dependents."

In

In this manner Cleon [5] ſupported the decree, and when he had concluded, Diodotus the ſon of Eucrates, who in the former aſſembly had moſt ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the bloody ſentence againſt the Mitylenéans, ſtood forth, and thus replied.

Speech of Diodotus.

" I NEITHER blame thoſe who propoſed the reſumption of " the decree againſt Mitylene, nor do I praiſe the men who inveigh " againſt repeated conſultations on points of the greateſt importance. " But I lay it down for certain, that there are no two greater im- " pediments of ſound mature counſel than precipitation and anger; " of which, the one is cloſely connected with madneſs, the other " with raw inexperience and ſhort limitary judgment.

" It may indeed be warmly aſſerted, that words are not the pro- " per guides to actions. But the author of ſuch an aſſertion is either

5 From the ſhort ſketch of Cleon's character given before by Thucydides, and the ſpeech he hath now made, it is likely he can be no favourite with the reader. Cicero hath ſtiled him, " a turbulent but elo- " quent Athenian." By means of his eloquence, and an impudence that never could be daſhed, he was now a prime favourite with the people, but the ſcorn and terror of all good men at Athens. He had ever been a ſnarler at Pericles, but ſo long as he lived could obtain no ſhare in the public adminiſtration. He had now got the aſcendant by cajoling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives againſt their miniſters and commanders. He will make a very ſplendid and very deſpicable figure in the ſequel. Ariſtophanes, who had a particular grudge againſt him, hath exhibited him in the moſt diſtaſteful light. His comedy of the *Horſemen* or *Knights* is intirely employed to ſhew him off. He calls him throughout the *Paphlagonian*, to brand his low and brutal diſpoſition, who " quitting his ori- " ginal trade of ſelling leather, vile leather, " ſince people rather ſwam than walked in " the ſhoes made of it, was now become " the leading politician, the ſcourge and " peſt of the republic." The *chorus* of the play ſalutes him with the moſt villainous titles. And an oracle is cooked up, which propheſieth that they ſhall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpower'd by a greater ſcoundrel than himſelf. A dealer in black-puddings is at laſt procured to be his competitor. The conteſt is carried on with all the ribaldry and ſcurrility that unbridled wit could forge for ſuch characters, and Cleon is at length defeated. This is the event upon the ſtage, but was by no means ſo in the *State* of Athens. The wit of Ariſtophanes ſeldom hurt knaves and ſcoundrels; it wounded and was miſchievous only to the ableſt miniſters and the warmeſt patriots.

" wanting in diſcernment, or confines it only to his own ſelfiſh views.
" He is wanting in diſcernment, if he imagines there is any other
" poſſible method of putting light into things that are future or un-
" ſeen; or confines it only to himſelf, if willing to recommend a
" ſcandalous meaſure, and conſcious he hath not eloquence enough
" to ſupport it openly, he lancheth out into plauſible calumnies, to
" intimidate his opponents as well as his audience.

" But odious beyond all ſupport is their procedure, who prema-
" turely condemn the advice of others as purchaſed and corrupt. For
" would they only acquieſce in the charge of ignorance, the defeated
" opponent goes off with the bare character of a man leſs inlightned
" indeed, but quite as honeſt. If he be charged with corruption,
" his point he may carry, but his honeſty will ever be ſuſpected;
" and if his point be loſt, he muſt paſs for knave and blockhead
" both. Such methods can never be conducive to the public good.
" The men, beſt able to adviſe, are by this means intimidated:
" Though the public welfare would then be beſt ſecured, if every
" perſon of ſo diſingenuous a temper was not able to open his mouth;
" for then, by his ſeducements, the public could never be miſled.
" But it is the duty of every true patriot to deſpiſe the ſlanders of
" opponents, and on fair and impartial views to get his own advice
" accepted. It is the duty of every well-regulated public, not in-
" deed to load a man with honours for having given the beſt advice,
" but, never to abridge him of his preſent portion; and, if he can-
" not prevail, by no means to diſgrace, much leſs to puniſh him:
" For then, neither would the ſucceſsful debater, from a view of in-
" hancing his own perſonal honours, ever ſpeak againſt conſcience,
" or aim merely at applauſe; nor would he, who hath been unſuc-
" ceſsful in his motions, be greedy of propoſing whatever may ca-
" jole, and ſo earn popularity for himſelf. But the method in vogue
" with us is the reverſe of this; and what is worſe, if a perſon be
" ſuſpected of corruption, tho' he adviſe the moſt prudent expedients,

" yet

" yet the odium raiſed againſt him upon the weak ſuggeſtion of
" lucre, quite weighs him down, and we are deprived of the mani-
" feſt ſervice he could do the *State*. Nay, ſuch is our method, that
" even the beſt advice, if readily offered, can eſcape ſuſpicion no
" more than the worſt. And hence, it is neceſſarily incumbent, as
" well upon him who would perſuade the public into the moſt pre-
" judicial meaſures, to ſeduce the people with art; as upon him who
" would adviſe the beſt, to diſguiſe the truth in order to prevail.
" Amidſt theſe jugglings, the public alone is debarred the ſervice of
" its moſt able counſellors, ſince in a plain and open method they
" cannot poſſibly act, and artifice muſt clear the way before them.
" For the man who openly beſtows any benefit upon it, is conſtantly
" ſuſpected of doing underhand a greater to himſelf.

" When affairs therefore of ſo high concern are before you, when
" the general temper is ſo over-run with jealouſy, we, who preſume
" to adviſe, muſt enlarge our proſpect farther than you, who only
" aſſiſt at a tranſient conſultation; becauſe we are accountable for
" what we propoſe, and you are not accountable for the prejudices
" with which you hear. For if not only he who propoſed, but he
" who complied, were equally anſwerable for events, your determi-
" nations would be better framed than they are at preſent. But now,
" hurried along as you are by your haſty reſentments on any ſiniſter
" event, you wreak your fury only upon the ſingle opinion of the
" perſon who adviſed, and not upon your own joint opinions, by con-
" currence of which the miſcarriage was incurred.

" For my part, I neither ſtand up to deny certain facts in favour
" of the Mitylenéans, nor to waſte the time in fruitleſs accuſations.
" We are not debating now what wrongs they have done us,
" ſince that would be a reproach to ſenſe; but what determination
" about them is beſt. For, tho' I can prove, beyond a ſcruple, that
" they have injured us in the moſt outrageous manner, yet I ſhall
" not for that reaſon adviſe you to butcher them, unleſs it be expe-

" dient; nor, were they objects of forgiveneſs, ſhould I adviſe for-
" giveneſs, unleſs I judged it for the intereſt of the public. I ap-
" prehend, that our conſultations turn more upon a future than a
" preſent view. And Cleon here moſt confidently aſſerts, that the
" ſureſt expedient of your future welfare is, to prevent all other re-
" volts by inflicting death in doom of this; but, equally confident
" of the juſt expedient of future ſecurity, I declare quite on the
" other ſide. And I intreat you, by no means to reject the real ad-
" vantage of mine for the ſpecious colourings of his advice. Strict
" juſtice, I grant, may be with him; and, enraged as you are
" againſt the Mitylenéans, may have a ſudden influence upon you.
" But we meet not here in judgment upon them, and juſtly to decide
" is not now our employment; we are only to conſult how to diſpoſe
" of them beſt for our own advantage.

" In the public communities of men, death is the penalty award-
" ed to ſeveral crimes, to ſuch as are not enormous like this, but of
" a leſs guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men run all ha-
" zards, and no one ever yet hath boldly incurred the danger, if
" ſelf-convinced beforehand, that he could not ſurvive the attempt.
" Where was the city ſo bent on revolt, that when its own domeſtic
" ſtrength, or the aid of others, were judged unequal to the work,
" durſt ever attempt it? The whole of mankind, whether indivi-
" duals or communities, are by nature liable to ſin: and a law of in-
" fallible prevention will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials
" have inforced all kinds of puniſhment, attentive, if poſſible, to re-
" ſtrain the outrages of the wicked. And in the early age it is pro-
" bable, that milder penalties were aſſigned for the moſt enormous
" wrongs; but, being found by experience ineffectual, they were af-
" terwards extended generally to loſs of life: This however is not yet
" effective. Some terror therefore muſt be invented, even more
" alarming than this, or this will never ſufficiently reſtrain. But then,
" there is a poverty which renders neceſſity daring; there is a power
" which

" which renders pride and inſolence rapacious. There are other con-
" tingencies, which, in the fervour of paſſions, as every human
" mind is poſſeſſed by ſome too ſtubborn to admit a cure, drive
" them on boldly to confront extremities. But the greateſt in-
" centives of all are hope and love: This points out a path, and
" that moves along according to direction: This thoughtleſly pro-
" poſeth the ſcheme, and that immediately ſuggeſteth a certainty of
" ſucceſs. Theſe are the ſources of all our evils; and theſe inviſible
" principles within us are too ſtrong for all the terrors that are ſeen
" without. To theſe add fortune, who contributes her ample ſhare
" to diveſt the mind of its balance. She ſhews herſelf by unexpected
" ſtarts, and encourageth even the incompetent to venture dangers,
" and hath a greater influence over communities, as the ends pro-
" poſed by them are of the greateſt concern, ſuch as liberty or do-
" minion, where every individual, amidſt the univerſal ardor, un-
" accountably plumes himſelf up, and acts with a ſpirit above him-
" ſelf. But in truth, it is quite impoſſible; it is a proof of egregious
" folly to imagine, when human nature is impelled by its own impe-
" tuous paſſions towards ſuch objects, that the force of laws or any
" intervening terror is ſtrong enough to divert them from the mark.
" Hence therefore ariſeth the ſtrongeſt diſſuaſive to us from confiding
" in the penalty of death as the only pledge of our future ſafety,
" which muſt betray us into weak prejudicial meaſures, which muſt
" drive all revolters into utter deſpair, by ſhewing them plainly,
" that we ſhall never accept repentance, ſhall not give them one
" moment's indulgence to palliate their offences.

" Conſider with yourſelves, in the merciful light, that a revolted
" city, when for certainty aſſured that it cannot hold out, may ſub-
" mit upon our own conditions, whilſt yet in a capacity to reimburſe
" our expences, and to advance the future tribute. But in the op-
" poſite caſe, can you imagine there is any city, which will not bet-
" ter prepare itſelf for revolt than Mitylene hath done, and hold out

" a ſiege

" a ſiege to the laſt extremity? Is there no difference between a
" quick and a ſlow ſubmiſſion? Shall not we be hurt, if forced
" through their deſpair, to continue a tedious and expenſive ſiege?
" and, when the place is taken, to be maſters only of one heap of
" deſolation, unable for the future to ſqueeze the leaſt pittance or
" revenue from it? It is revenue alone, which renders us a terror
" to our foes. We ought not therefore with the rigor of judges to
" inflict the exacteſt puniſhments upon theſe offenders. We ought
" rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate correction ſtill to
" preſerve thoſe cities in a full capacity of paying us the needful tri-
" bute. To keep men firm in their duty, we ſhould ſcorn the ex-
" pedient of ſevere and ſanguinary laws, ſince mild diſcretionary
" caution would better anſwer the purpoſe. This prudent conduct
" we are now reverſing, if, when re-poſſeſſed of a city ſtripped of
" its former liberty and ruled with violence, ſufficient motives of
" revolt, that it may again become independent; if now we judge,
" that this ought to be avenged with a weight of ſeverity. Men who
" have known what liberty is, ought not to be too ſeverely chaſtiſed,
" if they have dared to revolt; but, we ought to obſerve them with
" timely vigilance before they revolt, to prevent their taking the leaſt
" ſtep towards it, or even once entertaining a thought about it; at
" leaſt, when we have quelled the inſurrection, the guilt ſhould be
" faſtened upon as few as poſſible.

" Conſider, I beſeech you, with yourſelves, how greatly you will
" err in this, and in another reſpect, if Cleon's advice be approved.
" For now, the *populace* of all the cities are generally well-affected
" towards us. They either refuſe to concur with the *few* in their
" revolts; or, if their concurrence be forced, they inſtantly turn
" enemies to thoſe who forced them; — and you proceed to deter-
" mine the conteſt, aſſured that the *populace* of the adverſe city will
" be active in your favour. But if you doom to general exciſion the
" *people* of Mitylene, thoſe who had no ſhare in the revolt; who,

" when

" when once they had got arms into their hands, ſpontaneouſly de-
" livered up the place, —— you will be guilty, firſt of baſe ingrati-
" tude, for murdering your own benefactors, — and you will, next,
" eſtabliſh ſuch a precedent, as the factious *great* above all things
" wiſh to ſee. For then, whenever the latter effect the revolt of
" cities, they will inſtantly have the *people* attached to their party;
" ſince, you yourſelves have inforced the precedent, that puniſhment
" muſt fall upon the heads, not only of the guilty, but even of the
" innocent. Whereas indeed, tho' they had been guilty, we ought
" to have diſſembled our knowledge of it, that we might not
" force the only party which ever takes our ſide, into utter enmity
" and averſion. And I eſteem it much more conducive to the firm
" ſupport of empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may have
" felt, than in all the ſeverity of juſtice to deſtroy thoſe perſons
" whom in intereſt we ought to ſpare. And thus, that union of
" juſtice to others and duty to yourſelves in this inſtance of puniſh-
" ing the Mitylenéans, as alledged by Cleon, is plainly found to be
" groſly inconſiſtent, to be utterly impoſſible.

" Own yourſelves therefore convinced, that the greateſt advantages
" will reſult from the conduct which I have recommended; and,
" without giving too wide a ſcope to mercy or forbearance, by which
" I could never ſuffer you to be ſeduced, follow my advice and in
" purſuance of it reſolve —— " To judge and condemn, at your
" own diſcretion, thoſe guilty Mitylenéans whom Paches hath ſent
" hither to attend your deciſions, and to let the others continue as
" they are." Theſe are expedients of your future welfare and of
" immediate terror to your foes. For they who can form the
" ſoundeſt deliberations, ſtand ſtronger up againſt hoſtile oppoſition,
" than the men who ruſh to action with indiſcreet unpremeditating
" ſtrength."

Diodotus

The decree repealed.

Diodotus ended here. And when theſe two opinions, diametrically oppoſite to one another, had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a ſtiff conteſt in ſupport of each, and upon holding up of hands there ſeemed near an equality; but the majority proved at laſt to be along with Diodotus.

Notified but juſt in time.

Upon this they immediately ſent away another trireme, injoining all poſſible diſpatch, leſt this ſecond, not coming in time, might find the city already deſtroyed, as the other had got the ſtart of a day and a night. The Mitylenéan embaſſadors amply furniſhed them with wine and barley-cakes, and promiſed them great rewards, if they arrived in time. By this means they were ſo eager to accelerate the paſſage, that even whilſt plying the oar they eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil; and whilſt one half of the number refreſhed themſelves with ſleep, the other kept rowing amain. So fortunate were they that not one adverſe blaſt retarded their courſe. The former veſſel, as ſent on a monſtrous errand, had not haſtened its paſſage in the leaſt; and the latter was moſt intently bent on expedition. *That* indeed got before to Mitylene, but only long enough for Paches to read over the decree, and give orders for its immediate execution. At that criſis, the latter arriveth, and prevented the maſſacre. To ſuch an extremity of danger was Mitylene reduced.

The other Mitylenéans, whom Paches [6] had ſent to Athens as deepeſt concerned in the revolt, were there put to death, according to the advice of Cleon. And the number of theſe amounted to ſomewhat above a thouſand.

6 We hear no more in this hiſtory of Paches, who certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a great ſervice to his country, and had behaved through the whole affair with great diſcretion and humanity. And yet Plutarch tells us in two paſſages (in the *lives* of Ariſtides and Nicias) that at his return to Athens he was called to account for his conduct during this command, and finding he was going to be condemned, his reſentment and indignation roſe ſo high, that he inſtantly ſlew himſelf in court.

The Athenians, further, demoliſhed the walls of Mitylene and took away their ſhipping. They did not for the future enjoin an annual tribute upon the Leſbians, but dividing the whole iſland into ſhares (except what belonged to Methymne) three thouſand in the whole, they ſet apart three hundred of theſe as ſacred to the Gods, and ſent ſome of their own people who were appointed by lot, to take poſſeſſion of the reſt, as full proprietors. The Leſbians, as tenants of theſe, were obliged to pay them two * *Minæ* yearly for every ſhare, in conſideration of which they had ſtill the uſe of the ſoil. — The Athenians alſo took from them ſeveral towns upon the continent which had belonged to the Mitylenéans, and which continued afterwards in ſubjection to the Athenians. Thus ended the commotions of Leſbos.

* 6 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d. Sterling.*

Conqueſt of Minoa by Nicias.

The ſame ſummer, after the reduction of Leſbos — the Athenians, commanded by Nicias [7] the ſon of Niceratus, executed a deſign upon Minoa,

7 Nicias is now for the firſt time in the chief command, who is to act parts of very great importance in the ſequel of the war. We ſhould therefore take ſome notice of him on his firſt appearance. Plutarch, who hath wrote his *life*, gives light into ſeveral circumſtances, which fall not within the cognizance of a general hiſtorian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and was one of the moſt wealthy citizens. Beſide his eſtates, he had a large annual income from the ſilver mines at Laurium. Not that thoſe mines belonged to him, as one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patrimony of the *State*, annexed to it by Themiſtocles for the ſupport of the navy: But, as Xenophon relates, in his treatiſe of *revenue*, Nicias had a thouſand ſlaves conſtantly employed in working theſe mines. He hired them out to Soſias the Thracian, who was undertaker of the work, on condition to receive a clear *obole* a day for every one of them; and he always kept up the number. His income from hence was therefore near 2000 *l.* Sterling a year. He acted under Pericles ſo long as he lived; and, after his death, was ſet up by the more ſober and ſenſible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of his country, of unblemiſhed integrity, and very gentle and complacent in his manners. His good qualities were numerous and ſhining: His foibles were a great diffidence of himſelf, and a dread of the people, which made him court them by laying out his wealth in public games and ſhows for their entertainment. He had an inward fund of real piety; but was ſuperſtitiouſly attached to the ceremonial

Minoa, the iſland which lies before Megara. The Megaréans, having built a fort upon it, uſed it as a garriſon. But it was the ſcheme of Nicias, to fix the poſt of obſervation for the Athenians there, as being much nearer ſituated, and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. This would prevent the ſudden courſes of the Peloponneſians, frequent from thence; would curb the piratical cruizes; and, at the ſame time, ſtop all importations into Megara. Beginning therefore with the two forts detached from Niſæa, he took them by means of the engines he played againſt them from the ſea; and having thus opened the channel between them and the iſland, he took in by a wall of fortification that part of the main-land, from whence, only by croſſing the moraſs and the help of a bridge, a ſuccour could be thrown into the iſland, which lay at a very ſmall diſtance from the continent. This work was compleated in a few days, after which Nicias, leaving behind in the iſland a ſufficient garriſon to defend the works, drew off the reſt of his army.

Surrender of Platæa.

About the ſame time this ſummer, the Platæans, whoſe proviſions were quite ſpent, and who could not poſſibly hold out any longer, were brought to a ſurrender, in the following manner —— The enemy made an aſſault upon their wall, which they had not ſufficient ſtrength to repel. The Lacedæmonian general being thus convinced of their languid condition, was determined not to take the place by ſtorm. In this, he acted purſuant to orders ſent him from Lacedæmon, with a view, that whenever a peace ſhould be concluded

nial of the religion of his country. His great wealth drew a great number of followers and paraſites about him; and his benevolent diſpoſition was always ſeeking occaſions of doing good. In ſhort, ſays Plutarch, "bad men had a ſure fund "in his puſillanimity, and good men in "his humanity." No body could either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his intereſt there was great. He was always cautious and always diffident, and under ſuch an awe of the people in the general aſſemblies, that they would ſhout out to him by way of encouragement, as his modeſty was amiable and engaging when oppoſed to the impudence of Cleon. —— Thus much may ſuffice at preſent, ſince his military expeditions and the whole ſeries of his political conduct will be related by Thucydides.

with

with the Lacedæmonians, one certain condition of which muſt be reciprocally to reſtore the places taken in the war, Platæa might not be included in the reſtitution, as having freely and without compulſion gone over to them. A herald is accordingly diſpatched with this demand — " Whether they are willing voluntarily to give up the " city to the Lacedæmonians, and accept them for their judges who " would puniſh only the guilty, and contrary to forms of juſtice " not even one of thoſe." — The herald made this demand aloud. And the Platæans, who were now reduced to exceſſive weakneſs, delivered up the city.

Trial of the Platæans.

The Peloponneſians ſupplied the Platæans with neceſſary ſuſtenance for the ſpace of a few days, till the five delegates arrived from Lacedæmon, to preſide at their trial. And yet, when theſe were actually come, no judicial proceſs was formed againſt them. They only called them out, and put this ſhort queſtion to them — " Whether " they had done any ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in " the preſent war?" — Their anſwer was, that they begg'd permiſſion to urge their plea at large; which being granted, they pitched upon Aſtymachus the ſon of Aſopalaus and Laco the ſon of Aeimneſtus, who had formerly enjoyed the public hoſpitality of the Lacedæmonians, to be their ſpeakers, who accordingly ſtood forth, and pleaded thus ——

Speech of the Platæans.

" PLACING in you, O Lacedæmonians, an entire confidence, " we have delivered up our city; but never imagined we ſhould " be forced to ſuch a proceſs as this, when we expected only to " be tried by juſtice and laws — when we yielded to plead, not be- " fore other judges as is now our fate; but only before yourſelves. " Then indeed we thought, that juſtice might be obtained. — But " now, we have terrible grounds for apprehending, that we have " at once been doubly over-reached. Strong motives occur to alarm " our ſuſpicions, that the point moſt in view is to deprive us of our

" lives, and that you will not prove impartial judges. We cannot
" but be too certain of this, when no manner of crime is formally
" objected, againſt which we might form our defence; when
" barely at our own intreaty we are heard, and your conciſe demand
" is ſuch, that if we anſwer it with truth we condemn ourſelves; if
" with falſhood, muſt be inſtantly refuted.

" Thus on all ſides beſet with perplexities, ſomething of neceſſity
" muſt be ſaid in our own behalf; nay, where the danger is ſo ur-
" gent, the only ſmall glimpſe of ſecurity appears in hazarding a
" plea. For perſons like us diſtreſſed in ſilence to abandon their own
" defence — this may with ſad compunction torture them at laſt, as
" if their ſafety might have been earned by ſpeaking for themſelves—
" tho' never was perſuaſion ſo much to be deſpaired of as at pre-
" ſent. Were we indeed, who are the perſecuted party, entirely
" unknown to our judges, we might then alledge ſuch evidence as
" through ignorance you could not overturn, and ſo further our de-
" fence. But now we muſt ſpeak before men, who are informed of
" every point. Nor do our fears reſult from the prior knowledge
" you have had of us, as if you were now proceeding againſt us for
" having in valour been inferior to yourſelves; but, from our own
" ſad forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal which hath already
" condemned us, to gratify others. Yet, what we can juſtly ſay for
" ourſelves in regard to all our differences with the Thebans, we ſhall
" boldly alledge; the good ſervices we have done to you and to the
" reſt of Greece we ſhall fairly recite —— and ſtrive, if poſſible,
" to perſuade.

" To your conciſe demand —— Whether we have done any good
" ſervice in this war to the Lacedæmonians and their allies? —— we
" anſwer thus: " If you interrogate us as enemies, tho' we have
" done you no good, yet we have done you no harm; if you re-
" gard us as friends, you have offended more than we, in making
" war upon us." — In regard to the *peace* and againſt the *Mede*, we

" have

" have ever honeſtly performed our duty: The *peace* was not vio-
" lated firſt by us; againſt *him*, we alone of all the Bœotians, at-
" tended you in the field to maintain the liberty of Greece. For,
" tho' an inland people, we boldly engaged in the ſea-fight at Arte-
" miſium; and in the battle, fought upon this our native ground,
" we aſſiſted you and Pauſanias; and whatever the danger to which
" Greece, in that troubleſome period of time, was expoſed, in all
" we bore a ſhare beyond our ſtrength. To you in particular, O ye
" Lacedæmonians, in that greateſt conſternation Sparta ever felt,
" when after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had ſeized upon
" Ithome, we immediately diſpatched the third part of our force for
" ſuccour. Theſe things you are bound in honour never to forget.
" For thus upon former, and thoſe moſt critical occaſions, we with
" honour ſhew'd ourſelves your friends.——But at length we became
" your enemies! —— For that blame only yourſelves: Becauſe when
" we ſtood in great want of ſupport againſt the violence and oppreſ-
" ſion of the Thebans, to you we applied, and by you were rejected.
" You commanded us then to addreſs ourſelves to Athens. Athens,
" you ſaid, was near, but Sparta lay too remote to ſerve us. Yet,
" notwithſtanding this, in the preſent war we have committed no one
" diſhonourable act in regard to you, nor ſhould ever have committed.
" You injoined us indeed to revolt from the Athenians, and we re-
" fuſed to comply; but in this we have done no injuſtice. For they
" marched chearfully to our ſuccour againſt the Thebans, when you
" ſhrunk back; and to betray them afterwards had been baſe in us; in
" us, who were highly indebted to them, who at our own requeſt were
" received into their friendſhip, and honoured by them with the free-
" dom of Athens. No, it was rather our duty boldly to advance
" wherever they pleaſed to order. And whenever either you or the
" Athenians lead out your allies into the field, not ſuch as merely fol-
" low you, are to be cenſured for any wrong you may reſpectively
" commit, but thoſe who lead them out to its commiſſion.

" Manifold

" Manifold and notorious are the inſtances in which the Thebans
" have injured us. But outrageous above all is the laſt, about which
" you need no information, ſince by it we are plunged into this depth
" of diſtreſs. A right undoubtedly we had to turn our avenging
" arms upon men, who in the midſt of peace, and what is more,
" upon the ſacred monthly ſolemnity, feloniouſly ſeized upon our
" city. We obeyed herein that great univerſal law, which juſtifieth
" ſelf-defence againſt an hoſtile invader; and therefore cannot, with
" any appearance of equity, be now doom'd to puniſhment at their
" inſtigation. For, if your own immediate intereſt, and their pre-
" ſent concurrence with you in war, is to preſcribe and regulate
" your ſentence, you will ſhew yourſelves by no means fair judges
" of equity, but partially attached to private intereſt. What? tho'
" theſe incendiaries ſeem now a people well worth your gaining?
" There was a ſeaſon, a moſt dangerous and critical ſeaſon, when
" you yourſelves, and the other Grecians, were in different ſenti-
" ments. Now indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal blow
" at others; but at that ſeaſon, when the *Barbarian* ſtruck at in-
" ſlaving us all, theſe Thebans were then that *Barbarian*'s coadju-
" tors. And equitable certainly it is, that our alacrity at that ſeaſon
" ſhould be ſet in the balance againſt our preſent tranſgreſſions, if
" tranſgreſſors at preſent we have been. You then would find our
" greater merits quite outweighing our petty offences; and our me-
" rits to be dated at a time, when it was exceeding rare to ſee Gre-
" cian bravery ranged in oppoſition to the power of Xerxes; when
" praiſe was aſcribed, not to thoſe, who intent on ſelf-preſervation,
" dropped all the means of withſtanding his invaſion, but who choſe,
" thro' a ſeries of danger, courageouſly to execute the moſt glorious
" acts. Of this number are we, and as ſuch have been pre-emi-
" nently, moſt honourably diſtinguiſhed. And yet, from this ori-
" ginal we fear our ruin now may have taken its riſe, as we choſe to
" follow the Athenians from a regard to juſtice, rather than you

" from

" from the views of intereſt. But ſo long as the nature of things
" continues to be the ſame, you alſo ought to convince the world,
" that your ſentiments about them are not changed, that your prin-
" ciples ſtill ſuggeſt it to you as your greateſt intereſt, that whenever
" your gallant compatriots have laid upon you an obligation ſtrong
" enough to be eternally in force, ſomething on every preſent occur-
" rence ſhould be done for us by way of juſt acknowledgment.

" Reflect further within yourſelves, that you are now diſtinguiſhed
" by the body of Greece as examples for the upright diſintereſted
" conduct. Should you therefore determine in regard to us what in
" juſtice cannot be ſupported --- for the eyes of the world are now
" intent on your proceedings, and as judges applauded for their worth
" you ſit upon us whoſe reputation is yet unblemiſhed; take care
" that you do not incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent ſen-
" tence againſt valuable men, tho' you yourſelves are more to be va-
" lued; nor repoſit in her common temples thoſe ſpoils you have
" taken from us the benefactors of Greece. How horrible will it
" ſeem for Platæa to be deſtroyed by Lacedæmonians! that your fa-
" thers inſcribed the city upon the tripod of Delphos in juſtice to its
" merit, and that you expunged its very being from the community
" of Greece to gratify the Thebans! To ſuch exceſs of miſery have
" we been ever expoſed, that if the Medes had prevailed we muſt
" have been utterly undone; and now muſt be completely ruined by
" the Thebans, in the preſence of you who were formerly our moſt
" cordial friends! Two of the ſharpeſt, moſt painful trials we are
" to undergo, who but lately, had we not ſurrendered our city, muſt
" have gradually periſhed by famine; and now, ſtand before a tribu-
" nal to be ſentenced to death. Wretched Platæans, by all mankind
" abandoned! We, who beyond our ſtrength were once the ſupports
" of Greece, are now quite deſtitute, bereft of all redreſs! Not one
" of our old allies to appear in our behalf; and even you, O ye La-
" cedæmonians, you our only hope, as we have too much reaſon to
" apprehend, determined to give us up!

" But,

" But, by the Gods, who witneſſed once the ſocial oaths we mu-
" tually exchanged; by that virtue we exerted for the general welfare
" of Greece; by thoſe we adjure you to be moved with compaſſion,
" and to relent, if with the Thebans you are combined againſt us.
" In gratitude to us, beg the favour of *them*, that they would not
" butcher whom you ought to ſpare; demand ſuch a modeſt requital
" from them for your baſe concurrence, and intail not infamy upon
" yourſelves, to give others a cruel ſatisfaction. To take away our
" lives will be a ſhort and eaſy task; but then, to efface the infamy
" of it, will be a work of toil. You have no colour to wreak your
" vengeance upon us as enemies, who have ever wiſhed you well,
" and bore arms againſt you in mere ſelf-defence. Your deciſions
" can in no wiſe be righteous, unleſs you exempt us from the dread
" of death. Recollect in time, that you received us by free ſurren-
" der, that to you we held forth our hands; the law forbids Grecians
" to put ſuch to death; and that we have been from time immemo-
" rial benefactors to you. For caſt your eyes *there* upon the ſepul-
" chres of your fathers, who fell by the ſwords of the Medes, and
" were interred in this our earth: Theſe we have annually honoured
" with veſtments, and all ſolemn decorations at our public expence.
" Whatever hath been the produce of our ſoil, to them we have
" ever offered the firſt-fruits of the whole; as friends, out of earth
" that was dear to them; as companions, to thoſe who once fought
" together in the ſame field; and, leſt all this by a wrong determi-
" nation you inſtantly diſannul, maturely reflect. For Pauſanias in-
" terred them here, judging he had laid them in a friendly ſoil, and
" in the care of men with friendly diſpoſitions. If therefore you
" put us to death, and turn this Platæan into Theban ſoil, what is
" this but to leave your fathers and relations in a hoſtile land, and in
" the power of thoſe who murdered them, never again to receive
" the ſepulchral honours? Will you further inſlave the ſpot on
" which the Grecians earned their liberty? Will you lay deſolate the
" temples

" temples of thoſe Gods, to whom they addreſſed their vows before
" that battle againſt the Medes, and ſo were victorious? And, will
" you aboliſh the ſolemn ſacrifices, which thoſe gallant patriots have
" founded and appointed?

" It cannot, O Lacedæmonians, be conſiſtent with your glory, to
" violate the ſolemn inſtitutions of Greece, the memory of your own
" forefathers, and your duty to us your benefactors, *thus*, merely
" to gratify the malice of a hoſtile party, to put men to death who
" have never wrong'd you. No; but — to ſpare, to relent, to feel
" the juſt emotions of compaſſion, to recal the idea not only what
" miſeries we are deſigned to ſuffer, but what perſons we are for
" whom they are deſigned! and to remember the uncertain attack
" of calamity; upon whom, and how undeſervedly it may fall!
" To you, as in honour and neceſſity too obliged, we addreſs our
" intreaties; invoking aloud the Gods whom Greece at her common
" altars and with joint-devotion adores, — to accept our plea: alledg-
" ing thoſe oaths which your fathers have ſworn, — to pay them re-
" verence. We are ſuppliants now at the ſepulchres of your fathers;
" we call upon the dead repoſited there, to be ſaved from Thebans,
" that the kindeſt of friends, as we have been, may not be ſacri-
" ficed to the moſt deadly foes. Again, we recal to memory that
" day, in which having performed the moſt ſplendid atchievements
" in company with them, we are yet this day in danger of the moſt
" deplorable fate. Conclude we muſt — tho' 'tis hard for men in our
" diſtreſs to conclude; when the very moment their words are ended,
" their very lives are moſt imminently endangered: yet ſtill we inſiſt,
" that we ſurrendered not our city to the Thebans; rather than that
" we ſhould have choſe the moſt miſerable end by famine: but con-
" fiding in you, into your hands we gave it. And highly fitting
" it is, that, if we cannot prevail, you ſhould re-inſtate us in it, and
" leave us there at our own option to take our fate. But once more
" we conjure you, that we, who are citizens of Platæa, who have

" ſhewed ourſelves the moſt ſteddy patriots of Greece, and now, O " Lacedæmonians, your ſuppliants, — may not be turned over, out of " your hands, out of your protection, to the Thebans, our unre- " lenting enemies; — that you would become our ſaviours, and not " doom to utter deſtruction — the men to whom all Greece is in- " debted for her freedom."

In this manner the Platæans ſpoke; and the Thebans, fearing leſt their words might work ſo far upon the Lacedæmonians as to cauſe them to relent, ſtood forth, and declared a deſire to be alſo heard " ſince the Platæans, as they conceived, had been indulged in a much " longer diſcourſe, than was requiſite to anſwer the queſtion." Leave accordingly was given, and they proceeded thus —

Speech of the Thebans.

" WE ſhould not have requeſted your attention to any thing we " had to offer, if *theſe* Platæans had replied in brief to the queſtion, " and had not run out into ſlander and invective againſt us; — if " they had not defended themſelves in points quite foreign to the " purpoſe, and not at all charged againſt them as crimes; and " lanched forth into their own praiſe, uncenſured and unprovoked. " But now, it is incumbent upon us, in ſome points to contradict " and in ſome to refute, to prevent the bad effects which might re- " ſult, either from the criminations uttered againſt us, or the pom- " pous praiſe they have beſtowed upon themſelves; that you, under " proper information with whom the greater truth remains, may " fairly decide between us.

" Our enmity againſt them we openly avow, as it proceeded from " juſt and honourable motives; ſince to us, who were the founders " of Platæa, after we had gained poſſeſſion of Bœotia and of other " towns as well as Platæa, which, after being purged from extraneous " mixtures, remained in our juriſdiction, — theſe men diſdained to " pay ſubmiſſion, and ſcorned original and fundamental laws. They " wilfully

" wilfully divided from the other Bœotians, tranſgreſſing the laws
" of their country; and, when likely to be forced back into their
" duty, they went over to the Athenians, and in concert with them
" accumulated wrongs upon us, which have ſince been juſtly reta-
" liated upon them.

" But, when the *Barbarian* invaded Greece, they were the only
" Bœotians, who did not join the *Mede*. —— This *they* alledge, and
" hence they arrogate applauſe to themſelves, and laviſh their ca-
" lumnies upon us. We grant indeed they did not join the *Mede*;
" and the reaſon was, becauſe the Athenians did not join him. Yet
" afterwards, when with the ſame all-graſping ambition the Athe-
" nians invaded Greece, *they* were the only Bœotians then, who
" joined thoſe *Athenians*. But conſider further the reſpective ſituati-
" ons, from which ſuch conduct enſued in both. Our city at that
" time was not adminiſtred by the *few* who preſided with an equal
" and ſteddy rule, nor directed by the general voice of the *people*.
" Its ſtate was ſuch as with laws and ſound policy is quite incom-
" patible; it bordered cloſe upon a tyranny: the incroaching ambi-
" tion of a handful of men held faſt poſſeſſion of it. Theſe with
" no other view than the ſtrong eſtabliſhment of their own private
" authority in the ſucceſs of the *Mede*, by force over-awed the peo-
" ple, and opened their gates to the invader. This was not the act
" of a whole city, of a city maſter of its own conduct; nor ought
" ſhe to be reproached for offences committed in deſpite of her
" laws. But on the other hand, when the *Mede* was once repulſed
" and the city repoſſeſſed of her ancient polity, you ought then to con-
" ſider --- freſh invaſions being formed by the Athenians, projects at-
" tempted to bring the reſt of Greece and our dominions alſo into
" their ſubjection, ſedition fomented amongſt us by favour of which
" they ſeized the greater part --- whether in the field of Coronéa we
" fought them and prevailed, recovered the liberty of Bœotia, proceed
" even now with all alacrity, to regain their liberty for others, ſup-

" plying them with horſe and all other military proviſion, far be-
" yond any other confederate. Such is the apology we make for
" all the charge againſt us in having joined the *Mede*. But,--that
" *you* have been the moſt outrageous foes to Greece, and are moſt
" deſerving of whatever puniſhment can be inflicted upon you, we
" ſhall next endeavour to demonſtrate.

" In order to procure ſome revenge on us, it is your own plea,
" you became confederates and citizens of Athens." ---- Be it ſo.
" You ought then to have marched in their company only againſt
" us; you ought not to have followed them in their expeditions
" againſt others. Had your own wills been averſe to attend them
" on theſe occaſions, it was always in your power to have had re-
" courſe to that Lacedæmonian league, in which you concurred
" againſt the *Mede*, and about which you make at preſent the greateſt
" parade. That would have been amply ſufficient to turn aſide our
" enmity from you; and, what is above all, had ſecurely enabled
" you to rectify your meaſures. But it was not againſt your will,
" neither was it upon compulſion, that you have ſolely adhered to
" the Athenians.

But, then you rejoin -- " It was baſe to betray your benefactors."--
" Yet it was much more baſe and more enormous to betray at once the
" whole body of Grecians, with whom you had ſworn a mutual de-
" fence, than the ſingle Athenians; the Athenians truly have in-
" ſlaved your country; and the others would regain its freedom. You
" have not made your benefactors the requital which gratitude
" injoined, or which is exempted from reproach. ---- " Injured and
" oppreſſed you applied, it is pretended, to them for redreſs;"----
" and then you co-operated with them in oppreſſing others. But it
" is not more diſhonourable to be wanting in any act of gratitude,
" how juſtly ſoever it may be due, than to make the return in a
" manner in itſelf unjuſt. You yourſelves by acting thus have af-
" forded undeniable proofs, that you alone did not join the *Mede*,

" from

" from a zeal for the Grecians, but merely becauſe the Athenians
" did not join him. You were deſirous to act in concert with the
" latter, but in oppoſition to the former; and now modeſtly claim
" to be recompenſed by your *country*, for all the iniquitous ſervices
" you have done to a *party*. But, juſtice will never ſuffer this. To
" Athenians you gave the preference, ſtrive therefore from them to
" obtain redreſs. Ceaſe vainly to alledge the mutual oaths you once
" exchanged, as if they obliged at preſent to preſerve you: ---- You
" renounced, you violated firſt thoſe oaths, who rather concurred to
" inſlave the Æginetæ and ſome other people of the ſame aſſociation,
" than endeavoured to prevent it; and all without compulſion; ſtill
" happy in the uninterrupted poſſeſſion of your own rights, and not
" compelled to receive law from others, as was our fate. Nay, to
" the very laſt moment, before this blockade was formed againſt you,
" when we calmly invited you to be quiet and neutral, you inſo-
" lently refuſed. Which therefore is the people, on whom all
" Greece may faſten her hatred more deſervedly than on you, who
" have made it a point to exert your bravery in ruining your coun-
" try? Thoſe former good diſpoſitions you have ſo largely boaſted,
" you have now ſhewn plainly to be repugnant to your genius.
" What your natural turn hath ever been, the event hath with truth
" aſcertained. The Athenians took the road of violence, and you at-
" tended them through all the journey. —— And thus, ample proof
" hath been exhibited by us, that againſt our wills we ſerved the Per-
" ſian, and that you with moſt chearful diſpoſition have promoted
" the Athenian tyranny.

" But in regard to your finiſhing charge againſt us as guilty of
" exceſſive outrage and injuſtice:---" that, contrary to every law, in
" the midſt of peace, on a day of ſacred ſolemnity, we ſeized upon
" your city."— This great offence, in our opinion, is leſs to be im-
" puted to us than to yourſelves. Had we marched indeed againſt
" your city in a hoſtile manner, had we ſealed your walls and put

" your

" your property to fire and ſword, the charge had then been juſt.
" But if men, of the firſt rank amongſt you both for wealth and
" birth, deſirous to put a ſtop to your foreign combinations, and re-
" cal you to the common inſtitutions of all Bœotians; if ſuch at
" their own free motion invited our preſence, wherein are we unjuſt?
" For the leaders, in all caſes, are greater tranſgreſſors than the fol-
" lowers. Tho', in the *preſent*, neither are they in our judgments,
" nor are we tranſgreſſors. ----- They were citizens as well as you;
" they had larger concerns at ſtake; and therefore opening their gate
" and receiving us within their walls as friends and not as foes, they
" intended to prevent the corrupted part of your body from growing
" worſe, and protect the worthy and good according to their merit.
" They calmly ſtudied the welfare of your minds and your bodies,
" not ſuffering your city to become an alien, but recovering it again
" to its duty and relations, exempting it from being the foe of any
" honeſt Grecian, and re-uniting it in the bonds of amity with them
" all. --- There are proofs beſides, that we did not intermeddle in a
" hoſtile manner. We did no manner of violence to any one; we
" proclaimed aloud, that " whoever was deſirous to conform to the
" primitve inſtitutions of all Bœotians, ſhould come and join us."---
" You heard our voice with pleaſure; you came in and entered into
" articles with us; you remained for a time without diſturbance;
" but at length, having diſcovered the ſmallneſs of our number,
" and then perhaps we were judged to have proceeded inhumanly
" in preſuming to enter without the conſent of your populace, you
" then returned us not ſuch treatment as you had received from us,
" you made no remonſtrances againſt innovations, nor perſuaded us
" to depart, but in open breach of articles you ruſhed upon us. We
" lament not here ſo much the death of thoſe whom you ſlew in
" this baſe attack upon us; ſome colour of law might be alledged
" for their deſtruction: but, when contrary to every law in cold
" blood you murdered men, who had ſpread their arms for mercy,

" and

" and had ſurrendered themſelves priſoners on promiſe of their " lives,—was not that a monſtrous act? In one ſhort interval " of time you were guilty of three outrageous enormities, an " infraction of articles, the ſucceeding butchery of our people, " and a breach of the ſolemn promiſe made to us, that you would not " kill them, provided we refrained from plundering your lands. Yet " ſtill you cry aloud, that *we* are the breakers of law; you ſtill re- " monſtrate, that you are not debtors to juſtice. It is falſe. The " point, we preſume, will ſoon be determined right: And for theſe, " for all offences, you ſhall have your reward.

" We have thus diſtinctly run over this affair, for your ſakes, O " ye Lacedæmonians, as well as for our own; that you may be con- " vinced with how much equity you are going to condemn them, " and that we have purſued the offenders upon yet ſtronger obliga- " tions of juſtice. Let not the recital of their former virtues, if vir- " tues truly they ever had, mollify your hearts. Virtue ſhould " be pleaded by men who have ſuffered; but, on thoſe who have " committed baſeneſs, it ſhould redouble their puniſhment, becauſe " they ſin in foul contrariety to their former *ſelves*. Let them not " ſave themſelves by lamentations and pathetic complaints, tho' " they cried out ſo movingly upon the ſepulchres of your fathers, " and their own deſtitute forlorn condition. For to ſtop their cries " we have proved againſt them, that our youths when butchered by " them, met with a more cruel and unjuſt fate: thoſe youths, ſome " of whoſe fathers, reconciling Bœotia with you, died in the field " of Coronéa; the reſt, now advanced in years, bereft of their " children, their houſes deſolate, preſer a ſupplication far more juſt " to you, to avenge them upon *theſe* Platæans. Thoſe are moſt de- " ſerving of pity, who have ſuffered ſome great indignity; but when " vengeance is duly inflicted on ſuch men as theſe Platæans, the " world hath cauſe to triumph. Their preſent deſtitute forlorn con- " dition is the work of themſelves. They wilfully rejected a better

" alliance;

" alliance; and, tho' uninjured, broke every law againſt us; exe-
" cutioners of hatred more than juſtice, tho' now about to ſuf-
" fer leſs than the precedent they ſet requireth. For they ſhall be
" executed by lawful ſentence; not like men who with ſtretched-
" out hands obtained fair quarter, as they deſcribe themſelves, but
" who ſurrendered on this condition — to ſubmit to juſtice.

" Avenge therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of Greece ſo
" groſly violated by them. Retaliate all the injuries we have ſuffered,
" requiting ſo that chearful friendſhip we have ever ſhewn you;
" and let not *their* flow of words overturn *our* juſt demands. Make
" now a precedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Shew them, that
" deciſions muſt be formed, not according to what men may ſay,
" but according to what they have done: If their actions have been
" right, that a ſhort ſimple narration may at any time ſuffice: But,
" if thoſe actions have been wrong, that all ſtudied ornamental pe-
" riods are intended to diſguiſe the truth. If thoſe who preſide at
" judgments, as you at preſent, would proceed in a ſummary way,
" to a general determination againſt the guilty, little room would be
" left to diſguiſe unjuſtifiable actions by plauſible ſpeeches."

The Platæans *put to death.*

In this manner the Thebans replied; and the Lacedæmonian judges agreed in the reſolution, that the queſtion — " Whether they " had received any good ſervice from them in the war? — was properly and fairly conceived. They grounded this, upon the former propoſal made them to remain neutral according to the old treaty of Pauſanias after the *Mediſh* invaſion, and upon another more lately, which they had offered before they blocked them up, to be common friends to both ſides in conformity to the ſame treaty. But after this double refuſal, looking upon themſelves as no longer bound to obſerve thoſe articles, which others had deliberately infringed to traverſe their intereſt, — they now proceed again to bring them forwards man by man, and put the queſtion ---- " Whether they had " done

" done good ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and allies in the preſent " war?"---and upon their anſwering *No*, led them aſide and ſlew them. Not one of the number did they exempt; ſo that in this maſſacre there periſhed of Platæans not fewer than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians who had been beſieged in their company; and all the women were ſold for ſlaves. The Thebans aſſigned the city, for the ſpace of a year, to be the reſidence of certain Megaréans, who had been driven from home in the rage of a ſedition, and to thoſe ſurviving Platæans who had been friends to the Theban intereſt. But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, rooted up its whole foundation, and near to Juno's temple erected a ſpacious inn two hundred feet ſquare, partitioned within both above and below into a range of apartments. In this ſtructure they made uſe of the roofs and doors that had belonged to the Platæans; and of the other moveables found within their houſes, of the braſs and iron, they made beds which they conſecrated to Juno, in whoſe honour they alſo erected a fane of ſtone one hundred feet in diameter. The land, being confiſcated to public uſe, was farmed out for ten years, and occupied by Thebans. So much, nay ſo totally averſe to the Platæans were the Lacedæmonians become; and this, merely to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to ſerve them in the war which was now on foot. [8] And thus was the deſtruction of

Platæa *razed by the* Thebans.

8 Thucydides hath here been very ſparing of his cenſure. Nothing bad enough can be ſaid of the Lacedæmonian behaviour on this occaſion. To put brave men to death coolly and deliberately, who had moſt gallantly defended themſelves, and merely for their ſteddy attachment to liberty and the Athenians were hated by the Thebans, ſhews the public ſpirit of Spartans at this time to have been none at all. — The city of Platæa, thus barbarouſly demoliſhed, was rebuilt after the peace of Antalcidas, which put an end to the Peloponneſian war. But no long time after it was again demoliſhed by the Thebans, for a refuſal to join them againſt the Lacedæmonians. However, Alexander the great once more re-eſtabliſhed it, in a generous acknowledgment of the ſervices that little *State* had rendered to Greece; and the Platæans continued, even in the time of Plutarch, to celebrate the annual feſtival in honour of thoſe, who at the famous battle of Platæa had died for the liberties of Greece.

Platæa compleated in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens.

Alcidas returns with his fleet.

The forty ſail of Peloponneſians, which had been ſent to the relief of Leſbos, after flying through the open ſea to avoid the purſuit from Athens, were driven by a tempeſt on the coaſt of Crete; and from thence they ſeparately drop'd into Cyllene a Peloponneſian harbour, where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Braſidas the ſon of Tellis ſent thither purpoſely to aſſiſt Alcidas with his counſel. It was now the project of the Lacedæmonians, ſince they had miſcarried at Leſbos, to augment their fleet, and ſail immediately for Corcyra now embroiled in ſedition, as there were no Athenians in thoſe parts, excepting only twelve ſhips which were ſtationed at Naupactus — and thus their deſign might be effectuated, before a fleet large enough to obſtruct them could be ſent from Athens. —— This was their plan, and Braſidas and Alcidas prepared for its execution.

The ſedition of Corcyra.

The Corcyréans were now embroiled in a ſedition, excited by the return of the priſoners, whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval engagements of Epidamnus. They had obtained their releaſe, as was publicly given out, for the ſum of * eighty talents, for the payment of which their former friends at Corinth had joined in a ſecurity; but in fact, for a ſecret promiſe they had made the Corinthians, to put Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their engagements, they tampered with every ſingle Corcyréan, in order to bring about a revolt from the Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian ſhip arrived at the ſame time with embaſſadors on board. Theſe were admitted together to an audience, at which the Corcyréans decreed, "to maintain their alliance with the Athenians according to treaty, — but "to be friends to the Peloponneſians as in preceding times." Pythias, who at that time was at the head of the *people*, entertained and lodged the Athenians without the public warrant. And therefore againſt him the accomplices prefer an accuſation, as plotting how to ſubject

* 1550 *l. Sterling.*

ſubject Corcyra to Athenian ſlavery. Pythias being acquitted, in his turn exhibits a charge againſt five of the moſt conſiderable of their number, for having cut pales in the ſacred grove of Jupiter and Alcinus. The fine for every pale was by law a **ſtater*. Being condemned to pay the whole, they fled into the temples and ſat down as ſupplicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, who was alſo ſtrong in the ſenate, gets a freſh order to have it levied in all the rigor of law. Thus debarred of any legal redreſs, and conſcious further that Pythias, ſo long as he continued in the ſenate, would prevail upon the *people* to declare thoſe their friends and thoſe their foes who were ſo to Athens, — they riſe up from ſanctuary, and ſeizing daggers ruſh ſuddenly into the ſenate-houſe, where they ſtab Pythias and others both ſenators and private perſons, to the number of ſixty. Some few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, ſaved themſelves on board the Athenian veſſel, which yet lay in the harbour.

* 1 *l.* 0 *ſ.* 9 *d.*

After this bold aſſaſſination, they ſummoned the Corcyréans to aſſemble immediately, where they juſtified their proceedings "as moſt "highly for the public good, and the only expedient of preventing "Athenian ſlavery; — adviſing them "for the future to receive "neither of the rival-parties, unleſs they came peacefully in a ſingle "veſſel; if in more, to declare them enemies;" and in concluſion, they forced the ratification of whatever they had propoſed. They alſo inſtantly diſpatch embaſſadors to Athens, repreſenting the neceſſity they lay under to act as they had done; and to perſuade thoſe who had fled for refuge thither, not to ruſh into ſuch meaſures as might hurt the welfare of their country, from a dread of the miſeries which might thence enſue.

When theſe embaſſadors were arrived at Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their adherents under an arreſt as enemies to the *State*, and ſent them priſoners to Ægina.

In the mean time, thoſe of the Corcyréans who had thus ſeized the government, animated by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a Lacedæmonian embaſſy, attack the *people* and overpower them in battle. The *people*, by favour of the night which approached, fly to the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, where they drew up together and ſecured their poſts; they alſo got poſſeſſion of the Hyllaic harbour. But their opponents ſeized the forum where moſt of their own houſes were ſituated, and the harbour which points towards the forum and the continent.

The day following, they ſkirmiſhed a little with their miſſive weapons, and both parties ſent out detachments into the fields, to invite the concurrence of the ſlaves, upon a promiſe of their freedom. A majority of ſlaves came in to the aſſiſtance of the *people*, and the other party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

After one day's reſpite, they come again to blows. The *people* get the better now, by the advantage of their ſtrong poſts and their numbers. The women with notable boldneſs aſſiſted in the combat, by throwing tiles from the tops of the houſes, and ſuſtaining the tumult beyond their ſex. About the cloſe of the evening, the *few* were forced to fly, and then apprehenſive, leſt the *people* ſhould ruſh down upon and ſo at a ſhout ſeize the dock and put them to the ſword, in order to ſtop their paſſage, they ſet fire to the houſes all round the forum and to ſuch as were adjacent, ſparing neither their own nor thoſe of their enemies. The large effects of the merchants were conſumed in the flames, and the whole city was in danger of being reduced to aſhes, had a gale of wind aroſe to drive the flame that way. This put a ſtop to the conteſt and brought on a ceſſation, when both ſides applied themſelves to a ſtrict guard, for the night. The Corinthian veſſel, after this victory on the ſide of the *people*, ſtole privately away; and many of the auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repaſſed to the oppoſite ſhore.

The day following, Nicoſtratus the ſon of Diotrephes, who commanded the Athenian ſquadron, comes up to their aſſiſtance with his twelve ſail from Naupactus and five hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians. He forthwith negotiated an accommodation, and perſuades them to make up the affair with one another, by inſtantly condemning the ten principal authors of this ſedition (who immediately fled,) and permitting all others to continue in the city, upon articles ſigned between both parties and the Athenians--- "to have the ſame friends "and the ſame foes." Having ſo far carried his point, he was intent on immediate departure. But the managers for the *people* made him a propoſal, to leave five ſhips of his ſquadron with them, to deter the enemy from any freſh commotion, which ſhould be replaced by five of their own, which they would inſtantly man to attend him on his ſtation. With this propoſal he complied; and they named diſtinctly the mariners, who to a man were of the oppoſite party. Affrighted at this, as a pretext to convey them to Athens, they ſit down in the temple of the Dioſcuri. Nicoſtratus endeavoured to raiſe them up and to chear their deſpondency. Yet all he could ſay was unavailing; and the people run again to arms, pretending that ſuch a refuſal to put to ſea was a plain proof, that their intentions were inſincere throughout. Then they rifled their houſes of all the arms they could find; and ſome of them who fell into their hands, had immediately been butchered, if Nicoſtratus had not interpoſed.

A ſecond party, terrified at theſe proceedings, take their ſeats alſo as ſuppliants in the temple of Juno. The number of theſe was not leſs than four hundred. The *people*, grown now apprehenſive of ſome fatal turn, perſuade them to leave their ſanctuary; and having prevailed, tranſport them into that iſland which faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing needful for their ſuſtenance was carefully ſent them.

The ſedition continuing in this poſture, about the fourth or fifth day after the tranſportation of the latter body into the iſland, the Peloponneſian

loponnefian ſhips, which had aſſembled at Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in ſight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas was commander in chief as before, and Braſidas attended as his council. They came to anchor in the harbour of Sybota on the main; and next morning, at break of day, ſteered directly for Corcyra.

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra: They were afraid of the malecontents within, and the hoſtile fleet approaching the city. They got ſixty ſhips immediately on float, and each ſo faſt as it was manned advanced to meet the foe. The Athenians indeed propoſed, to put out firſt to ſea themſelves; and, that the Corcyréans ſhould afterwards come out and join them, when they had got all their ſhips together. But, as they advanced in a ſtraggling manner towards the enemy, two ſhips went over directly to them; and on board others the mariners were at blows with one another. In ſhort, there was no manner of order in any of their motions. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving how it was, with twenty of their ſhips drew up to engage the Corcyréans, and oppoſed the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of which were only the *Salaminian* and the *Paralus*.

The Corcyréans, who charged in this diſorderly manner and with few ſhips in a line, were on their ſide terribly diſtreſſed; whilſt the Athenians, fearing, leſt the other, vaſtly ſuperior in number, might quite ſurround their little ſquadron, would not venture to attack them when altogether, nor to break upon the middle of the enemy's line; but, aſſaulting them towards one of the extremities, ſink one of their ſhips. Upon this, the Peloponneſians having formed a circle, the Athenians ſailed round and round, and endeavoured to break their order. Thoſe who purſued the Corcyréans perceiving this, and fearing what had happened formerly at Naupactus, ſteered away from thence to ſupport their own ſquadron. And now, with their whole embodied ſtrength, they deſigned to pour upon the Athenians. *They*, having already ſhifted the helm, fell gradually away. They were deſirous to favour the flight of the Corcyréans beyond the poſſi-

bility

bility of a chace, and ſo they fell off entirely at their own leiſure, keeping the enemy in their front ſtill ranged in order. Such was this engagement, which at the ſetting of the ſun was quite ended.

The Corcyréans were afraid leſt the enemy in proſecution of their victory, ſhould immediately aſſault the city, or take up the perſons in the iſland, or by ſome other method attempt to diſtreſs them. For this reaſon, they removed the priſoners again from the iſland into the temple of Juno, and applied themſelves to guard the city. But the enemy, tho' victorious at ſea, durſt not think of proceeding to attack the city; but ſatisfied with taking thirteen ſhips belonging to the Corcyréans, they returned to the main, from whence they had ſallied to the engagement. The next day alſo, they refrained from making any attempt upon the city, where the diſorder and conſternation were as great as ever. Braſidas is reported urgently to have preſſed it upon Alcidas, but in the council of war was quite overruled. They landed however at cape Leucymne, and plundered the country.

The Corcyréan *people*, whoſe fears were ſtill ſuggeſting that they ſhould be attacked by the enemy's fleet, had conſer'd with the ſuppliants and others, about the only means to preſerve the city. And ſome of them they perſuaded to join in navigating their ſhips; for by ſome means or other they had again manned thirty, expecting every moment the enemy's approach. But the Peloponneſians continued the ravage of their fields only till noon, and then repaſſed to their former ſtations. Yet before the dawn of the ſucceeding day, they ſaw ſixty lights held up, to denote an equal number of Athenian ſhips advancing from Leucas. The Athenians, advertiſed of the ſedition and the courſe of the fleet under Alcidas againſt Corcyra, had ſent away this reinforcement under the command of Eurymedon the ſon of Thucles. Upon this, the Peloponneſians, whilſt yet it was night, crept homewards along the ſhore, and carrying their veſſels

over

over the iſthmus of Leucas, leſt they ſhould be diſcovered in going round it, are ſafely retreated within their own confines.

When the Corcyréans had diſcovered the approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and the departure of the enemy, they received the Meſſenians within their walls who till now had lodged without; and, having ordered the ſhips which they had mann'd to come about into the Hyllaic harbour, whilſt they were going about in purſuance of this order, they put all the adverſe faction whom they found to the ſword. Thoſe further, who had took on in the ſhips at their perſuaſion, they threw into the ſea and then retired. They afterwards went to Juno's temple, and perſuaded a party of ſuppliants there to the amount of fifty, to undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all condemned to die. The majority of ſuppliants, who refuſed to hear ſuch perſuaſion, no ſooner ſaw the fate of their brethren, than they either ſlew one another within the temple, or hung themſelves up upon the trees within its verge; each finding ſome expedient for his own diſpatch. During thoſe ſeven days that Eurymedon with his reinforcement continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended the maſſacre to all whom they judged their enemies. The crime, on which they juſtified their proceedings, was *their* attempt to overturn the *democracy*.

Some periſhed merely through private enmity; ſome, for the ſums they had lent, by the hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death was here exhibited. Every dreadful act uſual in a ſedition, and more than uſual, was perpetrated now. For fathers ſlew their children; ſome were dragged from altars; and ſome were butchered at them. And a number of perſons immured in the temple of Bacchus were ſtarved to death. So cruel was the progreſs of this ſedition, and ſo exceſſively cruel did it appear, becauſe the firſt of ſo black a nature that ever happened. But afterwards the contagion ſpread, one may ſay, thro' the whole extent of Greece, when factions raged in every city, the *popular* demogogues contending for the Athenians,

Athenians, the aſpiring *few* for the Lacedæmonians. In peace, it is true, they were void of all pretext, of all opportunity to invite theſe rivals. But now, amidſt declared hoſtilities, and the queſt of alliance to afflict their enemies and add an increaſe of ſtrength to themſelves, opportunities were eaſily found by ſuch as were fond of innovations to introduce the ſide they favoured. The conſequence of this was ſedition in cities, with all its numerous and tragical incidents. Such were now, and ſuch things ever will be ſo long as human nature continues the ſame; but under greater or leſs aggravations and diverſified in circumſtances, according to the ſeveral viciſſitudes of conjunctures, which ſhall happen to occur. In the ſeaſons of peace and affluence, communities as well as individuals, have their tempers under better regulation, becauſe not liable to that violence which flows from neceſſity. But war, which ſnatcheth from them their daily ſubſiſtence, is the teacher of violence, and aſſimilates the paſſions of men to their preſent condition.

By theſe means were cities haraſſed with ſeditions. And thoſe, to whoſe fate the later commotions fell, through enquiry what had happened in ſuch inſtances before, grew enormouſly ambitious to ſuppreſs the machinations of others, both in policy of attempts and extravagance of revenge. Even words loſt now their former ſignificance, ſince to palliate actions they were quite diſtorted. For, truly, what before was a brutal courage, began to be eſteemed that fortitude which becomes a human and ſociable creature; prudent conſideration, to be ſpecious cowardice; modeſty, the diſguiſe of effeminacy; and being wiſe in every thing, to be good for nothing. The hot fiery temper was adjudged the exertion of true manly valour; cautious and calm deliberation, to be a plauſible pretext for intended knavery. He who boiled with indignation, was undoubtedly truſty; who preſumed to contradict, was ever ſuſpected. He who ſucceeded in a roguiſh ſcheme was wiſe; and he who ſuſpected ſuch practices in others, was ſtill a more able genius. But, was he

provident enough, ſo as never to be in need of ſuch baſe expedients; he was one that would not ſtand to his engagements and moſt ſhamefully awed by his foes. In ſhort, he who could prevent another in executing villainy, or could perſuade a well-deſigning perſon to it, was ſure to be applauded.

Men now, who were allied in blood, were leſs valued or careſſed, than ſuch as were connected by voluntary combination; ſince the latter, unſcrupulous and uninquiſitive, were more ready to embark in any ſcheme whatever. For now aſſociations were not formed for ſuch mutual advantage as is conſiſtent with, but for the execution of ſuch rapines as are contrary to human laws. In mutual truſt they perſiſted, not out of any regard to religious obligation, but from the bond of communicated guilt. To the fair and honeſt propoſals of adverſaries they hearkened indeed, when ſuch by active ſtrength could control them, but never through candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another was a more valued poſſeſſion than never to have ſuffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for preſent reconciliation, had a temporary force, ſo long as neither knew how to break them; but never, when either party had power to abet their violation. He who, at inviting opportunity, durſt firſt incur the perjury, if the adverſary was off his guard, executed his rancour with higher ſpirit, than from enmity open and avowed. Such a ſtep was thought moſt ſecure; and, becauſe he had thus ſurpaſſed in guile, it was certainly extolled as a maſter-piece of cunning. Large is the number of villains, and ſuch obtain more eaſily the reputation of dexterity than their dupes can that of goodneſs: The latter are apt to bluſh; the former moſt impudently triumph.

The ſource of all theſe evils is a thirſt of power, in conſequence either of rapacious or ambitious paſſions. The mind, when actuated by ſuch, is ever ready to engage in party-feuds. For the men of large influence in communities avowing on both ſides a ſpecious cauſe, ſome ſtanding up for the juſt equality of the *popular*, others for the fair

fair decorum of the *ariſtocratical* government, by artful ſounds embaraſſed thoſe communities for their own private lucre. Both ſides, intent on victory, carried on the contention with the keeneſt ſpirit. They moſt daringly projected, and then regularly executed the moſt dreadful machinations. Their revenge was not limited by juſtice or the public welfare; it aimed at more ample ſatisfaction. Either ſide conſtantly meaſured it by ſuch retaliation as was judged the ſweeteſt, either by a capital condemnation through an iniquitous ſentence, or by earning the victory with their own hands, in which they were always ready to glut the preſent rancour of their hearts. And hence it was, that the pious and upright conduct was on both ſides diſregarded. And, when any point of great importance was before them, to carry it by ſpecious colluſive oratory was the greateſt enhancement of their credit. Yet all this while, the moderate members of ſuch communities, either hated becauſe they would not meddle, or envied for ſuch obnoxious conduct, fell victims to both.

Seditions in this manner introduced every ſpecies of outrageous wickedneſs into the Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is moſt frequently to be found in generous tempers, was laughed out of countenance and for ever vaniſhed. It was become the univerſal practice, to keep up a conſtant enmity of intention againſt one another, and never to believe. No promiſe was ſtrong enough, no oath ſufficiently ſolemn, to baniſh ſuch mutual diffidence. Thoſe who excelled in ſhrewd conſideration, reſigned all hope of any laſting ſecurity, and ſtood ever on their guard againſt whom it was impoſſible for them to truſt. But perſons of meaner underſtandings took more effectual methods for their preſervation. Living in conſtant apprehenſions, from their own inferiority and the craft of their opponents, leſt by words they ſhould be over-reached, or that ſuch ſubtle heads might execute their treacheries upon them unawares, they boldly ſeized the preſent moment, and at once diſpatched the men they dreaded; who, preſuming too much on their own penetration, and that it was ſuper-

fluous to aim a blow at thoſe whom they could at any time ſupplant by cunning, deſpiſed them ſo far as to neglect a proper guard, and ſo contributed to their own deſtruction.

Many ſuch daring outrages were now by way of precedent committed at Corcyra; nay all whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge upon ſuch as before were their maſters, and had exerted their ſuperiority with ſavageneſs more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upon them, were executed there.—Some joined in theſe acts of violence to procure a diſcharge from their former poverty; but the greater number, through a paſſionate deſire to ſeize the property of their neighbours. Or, tho' they were not lured by the luſt of rapine, but engaged in the conteſt upon fair and open views, yet hurried to wild extravagance through mad and undiſciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole order of human life was for a ſeaſon confounded in this city. The human temper, too apt to tranſgreſs in ſpite of laws, and now having gained the aſcendant over law, ſeemed pleaſed with exhibiting this public manifeſtation, that it was too weak for anger, too ſtrong for juſtice, and an enemy to all ſuperiority. Men could not otherwiſe have awarded the preference to revenge over righteous duty, and to lucre over that habit of juſtice in which envy never yet had power to annoy them. But more than this, when the point in view is revenge upon others, men haughtily make precedents againſt themſelves, by infringing thoſe laws which are binding by the ties of nature, and from which alone any hope of ſafety can be extracted for themſelves in a plunge of miſery, precluding thus all poſſibility of redreſs, ſhould they be reduced in ſome future extremity to make the ſame appeal.

And thus the Corcyréans continued to execute the rage of ſuch cruel paſſions, upon the heads of one another, within the precincts of their own city, of which this was the firſt example in Greece, till Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet under his command put out again to ſea.

But,

But, after his departure, they who by flight had preſerved their lives, to the number of about five hundred, having ſeized their forts upon the oppoſite ſhore, got poſſeſſion of their own land, on that ſide the water. Putting out hence, they plundered the Corcyréans in the iſland, and made ſuch havoc that a violent famine enſued in the city. They further ſent a deputation to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to negotiate the means of their reſtoration. But nothing of this kind ſucceeding, they got together afterwards a body of auxiliaries and tranſports, and ſo paſſed over to the iſland of Corcyra, to the amount of ſix hundred men. Having now ſet fire to their tranſports, to preclude every other expedient but gaining firm footing where now they were, they marched up to the mountain Iſtone, and having fortified themſelves there, made cruel work with thoſe in the city, and were maſters of the country round about.

About the end of the ſame ſummer, the Athenians ſent out twenty ſail for Sicily, under the command of Laches the ſon of Melanopus and Charœadas the ſon of Euphiletus. A war was now on foot between the Syracuſans and Leontines. Confederate with the Syracuſans were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, which had formerly entered into alliance with the Lacedæmonians before this war broke out, but had yet no where effectually joined them. With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrians ſided with the Syracuſans; and the Rhegians, from the motive of conſanguinity, with the Leontines. The allies therefore of the Leontines ſent to Athens, [9] petitioning the Athenians in

Sicily.

9 One of the perſons, or the chief, employed on this occaſion, is ſaid to be Gorgias of Leontium, the firſt rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his audience from the Athenians to deliver the reaſons of his embaſſy, he made a ſpeech ſo ſmooth and flowing, ſo new in the manner of its turns, ſo pretty in the expreſſion, and ſo nicely diverſified by a change and oppoſition of figures, that he won their hearts, and ſucceeded in his negotiation. Our hiſtorian indeed who takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reaſons juſt after for the ready compliance of the Athenians

in reſpect of their old alliance and their Ionic deſcent, to ſend them a ſuccour of ſhipping: For the Syracuſans had now blocked them up both by land and ſea. The Athenians immediately ſent one, giving out that they were bound in duty to take this ſtep; but their real motive was, to prevent the exportation of corn from thence to Peloponneſus, and alſo to ſound the poſſibility of bringing Sicily into their own ſubjection. Their ſquadron therefore, arriving at Rhegium on the Italian ſhore, ſupported their allies in the preſent war; and in this the ſummer ended.

The plague rageth again at Athens.

In the beginning of the winter, the plague broke out a ſecond time at Athens, not that during this whole interval of time it had wholly ceaſed, tho' its rage had very much abated. But now the mortality began again and continued not leſs than a year; but the former had raged for the ſpace of two. There was nothing which lay upon the Athenians ſo hard as this, or ſo much impaired their ſtrength. It appeared from the muſter-rolls, that there periſhed four thouſand and four hundred of thoſe citizens who wore the heavy-armour, and three hundred of the *horſemen*. The number of the lower people that died, was not to be computed.—There happened at the ſame time many earthquakes: at Athens; in Eubœa; amongſt the Bœotians, and eſpecially at the Bœotian Orchomenus.

Sicily.

The ſame winter the Athenians and Rhegians, on the coaſt of Sicily, form an expedition with thirty ſail, againſt thoſe which are called the iſles of Æolus. This was not feaſible in the ſummer-ſeaſon, for want of water. Theſe iſles are inhabited by the Liparéans, who were a colony from Cnidus. Their reſidence is chiefly in one of them called Liparé, tho' by no means large. They go from hence to the tillage of the others, Didymé and Strongylé and Hiera,

nians on this occaſion. It is a ſtep, which draws great conſequences after it. Thucydides in the ſequel will open all the plan, and give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, into which the Athenians are beginning to embark.

It

It is believed by thoſe people, that Vulcan [1] keeps his forge in Hiera, becauſe in the night it viſibly throws forth a great quantity of fire, and in the day of ſmoke. Theſe iſles are ſituated over-againſt the ſhore of the Siculi and the Meſſenians, and were allied with Syracuſe. The Athenians having plundered the ſoil, and finding the inhabitants would not come in, put back again to Rhegium. —— And here the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, the hiſtory of which Thucydides hath compiled.

YEAR VI.

THE following ſummer, the Peloponneſians and confederates aſ- *Before* Chriſt 426. ſembled at the Iſthmus, in order to make the uſual inroad into Attica; and Agis ſon of Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, was there ready for the command. But the frequent earthquakes which happened about this time, cauſed them to return back, and entirely put a ſtop to the deſigned incurſion. *Earthquakes.*

About the ſame ſpace of time, ſhocks of earthquakes were felt in Eubœa, where at Orobiæ the ſea breaking over what was then land with impetuous ſwells, laid a part of that city under water: Some of which ſtagnated there, tho' ſome waſhed its way back; however a tract now continues ſea which before was land. All thoſe, who could not reach the higher grounds in time, by running before the ſurge, were drowned. — A ſimilar inundation happened at the iſle of Atalanta, amongſt the Locrians of Opus, where it waſhed away the

1 So Virgil, l. viii. 416.

Inſula Sicanium juxta latus Æoliamque
Erigitur Liparen fumantibus ardua ſaxis:
Quam ſubter ſpecus & Cyclopum exeſa caminis
Antra Ætnæa tonant, validique incudibus ictus
Auditi referunt gemitum, ſtridunteque cavernis
Stricturæ Chalybum, & fornacibus ignis anhelat;
Vulcani domus, & Vulcania nomine tellus.

Athenian

Athenian fort, and of two veſſels that lay dry upon the beach ſtaved one to pieces. —— At Peparethus alſo the ſurge of the ſea roſe very high, but did not overflow. An earthquake however demoliſhed
* Prytanéum. part of the fortification, * the town-houſe, and ſome few dwelling-houſes. —— My ſolution of ſuch effects is this: Where the ſhock of the earthquake was moſt violent, it forcibly drove away the ſea before it, which ſuddenly returning again occaſioned theſe more violent ſwells. And without an earthquake I deem all ſuch accidents impoſſible.

Proceedings in Sicily. The ſame ſummer, many of other nations, as they happened to be drawn into the quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as well as the Sicilians themſelves who took up arms one againſt another, and the Athenians together with their allies. Yet, the moſt memorable actions alone, either of the allies thus aided by the Athenians, or of the common enemy againſt the Athenians, ſhall I now relate. —— Charœadas the Athenian commander having loſt his life in the Syracuſan war, Laches who had now the ſole command of the fleet, in junction with the allies, appeared before Mylæ of the Meſſenians. The garriſon of Mylæ conſiſted of two companies of Meſſenians; and theſe had formed an ambuſcade to cut off the enemy when landed. But the Athenians and allies drive them from the place of ambuſh with great ſlaughter. Then they proceeded to aſſault the works, which neceſſitated the defendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, and even to attend them againſt Meſſene. But after this, the Athenians and allies were no ſooner approached, than the Meſſenians alſo compounded, giving hoſtages and all other ſecurities required for their future behaviour.

Expedition againſt Melos *by* Nicias. The ſame ſummer, the Athenians with thirty ſail of ſhips commanded by Demoſthenes [2] the ſon of Alciſthenes and Procles the ſon of

2 This Demoſthenes will make a conſiderable figure in the courſe of this war. The moſt celebrated orator of the ſame name hath ranked him amongſt the greateſt of

of Theodorus, appeared upon the coaſt of Peloponneſus; whilſt a larger armament of ſixty, and two thouſand heavy-armed, was employed againſt Melos, under the command of Nicias ſon of Niceratus. Melos is an iſland; and as the inhabitants of it were averſe to the Athenian ſubjection, and had refuſed to accede to their alliance, they were now bent on its reduction. Having laid the iſland waſte, and the Melians ſtill refuſing to ſubmit, the Athenians put again to ſea and croſs'd over to Oropus on the oppoſite ſhore; where, arriving at night, the heavy-armed were detached to march with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of Bœotia. Notice being given of their arrival there, they were inſtantly joined by the whole force of Athens, which had marched out of the city under the orders of Hipponicus the ſon of Callias and Eurymedon the ſon of Thucles. A camp they formed; and, having for the ſpace of a day laid the territory waſte, they repoſed themſelves there the ſucceeding night. But the next morning, having gained a victory over the Tanagréans, who aided by a party of Thebans ſallied out upon them, they only ſtayed to gather up the arms and erect a trophy, and then marched away — theſe, back again to the city; and thoſe, to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting out again with his ſixty ſail, plundered all the ſea-coaſt of Locris, and then returned into the harbour of Athens.

Heraclea.

It was about this time that the Lacedæmonians founded the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia. Their view in doing it was this: —— Thoſe, who in general are ſtiled Melienſians, are divided into three

of his countrymen, with Ariſtides, Pericles and Nicias. He ſtiles him alſo an orator; and Thucydides will give us hereafter a ſpecimen of his manner of haranguing. His *name-ſake* indeed hath carried off all the glory of eloquence: But the *Demoſthenes*, who is the ſubject of this note, was an able general, very enterprizing, and very brave; always vigilant in the ſervice of his country, though more as a ſoldier than a ſtateſman; and, provided his country was ſerved, not too anxious about who carried off the honour. In ſhort, he was an open-hearted, diſintereſted, worthy Athenian.

bodies; Paralians, Hierenſians, and Trachinians. The laſt of theſe, the Trachinians, who had been terribly diſtreſſed by a war made upon them by the bordering Oetæans, had firſt of all intended to throw themſelves under the Athenian protection; but afterwards, apprehending they might not be hearty in their ſupport, they made application to Lacedæmon by Tiſamenus, the delegate appointed by them on this occaſion. The Dorians too, from whom the Lacedæmonians are deſcended, ſent their embaſſadors alſo to accompany and join with him in the negotiation, for they likewiſe were infeſted by thoſe Oetæans. The Lacedæmonians, after an audience, reſolved to ſend out this colony, as a ſure expedient not only to protect the Trachinians and Dorians from inſult, but to annoy the Athenians more ſenſibly, in the courſe of the war, from a city ſo commodiouſly ſeated. For thence they could at any time make an attack upon Eubœa, as the paſſage was but ſhort; and further, it lay moſt conveniently upon the road to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager about building this city. In the firſt place therefore, they begged the advice of the God at Delphi. His anſwer being favourable, they ſent out a colony compoſed of their own and the neighbouring people; encouraging farther all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this ſettlement, except Ionians and Achæans, and ſome of foreign nations. Three Lacedæmonians are appointed to be the leaders of this colony; Leon, and Alcidas, and Damagon. Theſe arriving at the ſpot erect upon a new foundation and wall round the city which is now called Heraclea, diſtant about * forty ſtadia from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the ſea. They proceeded next to build the naval docks; and theſe they began at Thermopylæ cloſe under the ſtraits, ſince there they were capable of the ſtrongeſt defence.

* *About* 4 *miles.*

The Athenians, when they ſaw the large reſort to this colony, were at firſt under great apprehenſions. They ſuſpected it to be chiefly intended for the annoyance of Eubœa, as the paſſage from it was ſhort to Cenæum in Eubœa; tho', in the ſequel, their apprehenſions

ſions proved intirely groundleſs. Not the leaſt damage accrued to them from this colony; and the reaſon was this: The Theſſalians, who were maſters of all the country round about it, and upon whoſe very land it was built, fearing leſt this new ſettlement might prove too powerful a neighbour at laſt, gave it all poſſible annoyance, and haraſſed the new inhabitants with continual war, till from the large number they were at firſt, they mouldered into nothing. When the Lacedæmonians firſt declared the colony, the whole world was eager to get a ſettlement in a city, which they thought would want no ſupport. Not but that its ſudden decay was owing alſo in great meaſure to the Lacedæmonian leaders. From the firſt moment of their arrival they had ſpoiled every thing wherein they meddled; they reduced their numbers to a handful of men, becauſe their fears had driven away the reſt, as the government was always ſevere, and not always juſt. The neighbouring people, ſurpriſing them in ſuch a ſtate, prevailed againſt them with the utmoſt eaſe.

Expedition of Athenians and Demosthenes.

The ſame ſummer, and even during that interval of time the Athenians were employed at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty ſail who were upon the Peloponneſian coaſt, in the firſt place, having placed an ambuſh at Ellomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off a part of the garriſon. In the next place, with an augmented force they came up to Leucas, being attended now by the whole ſtrength of the Acarnanians except the Oeniadæ, by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ſail of Corcyréans. The Leucadians, tho' their territory was laid waſte both without and within the Iſthmus, where the city of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are ſeated, yet durſt not venture out againſt ſuch ſuperior numbers. Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently preſſed it upon Demoſthenes the Athenian general, to block them up by a wall of circumvallation; imagining they might eaſily reduce them, and rid themſelves of a city which had been their eternal foe. But Demoſthenes choſe rather to hearken at this time to the ſuggeſtions of the Meſſenians; "how glorious it

" would be, as he was now at the head of ſo large a force, to in-
" vade the Ætolians, who were ſuch plagues to Naupactus; and, if
" their reduction could be compleated, the reſt of that continent
" might eaſily be brought into the Athenian ſubjection. For, tho'
" the Ætolians were a great and warlike people, yet as they dwelled
" in open villages remote from one another, as light-armour only
" was in uſe amongſt them, they preſumed he might eaſily complete
" their reduction, before any ſuccour could reach them." They adviſed him further, " to begin with the Apodoti, to take the Ophio-
" nians next, then to proceed to the Eurytanians (which is the moſt
" numerous people of Ætolia, reported alſo to ſpeak in a moſt bar-
" barous dialect, and to feed upon raw fleſh); that, if theſe could
" be ſurpriſed, the reſt of Ætolia would ſubmit of courſe." He therefore — willing to oblige the Meſſenians, and incited above all by the thought, that without expoſing the Athenian forces, after he had done with the Ætolians, he might march with the allied ſtrength of the continent and penetrate by land as far as Bœotia, through the Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnaſſus on his right till he got down amongſt the Phocians, who he reckoned, from their conſtant friendſhip with the Athenians, would readily join him, or however might eaſily be compelled to do it; and then, that Bœotia borders next on the Phocians: —Demoſthenes, I ſay, weighing from Leucas with his whole force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, coaſted along to Solium. He there communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which they refuſed to join becauſe he had refuſed the blockade of Leucas. Demoſthenes, with his other force, the Cephallenians, and Meſſenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred ſoldiers draughted from on board the Athenian ſhips (the fifteen Corcyréan were already departed), ſet about this expedition againſt the Ætolians. He began it from Oeneon in Locris: For the Locrians, called Ozolæ, were allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians with all their force in the midland parts. Theſe, being not only borderers,

but

but uſing alſo the ſame kind of arms with the Ætolians, were judged moſt proper to accompany the expedition, as they knew ſo well their method of battle, and their country. Having repoſed his army one night within the verge of the temple of the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants have a tradition that Heſiod [3] the poet expired, in purſuance of an oracle which had fixed Nemea for the place of his death), he marched again at break of day, and entered Ætolia. On the firſt day he taketh Potidania, on the ſecond Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. There he halted, and ſent away the booty to Eupolium of Locris. It was now his reſolution, after he had ſubdued the reſt, to march laſt of all againſt the Ophionians, if they did not voluntarily ſubmit beforehand, in his retreat back to Naupactus.

3 The ſtory of Heſiod's death is related by Plutarch in *The banquet of the ſeven wiſe men*. Solon interpoſing here, ſaid, "Such "things, Diocles, muſt be referred immediately to the Gods, they are above human condition. But the caſe of Heſiod "is within the lot of humanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know the "ſtory?" I do not, he replied. "It is "then well worth your hearing. A certain Mileſian, it ſeems, in whoſe company Heſiod was hoſpitably lodged and "entertained in Locris, had ſecretly debauched the daughter of their hoſt. "When the affair came to light, it was "ſuſpected that Heſiod had all along been "privy to the intrigue, and concealed ſuch "baſe behaviour; and, tho' he was intirely innocent, he fell a victim to haſty reſentment and foul calumniation. The "brothers of the damſel laid wait for and "ſlew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, and with him his ſervant, whoſe "name was Troilus. Their bodies being "thrown into the ſea, that of Troilus indeed, floating up into the river Daphnus, "was ſtopped at a rock quite ſurrounded "with water a ſmall diſtance from ſea. "But the moment Heſiod's body was "thrown into the ſea, a ſhoal of dolphins "caught it and carried it to Rhium and "Molycrium. The Locrians that very "day were aſſembled at Rhium for a ſolemn feſtival and ſacrifice, which they "ſtill continue to celebrate at the ſame "place. The dead body was no ſooner beheld in its approach, than full of wonder, "as was likely, they hurried down to the "beach, and, knowing it to be the body "of Heſiod, and very freſh, they poſtponed every other care to the diſcovery "of this murder, from their high regard "for Heſiod. This was ſoon done; the "aſſaſſins were found out, whom they "threw headlong into the ſea, and demoliſhed their houſes. But Heſiod was buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove."

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This preparation againſt them did by no means eſcape the Ætolians. The ſcheme was no ſooner formed than they had gained intelligence of it; and by that time the army was within their borders, they were all drawn together in a numerous body for their mutual defence: Nay, even the moſt diſtant Ophionians, who are ſeated upon the Meliac bay, the Bomienſians and Callienſians, were already come up.

The Meſſenians continued to amuſe Demoſthenes with the ſame ſuggeſtions as at firſt: They ſtill inſiſted, that the conqueſt of the Ætolians would be an eaſy performance, and adviſed him to advance immediately againſt their villages, nor give them time to gather together in a body to oppoſe him, but to attack every place he came to, and take it. This advice being quite to his own taſte, and relying upon his own good-fortune, which hitherto had never been checked, without waiting for the Locrians who were very much wanted, and were to have joined him (for he ſtood moſt in need of light-armed darters), he advanced to Ægitium, and aſſaulting, takes it by ſtorm. The inhabitants made their eſcape, and poſted themſelves upon the hills which overlook the town. It was ſituated amongſt lofty eminences, and diſtant from the ſea about * eighty ſtadia.

* *About eight miles.*

Defeat of Demoſthenes.

But now the Ætolians, who were come up for the preſervation of Ægitium, running down in ſeparate bodies from different eminences, made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, and poured in their javelins amongſt them: And whenever the Athenian army approached to charge, they plied before them; when they again fell back, theſe again returned to the charge. This kind of engagement continued for a long time, a ſeries of alternate purſuits and retreats, in both which the Athenians ſuffered moſt. So long however as their archers had darts, and opportunity to uſe them, they loſt no ground; for the light-armed Ætolians fell back to avoid the darts. But when the chief of the archers dropped, his party was ſoon diſperſed, and

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the whole army began to incline. Their ſtrength was quite exhauſted by ſo many repeated charges; and now, the Ætolians preſſing hard upon them, and pouring in whole ſhowers of miſſive weapons, they turned about and fled. Now tumbling into caverns from whence they could not recover themſelves, or bewildered in places of which they had no knowledge, they were miſerably deſtroyed. For Chromon the Meſſenian, who laid out all the routes, had been killed in the battle. The Ætolians purſued with their darts, and being not only ſwift of foot, but alſo lightly-armed, eaſily overtook many of them in their flight, and did great execution. A large party, who had loſt their way, threw themſelves into a wood which was quite impaſſable. The Ætolians ſet the wood on fire, in the flames of which they were all conſumed. Every affecting ſpecies of flight and deſtruction was now the fate of the Athenian army. Thoſe who had the good-fortune to eſcape, effected it by reaching the ſea and Oeneon of Locris, from whence they firſt began the expedition.

The number of the allies who thus periſhed, was large; that of heavy-armed Athenians was about a hundred and twenty; ſo conſiderable was the loſs, and all of them in the very flower of their youth. In the whole courſe of this war, the *State* of Athens never loſt at any one time ſo many of her moſt galant citizens as now. Procles alſo, the other commander in this expedition, periſhed.

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a truce obtained from the Ætolians. This being done, they retired to Naupactus, and there ſhipped themſelves for Athens. Demoſthenes however was left behind at Naupactus, and the parts adjacent. After ſuch a miſcarriage he durſt not preſume to face the people of Athens.

About the ſame time, the Athenians on the Sicilian ſtation, having ſailed towards Locris, landed upon that coaſt. They deſtroyed a party of Locrians who endeavoured to make head againſt them; and then take Peripolium, a town ſituated on the river Halex. Sicily.

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Naupactus. The ſame ſummer the Ætolians, who had ſome time before diſpatched an embaſſy to Corinth and Lacedæmon, compoſed of Tolophus the Ophionian, Boriades the Euryſthanian, and Tiſander the Apodotian, prevail there in their ſuit for a diverſion againſt Naupactus, becauſe the Athenians had invaded their territories. It was about autumn when the Lacedæmonians marched away three thouſand heavy-armed of their allies; of which number five hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city ſo lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was appointed to command in the expedition, and was accompanied by two other Spartans, Macarius and Menedæus. The army being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochus diſpatched a herald to the Ozolian-Locri: His route to Naupactus lay through their territory. He was alſo deſirous to detach them from the Athenian alliance. The Amphiſſenſians were the readieſt of all the Locri to give their concurrence, as ſtanding in perpetual awe of the hatred bore them by the Phocians. Theſe therefore were the firſt who ſent in hoſtages, and who perſuaded others to follow their example, from a dread of this army which was now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonenſians, their own borderers, were the firſt who complied; for their part of Locris is moſt difficult of acceſs. Theſe were followed by the Ippenſians, and Meſſapians, and Tritæenſians, and Challæans, Tolophonians, Heſſians and Oeanthians; and all theſe gave a perſonal attendance in the expedition. The Olpéans indeed ſent in their hoſtages, but would not attend. The Hyæans refuſed their hoſtages till one of their villages called Polis was ſeized.

When all things were ready, and the hoſtages placed ſecurely at Cytinium of Doris, Eurylochus with his army taking the route of Locris, advanced againſt Naupactus. He ſeized upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched, for refuſing to concur. When they had entered the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by the Ætolian aid, they waſted the country to the very ſuburb, of which alſo becauſe unfortified, they took poſſeſſion. Turning thence to Molycrium,

crium, a Corinthian colony, but now ſubject to the Athenians, they reduce it.

But Demoſthenes the Athenian (for he had continued at Naupactus ever ſince the Ætolian miſcarriage) having received intelligence of this army, and dreading the loſs of this place, had addreſſed himſelf to the Acarnanians, and with ſome difficulty, owing to his departure from Leucas, perſuades them to ſend a ſuccour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a thouſand of their heavy-armed under his orders, whom he threw into the town by ſea, which effectually preſerved it. For the danger before was manifeſt, as the wall was very large in compaſs, and the number of defendants inconſiderable.

When Eurylochus and his council had diſcovered that ſuch a ſuccour had been received into the town, and that its reduction was now impracticable, they marched away their forces, not towards Peloponneſus, but to that Ætolia which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to the neighbouring towns, and to Proſchion of Ætolia. The Ambraciots had now been with and prevailed upon them, to join in ſome attempts upon Argos in Amphilochia, upon the reſt of that province, and Acarnania; aſſuring them, that could theſe be reduced, the whole continent there would inſtantly go over to the Lacedæmonian league. Eurylochus having aſſured them of his concurrence, and given the Ætolians their diſmiſſion, halted thereabouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had entered upon the expedition againſt Argos, and it was time for him to join them. And here the ſummer ended.

The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of the winter, putting themſelves at the head of their Grecian allies, and as many of their Sicilian as unable to ſupport the Syracuſan yoke had revolted from Syracuſe to join them, began freſh operations of war in concert, and aſſaulted Neſſa a town of Sicily, the citadel of which was in the hands of the Syracuſans. But the attempt was unſucceſsful, and they again determined to draw off. During the retreat, the Syracuſans Sicily.

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ſallying forth, fell upon thoſe allies of the Athenians who marched in the rear, and with ſuch force, that they put a part of the army to flight, and ſlew a conſiderable number.

After this, Laches and the Athenians, having made ſome attempts, and landed on the coaſt of Locris near the mouth of the river Caïcinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians conſiſting of about three hundred, under Proxenus the ſon of Capaton. Theſe the Athenians defeated, and having ſtripped them of their arms, went off the coaſt.

The purification of Delos.

The ſame winter alſo the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Piſiſtratus the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed the whole, but ſo much of the iſland as lies within the proſpect of the temple. The purification now was univerſal, and performed in the following manner.

They broke up all the ſepulchres of the dead without exception, and prohibited for the future any death or birth in the iſland, both which were to be confined to Rhenæa. For Rhenæa lies at ſo ſmall a diſtance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was formerly of great power by ſea, amongſt other iſles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhenæa alſo, which he conſecrated to Delian Apollo, and faſtened it to Delos by a chain. And after this purification, the Athenians made the firſt inſtitution of the Delian games to be ſolemnized every fifth returning year. Not but that in the earlier times there was uſed to be a great conflux of Ionians and neighbouring iſlanders to Delos. They reſorted to the ſolemn feſtivals there with their wives and children, in the ſame manner as the Ionians do now to Epheſus. Games of bodily exerciſe and of muſic were actually celebrated, and cities exhibited their reſpective chorus's. For this we have the teſtimony of Homer, in the following verſes of his hymn to Apollo;

To

To thee, O Phœbus, moſt the Delian iſle
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleaſing ſmile;
When gay Ionians flock around thy fane;
Men, women, children, a reſplendent train,
Whoſe flowing garments ſweep the ſacred pile,
Whoſe grateful concourſe gladdens all the iſle,
Where champions fight, where dancers beat the ground,
Where chearful muſic echoes all around,
Thy feaſt to honour, and thy praiſe to ſound.

That there was alſo a muſical game to which artiſts reſorted to make trials of their skill, he fully ſheweth in other verſes to be found in the ſame hymn: For having ſung the Delian chorus of females, he cloſeth their praiſe with theſe lines, in which further he hath made mention of himſelf;

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day;
Hail! Cynthia, goddeſs of the lunar ſway;
Henceforth on me propitious ſmile! and you,
Ye blooming beauties of the iſle, adieu!
When future gueſts ſhall reach your happy ſhore,
And refug'd here from toils lament no more;
When ſocial chat the mind unbending chears,
And this demand ſhall greet your friendly ears---
" Who was the Bard, e'er landed on your coaſt,
" Who ſung the ſweeteſt, and who pleas'd you moſt?---
With voice united, all ye blooming fair,
Join in your anſwer, and for me declare;
Say --- " The blind Bard the ſweeteſt notes may boaſt,
" He lives at Chios, and he pleas'd us moſt."

Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that in early times there was a great concourſe and feſtival at Delos. But afterwards the people of the iſlands and the Athenians ſent in their parties for the chorus with victims. But the uſual games, and moſt of the ſolemn rites, had been diſuſed, through ſome ſiniſter events, till the Athenians now made a freſh inſtitution of this ſolemnity, with the addition of a chariot-race, which had not formerly been a part of it.

Invaſion of Amphilochian Argos.

The ſame winter, the Ambraciots in purſuance of their engagements with Eurylochus, who waited their motions, march away with three thouſand heavy-armed againſt the Amphilochian Argos. Accordingly breaking into Argia, they ſeize Olpæ, a ſtrong place, ſituated on an eminence on the ſea-ſide. This place had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, who uſed it for their public tribunal of juſtice. It is diſtant from the city of Argos, which is alſo a maritime town, about * twenty five ſtadia. The Acarnanians were now in motion, ſome running to the defence of Argos, others to encamp at the important poſt of Crenæ in Amphilochia, to obſerve the motions of the Peloponneſians commanded by Eurylochus, that they might not perfect their junction with the Ambraciots, without ſome moleſtation on their route. They alſo ſend to Demoſthenes the Athenian general in the Ætolian expedition, to come and put himſelf at their head; and to the Athenian ſquadron of twenty ſail, which was then upon the coaſt of Peloponneſus, under the command of Ariſtotle ſon of Timocrates, and Hierophon ſon of Antimneſtus.

* *About two miles and half.*

The Ambraciots at Olpæ ſent alſo a meſſenger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, to come out into the field. They were afraid leſt Eurylochus might not be able to paſs the Acarnanians, and ſo they ſhould be compelled either to fight alone; or, ſhould they attempt a retreat, to find it full of danger.

But the Peloponneſians commanded by Eurylochus had no ſooner heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpæ, than diſlodging from Proſchium they marched with all expedition to their ſupport. After paſſing

ſing the Achelous, they took the route of Acarnania, deſolate at preſent, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence of Argos, having on their right the city and garriſon of the Stratians, and the reſt of Acarnania on their left. When they had paſſed through the territory of the Stratians, they croſſed Phytia, and again through the extremity of Medeon, and then marched acroſs Limnæa. They now enter'd the kingdom of the Agræans, which had deſerted the Acarnanian to favour the Peloponneſian intereſt. Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild uncultivated ſpot, they croſſed it, and deſcended thence by night into Argia. They afterwards paſſed undiſcovered betwixt the city of the Argians, and the poſt of the Acarnanians at Crenæ, and ſo perfected their junction with the Ambraciots at Olpæ. After this junction, their numbers being large, they take poſſeſſion next morn, at break of day, of a poſt called Metropolis, and there fix their encampment.

The battle of Olpæ.

Not long after this the Athenian ſquadron of twenty ſail comes into the bay of Ambracia, to ſuccour the Argians. Demoſthenes alſo arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians, and ſixty Athenian archers. The ſtation of the fleet was fixed under the fort of Olpæ. But the Acarnanians, and ſome few of the Amphilochians, who had already gathered into a body at Argos, (for the majority of them was obſtructed by the Ambraciots,) got every thing in readineſs to engage the enemy. They elect Demoſthenes to be commander of the whole aſſociated force, with the aſſiſtance of their own generals. He cauſed them to advance near Olpæ, and there encamped them. A great hollow lay between the armies. For five days they remained in a ſtate of inaction, but on the ſixth both ſides drew up in order of battle. The Peloponneſians were more numerous, and their line of courſe was further extended. Demoſthenes therefore, that he might not be incloſed, placeth an ambuſcade of the heavy and light-armed, to the number in all of about four hundred, in a hollow way overgrown with ſhrubs and buſhes, with orders

ders that in the heat of the charge they ſhould riſe up and attack the over-extended line of the enemy in their rear. When all things were ready on both ſides, they came to blows. Demoſthenes led the right wing, compoſed of the Meſſenians and his few Athenians. The other conſiſted of the Acarnanians, drawn up in the order they happened to fall into as they came up, and the Amphilochian darters who were at hand. But the Peloponneſians and Ambraciots were drawn up promiſcuouſly, except the Mantinéans. The Mantinéans ſtood imbodied rather to the left, but not in the extremity: For Eurylochus, with a ſelect party, was poſted there over-againſt the Meſſenians and Demoſthenes.

No ſooner was the battle joined, and the Peloponneſians on that wing were moving forward their ſuperior numbers to ſurround the right of their adverſaries, than the Acarnanians ſtarting up from their ambuſcade, falling upon them in their rear, aſſault and put them to flight. They gave way before the very firſt ſhock, and ſtruck ſuch a conſternation into the bulk of the army, that they alſo began to run: For they no ſooner ſaw the party with Eurylochus, and which was the flower of their ſtrength, intirely broke, than they felt a panic for themſelves. And the Meſſenians, who fought at the ſame poſt with Demoſthenes, behaved ſo very well, that they finiſhed the rout. The Ambraciots in the mean time, and thoſe in the right, had got the better of their opponents, and were purſuing them towards Argos; for beyond a doubt they are the moſt warlike people of any in thoſe parts. But when they were returned from the purſuit, they perceived the bulk of their army was defeated; and the reſt of the Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with much difficulty they threw themſelves into Olpæ. The number of the ſlain was great, as they had made their attacks without any order, and with the utmoſt confuſion: We muſt except the Mantinéans, who kept moſt firmly together, and retreated in the beſt order of the whole enemy. The battle was ended only with the night.

The

The next morning, as Eurylochus was killed and Macarius alſo, the command devolved upon Menedæus. The defeat was irrecoverably great, and he was highly perplexed — whether he ſhould abide a ſiege, in which he muſt not only be ſhut up by land, but by the Athenian ſhips be blocked up alſo by ſea, — or, whether he ſhould endeavour to ſecure his retreat. At length — he treats with Demoſthenes and the Acarnanians for a ſuſpenſion of arms both for his own departure and the fetching off the dead. The dead they at once delivered, and ſet up a trophy themſelves, and took up their own dead to the number of about three hundred. But a truce for their departure was not openly granted to them all. Demoſthenes, in concert with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a ſecret article with the Mantinéans and Menedæus and the other Peloponneſian officers, and as many others as were of any conſideration — that "they ſhould depart immediately." His policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the promiſcuous body of mercenaries left quite deſtitute, wiſhing above all things for ſuch a pretext to calumniate the Lacedæmonians and Peloponneſians amongſt the Grecians of thoſe parts, "as men who wilfully abandon their friends, from a mere "ſelfiſh treacherous regard to their own ſafety." Having leave therefore to fetch off their dead, they interred them all ſo well as their hurry would admit. And thoſe in the ſecret, were buſy in concerting the means of their departure.

But now intelligence is brought to Demoſthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots of the city with their whole collected force had, in purſuance of the former ſummons, began their march for Olpæ, through Amphilochia, deſigning to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and quite ignorant of the late defeat. Upon this, he immediately detacheth a part of his army, to beſet all the paſſes, and to ſeize all the advantageous poſts upon their route, and got ready at the ſame time to march againſt them with the remainder of his force.

In

In the mean time, the Mantinéans and thoſe comprehended in the ſecret article, going out of the town upon the pretext of gathering herbs and fuel, went gradually off in ſmall parties, gathering what they pretended to come out for as they paſſed along. But when they had thus ſtraggled to a conſiderable diſtance from Olpæ, they moved away in a more nimble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in great numbers came out in their company, when they perceived them thus ſtealing off, felt an inclination to follow, and ſo taking to their heels, ran ſpeedily after them. The Acarnanians imagined at firſt, that they were all equally endeavouring to eſcape without permiſſion, and therefore ſet out in purſuit of the Peloponneſians. Their officers endeavoured to ſtop them, crying out, that "leave "was given for their eſcape." — Upon which a ſoldier, concluding their officers had been guilty of treachery, darted his javelin amongſt them. But afterwards they connived at the eſcape of the Mantinéans and Peloponneſians, but made ſlaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed was the tumult, and the perplexity alſo to diſtinguiſh which was an Ambraciot, and which was a Peloponneſian; and amidſt the confuſion about two hundred were ſlain. The reſt made their eſcape into the bordering kingdom of Agræis, where Salynthius king of the Agræans, who was their friend, took them under his protection.

The Ambraciots of the city were now advanced as far as Idomené. They are two lofty eminences, which are called by this name. The higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the detachment ſent before by Demoſthenes from the camp had ſeized, without being diſcovered, and had poſted themſelves upon it. The Ambraciots had poſſeſſed themſelves already of the lower, and halted there for the night. Demoſthenes after his evening repaſt, and the remainder of the army about ſhut of evening, began to march. He himſelf took half of them to attack the enemy in front, whilſt the other was fetching a compaſs round the mountains of Amphilochia.

The

The next morning was no ſooner in its dawn, than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in their beds, ſtill ignorant of all that had paſſed, and rather ſuppoſing theſe new-comers to be their friends. For Demoſthenes had politickly placed the Meſſenians in the van, and ordered them to diſcourſe as they moved along in the Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from their advanced guards, who further ſo long as the dark continued could not poſſibly diſtinguiſh their faces. By this means, he no ſooner aſſaulted the camp than the rout began. Numbers of them were ſlain upon the ſpot. The remainder fled amain towards the mountains. But the paſſes were all beſet; and more than this, the Amphilochians, who were well acquainted with their own country, were purſuing in the *light* enemies who were incumbered with the *heavy* armour. Quite ignorant of the country, nor knowing whither they were flying, they ruſhed headlong into hollow ways, into all the ambuſcades laid ready by the enemy, to their own deſtruction. Yet as no poſſible method of eſcape was unattempted, ſome of them turned towards the ſea, which was not greatly diſtant. And when they beheld the Athenian ſhips moving along the ſhore, in ſo fatal a concurrence for their ruin, they plunged into the water, and ſwam up to them, chooſing rather, in the preſent conſternation, to be deſtroyed by the Athenians on board thoſe ſhips, than by Barbarians and their moſt inveterate foes, the Amphilochians. Through ſuch a ſeries of misfortunes, but few out of the numerous body of Ambraciots were ſo happy as to eſcape to their own home. The Acarnanians having ſtripped the dead, and erected the trophies, marched back to Argos.

A ſecond battle or ſlaughter at Idomene.

On the following day they were addreſſed by a herald, ſent from thoſe Ambraciots who had eſcaped from Olpe, and were now in the Agræïs. His commiſſion was to obtain the bodies of the dead who had been killed ſince the firſt engagement, as they were attempting without permiſſion to eſcape along with the Mantinéans and others who were going off by agreement. This herald, caſting his eyes upon the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, was aſtoniſhed at the number. He

The herald.

knew nothing of that freſh calamity, but concluded they all belonged to the party for whom he was now employed. Somebody asked him the reaſon of his ſurpriſe, and what he judged to be the number of the dead? Now he who asked the queſtion ſuppoſed the herald to have been ſent by thoſe of Idomene. "Not more than two hundred," ſays the herald. The demandant then replied, "It ſhould ſeem otherwiſe "by the arms, for theſe are the arms of more than a thouſand men." The herald rejoined, "Then they cannot belong to thoſe of our party." The other replied, "They muſt, if you fought yeſterday at Idomene." "We fought no where yeſterday; we ſuffered the day before in our "retreat from Olpe." "But we fought yeſterday againſt thoſe Am-"braciots, who were advancing from the city to relieve you." When the herald heard this, and found that the army of relief from the city was thus deſtroyed, he burſt into a grone; and, quite overpower'd with the weight of the preſent calamities, he went off abruptly, and without renewing his demand about the dead.

During the whole courſe of this war, no other Grecian city ſuffered ſo great a loſs in ſo ſhort a time. I have not preſumed to mention the number of the ſlain, becauſe it is ſaid to have been incredibly great, when compared with the ſize of their city. But I am well convinced, that, if in compliance with the advice of the Athenians and Demoſthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians would have proceeded to the exciſion of Ambracia, they might have done it with the bare ſhout of their voice. But they dreaded its falling into the hands of the Athenians, who might prove worſe neighbours to them than the old.

But to return. A third part of the ſpoils was beſtowed upon the Athenians, the reſt was divided amongſt the confederate-cities. Thoſe allotted the Athenians were loſt at ſea. For the three hundred ſuits of armour, which are repoſited in the temples of Athens, were ſelected for Demoſthenes, who now returned thither, and brought them with him. The dread he had been under ever ſince his miſ-

carriage

carriage in Ætolia was quite diſpelled by the good-ſervice he had now performed.

A peace between the Ambraciots *and* Amphilochians.

The Athenians, with their ſquadron of twenty ſail, were now returned to Naupactus; and, ſince the departure of the Athenians and Demoſthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had granted by treaty to thoſe Ambraciots and Peloponneſians, who had refuged with Salynthius and the Agræans, a ſafe retreat from amongſt the Oeniadæ, who had alſo gone over to Salynthius and the Agræans. And afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians concluded a peace and an alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, upon theſe conditions:

" That neither the Ambraciots ſhould be obliged to join the Acar-
" nanians in any attempts againſt the Peloponneſians; nor the Acar-
" nanians to act with the Ambraciots againſt the Athenians.

" That if either were attacked, the others ſhould march to their
" defence.

" That the Ambraciots ſhould reſtore all the places and frontier
" belonging to the Amphilochians, which were at preſent in their
" hands. And,

" That they ſhould in no ſhape ſupport Anactorium, which was
" then in hoſtility with the Acarnanians."

Theſe articles being mutually agreed to, the war came to a concluſion. But after this, the Corinthians ſent a party of their own people, conſiſting of three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xenoclides the ſon of Euthycles, for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, after great difficulties, as they marched all the way over-land. And this is the account of tranſactions in Ambracia.

Sicily.

The Athenians in Sicily, this ſame winter, made a deſcent againſt Himeræa from their ſhips, whilſt the Sicilians, pouring down from the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. They ſteered their courſe alſo againſt the iſles of Æolus. But when they were returned to their old ſtation at Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus the ſon of Iſolochus,

lochus, who was commiſſioned to take upon him the command of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the confederates of Sicily had ſent a deputation to Athens, to ſolicit a more ample ſuccour of ſhipping. Becauſe, as in fact, the Syracuſans were maſters of all their lands, and they were alſo awed at ſea by a few Syracuſan veſſels, they were now intent on gathering together ſuch a naval force as might ſtrike an effectual terror. The Athenians equipped out forty ſail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their motive was, not only to bring the war in thoſe parts to a ſpeedy determination, but alſo to keep their own mariners in conſtant practice. Pythodorus, one of the admirals appointed for this ſervice, they ſent off immediately with a few ſhips: Sophocles ſon of Soſtratides, and Eurymedon ſon of Thucles, were ſoon to follow with the main body of the fleet. But Pythodorus, who had now took the command from Laches, ſteered about the cloſe of the winter, againſt that fortreſs of the Locrians which Laches had taken before. But, being defeated at his landing by the Locrians, he returned again to his ſtation.

An eruption of Ætna.

About the ſpring of the year, a torrent of fire overflowed from mount Ætna, in the ſame manner as formerly, which deſtroyed part of the lands of the Catanéans, who are ſituated at the foot of that mountain, which is the largeſt in all Sicily. It is ſaid that fifty years intervened between this flow and the laſt which preceded; and that in the whole, the fire hath thus iſſued thrice ſince Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. Such were the occurrences of this winter, at the end of which, the ſixth year alſo of this war, the hiſtory of which Thucydides hath compiled, expired.

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM

The End of the Firſt Volume.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PELOPONNESIAN WAR,

Tranſlated from the *GREEK* of

THUCYDIDES.

VOLUME THE SECOND.

By *WILLIAM SMITH*, A. M.

Rector of the Pariſh of the *Holy Trinity* in *Cheſter*, and Chaplain to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Derby*.

Μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος.



LONDON:

Printed by JOHN WATTS. MDCCLIII.

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE FOURTH.

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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK IV.

YEAR VII.

THE enſuing ſummer, when the corn was beginning to ear, ten ſail of Syracuſan, joined by an equal number of Locrian veſſels, at the invitation of the inhabitants, ſtood away for Meſſene in Sicily, and took poſſeſſion of the place. And thus Meſſene revolted from the Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing to the practices of the Syracuſans; who, foreſeeing that this town might open the way for the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid leſt the Athenians ſhould get eſtabliſhed there, and with augmented forces pour out from thence upon them. The Locrians aſſiſted out of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they were deſirous to have it in their power to attack both by land and ſea. At the ſame time alſo theſe

Before Chriſt 425.

Affairs in Sicily.

theſe Locrians broke in upon the territory of the Rhegians with their intire force, to deter them from any attempt to ſave Meſſene, and to gratify alſo thoſe fugitives from Rhegium, who acted now in combination with them. For Rhegium had for a long time been embroiled in ſedition, and ſo was unable to take the field againſt theſe invaders, who for the ſame reaſon were more eager to diſtreſs them. When the ravage was compleated, the Locrians marched their land-forces back, but their ſhips were ſtationed on the guard of Meſſene. They alſo were very buſy in the equipment of an additional number, which were to repair to that ſtation, and be ready to move from thence to any future operations of war.

Attica invaded.

About the ſame ſeaſon of the ſpring, before the corn was fully grown, the Peloponneſians and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, the ſon of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded. They fixed their camp, and ravaged the country.

A ſquadron ſets out for Sicily.

The Athenians now ſent out to ſea the forty ſhips already prepared for the Sicilian voyage, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, who ſtayed behind to bring up this reinforcement, ſince Pythodorus the third in the commiſſion was already in his poſt at Sicily. They had orders alſo in the courſe of the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide effectually for the preſervation of thoſe in the city, who were ſadly infeſted by the outlaws poſted on the mountain. Sixty ſail of Peloponneſians were now upon that coaſt, to act in ſupport of thoſe on the mountain, who, as the city was ſorely oppreſſed with famine, preſumed they ſhould with eaſe carry all before them. Demoſthenes further, who had been in no public employ ſince his return from Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this fleet with authority to employ it on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, if he judged it for the ſervice.

Pylus *fortified.*

When they were got to the height of Laconia, intelligence is brought them, that "the Peloponneſian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eurymedon and Sophocles were for making the beſt of their way thither.

thither. But it was the advice of Demoſthenes to go firſt to Pylus, and after they had ſecured that place, to proceed in their voyage. This was poſitively refuſed; but it ſo happened, that a ſtorm aroſe which drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demoſthenes inſiſted that they ſhould immediately fortify the place, ſince this was the motive of his attendance in the fleet. He ſhewed them, that "there was "at hand plenty of timber and ſtone for the work; that, beſide "the ſtrength of its natural ſituation, the place itſelf was barren, "as was alſo the greateſt part of the adjacent country." For Pylus lies at the diſtance of about * four hundred ſtadia from Sparta, in the diſtrict which was formerly called Meſſenia; but the name given it by the Lacedæmonians is Coryphaſium. The others replied, "There "are many barren capes in Peloponneſus, which thoſe may ſecure "who have a mind to plunge the commonwealth into needleſs ex-"pences." This place however ſeemed to him to be better marked out for this purpoſe than any other, as being poſſeſſed of an harbour; and as the Meſſenians, who formerly bore ſome relation to it, and ſtill uſed the ſame dialect with the Lacedæmonians, might from hence give them great annoyance, and at the ſame time effectually keep poſſeſſion of it. But when neither the commanders nor ſoldiers, nor the inferior officers [1], to whom he afterwards communicated his project, would be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it drop till the mere love of employment, during the idleneſs of their ſuſpended voyage, ſeditiouſly inclined the private ſoldiers to compaſs it with a wall. They took the work in hand, and ply'd it briskly. Tools they had none for hewing and fitting the ſtones; but picked out

* *About forty* Engliſh *miles.*

1 The word in the original is *Taxiarchs*. They ſeem to be nearly the ſame with *Captains* of *a company*, in the modern ſtile, as their command was over about one hundred men. *Taxiarchs* were alſo officers of a higher claſs, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing one, whoſe buſineſs it was to marſhal the armies, to order the marches and encampments, to take care of proviſions, and to puniſh military offences. But the former ſeem to be the *officers* to whom Demoſthenes applied himſelf in the preſent inſtance.

and

and carried ſuch as they judged moſt proper for the work, and laid them one upon another as compactly as they could. The mud, that was any where requiſite, for want of veſſels they carried on their ſhoulders, bending forwards as much as poſſible that it might have room to ſtick on, and holding it up with both hands claſped faſt behind that it might not ſlide down. They ſpared no pains to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to put the place in a proper poſture of defence, before they could come to their diſturbance. For the largeſt part of it was ſo well fortified by nature, that it ſtood in no need of the defence of art.

The news of this arrived at Sparta, during the celebration of ſome public feſtival. They ſet light by it; aſſured, that ſo ſoon as they appeared in ſight, the enemy would either abandon it, or the place be recovered by an eaſy effort. And they were ſomething more dilatory, becauſe their army was yet in Attica.

The Athenians, having compleated their works on the ſide towards the land and on the other neceſſary ſpots in the ſpace of ſix days, leave Demoſthenes with five ſhips to guard it, and with the larger number reſumed their voyage for Corcyra and Sicily.

The enemy retreats out of Attica.

But the Peloponneſians in Attica were no ſooner advertiſed of this ſeizure of Pylus, than they marched back with all expedition. The Lacedæmonians and Agis their king regarded this affair of Pylus as their own domeſtic concern. And beſides, as they had made the inroad early in the year and whilſt the corn was yet green, many of them laboured under a ſcarcity of proviſions. The weather alſo, which proved tempeſtuous beyond what was uſual in that ſeaſon, had very much incommoded the army. In this manner, many accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, and to render this the ſhorteſt of all their invaſions. For the whole of their ſtay in Attica was but fifteen days.

Eion. About the ſame time Simonides an Athenian commander, having gathered together a ſmall party of Athenians from the neighbouring garriſons

garriſons and a body of the circumjacent dependents, took poſſeſſion of Eïon in Thrace, a colony of the Mendéans. It had declared againſt the Athenians, but was now put into their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalcidéans and Bottiæans coming immediately to its relief, he was beat out of it again, and loſt a great number of his men.

Steps for the recovery of Pylus.

After the retreat of the Peloponneſians out of Attica, the *Spartans*, [2] in conjunction with thoſe of their allies who lay the neareſt, marched without loſs of time to the recovery of Pylus. The reſt of the Lacedæmonians were longer in their approach, as but juſt returned from another expedition. Yet a ſummons had been ſent all round Peloponneſus, to march directly for Pylus. Their fleet of ſixty ſail was alſo remanded from Corcyra, which being tranſported by land over the iſthmus of Leucas arrive before Pylus, undeſcried by the Athenians who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the land-army had alſo approached.

Demoſthenes, before the coming up of the Peloponneſian fleet, had timely diſpatched two veſſels to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, preſſing them to return as the place was in danger of being loſt; which veſſels made the beſt of their way, in purſuance of the earneſt commands of Demoſthenes. But the Lacedæmonians were now preparing to attack the fortreſs both by land and ſea, preſuming it would eaſily be deſtroyed, as the work had been raiſed with ſo much precipitation and was defended by ſo ſmall a number of hands. But, as they alſo expected the return of the Athenian ſhips from Zacynthus, they deſigned, in caſe they took not the place before, to bar up the mouths of the harbour, ſo as to render the entrance impracticable to the Athenians. For an iſle which is called Sphacteria, lying before and at a ſmall

The Lacedæmonians ſecure the iſle Sphacteria.

2 The reader will be pleaſed to take notice, that the word *Spartans* is here emphatical. It means *thoſe* of the firſt claſs, the nobleſt perſons in the community, as is plain from the ſequel.

diſtance,

diſtance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths of the harbour narrow; *that* near the fortreſs of the Athenians and Pylus a paſſage for two ſhips only abreaſt, and *that* between the other points of land for eight or nine. The whole of it, as deſart, was overgrown with wood and quite untrod, and the compaſs of it at moſt is about * fifteen *ſtadia*. They were therefore intent on ſhutting up theſe entrances with ſhips moored cloſe together and their heads towards the ſea. And to prevent the moleſtation apprehended ſhould the enemy take poſſeſſion of this iſland, they threw into it a body of their heavy-armed, and poſted another body on the oppoſite ſhore; —— for by theſe diſpoſitions the Athenians would be incommoded from the iſland, and excluded from landing on the main-land: And, as on the open coaſt of Pylus without the harbour there is no road where ſhips can lie, they would be deprived of a ſtation from whence to ſuccour the beſieged: And thus, without the hazard of a naval engagement it was probable they ſhould get poſſeſſion of the place, as the quantity of proviſions in it could be but ſmall, ſince the ſeizure had been executed with ſlender preparation. —— Acting upon theſe motives, they threw the body of heavy-armed into the iſland, who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. Theſe for a time were ſucceſſively relieved by others. But the laſt body, who guarded that poſt and were forced to continue in it, conſiſted of about four hundred and twenty excluſive of the Helots who attended them. And *theſe* were commanded by Epitadas the ſon of Molobrus.

* 1 ¼ *mile.*

Demoſthenes. Demoſthenes, perceiving by theſe diſpoſitions that the Lacedæmonians would attack him by land and ſea, provided for his own defence. The triremes yet remaining with him he drew aſhore, and ranged them by way of paliſade before the fortreſs. The mariners he armed with bucklers, ſorry ones indeed, as moſt of them were only twigs of oſier plaited. Better arms were not to be procured in ſo deſart a place. And even theſe they had taken out of a cruizer of thirty oars and a light packet belonging to Meſſenians, who

who happened accidentally to put in. The Meſſenians on board them were about forty heavy-armed, whom he ranged amongſt his own body. The greater part therefore of the unarmed as well as ſome who had armour he placed on the ſtrongeſt parts of the fortreſs towards the continent, with orders to beat off the land-army whenever they approached. And having ſelected from his whole number ſixty heavy-armed and a few archers, he marched out of the fortreſs to that part of the beach where he expected the enemy would endeavour to land. The ſhore indeed was rough and rocky, and bordered on the main-ſea; yet, as the wall was weakeſt in this quarter, he judged it would ſooneſt tempt and animate an aſſault. For never imagining they ſhould be out-numbered in ſhipping, they had left the wall on this ſide but weak; and, ſhould the enemy now force a landing, the place would undoubtedly be loſt.

Senſible of this, and determined if poſſible to prevent their landing, Demoſthenes poſted himſelf with his choſen band on the very edge of the water, and endeavoured to animate them by the following harangue.

Speech of Demoſthenes.

" MY fellow-ſoldiers, here poſted with me in this dangerous ſituation, I conjure you, in ſo urgent an extremity, to throw away all ſuperfluous wiſdom. Let not a ſoul amongſt you compute the perils which now inviron us, but regardleſs of the iſſue and inſpirited by hope let him charge the foe, and be confident of ſucceſs. A ſituation deſperate like this alloweth no room for calm conſideration, but demands the moſt precipitate venture. Superior advantages however are along with us; — of this I am convinced, provided we only ſtand firm together, and ſcorning to be terrified at the number of our foes do not wilfully betray thoſe advantages which are now in our favour. The ſhore is moſt difficult of acceſs: — This in my judgment makes abundantly for us; — This will ſupport us, if we keep our ground. But if we give way,

" difficult as it is now, their landing will be eaſy --- when there are
" none to obſtruct it. Nay, what is worſe, we ſhall make the enemy
" more furious, when, if we may afterwards preſs hard upon him,
" it is no longer in his power to re-embark with eaſe. For ſo long
" as they continue on board they may moſt eaſily be encountered;
" whilſt they are buſy in landing, they cannot ſo far over-match us,
" as that we ought to ſhrink before their numbers. Large tho'
" they be, the ſpot of action will be ſmall for want of ground to
" draw up in order. What tho' their force be ſuperior for the land,
" that advantage will be loſt in their preſent ſervice, when they muſt
" act from their veſſels and on the water, where many lucky contin-
" gencies are requiſite. And thus am I ſatisfied, that with theſe
" diſadvantages they are but merely a balance for our ſmallneſs of
" number.

" As for you, O Athenians, who are now preſent, and who, by
" the long experience of frequent deſcents, are perfectly convinced
" that men, who ſtand firm and ſcorn to give way before the daſh of
" the ſurge or the menacing approach of a veſſel, can never be beat
" off — from you I inſiſt, that firmly embodied together and charg-
" ing the enemy on the very margin of the water, you preſerve all us
" who are here, and preſerve this fortreſs."

IN this manner Demoſthenes having encouraged his men, the Athenians became more animated than ever; and, marching forwards to the very margin of the ſea, poſted themſelves there in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians were alſo in motion; their land-force was marching to aſſault the fortreſs, and their fleet was approaching the ſhore. It conſiſted of forty-three veſſels, and a *Spartan*, Thraſymelidas the ſon of Crateſicles, was on board as admiral. He ſteered directly for the ſpot on which Demoſthenes expected his coming. In this manner were the Athenians aſſaulted on both ſides, by land and ſea.

The

The ſhips of the enemy came on in ſmall diviſions, becauſe there was not room for larger. They ſlackened by intervals, and endeavoured by turns to force their landing. They were brave to a man, and mutually animated one another to beat off the Athenians and ſeize the fortreſs. *The attack.*

But Braſidas ſignalized himſelf above them all. He commanded a trireme; and obſerving that the other commanders and pilots, tho' they knew they could run aground, yet kept aloof becauſe the ſhore was craggy, and ſhunned every hazard of ſtaving their veſſels, he ſhouted aloud, "that it was ſhameful for the ſaving of timber to "ſuffer enemies to raiſe fortifications within their territory." He encouraged them on the contrary "to force their landing, tho' they "daſhed their veſſels to pieces;" begging the confederates "in this "juncture not to refuſe beſtowing their ſhips on the Lacedæmo-"nians in lieu of the great ſervices they had done them, but to run "them aſhore, and landing at all adventures to ſeize the enemy and "the fortreſs." In this manner he animated others, and having compelled his own pilot to run the veſſel aſhore, he was at once upon the ſtairs, and endeavouring to get down was beat back by the Athenians. After many wounds received, he fainted with loſs of blood; and falling down upon the gunnel, his ſhield tumbled over into the water. It was brought aſhore and taken up by the Athenians, who afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which they erected for this attack. Braſidas.

The others indeed with equal ſpirit endeavoured but yet could not poſſibly land, as the ground was difficult of acceſs, and the Athenians ſtood firm and no where at all gave way. Such now was the ſtrange reverſe of fortune, that the Athenians upon land, upon Laconic land, beat off the Lacedæmonians who were fighting from the water; and the Lacedæmonians from ſhips were endeavouring a deſcent upon their own now hoſtile territory againſt Athenians. For at this period of time it was the general opinion, that *thoſe* were land-

land-men and excelled moſt in land-engagements, but that *theſe* were ſea-men and made the beſt figure at ſea.

Repulſed. The attack was continued the whole day and part of the next before it was given up. On the third day, they detached ſome veſſels to Aſine to fetch timber for engines, hoping by them to accompliſh the taking of the wall adjacent to the harbour, which tho' of a greater height yet might eaſier be approached by ſea.

The Athenians *reinforced.* During this pauſe, forty ſail of Athenians came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had been enlarged by the acceſſion of ſome guard-ſhips from off the ſtation of Naupactus, and four ſail of Chians. Theſe no ſooner diſcovered the main land about Pylus and the iſland Sphacteria to be full of armed ſoldiers, the harbour alſo to be occupied by the ſhips of the enemy which lay quiet in their poſts, than perplexed how to act they ſailed back for the preſent to the iſle of Prote not far diſtant and deſart, and there ſpent the night.

And attack in their turn. The day following, being formed into the order of battle, they ſhewed themſelves again as ready for engagement, ſhould the enemy venture to ſtand out againſt them into the open ſea; and if not, were determined to force their way into the harbour. The enemy ſtill kept in the ſame quiet poſture, nor ſet about executing their former deſign of barring the entrances. They continued in their uſual poſition along the ſhore, when they had manned their veſſels, and got every thing ready to engage the aſſailants ſhould they break into the harbour, where there was no danger of being ſtraitened for room. The Athenians, perceiving their intent, broke into the harbour at both entrances. Falling there upon the greater number of veſſels now advanced into deep water to obſtruct the paſſage, they put them to flight; and following the chace, which could be but ſhort, they ſhattered ſeveral, and took five, one of which had her whole crew on board. They proceeded to attack the reſt, which had fled amain towards the ſhore. Some moreover, which had juſt been manned were diſabled before they could lanch into the deep. Others, deſerted

deſerted by the mariners who had fled along the ſhore, they faſtened to their own, and towed away empty. The Lacedæmonians ſeeing theſe things, and prodigiouſly alarmed at the ſad event, leſt now the communication ſhould be cut off with the body in the iſland, ruſhed down with all their force to prevent it. Armed as they were they plunged into the water, and catching hold of the veſſels in tow pulled them back towards the ſhore. It was now the apprehenſion of every ſoul amongſt them, that the buſineſs flagged wherever he himſelf was not preſent. Great was the tumult in this conteſt for the ſhips, inverting the general cuſtom of both contending parties. For the Lacedæmonians, inflamed and terrified, fought a ſea-fight (if it may be ſo expreſſed) from the ſhore: The Athenians, already victorious, and eager to give their good-fortune its utmoſt completion, fought a land-battle from on board. The ſtruggle on both ſides was long and laborious, and blood was abundantly ſhed before the diſpute could be ended. But at length the Lacedæmonians recovered all their empty veſſels, excepting ſuch as had been taken on the firſt onſet. Each party being retired to their reſpective poſts, the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered up the dead, and were maſters of all the wreck and ſhatters of the action. Then, without loſs of time, they ranged their veſſels in circuit quite round the iſland, and kept a ſtrict watch, as having intercepted the body of men which was poſted there. But the Peloponneſians on the main-land, with the acceſſion of their auxiliaries who had now joined them, remained upon the oppoſite ſhore near Pylus.

And inveſt Sphacteria.

When the news of this action at Pylus was brought to Sparta, it was reſolved, as the great calamity was ſo urgent, that the *magiſtrates* in perſon ſhould repair to the camp, and conſult upon the very ſpot what reſource they had left. And when their own eyes had ſhewed them the impoſſibility of relieving their men, and they were loth to leave them in the wretched extremity either of periſhing by famine, or, overpowered by ſuperior numbers, of being ſhamefully made priſoners,

The Spartans *highly perplexed.*

ſoners, it was concluded " to ſend to the Athenian commanders to " ask a ſuſpenſion of arms at Pylus, whilſt they diſpatched an em- " baſſy to Athens to procure an accommodation, and to obtain leave " as ſoon as poſſible to fetch off their *Spartans*." Theſe commanders accepting the propoſal, the ſuſpenſion was agreed upon on the following conditions.

A ſuſpenſion of arms.

" THAT the Lacedæmonians ſhould immediately deliver up the " ſhips in which they had fought; and all the ſhips of war in gene- " ral, which they had any where in Laconia, they ſhould bring to " Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians. That they ſhould refrain " from making any attempt whatever upon the fortreſs, either by ſea " or land."

" That the Athenians ſhould permit the Lacedæmonians on the " main-land to carry over a ſtated quantity of proviſions to thoſe in " the iſland, two Attic * *chœnix's* of meal, with two *cotyls* of wine, and " a piece of fleſh for every Spartan, and a moiety of each for every " ſervant. Theſe proviſions to be carried thither under the inſpec- " tion of the Athenians; and no veſſels whatever to croſs over with- " out permiſſion."

" That the Athenians, notwithſtanding, be at liberty to continue " their guard round the iſland, but not to land upon it; and ſhould " refrain from giving any annoyance to the army of the Peloponne- " ſians, either by ſea or land."

" That if either party ſhould violate theſe conditions either in the " whole or any part whatever, the truce to be immediately void; " otherwiſe, to continue in force till the return of the Lacedæmonian " embaſſy from Athens."

" That the Athenians ſhould convoy that embaſſy thither and back " again in a trireme."

* More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, *Engliſh* meaſure.

" That

" That upon their return the truce ſhould be ended, when the " Athenians ſhould reſtore the ſhips now delivered to them, in the " ſame number and condition as they were in before."

On theſe conditions a ſuſpenſion of arms took place, in purſuance of which the ſhips were delivered up to the number of ſixty, and the embaſſadors diſpatched away, who arriving at Athens, addreſſed themſelves as followeth :

Speech of the Lacedæmonian *embaſſy.*

" HITHER, O Athenians, we are ſent on the part of the La- " cedæmonians, to negotiate with you in behalf of their citizens in " the iſland, and to propoſe an expedient which will tend very much " to your advantage, and will at the ſame time preſerve as much as " poſſible our own honour, in the great calamity with which we are " at preſent beſet. It is not our purpoſe to run out into a long un- " accuſtomed flow of words. We ſhall adhere to the rule of our " country, to ſpare many words where few may ſuffice; and then " only to enlarge, when the important occaſion requireth an exact " detail for the more judicious regulation of neceſſary acts. Receive " therefore our diſcourſe with an attention cleared of enmity. Be in- " formed as men of underſtanding ought; and conclude that you are " only to be put in mind of that judicious method of procedure, of " which yourſelves are ſuch competent judges.

" You have now an opportunity at hand to improve a preſent ſuc- " ceſs to your own intereſt and credit, to ſecure the poſſeſſion of what " you have hitherto acquired, and to adorn it with the acceſſion of " honour and glory. You are only to avoid that inſolence of mind " ſo frequent to men who have been, till the preſent, ſtrangers to " ſucceſs. Such men are ever apt to preſume too much on larger " acquiſitions, tho' merely becauſe their preſent proſperity was be- " yond their expectation: Whilſt they, who have experienced the " frequent viciſſitudes of fortune, have gained a more judicious turn,

" and

" and preſume the leaſt upon continuance of ſucceſs. And there is
" the higheſt reaſon to conclude, that experience hath improved the
" commonwealth of Athens and us Lacedæmonians in this piece of
" wiſdom, much more than any other people.

" But be aſſured of it now, when you behold the calamities with
" which we are at preſent invironed; — we, who inveſted with the
" higheſt honours and dignities of Greece, are this moment addreſ-
" ſing ourſelves to you, begging ſuch favours as we formerly thought
" were more peculiarly lodged in our own diſpenſation. Not that
" we are thus reduced through failure of our ſtrength, or through
" former ſtrength too haughtily exerted, but merely through the
" weight of ſuch unforeſeen diſaſters as continually happen, and to
" which the whole of mankind alike are ever ſubject. And from
" hence it is right that you ſhould learn, amidſt the preſent ſtrength
" of your *State* and its late acquiſitions, that fortune may not always
" declare upon your ſide. Wiſe indeed are they, who in their eſti-
" mates of ſucceſs make judicious allowances for chance. Such are
" beſt able to bear the alternatives of calamity with prudence and
" temper. Such will form their judgments of war, not as the infal-
" lible means of accompliſhing whatever ſcheme they pleaſe to un-
" dertake, but as deriving its effects from the guidance of fortune.
" Such are the perſons who are moſt of all exempted from fatal miſ-
" carriages; becauſe they are not puffed up by preſuming too far on
" preſent proſperity, and would gladly acquieſce in the peaceable en-
" joyment of what they now poſſeſs.

" It concerns your honour, Athenians, to deal in this manner with
" us, leſt, in caſe you now reject our propoſals, when you your-
" ſelves in future times miſcarry (many ſuch events muſt happen),
" your preſent good-fortune may then be perverſely aſcribed to
" chance, even tho' you are now able to deliver down to poſterity
" the fame of your power and moderation beyond a poſſibility of
" blemiſh. The Lacedæmonians invite you to agreement, and a con-

" cluſion

" cluſion of the war. They offer you peace and alliance, nay friend-
" ſhip in its whole extent, and the exchange of good offices mutu-
" ally revived; demanding nothing in return but their citizens out of
" the iſland. To this ſtep they have condeſcended rather than be ex-
" poſed to the dangers incidental on either ſide, ſhould *they* either
" ſeize ſome favourable opportunity to force their eſcape by arms, or
" holding out to the laſt againſt your blockade, be reduced with all
" the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in our opinion, may
" the ſooneſt be brought to a firm determination ---- not when either
" party having exerted all their ſtrength, and gained the far greater
" ſuperiority in war, diſdains the fair accommodation, and relieth on
" that forced acquieſcence which neceſſitated oaths impoſe; but ra-
" ther, when tho' victory be within their reach, they recollect huma-
" nity, and having ſucceeded by valour quite beyond their expecta-
" tions, determine the conteſt with temper and moderation. Then
" the foe, who hath not felt the extremity of force, is henceforth
" diſarmed by the ſtrength of gratitude, and is more ſecurely bound
" by the affections of his own mind to abide for the future by all
" his compacts. Such ready deference mankind are more apt to
" ſhew towards thoſe who have been with a remarkable ſuperiority
" their enemies, than to ſuch as they have oppoſed in more equal
" competition. It is natural, when men take the method of volun-
" tary ſubmiſſion, for the pleaſing conteſt of generoſity to be kindled
" between them; but to hazard the laſt extremities, and even grow
" deſperate againſt that haughtineſs which will not relent.

" Now, if ever, is the criſis come to effect ſuch a pleaſing recon-
" ciliation between us both, before the intervention of ſome incu-
" rable event to ulcerate our paſſions, which may lay us under the
" ſad neceſſity of maintaining an eternal enmity both public and pri-
" vate in regard to you, and you loſe the benefit of thoſe advanta-
" geous offers we now lay within your option. Whilſt the event is
" yet undetermined, whilſt the acquiſition of glory, and of our

" friendſhip is within your reach, whilſt yet we only feel the weight
" of a ſupportable calamity, and are clear from foul diſgrace, let us
" now be mutually reconciled; let us give the preference to peace
" over war, and effectuate a ceſſation of miſeries to the other Gre-
" cians. The honour of ſuch an event will by them be more abun-
" dantly aſcribed to you. At preſent they are engaged in a per-
" plexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its authors. But in caſe
" a reconciliation now take place, a point for the moſt part within
" your deciſion, they will gratefully acknowledge you for generous
" benefactors.

" If then you thus determine, you gain an opportunity to render
" the Lacedæmonians your firm and laſting friends, ſince now they
" requeſt your friendſhip, and chooſe to be obliged rather than com-
" pelled. Reflect within yourſelves how many benefits muſt in all
" probability reſult from ſuch a lucky coincidence. For you cannot
" but know, that when *we* and *you* ſhall act with unanimity, the reſt
" of Greece, conſcious of inferiority, will pay us the utmoſt honour
" and regard."

The Lacedæmonians talked in this ſtrain upon the preſumption, that the Athenians had formerly been deſirous of peace, and had been obſtructed merely through their oppoſition; but now, thus freely tender'd, they would accept it with joy, and give up the *men*. The Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the *Spartans* in the iſland already in their power, imagined that a peace would be at any time in their own option, and were now very eager to improve their preſent ſucceſs. But ſuch a meaſure was inſiſted upon moſt of all by Cleon the ſon of Cleænetus, the greateſt demagogue at this time, and moſt in credit with the people. It was he who perſuaded them to return the following anſwer.

Cleon.

" THAT,

" THAT, previous to all accommodation, the *Spartans* ſhut up " in the iſland muſt deliver up their arms and their perſons, and be " brought priſoners to Athens. When this was done, and the Lace- " dæmonians had ſurrender'd Niſæa and Pegæ, and Trœzene and " Chalcis, (of which places they had not poſſeſſed themſelves by " arms, but in purſuance of a former treaty, when diſtreſs exacted " compliance from the Athenians, and they had been obliged upon " any terms to purchaſe peace), then they might fetch away their " countrymen, and conclude a peace for whatever term both parties " ſhould agree."

Anſwer of the Athenians.

To this anſwer the Lacedæmonians made no direct reply [3]. They only requeſted that a *committee* might be appointed, with whom, after the arguments on each ſide ſhould be freely offered and diſcuſſed, they might agree upon ſome expedient to mutual ſatisfaction. Cleon upon this broke out into loud invectives againſt them, affirming, " he " knew beforehand that they intended nothing juſt or fair; but now " their view was manifeſt to all, as they had abſolutely refuſed to " have any tranſactions with the body of the *people*, and had thus " expreſſed a deſire to negotiate with a ſmall *committee*: If their " views were fair and upright, he called upon them to explain them- " ſelves in the preſence of all." But the Lacedæmonians perceiving that nothing they could urge would have any influence on the *people*, and in caſe, to ward off the diſtreſs they feared, they ſhould make too large propoſals, theſe offered and unaccepted, would expoſe them to the cenſure of their confederates; and that further, the Athenians would not comply with their demand on any reaſonable terms; they

Nothing effected.

3 Diodorus Siculus, l. 12. ſays further, That the Lacedæmonian embaſſadors offered to ſet at liberty an equal number of Athenians, who were now their priſoners. And, when this offer was rejected, the embaſſadors replied freely, " It was plain they ſet a " higher value on Spartans than on their " own citizens, ſince they judged an equal " number of the latter not to be an equi- " valent."

broke off all further conference, and quitted Athens. The very mo-
The truce ends. ment they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians redemanded their ſhips, according to the article for that purpoſe agreed on. But the Athenians objecting ſome infractions to them, ſuch as an incurſion towards the fortreſs, expreſly prohibited by the articles, and ſome other matters of little conſequence, abſolutely refuſed a reſtitution. They juſtified the refuſal upon this expreſs ſtipulation between them, that "if the conditions were in any "degree violated, the truce ſhould immediately be void." The Lacedæmonians proteſted againſt theſe proceedings, and charging the detention of their ſhips with the higheſt injuſtice, broke off all further debate, and prepared for war.

Pylus was now the ſcene in which both theſe warring parties exerted their utmoſt efforts. The Athenians ſailed the whole day round the iſland with two ſhips in an oppoſite courſe; in the night, their whole fleet was ſtationed round it upon guard, except on that ſide towards the main-ſea when the weather was tempeſtuous. And to ſtrengthen their guard, they had now received a reinforcement of twenty ſail from Athens, ſo that the number of their ſhipping amounted in the whole to ſeventy. The Peloponneſians maintained their poſt on the continent, and made frequent aſſaults upon the fort: intent all along to ſeize the firſt favourable opportunity, and to accompliſh the preſervation of their countrymen.

Sicily. In Sicily, this while, the Syracuſans and confederates, augmenting the number of their guard-ſhips on the ſtation of Meſſene with another ſquadron they had ſince equipped, from Meſſene renewed the war. The Locrians ſpared no pains to ſpur them on from the great averſion they bore to the Rhegians. They had now broke into the territories of the latter with their whole force. They had even a mind to hazard a naval engagement againſt them, as they ſaw the number of Athenian ſhips at hand to be very inconſiderable, and had received intelligence that the larger numbers deſigned for this ſervice

vice were ſtopped for the preſent to block up the iſle of Sphacteria. For ſhould they once get the better at ſea, they hoped, as they then might attack Rhegium both by ſea and land, to find it an eaſy conqueſt, and ſo the poſture of their own affairs would be conſiderably ſtrengthened. For as Rhegium, which is a promontory of Italy, lies at a very ſmall diſtance from Meſſene in Sicily, they could then prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be intirely maſters of the *ſtrait*. This *ſtrait* is that part of the ſea which runs between Rhegium and Meſſene, and over which lies the ſhorteſt cut from Sicily to the continent. It is the place which was formerly called Charybdis, and through which Ulyſſes is ſaid to have ſailed. As the current here ſets in ſtrongly from two great ſeas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and runs with great rapidity, it is not at all ſtrange that it ſhould have been eſteemed a dangerous paſſage.

An action in the ſtrait of Meſſene.

Yet in the very middle of this ſtrait the Syracuſans and confederates, with a number of ſhips little more than thirty, were forced to engage in the evening of the day, the diſpute beginning about a veſſel that was paſſing through. They ſtood away to oppoſe ſixteen ſail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They were worſted by the Athenians; but each ſide ſeparated in hurry and confuſion, juſt as they could, to their ſeveral ſtations at Meſſene and Rhegium. They loſt one ſhip in this action, which was ſtopped by the ſudden approach of night.

But after this, the Locrians evacuated the territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected fleet of the Syracuſans and confederates took a new ſtation at Peloris of Meſſene, and their whole land-force attended. The Athenians and Rhegians ſailing up to their ſtation, and finding none at preſent on board the ſhips, ruſhed in amongſt them. Yet they loſt one of their own veſſels by the force of a grappling-iron faſtened upon it, the crew of which was ſaved by ſwimming. Immediately after this the Syracuſans got on board, and being towed along the ſhore towards Meſſene, the Athenians came up again to attack

tack them; but, the enemy running off into the deep and giving the firſt charge, they loſe another of their ſhips. Tho' continuing to be towed along the ſhore, and to charge in this manner, yet the Syracuſans, without ſuffering any loſs, got ſafe into the harbour of Meſſene. And now the Athenians, having received intelligence that Camarina was betrayed to the Syracuſans by Archias and his accomplices, ſtood away for that place.

Naxus. In the mean while the Meſſenians, with their whole force by land, and accompanied by their ſhips, marched away againſt Chalcidic Naxus, which bordered upon their own territory. The firſt day they forced the Naxians to ſhelter themſelves behind their walls, and then they plundered the country. The day following, ſailing up the river Aceſine, they plundered along the ſhore, and with their land-force made an aſſault upon the city. The Siculi, who live upon the mountains, were now pouring down in numbers to repel the Meſſenians. This the Naxians perceiving, became more courageous, and animating one another with the thought that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were now marching to their relief, they ſuddenly ſally out of the city and fall upon the Meſſenians, whom they put to flight, and ſlaughtered more than a thouſand of them; the remainder, with difficulty, eſcaping to their own homes: For the Barbarians attacked them upon their road, and made great havoc of them. The ſhips upon the ſtation of Meſſene brake up ſoon after, withdrawing reſpectively to their own harbours.

Meſſene. Immediately the Leontines and allies, in concert with the Athenians, appeared before Meſſene, as now reduced to a very low ebb. They aſſaulted it on all ſides; the Athenians making their attempt from their ſhips on the ſide of the harbour, whilſt the land-forces did the ſame on the body of the place. But the Meſſenians, and a party of Locrians commanded by Demoteles, who after their late blow had been left there for the ſecurity of the place, made a ſudden ſally from the city, and falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leontines, put the

the greater part to flight, and did great execution upon them. This was no ſooner perceived by the Athenians, than they threw themſelves aſhore to ſuccour their confederates, and falling in with the Meſſenians, who had loſt the order of their battle, drove them again behind their walls. This done, having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhegium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily continued a land-war againſt one another, in which the Athenians had no participation.

Pylus. At Pylus, the Athenians ſtill kept the Lacedæmonians blocked up in the iſland, and the army of the Peloponneſians remained in their old poſt upon the continent, in a ſtate of inactivity. Their conſtant guard ſubjected the Athenians to exceſſive hardſhips, ſince proviſions and freſh water were equally ſcarce. There was but one ſingle fountain for their uſe, which lay within the fortreſs of Pylus, and yielded but a ſlender quantity of water. The majority of them were forced to dig into the gravel upon the beach of the ſea, and take up with ſuch water as could thus be got. They were further very much ſtraitned in their ſtation for want of room. They had not road enough for their ſhips to ride in with tolerable convenience, ſo that alternately one diviſion lay aſhore to take their neceſſary repaſts, whilſt the other lanched more to ſea. But what diſcouraged them moſt was the length of the blockade, ſo contrary to what they had expected. They had imagined a few days ſiege would have worn out a body of men ſhut up in a barren iſland, and having only ſalt-water for their drink. But this had been redreſſed by the Lacedæmonians, who had by a public edict encouraged all who were willing to carry over into the iſland meal, and wine, and cheeſe, and any other eatable which might enable them to hold out, aſſigning a large pecuniary reward for any ſucceſsful attempt of this nature, and promiſing freedom to every Helot who carried them proviſions. This was performed through a ſeries of dangers by ſeveral; but the Helots were moſt active of all, who putting off from Peloponneſus (wherever they

they chanced to be) landed by favour of the dark on the ſide of the iſland which lies upon the main-ſea. Their chief precaution was to run over in a hard gale of wind. For whenever the wind blew from the ſea, they were in leſs danger of being diſcovered by the guard of triremes, which then could not ſafely lie quite round the iſland. In executing this ſervice they put every thing to hazard. As a prior valuation had been given in, they run their veſſels on ſhore at all adventures; and the heavy-armed ſoldiers were ready to receive them at every place moſt convenient for landing. Thoſe however, who ventured out when the weather was calm, were certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were expert at diving, ſwam over through the harbour, dragging after them by a ſtring bottles filled with poppies mixed up with honey and the powder of linſeed. Theſe for a time eſcaped diſcovery, but were afterwards cloſely watched. No artifice was left unpractiſed on either ſide; ſome being ever intent to carry proviſions over, and others to intercept them.

Athens. At Athens, in the mean time, the people being informed of the hardſhips to which their own forces are reduced, and that thoſe in the iſland receive ſupplies of proviſion, were perplexed how to act. They were full of apprehenſions leſt the winter ſhould put a ſtop to their ſiege, being conſcious of the impoſſibility of procuring them ſubſiſtence from any part of Peloponneſus; and more ſo, as the ſoil about them was barren, and that even in ſummer they were not able to furniſh them with neceſſary ſupplies; that further, as no harbours were in the parts adjacent, there would be no commodious road for their ſhipping; ſo that, in caſe they relaxed their guard, the beſieged would go ſecurely away; or otherwiſe, they might get off, by the favour of ſtormy weather, in thoſe veſſels which brought over proviſions. But they were moſt of all alarmed at the conduct of the Lacedæmonians, who, becauſe they had now a ſafe reſource in proſpect, had diſcontinued all manner of negotiation. In a word, they highly repented the refuſal of their former offers.

Cleon,

Cleon, conſcious to himſelf that the blame of baffling that accommodation would be thrown upon him, taxed them who brought the laſt advices as broachers of falſhoods. But thoſe who had been ſent to make the report, demanded, "ſince they could not be credited, "that a deputation might be ſent to know its truth." For which office Cleon himſelf was nominated by the Athenians, in conjunction with Theogenes. *Cleon's bravado.*

But now he plainly ſaw, that he muſt either be neceſſitated to make the ſame report as thoſe had done whom he had charged with falſhood; or, ſhould he report differently, *muſt ſoon* be convicted of a lye. He perceived alſo, that the inclinations of the people were moſtly bent on an ample reinforcement; upon which, he ventured to give them this further advice —— That "ſending a deputation on "ſuch an errand was quite ſuperfluous, ſince opportunities might be "loſt by ſo dilatory a meaſure: If they were really convinced of the "truth of the report, they ſhould at once put to ſea againſt their "enemies." He then proceeded to a malicious glance againſt Nicias ſon of Niceratus, who at that time preſided over the military affairs. He hated him, and ſneered him thus —— That "if their "generals were really men, it would be an eaſy matter to ſail thi-"ther with an additional ſtrength, and make a ſeizure of thoſe in "the iſland; for his own part, was he in command, he would do it "in a trice." The Athenians began immediately to clamour and rail at Cleon, for not inſtantly ſetting about that enterpriſe himſelf, which to him appeared ſo eaſy. This Nicias laying hold of, chagrined at the ſame time by the ſneer upon himſelf, called upon him aloud —— "To take what force he pleaſed, and to perform the ſer-"vice in his ſtead." Cleon, imagining this to be a mere verbal offer, declared himſelf ready. But when he found that Nicias was earneſt in the point of reſignation, he drew back, alledging, that "it "could not be, ſince not he but Nicias was General." He trembled now, ſince he never ſuſpected that the other would venture to give

up his office to him. Nicias however called a ſecond time upon him, and formally ſurrendered his office to him, ſo far as related to Pylus, deſiring the Athenians to be his witneſſes. The people now (for ſuch is the temper of the multitude) the more pains Cleon took to decline the voyage, and diſentangle himſelf from his own bravados, called out ſo much the more vehemently upon Nicias to give up the command, and roared aloud at the other to go on board. Unable now to extricate himſelf, he intimates his acceptance of the employ, and ſtanding forth, averred, that "he was not under the "leaſt dread of the Lacedæmonians, would not be accompanied by "ſo much as one Athenian, but would take only what Lemnians "and Imbrians were at hand, and thoſe targeteers who were come "to their aid from Ænus, and the four hundred archers from other "places. With theſe, *he ſaid*, added to the military force already "at Pylus, he would either in the ſpace of twenty days bring "off all the Lacedæmonians alive, or put them all to death upon "the ſpot."

This big way of talking raiſed a laugh among the people; all men of ſenſe however were not a little delighted. They concluded, they ſhould compaſs by it one of theſe two deſirable ends; either, to rid themſelves effectually of Cleon, which they chiefly expected; or, ſhould they be diſappointed of this, to get thoſe Lacedæmonians into their power [4].

Having

4 The honour of Athens was very deeply concerned in the point, which had been the ſubject of this day's debate in the aſſembly of the people, and yet it hath turned out a mere comic ſcene. The dignity of the republic had never been well ſupported on theſe occaſions, ſince the death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all kinds of drollery and ſcurrility into the debates; and it was now become quite the ſame thing to the people, whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath now railed Nicias, tho' none but a perſon of ſo diffident and fearful a temper as Nicias could ſo have been railed, out of an honourable command; and then is laughed himſelf into it, and tho' an arrant poltroon is metamorphoſed into a general of the firſt claſs, and ſoon after ſwells into a very hero. However, the Athenian good-ſenſe, whatever turn Thucydides gives it,

Having thus tranſacted the requiſite points in the public aſſembly, where the Athenians had awarded the expedition to him by a formal decree, and Demoſthenes, at Cleon's own requeſt, was joined in the commiſſion of commanders at Pylus, he haſtened to his poſt with the utmoſt ſpeed. His reaſon for aſſociating Demoſthenes in the command, was owing to ſome notice received that he was bent on landing upon the iſland; as the ſoldiers, terribly incommoded by the ſtraitneſs of their ſtations, and reſembling beſieged more than beſiegers, were eager for this bold adventure. Demoſthenes was animated more to the attempt, becauſe the iſland had lately been ſet on fire. Before this accident, as it had been quite covered over with wood, and was pathleſs, becauſe ever uninhabited, he durſt not think of ſuch a ſtep, and judged all theſe circumſtances to be for the enemy's advantage. For, tho' a more numerous army ſhould have landed againſt them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them from poſts undeſcried. What errors might be committed, or how large their ſtrength, might be more eaſily concealed on that ſide by the covert of the woods; whereas all the errors of his own army would lie clear and open to obſervation, when the enemy might ſuddenly attack, and in what quarter they pleaſed, ſince battle muſt be intirely in their own option. On the other ſide, ſhould he force them to a cloſe engagement on rough and woody ground, the ſmaller number, by being skilled in the paſſes, he imagined, muſt prove too hard for a ſuperior number without ſuch experience; that by this means his own force,

He goes to Pylus.

it, can hardly be juſtified on this occaſion, in thruſting ſo important a commiſſion upon Cleon purely for a joke. Plutarch ſays, they always bore his impertinent and mad way of talking, becauſe it was humourous and diverting. Once, when the aſſembly had been met ſome time, and the people had ſat long expecting his coming, at length he made his appearance with a garland on his head, and begged the favour of them to adjourn till the morrow, "For at preſent, "*ſaid he*, I am not at leiſure, ſince I have "ſacrificed to day, and muſt entertain my "friends." A loud laugh enſued at his impudence, and then they roſe and adjourned. This affair of Pylus was however far from a jocular point; and the Athenians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had not Cleon been wiſe enough to aſſociate Demoſthenes with him in the command.

merely on account of its numbers, might be imperceptibly deſtroyed, as it could not be diſcerned, which part of it was hardeſt preſſed, and ſtood moſt in need of ſupport.

Demoſthenes *intent on an attack.*

Theſe inward ſuggeſtions were more prevalent in the mind of Demoſthenes from the remembrance of his Ætolian defeat, which was partly owing to the woods amongſt which he engaged. But as the narrowneſs of their ſtation had neceſſitated his ſoldiers to land ſometimes upon the skirts of the iſland, and under the cover of an advanced guard to dreſs their repaſt, a ſoldier, tho' intirely without deſign, ſet the wood on fire, which ſpread but ſlowly, till a brisk gale happening to ariſe, the greateſt part of it was unexpectedly deſtroyed by the flames. Demoſthenes, having gained by this means a clearer view of the Lacedæmonians, found them more numerous than from the quantity of victuals ſent in by ſtipulation he was uſed to compute them. He then judged it highly to concern the Athenians to exert their utmoſt efforts: and, as the iſland was now become more opportune for a deſcent, he got every thing in readineſs for its execution, having ſent for a ſupply of men from the adjacent confederates, and buſied himſelf about all the diſpoſitions needful for ſucceſs. He had further received an expreſs from Cleon notifying his approach, who now, at the head of the ſupply he himſelf had demanded, arriveth at Pylus. No ſooner were they joined, than they diſpatched a herald to the camp on the continent, demanding — "Whether they were "willing to order their people in the iſland to ſurrender their arms "and perſons, without risking extremities, on condition to be kept "under an eaſy confinement till the whole diſpute could be properly "accommodated?" — This being poſitively refuſed, they remained quiet one day longer; but on the ſucceeding day, having embarked their whole ſtrength of heavy-armed on board a few veſſels, they put out by night, and a little before the enſuing dawn landed on each ſide of the iſland, both from the main ſea and the harbour, amounting in the whole to eight hundred men in heavy-armour. They advanced

advanced with their utmoſt ſpeed towards the firſt guard on the iſland. This was done in purſuance of a previous diſpoſition: For this firſt guard conſiſted of about thirty heavy-armed: The main-body under Epitadas was poſted about the centre, where the ground was moſt level and watry: And another party guarded the extremity of the iſland facing Pylus, which towards the ſea was a rocky cliff, and by land altogether impregnable. On the top further of this cliff was ſeated a fort, built ſome ages before of ſtones picked carefully for the purpoſe. This they judged might be ſerviceable to them, ſhould they be forced to ſhelter themſelves from ſuperior violence. In this manner was the enemy poſted.

Lands on Sphacteria.

The Athenians immediately, in their firſt career, put the whole advanced guard to the ſword, having ſurpriſed them yet in their huts, and but ſeeking to lay hold of their arms. Their landing was yet undiſcovered, ſince the enemy judged their veſſels to be only the uſual guard which was every night in motion.

No ſooner alſo was the dawn completely broke, than the remainder of the Athenian force was landed from a number of veſſels ſomewhat more than ſeventy. All the mariners came aſhore, in their reſpective diſtinctions of arms, excepting the rowers of the loweſt bench [5]. They were eight hundred archers, and a body no leſs numerous of targeteers. The Meſſenian auxiliaries attended, and all in general who had been employed at Pylus, except ſuch as were neceſſarily detained for the guard of the fortreſs.

5 It is in the original, excepting the *Thalamii*. The rowers on the different benches were diſtinguiſhed by a peculiar name. Thoſe of the uppermoſt were called *Thranitæ*; thoſe of the middle, *Zeugitæ*; and thoſe of the loweſt, *Thalamii*. The labour of the *Thalamii* was the leaſt, though moſt conſtant, becauſe of their nearneſs to the water, and the ſhortneſs of their oars. Much more ſtrength and skill were required on the upper benches, and moſt of all on the uppermoſt, who for that reaſon had better pay. Thoſe on the loweſt bench ſeem to have been mere drudges at the oar, and qualified for nothing better; the others were more complete ſeamen, and ready on all occaſions for the duty both of rowing and fighting.

According

According to a diſpoſition formed by Demoſthenes, they advanced in ſeparate bodies, conſiſting of near two hundred more or leſs, and took poſſeſſion of all the eminences. The deſign was, thus to reduce the enemy to a plunge of diſtreſs by ſurrounding them on all ſides, and puzzling them in their choice which party firſt to make head againſt; that at the ſight of numbers on all ſides they might be quite confounded; and, ſhould they then attack the body in their front, they might be haraſſed by others in their rear; or, ſhould they wheel towards thoſe on either flank, they might be expoſed to the bodies both in front and rear. Which way ſoever the enemy might turn, they were ſure to have behind them the light-armed and leſs martial of their opponents, infeſting them with their bows and darts and ſtones. Theſe would do execution from a diſtance: an enemy could not poſſibly engage with them; ſince even flying they would prevail, and when the enemy retreated would return briſkly to their work. With ſo much addreſs had Demoſthenes previouſly plan'd the order of landing, and in cloſe adherence to it brought them now to action.

The body commanded by Epitadas, and which was the bulk of the whole force in the iſland, when they ſaw their advanced guard intirely cut off and the enemy advancing to attack them next, drew up in order and marched towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, deſigning to engage them. For the latter were ſo placed as to oppoſe them in front; the light-armed were poſted on either of their flanks and in their rear. But againſt theſe heavy-armed they could not poſſibly come to action, nor gain an opportunity to exert their own diſtinguiſhing ſkill. For the light-armed, pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, compelled them to halt; and their oppoſites would not move forwards to meet them, but ſtood quiet in their poſt. Such indeed of the light-armed, as adventured in any quarter to run up near their ranks, were inſtantly put to flight; however, they ſoon faced about and continued their annoyance. They were not incum-

bered

bered with any weight of armour; their agility eaſily conveyed them beyond the reach of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever left deſart had never been levelled by culture. In ſuch ſpots the Lacedæmonians, under the load of their arms, could not poſſibly purſue. In this kind of ſkirmiſh therefore they were for a ſmall ſpace of time engaged.

When the Lacedæmonians had no longer ſufficient agility to check the attacks of theſe ſkirmiſhing parties, the light-armed ſoon took notice that they ſlackened in their endeavours to beat them off. It was then, that their own appearance many times more large than that of their foes, and the very ſight of themſelves began to animate them with exceſs of courage. Experience had now leſſened that terror in which they had been uſed to regard *this* foe. They now had met with no rough reception from them, which fell out quite contrary to what they firmly expected at their firſt landing, when their ſpirits had ſunk very low at the thought, that it was againſt *Lacedæmonians*. Contempt enſued; and embodying, with a loud ſhout they ruſhed upon them; pouring in ſtones and arrows and darts, whatever came firſt to hand. At ſuch a ſhout accompanied with ſo impetuous a charge, aſtoniſhment ſeized their foes quite unpractiſed in ſuch a form of engagement; at the ſame time the aſhes of the wood, which had been burnt, were mounting largely into the air. So that now each loſt the ſight of what was cloſe before him, under the ſhowers of darts and ſtones thrown by ſuch numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of duſt.

Amidſt ſo many difficulties the Lacedæmonians now were ſorely diſtreſſed. The ſafe-guards on their heads and breaſts were no longer proof againſt the arrows, and their javelins were broke to pieces when poiſed for throwing. They were quite at a loſs for ſome means of defence; they were debarred the proſpect of what was paſſing juſt before them; and the ſhouts of the enemy were ſo loud that they could no longer hear any orders. Danger thus ſurrounding them

them on all ſides, they quite deſpaired of the poſſibility of ſuch reſiſtance as might earn their ſafety. At laſt, a great part of that body being wounded, becauſe obliged to adhere firmly to the ſpot on which they ſtood, embodying cloſe, they retreated towards the fort on the ſkirt of the iſland, which lay at no great diſtance, and to their guard which was poſted there. But when once they began to move off, the light-armed, growing more reſolute and ſhouting louder than ever, preſſed hard upon their retreat; and whatever Lacedæmonian fell within their reach, in the whole courſe of the retreat, was inſtantly ſlaughtered. The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the fort, and in concert with the guard poſted there drew up in order to defend it, in whatever quarter it might poſſibly be aſſaulted. The Athenians, ſpeedily coming up, were hindered by the natural ſite of the place from forming a circle and beſetting it on all ſides. Advancing therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long time, for the greateſt part of the day, both ſides perſiſted in the conteſt, under the painful preſſures of battle and thirſt and a burning ſun. No efforts were ſpared by the aſſailants to drive them from the eminence; nor by the defendants to maintain their poſt. But here the Lacedæmonians defended themſelves with more eaſe than in the preceding engagement, becauſe now they could not be encompaſſed on their flanks.

When the diſpute could not thus be brought to a deciſion, the commander of the Meſſenians, addreſſing himſelf to Cleon and Demoſthenes, aſſured them, "they took a deal of pains to no manner "of purpoſe; but would they be perſuaded to put under his guidance "a party of the archers and light-armed, to get a round-about "way on the enemies rear by a track which he himſelf could find, "he was confident he could force an entrance." Having received the party he demanded, marching off from a ſpot undeſcried by the Lacedæmonians in order to conceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon the verge

verge of the iſland, in the quarter where the Lacedæmonians depending upon its natural ſtrength had placed no guard, with great difficulty and fatigue he got behind them undiſcovered. Now ſhewing himſelf on a ſudden upon the ſummit and in their rear, he aſtoniſhed the enemy with this unexpected appearance; and his friends, who now beheld what they ſo earneſtly looked for, he very much emboldened. The Lacedæmonians were now expoſed to the miſſive weapons on both ſides; and (if a point of leſs conſequence may be compared to one of greater) were in a ſtate parallel to that of their countrymen at Thermopylæ [6]. For *thoſe* being hemmed in by the Perſians in a narrow paſs, were utterly deſtroyed: *Theſe* now, in like manner beſet on both ſides, were no longer able to contend. Being but a handful of men oppoſed to ſuperior numbers, and much weakened in their bodies for want of food, they quitted their poſt. And thus the Athenians became maſters of all the approaches.

But Cleon and Demoſthenes, aſſuredly convinced that ſhould the foe give way too faſt, it would only conduce to their expeditious ſlaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, began to ſtop their fury, and to draw off their men. They were deſirous to carry them alive to Athens, in caſe they would ſo far hearken to the voice of a herald as to throw down their arms, dejected as they muſt be in ſpirit and overpowered with the inſtant danger. It was accordingly proclaimed, that "ſuch as were willing ſhould deliver up their "arms and their perſons to the Athenians, to be diſpoſed of at "diſcretion."

6 The famous three hundred Spartans with king Leonidas at their head, who ſtopped the vaſt army of Xerxes at the paſs of Thermopylæ, and at length periſhed all to a man. They were all afterwards intombed on the ſpot where they fell with this ſhort epitaph;

Tell, traveller, at Sparta what you ſaw,
That here we lie obedient to her law.

The ſame ſpirit and reſolution was at this time generally expected from theſe Spartans, now encompaſſed round about by their enemies, in the iſle of Sphacteria.

The Spartans *ſurrender.*

When this was heard, the greater number threw down their bucklers and waved their hands, in token of accepting the propoſal. A ſuſpenſion of arms immediately took place, and a conference was held between Cleon and Demoſthenes on one ſide, and Styphon the ſon of Pharax on the other. Of thoſe who had preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was the firſt, had been ſlain, and Hippagretes who was his ſucceſſor, lying as dead among the ſlain, tho' he had yet life in him, Styphon was now the third appointed to take the command upon him, according to the proviſion made by their law, in caſe their generals drop. Styphon intimated his deſire of leave to ſend over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. This the Athenians refuſed, but however called over ſome heralds to him from the continent. Meſſages paſſed backwards and forwards twice or thrice; but the laſt who croſſed over to them from the Lacedæmonians on the continent brought this determination —— "The Lacedæmonians permit you to take care of your own concerns, "provided you ſubmit to nothing baſe." In conſequence of this, after a ſhort conſultation with one another apart, they delivered up their arms and their perſons. The remainder of the day and the ſucceeding night the Athenians confined them under a ſtrong guard. But the day following, having erected a trophy upon the iſland, they got themſelves in readineſs to ſail away, and diſtributed the priſoners to the cuſtody of the captains of the triremes. The Lacedæmonians, having obtained permiſſion by a herald, fetched off their dead.

The number of thoſe who were ſlain, and thoſe who were taken alive, ſtood thus: They who had thrown themſelves into the iſland amounted in the whole to four hundred and twenty heavy-armed. Of theſe three hundred wanting eight were carried off alive, the reſt had been deſtroyed. Among the priſoners were about one hundred and twenty *Spartans*. The number of Athenians ſlain was inconſiderable: for it was not a ſtanding fight. The whole ſpace that theſe

men

men were beſieged in the iſland, from the engagement at ſea till the battle in the iſland, was ſeventy-two days. Twenty of theſe, during the abſence of the embaſſadors to negotiate an accommodation, they were ſupplied with food: The remainder of the time, they were fed by ſuch as got over by ſtealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were found in the iſland, even when all was over. Their commander Epitadas had made a more ſparing diſtribution than his ſtores required.

Now the Athenians and Peloponneſians reſpectively drew off their forces from Pylus to return home: And the promiſe of Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. For within the twenty days, he brought them priſoners to Athens, and made his words good [7]. *Cleon's bravado made good.*

The expectation of Greece was more diſappointed by this event, than by any other occurrence whatever in the ſeries of the war. It was generally preſumed that neither famine nor any extremity could have reduced theſe Lacedæmonians to deliver up their arms, but that ſword in hand and fighting to the laſt gaſp, they would have bravely periſhed. They could not afterwards believe that thoſe who ſurrendered were like to thoſe who were ſlain. Some time after, a ſoldier in one of the confederate bands of the Athenians, demanding with a ſneer of one of them who were taken priſoners in the iſland, "if the ſlain were not men of true gallantry and courage?" the

7 It ſhould be added here, that he alſo robbed for the preſent a very able and gallant officer of the praiſe he merited on this occaſion. The whole affair of Pylus was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a ſucceſsful and glorious iſſue by the conduct and bravery of Demoſthenes. Ariſtophanes (in *the Knights*) hath made a low comic character of the latter, and introduced him venting ſad complaints againſt Cleon for pilfering the honour from him. "This *Paphlagonian* (ſays he) hath "ſnatched from every one of us whatever "nice thing we had got to ſuit the palate "of our lord and maſter (the *people.*) 'Tis "but the other day, I myſelf had cooked "up a noble paſty of Lacedæmonians at "Pylus, when this vileſt of ſcoundrels "came running thither, pilfered it away "from me, and hath ſerved it up to table "as if it was of his own dreſſing."

other replied, that " a ſpindle (by which he meant an arrow) " would be valuable indeed, if it knew how to diſtinguiſh the " brave ;" intimating by this anſwer, that the ſlain were ſuch as ſtones and darts diſpatched in the medley of battle.

The priſoners carried to Athens.

When the priſoners were brought to Athens, it was the public reſolution there " to keep them in bonds, 'till ſome definitive treaty " could be agreed on. And if previouſly to this, the Peloponneſians " ſhould repeat their inroad into the Attic territory, they ſhould all " undergo a public execution." They eſtabliſhed alſo a garriſon for Pylus. And the Meſſenians of Naupactus ſending thither the moſt proper of their own people, as into their own native country (for Pylus is a part of the ancient Meſſenia) infeſted Laconia with depredations and did them vaſt damage, the more becauſe they ſpoke the ſame dialect *.

The Lacedæmonians *ſue for peace.*

As for the Lacedæmonians, who never knew before what it was to be thus plundered, war in ſuch a ſhape being new to them, and their Helots deſerting continually to the foe; apprehenſive farther, leſt ſuch unuſual proceedings within their own diſtrict might draw worſe conſequences after them, — they had a painful ſenſe of their preſent ſituation. This compelled them to ſend their embaſſies to Athens, deſirous however at the ſame time to conceal what they really thought of their own ſtate, and ſpare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus and their people. But the Athenians grew more unreaſonable in their demands, and after many journeys to and fro ſent them finally away with an abſolute denial. Such was the courſe of proceedings in relation to Pylus.

The Athenians *invade the* Corinthians.

The ſame ſummer, and immediately on the cloſe of the former event, the Athenians ſet out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty ſhips which carried two thouſand heavy-armed of their own people, and with ſome horſe-tranſports on board of which were two hundred horſemen. They were alſo attended by ſome of their confe-

derates,

* The *Doric*.

derates, by the Mileſians and Andrians and Caryſthians. Nicias the ſon of Niceratus with two collegues commanded this armament. At the early dawn of morning they came to anchor between Cherroneſus and Reitus, on the ſhore of that place which the Solygian hill overhangs, of which formerly the Dorians poſſeſſing themſelves made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth who were of Æolian deſcent. Upon that eminence there is now a village called Solygia. From theſhore where the armament came now to anchor, this village was diſtant about * twelve, the city of Corinth † ſixty, and the Iſthmus ‡ twenty ſtadia.

* *Near* 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ *mile.*
† 6 *miles.*
‡ 2 *miles.*

Battle of Solygia.

The Corinthians, who had already been adviſed from Argos of the approach of the Athenian armament, had long ſince by way of prevention drawn their whole force together at the Iſthmus, excepting what was in employ without the Iſthmus and the five hundred abſent in the guard of Ambracia and Leucadia. With all the reſt of their people able to bear arms they were poſted on the iſthmus, to watch the approach of the Athenians. But when the Athenian fleet had paſſed by undiſcovered by favour of the night, and ſignals notified their approach elſewhere, leaving half their force at Cenchrea to obſtruct any attempt of the Athenians upon Crommyon, they marched with all ſpeed againſt the enemy. Battus one of their commanders (for there were two ſuch in the field) at the head of a ſeparate body marched up to the open village of Solygia in order to defend it, whilſt Lycophron with the remainder advanced to the charge. The Corinthians fell firſt upon the right wing of the Athenians who were but juſt landed before Cherroneſus, and then proceeded to engage the whole of that army. The action was warm, and fought hand to hand. The right wing, conſiſting of the Athenians and alſo the Caryſthians who were drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a warm reception, and with much difficulty repulſed them. Retreating therefore upwards to a wall built of ſtone (for the ground was a continued aſcent,) and being there above the enemy, they

annoyed

annoyed them with ſtones; and having ſung their pæan, ruſhed down upon them again. The Athenians having ſtood the ſhock, they engaged a ſecond time hand to hand. But a band of Corinthians being come up to the ſupport of their own left wing, occaſioned the rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and purſued them to the ſea-ſide. But the Athenians and Caryſthians now turned again, and beat them off from the ſhips.

Athenians victorious.

In other parts of the action the diſpute was reſolute on both ſides, eſpecially where the right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron at its head, was engaging the left wing of the Athenians. They were apprehenſive the enemy would endeavour to force their way to the village of Solygia. For a conſiderable ſpace the battle was obſtinate, neither ſide giving way; but at length, through the advantage on the Athenian ſide of being aſſiſted by a party of horſe, whereas their oppoſites had none, the Corinthians were broke and driven up the aſcent, where grounding their arms, they came down no more to the charge, but remained in a quiet poſture. In this rout of the right wing, numbers of the Corinthians periſhed, and Lycophron their general. But the reſt of the body had the good fortune to make a ſafe retreat, and ſo to ſecure themſelves upon the eminence, as they could not be briskly purſued, and were not compelled to move off with precipitation. When the Athenians perceived that the enemy would no more return to the charge, they rifled the bodies of the foes whom they had ſlain, and carried off their own dead, and then without loſs of time erected their trophy.

Yet forced to re-embark.

That diviſion of the Corinthians which had been poſted at Cenchrea to prevent any attempt upon Crommyon, had the view of the battle intercepted from them by the mountain Oneius. But when they ſaw the cloud of duſt, and thence knew what was doing, they marched full ſpeed towards the ſpot. The aged inhabitants alſo, when they were informed of the battle, ruſhed out of Corinth to ſuccour their own people. The Athenians perceiving the approach of

of ſuch numerous bodies, and judging them to be ſuccours ſent up by the neighbouring Peloponneſians, threw themſelves immediately on board their ſhips, with what ſpoil they had taken, and the bodies of their own dead excepting two, which not finding in this hurry they left behind. They were no ſooner re-embarked than they croſſed over to the adjacent iſlands, from whence they diſpatched a herald to demand leave, which was granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had left behind [8].

The number of Corinthians ſlain in the battle was two hundred and twelve; that of Athenians ſomewhat leſs than fifty.

Their farther proceedings.

The Athenians, leaving the iſlands, appeared the ſame day before Crommyon, ſituated in its territory, and diſtant from the city of Corinth one hundred and twenty ſtadia *. They landed and ravaged the country, and that night repoſed themſelves there. The day following they ſailed along the coaſt, firſt to Epidaurus; and, after a kind of deſcent there, arrived at Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and Trœzen. Poſſeſſing themſelves there of the iſthmus of Cherroneſus on which Methone is ſituated, they run up a wall acroſs it, and fixed a garriſon of continuance in that poſt, which for the future extended their depredations over all the diſtricts of Trœzen,

* *About* 12 Engliſh *miles.*

8 This incident is related by Plutarch (in *the Life of* Nicias) as a proof of the great piety and humanity of Nicias. His asking leave to fetch off theſe two bodies was, according to that writer, an actual renunciation of the victory; ſince it was againſt all rules, for perſons who had condeſcended to ſue. a ſubmiſſion, to erect a trophy. But, without diſparaging the good qualities of Nicias, or his obedience to the inſtitutions of his country in regard to the dead, which were ever moſt ſacredly obſerved, it may be queſtioned, whether he renounced the victory on this occaſion. Thucydides ſays the trophy was already erected, which aſcertained, without doubt, the honour of the victory, and nothing is ſaid of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they received this requeſt of truce from Nicias. His reembarking in a hurry ſeems a diſtinct affair. It had no connexion with the late battle, which had been clearly and fairly won; but was owing to a freſh army coming into the field on the ſide of the enemy. This ſtopped him indeed from gaining any freſh honour, but ſurely did not deprive him of what he was already poſſeſſed of.

Halias and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once this poſt was ſufficiently ſecured, ſailed away for Athens.

Corcyra. During the ſpace of time which co-incided with theſe tranſactions, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who with the ſhips of the Athenians had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the Corcyréans of the city, marching out againſt thoſe who were poſted on the mount of Iſtone, *that* party who repaſſing ſoon after the ſedition were at this time maſters of the country, and committed ſad ravage. Accordingly they aſſaulted that poſt, and carried it by ſtorm. The defendants, who had fled away in a body towards another eminence, were ſoon forced to capitulate "giving "up their auxiliaries, and then giving up their own arms, to be pro- "ceeded with afterwards at the pleaſure of the *people* of Athens." The commanders removed them all for ſafe cuſtody into the iſle of Ptychia, till they could conveniently be conveyed to Athens, with this proviſo, that "if any one perſon ſhould be caught in an attempt to "get off, the whole number ſhould forfeit the benefit of the capitu- "lation."

Tragical period of the ſedition. But the leaders of the *populace* at Corcyra, apprehending that the Athenians, ſhould they be ſent to Athens, might poſſibly ſave their lives, contrive the following machination. —— They tamper ſucceſsfully with ſome of thoſe who were confined in the iſle, by the means of ſome truſty agents whom they ſent privately amongſt them, and inſtructed that "with great profeſſions of regard for them, they "ſhould inſinuate no other reſource was left for them but to make "their eſcape with all poſſible expedition, and that themſelves would "undertake to provide them with a bark, for it was the certain re- "ſolution of the Athenian commanders to give them up to the fury "of the Corcyréan populace." — When they had given ear to theſe ſuggeſtions, and were on board the bark thus treacherouſly provided for them, and ſo were apprehended in the very act of departure, the articles of capitulation came at once to an end, and they were all given

given up to the Corcyréans. Not that the Athenian commanders did not highly contribute to the ſucceſs of this treachery; ſince, in order to make it go down more eaſily, and to leſſen the fears of the agents in the plot, they had publicly declared that "the conveyance of thoſe "perſons to Athens by any other hands would highly chagrin them, "becauſe then, whilſt they were attending their duty in Sicily, others "would run away with all the honour." The Corcyréans had them no ſooner in their power, than they ſhut them up in a ſpacious edifice. Hence afterwards they brought them out by twenties, and having formed two lines of ſoldiers, in all military habiliments, facing one another, they compelled them to walk between the lines, chained one to another, and receiving blows and wounds as they paſſed along from thoſe who formed the lines, and ſtruck at pleaſure ſo ſoon as they perceived the objects of their hatred. They were followed by others who carried ſcourges, and laſhed thoſe forwards who moved not readily along. Threeſcore perſons had been brought forth and deſtroyed in this manner, before thoſe who remained in the edifice became ſenſible of their fate. For they had hitherto imagined, that thoſe who fetched them out did it merely to ſhift their confinement. But when they learned the truth from ſome perſon or other whom they could not diſbelieve, they called out aloud on the Athenians, and implored as a favour to be put to death by them. To ſtir from the place of their confinement they now abſolutely refuſed, and averred, that to the utmoſt of their power they would hinder every body from coming in to them. But the Corcyréans had not the leaſt inclination to force an entrance by the doors. They mounted up on the top of the edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the tiles and ſhot arrows down upon them. The others protected themſelves to the beſt of their power; and many of them were employed in making away with themſelves by cramming the arrows ſhot from above down their own throats. Others, tearing away the cordage from the beds which happened to be within, or twiſting ſuch ropes as they could from ſhreds

of their own garments, ſo ſtrangled themſelves to death. No method was omitted during the greateſt part of the night (for night dropt down upon this ſcene of horror) till, either diſpatched by their own contrivance, or ſhot to death by thoſe above, their deſtruction was completely finiſhed. So ſoon as it was day, the Corcyréans, having thrown their bodies on heaps into carriages, removed them out of the city. But their wives, ſo many as had been taken priſoners in company with their huſbands, they adjudged to ſlavery for life.

In this manner the Corcyréans from the mountain were deſtroyed by the *people*. And a ſedition ſo extenſive was brought to this tragical period, ſo far at leaſt as relates to the preſent war. For nothing of the ſame nature broke out afterwards ſo remarkable as to need a particular relation.

The Athenians departing from Corcyra, made the beſt of their way for Sicily, whither they were bound at firſt ſetting out, and proſecuted the war there in concert with their allies.

Anactorium. In the cloſe of this ſummer, the Athenians on the ſtation of Naupactus, marching in junction with the Acarnanians, poſſeſſed themſelves of Anactorium, a city of the Corinthians, ſituated on the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It was put into their hands by treachery. In conſequence of this, the Corinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place repeopled by new inhabitants invited thither from all parts of Acarnania. And the ſummer ended.

Death of Artaxerxes. The enſuing winter, Ariſtides the ſon of Archippus, one of thoſe who commanded the ſquadrons which the Athenians had put out to raiſe contributions among their dependents, apprehended Artaphernes a noble Perſian, at Eïon on the river Strymon. He was going to Lacedæmon on a commiſſion from *the King*. Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had his letters, which were wrote in Aſſyrian, tranſlated and read in public. Their contents were large, but the principal was *this* paſſage addreſſed to the Lacedæmonians —— that " he " was

" was not yet properly informed what it was they requeſted of him. " For tho' he had been attended by frequent embaſſies, yet they did " not all agree in their demands. If therefore they were deſirous to " make an explicit declaration, they ſhould ſend ſome of their body " to him in company with this Perſian." But the Athenians afterwards ſend Artaphernes back to Epheſus in a trireme, and with an embaſſy of their own, who meeting at that place with the news that Artaxerxes the ſon of Xerxes was lately dead (for about this time that monarch died) the embaſſadors returned back to Athens.

The ſame winter alſo the Chians demoliſhed their new fortification. Chians.
The Athenians had expreſly ordered it, ſuſpecting that they were intent on ſome innovating ſchemes. It availed nothing, that they had lately given the Athenians all poſſible ſecurities, and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that they would in no ſhape attempt or think of innovations. And thus the winter ended; and with it the ſeventh year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory, was brought to a concluſion.

YEAR VIII.

Early in the following ſummer, at the time of the new moon, the ſun was partially eclipſed; and in the beginning of the ſame month, the ſhock of an earthquake was felt. *Before* Chriſt, 424. Darius Nothus 1.

The fugitives from Mitylene and Leſbos in general, who to a great number had ſheltered themſelves on the continent, aſſemble in a body, and having hired ſome additional ſuccours in Peloponneſus, and drawn them over ſafely from thence, ſurpriſe Rhætium; but, in conſideration of two thouſand Phocéan ſtaters * paid immediately down, they reſtored it again undamaged. This being done, they marched next againſt Antandrus, and got poſſeſſion of it by the treachery of a party within the city, who betrayed it to them. It was farther their intention to ſet at liberty thoſe cities ſtiled the Actéan, which had formerly Antandrus.

* *Above* 1800 l. *ſterling.*

been poſſeſſed by the Mitylenéans, but were now in the hands of the Athenians. But their principal view was the poſſeſſion of Antandrus, which once effectually ſecured (for it lay convenient for the building of ſhips, as it had plenty of timber, and mount Ida ſtood juſt above it) they would then be amply furniſhed with all the expedients of war, nay, might act offenſively from thence, might terribly annoy Leſbos which lies near it, and reduce the Æolian fortreſſes along the coaſt. This was the plan, which now they were intent to put in execution.

Conqueſt of Cythera.

The ſame ſummer the Athenians, with a fleet of ſixty ſhips, and taking with them two thouſand heavy-armed, a few horſemen, the Mileſians, and others of their confederates, made an expedition againſt Cythera. The command was lodged with Nicias ſon of Niceratus, Nicoſtratus ſon of Diotrephes, and Autocles ſon of Tolmæus. Cythera is an iſland: it lies upon the coaſt of Laconia over-againſt Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, reſorting thither from the neighbouring coaſt. A magiſtrate was ſent over yearly from Sparta by the ſtile of *Judge of Cythera*; the garriſon of heavy-armed eſtabliſhed there was regularly relieved; and no care omitted in the good government and management of the place. It was the port which their trading ſhips firſt entered, in their return from Egypt and Libya. It was the chief ſecurity of Laconia againſt thoſe piratical parties which might infeſt it from the ſea, from whence alone they are capable of doing them any miſchief: for by its ſituation it hath intirely the command of the ſeas of Sicily and Crete. The Athenian armament therefore arriving here, with a detachment of ten ſhips and two thouſand heavy-armed, ſurpriſe a maritime town which is called Scandéa. With the reſt of their force they made a deſcent on that part of the iſland which is oppoſite to Malea, and advanced toward the city of Cythera ſituated alſo on the ſea, and they found immediately that all the inhabitants were drawn out into the field in readineſs to receive them. An engagement enſued, wherein the Cytheréans

Cytheréans maintained their ground for a ſmall ſpace of time, but then turning about, fled amain into their citadel. They ſoon afterwards capitulated with Nicias and his collegues, ſubmitting to the Athenians at diſcretion, barring only the penalty of death. Some of the Cytheréans had before-hand obtained a conference with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation more eaſy and expeditious, and not only the preſent, but all future points were by this means ſpeedily and ſatisfactorily adjuſted. For the Athenians inſiſted that they ſhould evacuate Cythera, becauſe they were Lacedæmonians, and becauſe the iſland lay ſo conveniently on the Laconic coaſt. The accommodation being once perfected, the Athenians, having ſecured Scandea the fortreſs ſituated upon the harbour, and fixed a garriſon in Cythera, ſtood away for Aſine and Helas, and moſt of the adjacent places on the coaſt. There they made deſcents, and repoſing themſelves in the nights at the moſt convenient of thoſe places, they ſpent about ſeven days in ravaging the country.

Low ſtate of the Lacedæmonians.

The Lacedæmonians, tho' they ſaw the Athenians had poſſeſſed themſelves of Cythera, and expected further that they would proceed to make more ſuch deſcents upon their territories, yet no where drew together in a body to repulſe them. They only ſtationed their parties of guard in ſuch poſts as were of greateſt importance. In other reſpects they exerted their utmoſt vigilance, being under apprehenſions that the very form of their government was in danger of ſubverſion. Their loſs in Sphacteria was unexpected and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands of the enemy, as was alſo Cythera. War was burſting in upon them on all ſides with irreſiſtible impetuoſity. This compelled them, contrary to their uſual maxims, to form a body of four hundred horſe and archers. If they were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, at this juncture they were more feelingly ſo, when they ſaw the neceſſity of entering the liſts, contrary to all that practice of war to which they had been inured, in a naval

conteſt, and in this againſt the Athenians, whoſe paſſion it was to compute as ſo much loſs whatever they left unattempted. Their general misfortunes beſides, which ſo ſuddenly and ſo faſt had poured in upon them, had thrown them into the utmoſt conſternation. They exceſſively dreaded the weight of ſuch another calamity, as they had been ſenſible of in the blow at Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durſt no longer think of fighting; nay, whatever meaſures they concerted, they at once deſponded of ſucceſs, as their minds, accuſtomed 'till of late to an uninterrupted career of good fortune, were now foreboding nothing but diſappointments. Thus, for the moſt part, whilſt the Athenians were extending their devaſtations all along their coaſts, they remained inactive. Each party on guard, tho' the enemy made a deſcent in the face of their poſt, knowing themſelves inferior in number and ſadly diſpirited, made no offer to check them. One party indeed which was poſted near Cortyta and Aphrodiſia, perceiving the light-armed of the enemy to be ſtraggling, ran ſpeedily to charge them; but when the heavy-armed advanced to their ſupport, they retreated with ſo much precipitation, that ſome (tho' few) of them were killed, and their arms rifled. The Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-imbarked and re-paſſed to Cythera.

The Athenians *attack* Thyrea.

From thence they ſailed again along the coaſt to the Limerian Epidaurus; and, after ravaging part of that diſtrict, they arrive at Thyrea, which, tho' it lies in the diſtrict called Cynuria, is the frontier-town which parts Argia and Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedæmonians, who had aſſigned it for the reſidence of the exiled Æginetæ, in requital of the ſervices they had done them at the time of the earthquake and the inſurrection of the Helots, and further becauſe, tho' ſubject to the Athenians, they had ever firmly abided in the Lacedæmonian intereſt. The Æginetæ, thus again invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the fortification upon the ſea-ſide which they

they were buſy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, which was the place of their reſidence, ſeated higher up at the diſtance of about * ten ſtadia from the ſhore. A party of Lacedæmonians had been poſted there, to aſſiſt thoſe who were employed in the new fortification; and yet, tho' earneſtly preſſed by the Æginetæ, they refuſed to accompany them within their walls, being averſe to run the riſk of a new blockade. They choſe rather to retreat towards the eminences, as they judged themſelves diſabled by the inferiority of their numbers from facing the enemy, and remained there in a ſtate of inaction.

* *About a mile.*

They take and burn it.

By this time the Athenians, having compleated their landing and advanced with their whole force, take Thyrea by ſtorm. They ſet the city in flames and deſtroyed whatever was within it. Such of the Æginetæ as ſurvived the inſtant carnage, they carried priſoners to Athens; and with them Tantalus ſon of Patrocles, who commanded there as general for the Lacedæmonians. He had been wounded, and ſo taken priſoner. They alſo carried thither ſome few perſons whom they had taken in Cythera, ſuch as for its ſecurity it was expedient to remove. Theſe the Athenians after a conſultation decreed "to be diſpoſed of in the iſlands, but the reſt of the Cytherèans ſtill "to occupy their own lands ſubjected to the yearly tribute of * four "talents; but the Æginetæ, as many as had been taken priſoners, "to be all inſtantly put to death," (to gratify that eternal rancour they bore them;) "and Tantalus to be kept in priſon along with his "countrymen taken in Sphacteria."

* *Four thousand pounds.*

A congress in Sicily.

The ſame ſummer, a ſuſpenſion of arms was agreed on in Sicily; firſt, between the Camarinèans and Geloans: and then, the other Sicilians, holding a general congreſs at Gela, whither the embaſſadors from the ſeveral *States* reſorted, entered into conferences about the terms of a general reconciliation. Many different expedients were propoſed on all ſides and many diſputes aroſe, each inſiſting on a reparation ſuitable to their own private ſenſe of grievance.

But

But Hermocrates [9] the ſon of Hermon a Syracuſan, who laboured moſt of any at a firm re-union, delivered his ſentiments thus:

Speech of Hermocrates.

" I AM here the repreſentative, ye men of Sicily, of one and " not the meaneſt of the Sicilian ſtates, nor yet the moſt exhauſted " by war; and what I am going to propoſe is calculated for, and " will, I am convinced, moſt effectually ſecure the welfare of our " common country. And what need is there now to run over in " minute detail the calamities inſeparable from war, in the hearing " of men who have experienced them all? None ever plunge head- " long into theſe, through an utter ignorance of them; nor, when " the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are men uſed to be de- " terred by fear. The acquiſitions propoſed, in the latter caſe, are " generally imagined to overbalance dangers: and the former chooſe " rather to ſubmit to hazards, than ſuffer diminution of their pre- " ſent enjoyments. Yet, where the parties, actuated by theſe dif- " ferent views, embroil themſelves at a juncture when it is impoſſible " to ſucceed, exhortations to a mutual agreement are then moſt " highly expedient.

" To be influenced by ſuch exhortations muſt at preſent be highly " for the advantage of us all. For it was the ſtrong deſire of fixing " our own ſeparate views on a firm eſtabliſhment, which at firſt " embroiled us in this war, and which at preſent raiſeth ſuch mutual " altercations even during our endeavours to effect an accommoda-

9 This great and accompliſhed Syracuſan ſeems to be uſhered into this hiſtory with peculiar dignity, as the very mouth of Sicily, exhorting them all to concord and unanimity, and teaching them the method of ſecuring the welfare and glory of their common country, upon the nobleſt plan. This is noted merely to draw upon him the attention of the reader. He will act afterwards in the moſt illuſtrious ſcenes, and ſhew himſelf on all occaſions a man of true honour and probity, a firm and diſintereſted patriot, an excellent ſtateſman, and a moſt able commander. The Athenians never had a more determined or a more generous enemy. But that will not hinder our hiſtorian from repreſenting him in all his merit.

" tion:

" tion: and in fine, unleſs matters can be ſo equally adjuſted as to
" ſatisfy all parties, we ſhall again have recourſe to arms. But then,
" we ought to recollect, that not merely for ſecuring our ſeparate
" intereſts, if we would act like men of ſenſe, is this preſent con-
" greſs opened; but, to concert the beſt meaſures within our reach
" to preſerve (if poſſible) our country from falling, and as I judge,
" in great danger of falling, a ſacrifice to Athenian ambition. It is,
" to convince you how neceſſary a re-union is, not ſo much from
" what I can urge, as from the light theſe very Athenians themſelves
" hold out before you. Poſſeſſed of a power far ſuperior to any other
" Grecians, here they lie amongſt us with a few ſhips, to note down
" our indiſcretions; and, under the plauſible pretext of alliance, tho'
" with malice lurking in their hearts, they are ſtudying to improve
" them in a ſpecious manner to their own advantage. For ſhould
" war be again our option; and in it, ſhould the aſſiſtance of men
" be accepted, who tho' uninvited would be glad to invade us;
" whilſt we are haraſſing and exhauſting one another, and cutting
" open for theſe Athenians a road to our ſubjection, it is much to be
" apprehended that, when once they behold our ſtrength at the
" loweſt ebb, they will pay us a viſit with more formidable ar-
" maments, and exert their utmoſt endeavours to compleat our
" deſtruction.

" It becomes each party amongſt us, provided we know what is
" really our intereſt, to form alliances and to lanch into hazardous
" attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to others than to preju-
" dice what themſelves at preſent poſſeſs; and to reſt aſſured that
" ſedition muſt ruin our ſeveral *States*, nay Sicily itſelf, of which
" we the joint poſſeſſors are ready, are all of us ready to be ſup-
" planted by hoſtile treachery, whilſt mutually embroiled in our do-
" meſtic quarrels. It is high time we were convinced of this, that
" every individual might be reconciled with his neighbour, and com-
" munity with community, and all in general combine together to

" preſerve the whole of Sicily; that our ears be deaf to the miſ-
" chievous ſuggeſtions, that thoſe amongſt us of Doric deſcent are
" enemies to every thing that is Attic, whilſt thoſe of Chalcidic,
" becauſe of their Ionian affinity, are ſure of their protection. The
" Athenians invade us not from private enmity, becauſe we are
" peopled here from theſe divided races, but to gratify their luſt after
" thoſe bleſſings in which Sicily abounds, and which at preſent we
" jointly poſſeſs. Nay, this they have already clearly declared, by
" their ready compliance with the invitation of thoſe of the Chalci-
" dic race. For tho' they have never claimed aſſiſtance from hence
" by virtue of their natural attachments here, yet they have ſhewn
" a greater readineſs in ſupport of thoſe than any compact between
" them required. Yet tho' the Athenians be in this manner rapaci-
" ous, in this manner politic, by me at leaſt they ought to be for-
" given; ſince I blame not men who are greedy of empire, but ſuch
" as are too eager to bend their necks to their yoke: Becauſe, it is
" the conſtant never-failing turn of the human temper, to control
" who will ſubmit, but to make head againſt more powerful in-
" croachments. As for us, who know theſe things, and yet will not
" timely provide againſt them, tho' each in this aſſembly be ſepa-
" rately convinced, that it demands our greateſt attention to unite in
" diſſipating a ſtorm which threatens us all, we err ſtrangely in our
" conduct; eſpecially, when its diverſion might be ſo readily ef-
" fected, would we only bring our private quarrels to an amicable
" determination: For it is not from quarters of their own, that the
" Athenians ruſh thus to annoy us; but from ground which belongs
" to thoſe who invited them. Thus of courſe, without any inter-
" vening trouble, one war will not be terminated by another, but
" diſſenſion will at once ſubſide in peace. And theſe new-comers,
" who under ſpecious colours are here for our ruin, muſt return
" again with a diſappointment, which they may as ſpeciouſly palliate.

" So

" So deſirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue from proper de-
" terminations in regard to the Athenians.

" That peace is the greateſt of human bleſſings, is a truth which
" all the world alloweth; — what hindereth us then, why we ſhould
" not firmly eſtabliſh it with one another? or, do you rather imagine,
" that if the condition of one man be happy and that of another be
" wretched, tranquillity will not contribute ſooner than warfare to
" amend the ſtate of the latter, and to preſerve the ſtate of the for-
" mer from a ſad reverſe? or, that peace is not better calculated to
" preſerve unimpaired the honours and ſplendors of the happy, and
" all other bleſſings, which, ſhould we deſcend to a minute detail,
" might largely be recounted, or might be ſet in the ſtrongeſt light
" by oppoſing to them the calamities which enſue from war? Fix
" your minds therefore on theſe conſiderations, that you may not
" overlook my admonitions, but in compliance with them look out
" reſpectively in time for expedients of prevention.

" In caſe it be preſumed, that ſucceſs muſt reſult from power,
" without taking into debate the juſtice or violence of the cauſe,
" let me detect the dangerous fallacy of ſuch a ſanguine hope, which
" muſt be blaſted in the end. Many are they, it is well known,
" who would have gratified their revenge on violent oppreſſors, and
" many who have exerted their utmoſt force for their own ag-
" grandiſement; yet the firſt, ſo far from accompliſhing their re-
" venge, have met deſtruction in its purſuit; and it hath been the
" fate of the latter, inſtead of inlarging, to ſuffer the loſs of what
" they already poſſeſſed. For revenge is not certain, becauſe juſtly
" ſought after to retaliate violence; nor is power aſſured of its end,
" becauſe invigorated with ſanguine expectation. Events are for the
" moſt part determined by the fallible unſteddy balance of futurity;
" which, tho' deceivable as deceit can be, yet holds out before us
" the moſt inſtructive hints. For thus, armed equally beforehand
" with needful apprehenſion, we embark into mutual conteſts with

" wiſe premeditation. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy
" dread of the yet inviſible event, and awed on all ſides by the terrors
" which the preſence of theſe Athenians ſpreads amongſt us; deterred
" further by thoſe hopes already blaſted, which aſſured us alternately
" of ſucceſs againſt one another, had not they interfered to obſtruct
" and control us; let us ſend far away from Sicily theſe enemies that
" are hovering about us; let us enter into firm and laſting union
" with one another; at leaſt, let us conclude a truce for ſo long a
" time as can poſſibly be agreed, and defer our own private diſputes
" to a remote deciſion. In a word, let us acknowledge, that, if
" my advice takes place, we ſhall continue free in our reſpective
" communities, where, maſters of ourſelves and accountable to none
" beſides, we ſhall be enabled to recompence both our friends and
" our foes according to their deſerts. But, in caſe it be obſtinately
" rejected, and the miſchievous inſinuations of others prevail, why
" then adieu henceforth to the juſt vindication of our own wrongs;
" or, if we are violently bent upon effecting it, we muſt ſtrike up a
" friendſhip with unrelenting foes, and muſt range ourſelves in op-
" poſition there, where nature hath moſt cloſely attached us.

" For my own part, who now (as I obſerved at ſetting out) re-
" preſent the greateſt of the Sicilian ſtates, and in this character am
" more accuſtomed to attack another than to defend myſelf, I here,
" in her name, conjure you to make uſe of conviction and unite to-
" gether in a ſpeedy accommodation, nor ſo eagerly to thirſt after
" the damage of our foes as to plunge ourſelves into irreparable miſ-
" chiefs. I am not conſcious to myſelf of that fooliſh haughtineſs
" of heart, which expects to be abſolute in its own private will;
" or that fortune, whoſe maſter I am not, ſhould attend my orders;
" but I am ready to give way to good ſenſe and reaſon. And I re-
" quire you all reſpectively thus to give way to one another, and not
" to wait till you are compelled to do ſo by your enemies. It can
" argue no baſeneſs, for kinſmen to give way to kinſmen, a Dorian

" to

" to a Dorian, or a Chalcidéan to others of his own race. Nay,
" what is moſt comprehenſive, we are all neighbours, all joint-inha-
" bitants of the ſame land, a land waſhed round by the ſea, and all
" ſtiled by the ſame common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed in
" the courſe of time I foreſee we ſhall wage upon one another, and
" future conferences will again be held, and mutual friendſhip ſhall
" thus revive. But when foreigners invade us, let us be wiſe enough
" to unite our ſtrength, and drive them from our ſhores: For to be
" weakened in any of our members, muſt endanger the deſtruction
" of the whole; and to ſuch confederates and ſuch mediators we
" will never for the future have recourſe.

" If to ſuch conduct we adhere, we ſhall immediately procure a
" double bleſſing for Sicily. We ſhall deliver her from the Atheni-
" ans, and a domeſtic war. For the future we ſhall retain the free
" poſſeſſion of her in our own hands, and more eaſily diſconcert any
" projects that hereafter may be formed againſt her."

All their quarrels made up.

THE Sicilians acknowledged the weight of theſe arguments thus urged by Hermocrates, and all the ſeveral parties joined in one common reſolution " to put an end to the war, each retaining what they
" were at preſent poſſeſſed of; but that Morgantina ſhould be re-
" ſtored to the Camarinéans, upon the payment of a certain ſum of
" money to the Syracuſans." Such alſo as were confederated with the Athenians, addreſſing themſelves to the Athenian commanders, notified their own readineſs to acquieſce in theſe terms, and their reſolution to be comprehended in the ſame peace. Theſe approving the meaſure, the laſt hand was put to the accommodation.

The commanders fined at Athens.

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer any buſineſs there, ſailed away from Sicily. But the *people* at Athens manifeſted their diſpleaſure againſt the commanders at their return home, by paſſing a ſentence of baniſhment againſt Pythodorus and Sophocles, and ſubjecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to a pecuniary mulct; as if,

when

when able to have perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been bribed to deſiſt. They had enjoyed ſo long a career of good fortune, that they imagined nothing could diſconcert their ſchemes; that enterprizes of the greateſt as well as of ſmall importance, no matter whether adequately or inſufficiently ſupported, muſt be ended to their wiſh. This was owing to the unexpected good luck with which moſt of their projects had of late ſucceeded, and now invigorated all their expectations.

Megara. The ſame ſummer, the Megaréans of the city of Megara, preſſed hard by the Athenians, who conſtantly twice a year made an inroad into their territory with their whole *united force*; *haraſſed* at the ſame time by their own outlaws, who having been ejected by the *popular* party in the train of a ſedition had ſettled at Pegæ, and from thence were continually plundering them, began to have ſome conference about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, that the city might not doubly be expoſed to ruin. The friends of theſe exiles, perceiving ſuch a deſign to be in agitation, inſiſted more openly than ever that the affair ſhould be regularly conſidered. The leaders of the *people* being convinced that their own and the ſtrength of the *people* united in their preſent low condition could not poſſibly overrule it, were ſo far influenced by their fears as to make a ſecret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the ſon of Ariphron and Demoſthenes the ſon of Alciſthenes, "to put the city into their hands;" concluding, they ſhould be leſs endangered by ſuch a ſtep than by the reſtoration of the exiles whom they themſelves had ejected. It was agreed, that in the firſt place the Athenians ſhould take poſſeſſion of the *long walls* (theſe were * eight ſtadia in length, reaching down from the city to Niſæa their port) to prevent any ſuccour which might be ſent from Niſæa by the Peloponneſians, ſince there alone they kept their garriſon for the ſecurity of Megara. After this, they promiſed their endeavours to put them in poſſeſſion of the upper city. And this they would be able to effect more eaſily, when the former point was once ſecured.

* *About* $\frac{1}{4}$ *of a mile.*

The

Stratagem to ſeize it.

The Athenians therefore, when all was fixed and determined on both ſides, croſſed over by night to Minoa the iſland of the Megaréans with ſix hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Hippocrates, and ſat themſelves down in a hollow, whence the bricks for the walls had been taken, and which lay near enough for their purpoſe: whilſt another body, under Demoſthenes the other commander, conſiſting of light-armed Platæans, and the Athenian patroles, concealed themſelves near the temple of Mars, which lies ſtill nearer. Not a ſoul within the city knew any thing of theſe motions, excepting thoſe whoſe vigilance it concerned this night to obſerve them. When the morning was ready to break, the plotters of Megara proceeded thus ——

Through a ſeries of time they had eſtabliſhed a cuſtom to have the gates of *the long-walls* opened to them in the night, by carrying out a wherry upon a carriage, which they perſuaded the officers poſted there, they conveyed nightly down the ditch into the ſea, and ſo went upon a cruize. And before it was light, bringing it back again to the walls upon the carriage, they conveyed it through the gates, that it might eſcape the notice of the Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means might be eluded, as they never would deſcry any boat in the harbour. The carriage was now at the gates, which were opened as uſual for the reception of the wherry. This the Athenians obſerving (for this was the ſignal agreed on) came running from their place of ambuſh to take poſſeſſion of the gates before they could be ſhut again. The very moment the carriage was between, and obſtructed the cloſing them together, both they and the Megaréan coadjutors, put the watch which was poſted at the gates to the ſword. The Platæans and patroling parties under Demoſthenes ruſhed in firſt to that ſpot where the trophy now ſtands, and having thus gained an entrance (for the Peloponneſians who were neareſt had taken the alarm) the Platæans made good their ground againſt thoſe who attacked them, and ſecured the gates till the heavy-armed Athenians, who were coming up with all ſpeed, had entered. Each of theſe

theſe Athenians afterwards, ſo faſt as he got in, advanced along the wall. The Peloponneſian guards, tho' few in number, made head againſt them for a time; ſome of them ſoon dropped, and then the reſt ran ſpeedily off. They were diſmayed at ſuch an attack from their enemies in the night; and, as the treacherous Megaréans fought againſt them, they concluded that all the Megaréans were combined together in betraying them. It happened farther, that an Athenian herald had proclaimed of his own accord that "ſuch Megaréans "as were willing to ſide with the Athenians ſhould throw down their "arms." When the Peloponneſians heard this, they at once quitted their poſts; and, ſeriouſly believing that all the Megaréans had combined to betray them, fled amain into Niſæa.

It miſcarries.

At the time of morning's dawn, the *long-walls* being thus ſurpriſed, and the Megaréans within the city thrown into a tumult, the agents for the Athenians, in concert with all their accomplices in the plot, inſiſted on the neceſſity to throw open the city-gates, and march out to battle; ſince it had been agreed between them, that ſo ſoon as ever the gates were thus opened, the Athenians ſhould ruſh in. There was a method to be obſerved on their ſide, in order to be diſtinguiſhed; this was to beſmear themſelves with ointment, that they might receive no harm. Their ſecurity would have been greater, had they opened the gates at once; for now four thouſand heavy-armed Athenians and ſix hundred horſemen, who had marched in the night from Eleuſis, according to a prior diſpoſition, were at hand. But whilſt the accomplices, properly beſmeared, ſtood ready at the gates, one of their own party, who was privy to the whole plot, diſcovereth it to the other Megaréans. Theſe drawing up together, came forwards in a body, and denied "the expediency of marching out, "(ſince formerly, when ſtronger than now, they durſt not hazard "ſuch a ſtep) or running ſuch a manifeſt riſk of loſing the city: and, "ſhould any one affirm the contrary, the point ſhould be inſtantly "determined by blows." They gave not the leaſt hint as if they had

"diſcovered

diſcovered the deſign, but ſtrenuouſly inſiſted that their own meaſure was moſt adviſeable, and ſtood firm together for the ſecurity of the gates. Thus it was no longer poſſible for the conſpirators to put their plot in execution.

Niſæa *ſurrendered.*

The Athenian commanders, being ſenſible that the project had been ſome how croſſed, and that they were not able themſelves to take the city by ſtorm, immediately run up a wall to inveſt Niſæa; concluding, that could they carry it before any ſuccours came up, it would be impoſſible for Megara to hold out much longer. Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, were quickly ſupplied them from Athens. They begun at the wall which they had lately ſurpriſed, they ran it along for ſome time parallel with Megara, and then down to the ſea on both ſides of Niſæa. The work, both of ditch and wall, was divided amongſt the army. They made uſe of the ſtones and bricks of the ſuburbs, and having felled ſome trees and wood, they ſtrengthened what was weak with an additional paliſade. The houſes of the ſuburbs, being topped with battlements, ſerved the uſe of turrets. This whole day they plied hard at the work; and about the evening of the ſucceeding day it was only not completed. The garriſon within Niſæa was in great conſternation. They laboured already under a ſcarcity of proviſions, which they had been uſed to fetch daily from the upper city. Thus concluding that the Peloponneſians could not ſuccour them with ſufficient expedition, and imagining the Megaréans were combined againſt them, they capitulated with the Athenians on the following terms:

" To be diſmiſſed every man at a certain ranſom, after delivering " up their arms."

" But as for the Lacedæmonians, their commander, and every other " perſon in that number, *theſe* to be diſpoſed of by the Athenians at " diſcretion."

Theſe terms being agreed to, they evacuated Niſæa. And the Athenians, having thus cut off their long-walls from the city of the Megaréans, and poſſeſſed themſelves of Niſæa, were preparing to accompliſh what was yet to be done.

Activity of Braſidas.

But Braſidas ſon of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. He was no ſooner informed of the ſurpriſal of the walls, than he trembled for the Peloponneſians in Niſæa, and left Megara ſhould be taken. He ſummons the Bœotians to attend him expeditiouſly with their forces at Tripodiſcus (the place ſo named is a village of the Megaris under the mountain Geranéa) whither he was marching himſelf with two thouſand ſeven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four hundred Phliaſians, ſix hundred Sicyonians, and what levies he had already made upon his own account. He imagined he might come up before Niſæa could be taken. But hearing the contrary (for he came up in the night to Tripodiſcus), with a picked body of three hundred men, before the news of his march could be ſpread, he approached to the city of Megara, undeſcried by the Athenians, who were poſted near the ſea. He intended to declare that he was ready to attempt, and in fact would have been glad to have effected, the recovery of Niſæa. But it was principally his view to get admiſſion into Megara, and provide for its ſecurity. He demanded admiſſion, aſſuring them he had great hope of recovering Niſæa. But the factious in Megara, perplexed at this ſtep of Braſidas —— on one ſide, leſt he meant to reinſtate the exiles by ejecting them; the other, leſt the *people* with ſuch an apprehenſion might at once fall upon them, and their city thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be loſt, if the Athenians, who lay ready in ambuſh, ſhould ſeize it; — refuſed him admittance, and both factions thought proper, without any ſtir, to await the event. For it was ſeverally their full expectation, that a battle muſt enſue between the Athenians and theſe new-comers; and then, without plunging themſelves

into

into unneceſſary hazards, they might join their own favourite party if victorious.

Braſidas, when he could not prevail, withdrew again to the main of his army. By the ſucceeding dawn the Bœotians joined him, who had reſolved to ſuccour Megara, even previous to the ſummons ſent by Braſidas, ſince they regarded the danger that place was in as their own. They were actually advanced with their whole force as far as Platæa; and, the meſſenger having met with them here, they became much more eager than before. They ſent forwards a detachment of two and twenty hundred heavy-armed, and ſix hundred horſemen, but diſmiſſed the multitude to their own homes. When the whole force was thus united, conſiſting of at leaſt ſix thouſand heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians ſtood drawn up in order near Niſæa and the ſea-ſhore, whilſt their light-armed were ſtraggling about the plain, the Bœotian cavalry made an unexpected ſally againſt thoſe ſtragglers, and chaced them to the ſhore: For hitherto no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf of the Megaréans. The Athenian cavalry clapped ſpurs to repel the Bœotian, and a battle enſued. The horſe were a long time thus engaged, and both ſides claimed a victory. For the general of the Bœotian cavalry, and a ſmall number of his party, the Athenians drove before them to Niſæa, where they put them to the ſword and rifled them. They remained maſters of the dead bodies, gave them up afterwards by truce, and erected a trophy: But neither ſide ſo keeping their ground as to render the action deciſive, they retreated as it were by conſent; the Bœotians to their main-army, and the Athenians to Niſæa.

An engagement.

Braſidas, after this, advanced nearer to the ſea and to the city of Megara with his army. Having occupy'd there ſome advantageous ground, they drew up in order and ſtood ſtill, imagining the Athenians would attack them; and aſſured, that the Megaréans were intently obſerving for whom the victory might declare. In both theſe reſpects, they judged their preſent poſture the moſt judicious; be-

He leaves Megara.

cauſe it was not their own buſineſs to attack, or voluntarily to run into conflict and danger; and thus, having manifeſtly exhibited their alacrity to act defenſively, a victory might juſtly be aſcribed to them without the expence of a battle. In regard further to the Megaréans the conſequence could not but be fortunate: For, in caſe the latter had never beheld them thus prompt in their ſuccour, they would have ſtopped all farther riſk, and ſo undoubtedly they ſhould have loſt the city, as men completely vanquiſhed: But now, ſhould the Athenians decline an engagement, the points for which they themſelves came thither muſt be ſecured without a blow; which proved to be the reſult. For the Megaréans,—when the Athenians came out and drew up in order cloſe to the *long-walls*, and then, as the enemy did not advance to attack them, ſtood quiet in their ranks; their commanders alſo judging the hazard by no means equal, and themſelves, who had ſo far been ſucceſsful, not at all concerned to begin an engagement againſt ſuperior numbers, in which, ſhould they prevail, they could only take Megara; but, ſhould they miſcarry, muſt loſe the flower of their domeſtic ſtrength; eſpecially as their opponents would act in probability with more daring reſolution, ſince, as the large ſtrength they had now in the field conſiſted only of quota's from ſeveral conſtituents, they hazarded but little; thus facing one another for a conſiderable ſpace, and neither ſide preſuming to make an attack, till each at length wheeled off, the Athenians firſt towards Niſæa, and the Peloponneſians again to their former poſt. — Then, I ſay, the Megaréans in the intereſt of the exiles, regarding Braſidas as victor, and animated by the refuſal of attack on the Athenian ſide, open the gates of Megara to Braſidas himſelf, and the ſeveral commanders from the auxiliary ſtates; and, having given them admiſſion, proceed with them to conſultation, whilſt the partizans of the Athenian intereſt were in the utmoſt conſternation.

Soon afterwards, the confederates being diſmiſſed to their reſpective cities, Braſidas alſo himſelf returned to Corinth, to continue his preparations

parations for that Thracian expedition, in which before this avocation he had been intently employed.

The Athenians alſo being now marched homewards, the Megaréans in the city, who had acted moſt zealouſly in favour of the Athenians, finding all their practices detected, ſtole off as faſt as poſſible. The others, after concerting the proper ſteps with the friends of the exiles, fetch them home from Pegæ, having firſt adminiſtred to them the moſt ſolemn oaths " to think no more on former injuries, " and to promote the true welfare of the city to the utmoſt of their " power."

Reſettlement there.

But theſe, when re-inveſted with authority, and taking a review of the troops of the city, having previouſly diſpoſed ſome bands of ſoldiers in a proper manner, picked out about a hundred perſons of their enemies, and who they thought had buſied themſelves moſt in favour of the Athenians. And having compelled the *people* to paſs a public vote upon them, they were condemned to die and ſuffered an inſtant execution. They farther new-modelled the government of Megara into almoſt an *oligarchy*. And this change, tho' introduced by an inconſiderable body of men, nay, what is more in the train of ſedition, yet continued for a long ſpace of time in full force at Megara.

And a maſſacre

The ſame ſummer, the Mitylenéans being intent on executing their deſign of fortifying Antandrus, Demodocus and Ariſtides, who commanded the Athenian ſquadron for levying contributions, and were now at Helleſpont (for Lamachus the third in the commiſſion had been detached with ten ſhips towards Pontus), when informed of what was thus in agitation, became apprehenſive that Antandrus might prove of as bad conſequence to them as Anæa in Samos had already done; wherein, the Samian exiles having fortified themſelves, were not only ſerviceable to the Peloponneſians at ſea, by furniſhing them with pilots; but farther, were continually alarming the Samians at home, and ſheltering their deſerters. From theſe apprehenſions they

Antandrus.

they aſſembled a force from amongſt their dependents, ſailed thither, and having defeated in battle thoſe who came out of Antandrus to oppoſe them, gain once more poſſeſſion of that town. And no long time after, Lamachus, who had been detached to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calex in the diſtrict of Heraclea, loſt all his ſhips. A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, and the land-flood ruſhing ſuddenly down, bore them all away before it. He himſelf and the men under his command were forced to march over land through Bithynia (poſſeſſed by thoſe Thracians who are ſeated on the other ſide of the ſtrait in Aſia) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megaréans, in the mouth of the Euxine ſea.

Project of a revolution in Bœotia.

This ſummer alſo Demoſthenes, immediately after he had quitted the Megaris, with the command of forty ſail of Athenians, arrives at Naupactus. For with him, and with Hippocrates, ſome perſons of the Bœotian cities in thoſe parts had been concerting ſchemes how to change the government of thoſe cities, and introduce a *democracy* on the Athenian model. The firſt author of this ſcheme was Ptœodorus an exile from Thebes, and matters were now ready for execution.

Some of them had undertaken to betray Siphæ: Siphæ is a maritime town in the diſtrict of Theſpiæ, upon the gulf of Criſſa. Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chæronéa, a town tributary to that Orchomenus which was formerly called the Minyeian but now the Bœotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring ſoldiers for the purpoſe from Peloponneſus. Chæronéa is ſituated on the edge of Bœotia towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part inhabited by Phocians. The ſhare aſſigned to the Athenians was the ſurpriſal of Delium, a temple of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards Eubœa. Theſe things farther were to be atchieved on a day prefixed, that the Bœotians might be diſabled from ruſhing to the reſcue of Delium with all their force, by the neceſſity of ſtaying at home to defend their reſpective habitations.

Should

Should the attempt ſucceed, and Delium once be fortified, they eaſily preſumed that, tho' the change of the Bœotian governments might not ſuddenly be effected, yet, when thoſe towns were in their hands, when their devaſtations were extended all over the country, and places of ſafe retreat lay near at hand for their parties, things could not long remain in their former poſture; but in proceſs of time, when the Athenians appeared in ſupport of the revolters, and the Bœotians could not unite in a body to oppoſe them, the deſigned revolution muſt neceſſarily take place. This was the nature of the ſcheme at preſent in agitation.

Hippocrates, having the whole force of Athens under his command, was ready at the proper time to march into Bœotia. But he had diſpatched Demoſthenes beforehand to Naupactus with forty ſhips, that after he had collected a ſufficient force in thoſe parts from the Acarnanians and their other confederates, he ſhould appear with his fleet before Siphæ, which was then to be betrayed to him. A day alſo was fixed upon between them, in which both of them were at once to execute the parts aſſigned them.

Demoſthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, found the Oeniadæ already compelled by the united Acarnanians into an aſſociation with the confederates of Athens. He marched away therefore, at the head of the whole confederacy in thoſe parts, and invaded firſt Salynthius and the Agræans; and having carried ſome other points, got all in readineſs to ſhew himſelf before Siphæ at the time appointed.

Braſidas *begins his march for* Thrace.

About the ſame time this ſummer, Braſidas at the head of ſeventeen hundred heavy-armed, began his march towards Thrace. When he was come up to Heraclea in Trachis, he diſpatched a meſſenger beforehand to his correſpondents in Pharſalus, to beg a ſafe conduct for himſelf and his army. And as ſoon as he was met at Melitia of Achæa by Panærus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, who had been formerly the public hoſt of the Chalcidéans,

cidéans, he continued his march forwards. Others alſo of the Theſſalians aſſiſted in conducting him, and from Lariſſa Niconidas the friend of Perdiccas. The paſſage through Theſſaly without proper guides is always difficult, and muſt be more ſo to an armed body. Beſides, to attempt ſuch a thing through a neighbouring dominion without permiſſion firſt obtained, hath ever been regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, and the bulk of the Theſſalians had been ever well-affected to the Athenians. Nor could Braſidas have poſſibly effected it, had not the Theſſalian been rather deſpotic than free governments. For upon his route he was ſtopped at the river Enipeus by ſome of contrary ſentiments to the reſt of their countrymen, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, and taxed him with injuſtice in having come ſo far without the general permiſſion. His conductors told them in return, that " without ſuch permiſſion " he ſhould not proceed; but, as he had come amongſt them on a " ſudden, they thought themſelves obliged in friendſhip to conduct " him." Braſidas alſo gave them ſtrong aſſurances, that " he was " come thither for the ſervice of Theſſaly and of them; that his " arms were not intended againſt them, but againſt the common " enemy, the Athenians; that he never ſuſpected any enmity between " Theſſalians and Lacedæmonians, why they might not tread upon " one another's ground; that even now, ſhould they withhold their " conſent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to proceed; but" he conjured them " however to give him no moleſtation." Having heard theſe declarations, they acquieſced and withdrew. Braſidas now, by the advice of his conductors, advanced with the utmoſt ſpeed without ever halting, in order to anticipate freſh and more potent obſtruction. Nay, the very ſame day that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as to Pharſalus, and encamped upon the banks of the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to Phacium, and from thence into Peræbia. Being ſo far advanced, his Theſſalian guides received their diſmiſſion; and the Peræbians, who are tributaries to the

the Theſſalians, eſcorted him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas: it is a fortreſs of Macedonia ſituated under mount Olympus on the Theſſalian ſide. In this manner Braſidas, advancing ſo expeditiouſly as to prevent all obſtruction, compleated his paſſage through Theſſaly, and arrived in the dominions of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For thoſe in Thrace, who revolted from the Athenians, had joined with Perdiccas in procuring this auxiliary force out of Peloponneſus, becauſe the great ſucceſs of the Athenians had ſtruck a terror amongſt them. The Chalcidéans were perſuaded, that they ſhould be firſt attacked by the Athenians: and in truth their neighbour-ſtates, who yet perſevered in their obedience, were ſecretly inſtigating them to it. Perdiccas indeed had not yet declared himſelf their enemy; but he dreaded the vengeance of the Athenians for former grudges; and now he had a ſcheme at heart for the ſubjection of Arribæus king of the Lynceſtians.

The Lacedæmonians ſubtilmanly make away with 2000 Helots.

Other points concurred to facilitate the procurement of ſuch a ſuccour from Peloponneſus, ſuch as the misfortunes by which the Lacedæmonians at preſent were afflicted. For, the Athenians preſſing hard on Peloponneſus, and not leaſt of all on Laconia, they hoped in caſe they could equally annoy *them* in this quarter, by thus marching an army againſt their dependents, to effect a diverſion. And they were more encouraged by the offers of maintenance for their troops, and ſolicitations to ſupport revolts. They were at the ſame time glad of a pretext to rid themſelves of their Helots, leſt, in the preſent ſtate of affairs, now that Pylus was in hoſtile hands, they might be tempted to rebel. This farther gave riſe to the following event; — Dreading the youth and number of theſe ſlaves (for many precautions have ever been put in practice by the Lacedæmonians to curb and awe their Helots) they made public proclamation, that "ſo many of them, as could claim the merit of having done ſignal "ſervice to the Lacedæmonians in the preſent war, ſhould enter

" their claims, and be rewarded with freedom." The view in this was to ſound them, imagining that ſuch, who had the greatneſs of ſpirit to claim their freedom in requital of their merit, muſt be alſo the ripeſt for rebellion. About two thouſand claimants were adjudged worthy, and accordingly were led about in ſolemn proceſſion to the temples, crowned with garlands, as men honoured with their freedom. But, in no long time after, they made away with them all, nor hath the world been able to diſcover, in what manner they were thus to a man deſtroyed.

Braſidas. Now alſo with alacrity they ſent away ſeven hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders of Braſidas. The reſt of his body were mercenaries, whom he had hired in Peloponneſus. And it was, in compliance with his own particular deſire, that Braſidas was employed in this ſervice by the Lacedæmonians.

His excellent conduct. The Chalcidéans however were highly ſatisfied with a perſon, who had ever paſſed in Sparta for one of the moſt active and accompliſhed citizens; and who, in his foreign employments, had performed very ſignal ſervices for his country. From his firſt appearance amongſt them, his juſtice and moderation ſo inſtantly recommended him to the adjacent cities, that ſome voluntarily ſubmitted, and others were by intrigue put into his poſſeſſion. By him the Lacedæmonians were actually impowered, if the accommodation they wiſhed for took place, which it afterwards did, to make exchange and reſtitution of towns, and ſo relieve Peloponneſus from the hardſhips of the war.

He does honour to his country. Nay more, even in ſucceeding time, upon the breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and prudence of Braſidas exerted at this juncture, which ſome atteſted by their own experience, others upon ſound and unſuſpected report, imprinted a zeal on the confederates of Athens to go over to the Lacedæmonians. For, having been the firſt ſent out to a foreign truſt, and approved in all reſpects as a worthy

worthy man, he left behind him a ſtrong preſumption, that the reſt of his countrymen are like himſelf [1].

So ſoon therefore as it was known at Athens, that he was arrived to take upon him the conduct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians declare Perdiccas their enemy, aſcribing this expedition to his cabals, and by ſtrengthening their garriſons kept a ſtrict watch over all their dependents in that quarter.

Perdiccas proclaimed an enemy at Athens.

But Perdiccas with his own forces, and accompanied by the body under Braſidas, marcheth againſt a neighbouring potentate, Arribæus ſon of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lynceſtians: Enmity was ſubſiſting between them, and the conqueſt of him was the point in view. When he was advanced with his army, and in conjunction with Braſidas, to the entrance of Lyncus, Braſidas communicated his intention to hold a parley with Arribæus, before he proceeded to act offenſively againſt him; and (if poſſible) to bring him over to the Lacedæmonian alliance: For Arribæus had already notified by a herald, that he was willing to refer the points in diſpute to the arbitration of Braſidas. The Calcidéan embaſſadors alſo, who followed the camp, were continually ſuggeſting to him, that "he ought not "to plunge himſelf raſhly into difficulties for the ſake of Perdiccas," deſigning to reſerve him more intire for their own ſervice. And beſides this, the miniſters of Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedæmon to be their maſter's intention, to bring over all the neighbouring *States* into this alliance: So that it was entirely with public views, that Braſidas inſiſted upon treating with Arribæus. But Perdiccas urged in oppoſition, that "he had not brought Braſidas to be the judge of "his controverſies, but to execute his vengeance on the enemies he "ſhould point out to him; that it would be unjuſt in Braſidas to

He joins Braſidas.

[1] When Braſidas was beginning his march for Thrace, he wrote this letter to the *Ephori* at Sparta; —— "I will "execute your orders in this war, or "die." Plutarch's *Laconic Apothegms.*

" treat with Arribæus, when *he* ſupported half the expence of his " troops." Yet, in ſpite of ſuch remonſtrances and in open defiance of him, Braſidas parleyed. And being ſatisfied with the offers of Arribæus, he drew off his troops, without ſo much as entering his dominions. But henceforth Perdiccas, looking upon this ſtep as an injury to himſelf, reduced his contribution of ſupport from a moiety to a third.

Braſidas *received at* Acanthus.

Braſidas however the ſame ſummer, without loſs of time continued the operations of war; and, a little before the vintage, being attended by the Chalcidéans, marched towards Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabitants of this place were embroiled in a ſedition about his reception; a party, who co-operated with the Chalcidéans were for it; but *the people* oppoſed. Yet, fearing the loſs of their fruit which was not quite got in, the *people* were at laſt prevailed upon by Braſidas, to grant entrance to himſelf without any attendants, and after giving him audience to reſolve for themſelves. Braſidas is admitted; and ſtanding forth in the preſence of the *people*, for tho' a Lacedæmonian he was an able ſpeaker, he harangued them thus:

Speech of Braſidas.

" MY commiſſion from the Lacedæmonians and the march of " their troops hither under my command verify, O ye Acanthians, " the declaration made by us, when firſt we begun this war againſt " the Athenians, that we were going to fight for the liberties of " Greece. But if our appearance here hath been too long deferred, " it ſhould be aſcribed to the unexpected turns of war nearer home, " *where*, as we hoped to demoliſh the Athenians ſpeedily without " endangering you, we ought to be exempted from any cenſure " *here*. For now, you behold us opportunely at hand, and intent in " conjunction with you to pull theſe tyrants down.

" I am ſurprized indeed that your gates ſhould be barred againſt " me, or that my preſence ſhould any way chagrin you. For we

" Lacedæmonians,

" Lacedæmonians, imagining we were going to confederates, whoſe
" wiſhes were faſtened upon us before their eyes could behold us,
" and from whom we might depend upon the moſt cordial recep-
" tion; we, I ſay, have pierced forwards through a ſeries of dangers,
" marching many days together through hoſtile territories, and ſur-
" mounting every obſtacle by a zeal for your ſervice. If therefore
" your affections are alienated from us, or if you act in oppoſition to
" your own, and to the liberty of the reſt of Greece, your conduct
" muſt terribly diſtreſs us. And that, not only becauſe you your-
" ſelves reject us, but may by ſuch a ſtep deter all others, to whom
" I ſhall afterwards apply, from co-operating with me. Such ob-
" ſtacles you will raiſe before me, if you, to whom firſt I have ad-
" dreſſed myſelf, you who are maſters of a city of great importance,
" and are in eſteem for your good-ſenſe and diſcretion, ſhould re-
" fuſe to receive me. I ſhall be utterly unable to put a plauſible co-
" lour upon ſuch a refuſal, and ſhall be expoſed to reproach, as if I
" meant injuſtice under the cloke of liberty, or came hither too weak
" and impotent to make head againſt the Athenian ſtrength, ſhould
" it be exerted againſt me.

" And yet with that force, of which at this very moment I am
" honoured with the command, I marched myſelf to the ſuccour of
" Niſæa, and openly defied a ſuperior number of Athenians who de-
" clined the encounter. It is not therefore probable, that they can
" ſend hither a force to our annoyance equal to that armament they
" employed at Niſæa: Nor am I ſent hither to execute the ſchemes
" of oppreſſion, but to further the deliverance of Greece. I have
" the ſecurity of moſt ſolemn oaths, ſworn by the magiſtrates of
" Lacedæmon, that whatever people I bring over to their alliance
" ſhall remain in free poſſeſſion of their own liberties and laws. And
" farther, we are forbid the uſe of violence and fraud as the means
" of rendering you dependent on us; but, on the contrary, are to
" act in ſupport of you who are oppreſſed with Athenian bondage.

" Upon

" Upon reaſons ſo valid do I inſiſt upon it, that I am no longer
" ſuſpected by you, having given you the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that
" I am no impotent an avenger, and that you may boldly abet my
" cauſe.

" If there be any perſon in this aſſembly, who heſitates upon the
" apprehenſion that I may betray the city into the hands of a private
" cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and diſtinguiſh himſelf in
" open confidence. I came not hither to be the tool of faction;
" I am convinced that liberty can never be re-eſtabliſhed by me, if
" diſregarding ancient conſtitutions, I inſlave the *multitude* to the
" *few*, or the *few* to the *crowd*. Such things would be more grie-
" vous than the yoke of foreign dominion. And ſhould we Lace-
" dæmonians proceed in this manner, our labours could never merit
" a return of gratitude, but inſtead of honour and glory, foul re-
" proach would be our portion. The crimes, on which we have
" grounded this war againſt the Athenians, would then appear to be
" our own, and more odious in us for having made parade of diſin-
" tereſted virtue, than in a *State* which never pretended to it. For
" it is more baſe in men of honour to enlarge their power by ſpecious
" fraud, than by open force. The latter, upon the right of that ſu-
" perior ſtrength with which fortune hath inveſted it, ſeizeth at once
" upon its prey; the other can only compaſs it by the treachery of
" wicked cunning.

" It is thus that in all concerns of more than ordinary importance,
" we are accuſtomed to exert the utmoſt circumſpection. And be-
" ſides the ſolemn oaths in your favour, you can receive no greater
" ſecurity of our honeſt intention than the congruity of our actions
" with our words, from whence the ſtrongeſt conviction muſt reſult,
" that with what I have ſuggeſted you are obliged in intereſt to com-
" ply. But if all my promiſes are unavailing, and you declare ſuch
" compliance impoſſible; if profeſſing yourſelves our ſincere well-wiſh-
" ers, you beg that a denial may not expoſe you to our reſentments; if

" you

" you alledge that the dangers through which your liberty muſt be
" ſought overbalance the prize; that in juſtice it ought only to be
" propoſed to ſuch as are able to embrace the offer, but that no one
" ought to be compelled againſt his own inclinations; —— I ſhall be-
" ſeech the tutelary gods and heroes of this iſland to bear me witneſs,
" that whereas I come to ſerve you, and cannot perſuade, I muſt
" now, by ravaging your country, endeavour to compel you. And,
" in acting thus, I ſhall not be conſcious to myſelf of injuſtice, but
" ſhall juſtify the ſtep on two moſt cogent motives: —— For the
" ſake of the Lacedæmonians; leſt whilſt they have only your af-
" fections, and not your actual concurrence, they may be prejudiced
" through the ſums of money you pay to the Athenians: —— For
" the ſake of all the Grecians; that they may not be obſtructed by
" you in their deliverance from bondage. This is the end we pro-
" poſe, and this will juſtify our proceedings. For without the pur-
" poſe of a public good, we Lacedæmonians ought not to ſet people
" at liberty againſt their wills. We are not greedy of empire, but
" we are eager to pull down the tyranny of others. And how could
" we anſwer it to the body of Greece, if, when we have undertaken
" to give liberty to them all, we indolently ſuffer our endeavours to
" be traverſed by you?

" Deliberate ſeriouſly on theſe important points, and animate your-
" ſelves with the glorious ambition of being the firſt who enter the
" liſts for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an eternal renown, of
" ſecuring the uninterrupted poſſeſſion of your private properties, and
" inveſting the *State* of which you are members with the moſt * ho-
" nourable of all titles."

* *Fre.*

Here Braſidas concluded. And the Acanthians, who had already heard this affair largely diſcuſſed on both ſides, and ſecretly declared their votes — the majority, becauſe the arguments of Braſidas were prevailing, and becauſe they dreaded the loſs of their fruit, reſolved

Acanthus revolts.

to

to revolt from the Athenians. Then they required of Braſidas himſelf to ſwear the oath of their ſecurity, which the Lacedæmonian magiſtrates had at his departure injoined him to take, that "whatever people was brought over into their alliance by him ſhould remain "in poſſeſſion of their own liberties and laws," and this done, they receive his army. Not long after, Stagyrus alſo, another colony of the Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the tranſactions of this ſummer.

Bœotia. Very early in the ſucceeding winter, when the ſtrong places of Bœotia were to have been betrayed to Hippocrates and Demoſthenes the Athenian commanders, preparatory to which Demoſthenes was to ſhew himſelf with his fleet before Siphæ, and the other to march to Delium, there happened a miſtake about the days prefixed for execution. Demoſthenes indeed, who ſteered towards Siphæ, and had on board the Acarnanians, and many of the confederates of that quarter, is totally diſappointed. The whole ſcheme had been betrayed by Nicomachus the Phocian of Phanotis, who gave information of it to the Lacedæmonians, and they to the Bœotians. All Bœotians now taking up arms to prevent conſequences, (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to diſtreſs them on that ſide) Siphæ and Chæronéa are ſecured in time. And ſo ſoon as the conſpirators perceived that things went wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of exciting commotions in the cities.

The whole force of Athens *marches to* Delium. Hippocrates, having ſummoned into the field the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as ſojourners, not excepting even foreigners who chanced at that time to be there, arriveth too late before Delium, not before the Bœotians were returned home again from Siphæ. He incamped his forces, and ſet about fortifying Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the following manner. —— Round about the temple and its precincts they ſunk a ditch: Of the earth thrown up they formed a rampart inſtead of a wall. They drove into the ground on each ſide a row of ſtakes, and then threw on the vines they cut from within

within the precincts of the temple. They did the same by the stones and bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been demolished, and omitted no expedient to give height and substance to the work. They erected wooden turrets upon such spots as seemed most to require it. No part of the old pile of the temple was now standing: The portico, which stood the longest, had lately fell down. They began the work the third day after their marching out from Athens. That day they plied it, and the following, and continued it on the fifth till the time of repast. Then, the work being for the most part compleated, they drew off their army to the distance of about * ten stadia from Delium, in order to return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the most part marched off directly, but the heavy-armed halting there sat down upon their arms.

* *About an* English *mile.*

Hippocrates stayed behind for the time necessary to post the proper guards, and to put the finishing hand to those parts of the fortification which were not yet perfectly compleated. But during all this space, the Bœotians had been employed in drawing their forces together to Tanagra. When the quotas from the several cities were come up, and they perceived the Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the other *rulers* of Bœotia (for they were eleven in all) declared their resolution not to engage, since the enemy is no longer on Bœotian ground: for the Athenians, when they grounded their arms, were within the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Æoladas, one of the Bœotian *rulers* in the right of Thebes, and at this time in the supreme command, in concert with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged it expedient to hazard an engagement; and addressing himself to every battalion apart, lest calling them together might occasion them to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the Bœotians to march up to the Athenians, and to offer battle. His exhortation to each was worded thus:

That of Bœotia *assembled.*

Speech of Pagondas.

" IT ought never, ye men of Bœotia, to have entered into the " hearts of any of your *rulers*, that it is improper for us to attack " the Athenians, becauſe we find them not upon our own ſoil. For " they, out of a neighbouring country, have ruſhed into Bœotia, " and have fortified a poſt in it; from whence they intend to ravage " and annoy us. And our enemies in ſhort they are, in whatever " place we find them, from what place ſoever they march to execute " hoſtilities againſt us. Now therefore let him, who hath judged " this ſtep we are taking hazardous and inſecure, acknowledge and " forego his error. Cautious and dilatory meaſures are not to be ad- " hered to by men who are invaded, and whoſe all is at ſtake; they " are expedient only for thoſe whoſe properties are ſecure, and who " bent on rapine exert their malice in the invaſion of others. But it " is eternally the duty of you Bœotians to combat ſuch foreigners as " preſume to invade you, either upon your own or your neighbours " ground, no matter which. And this above all muſt be done againſt " Athenians, not only becauſe they are Athenians, but becauſe they " are the neareſt borderers upon us. For it is a maxim allowed, that " no *State* can poſſibly preſerve itſelf free, unleſs it be a match for its " neighbouring powers.

" Let me add farther, that when men are bent on inſlaving not " neighbouring only, but even ſuch people as are more remote, how " can it be judged improper to encounter ſuch, ſo long as we can " find ground whereon to ſtand? Call to mind for your preſent in- " formation the Euboeans ſituated in yon iſland oppoſite to us; call " to mind the preſent diſpoſition of the bulk of Greece in regard " to theſe Athenians. Why ſhould we forget, that neighbouring " *States* ſo often battle one another about ſettling their various boun- " daries; whereas, ſhould we be vanquiſhed, our whole country " will be turned merely into one heap of limitation, and that never " again by us to be diſputed? For when once they have entered upon " it, they will remain the maſters of it all, beyond control. So

" much

" much more have we to fear from theſe neighbours of ours, than
" any other people.
" Thoſe again, who in all the daring inſolence of ſuperior ſtrength
" are wont to invade their neighbours, as theſe Athenians now do us,
" march with extraordinary degrees of confidence againſt ſuch as are
" inactive, and defend themſelves only on their own ſoil. His ſchemes
" are more painfully compleated, when men ſally boldly beyond their
" borders to meet the invader, and if opportunity ſerveth attack him
" firſt. Of this truth our own experience will amply convince us.
" For ever ſince the defeat we gave theſe very men at Coronea, when
" taking the advantage of our ſeditions they had poſſeſſed themſelves
" of our lands, we have kept Bœotia quiet from every alarm till the
" preſent. This we ought now to remember, that the ſeniors among
" us may proceed as they then begun; that the juniors, the ſons of
" thoſe fires who then diſplayed ſuch uncommon bravery, may exert
" themſelves to preſerve unblemiſhed their hereditary virtues. We
" ought all to be confident, that the God will fight on our ſide,
" whoſe temple they pollute by raiſing ramparts, and dwelling within
" its verge. And, as the victims we have offered are fair and auſpi-
" cious, we ought at once to advance to the charge of theſe our foes,
" and make them know, that their luſt and rapine they only then can
" gratify, when they invade ſuch cowards as abandon their own de-
" fence: but from men, who were born to vindicate their own coun-
" try for ever by the dint of arms, and never unjuſtly to inſlave ano-
" ther; — that from ſuch men they ſhall not get away without that
" ſtruggle which honour injoins."

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Bœotians, and perſuaded them to march againſt the Athenians. He put them inſtantly in motion, and led them towards the enemy: For it was now late in the day. When he had approached the ſpot on which they were poſted, he halted in a place from whence, as an eminence lay between, they *Preparation for battle.*

could have no view of one another. There he drew up his men, and made all ready for the attack.

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, who was yet at Delium, that "the enemy is advancing to the charge," he ſendeth orders to the main-body to form into the order of battle. And not long after he himſelf came up, having left about three hundred horſe at Delium, to guard that place in caſe an attempt ſhould be made upon it, or ſeizing a favourable opportunity to fall upon the rear of the Bœotians during the engagement. Not but that the Bœotians had poſted a party of their own to watch their motions, and find them employment. When therefore the whole diſpoſition was perfected, they ſhewed themſelves on the top of the eminence, and there grounded their arms, remaining ſtill in the ſame order in which they deſigned to attack; being in the whole about ſeven thouſand heavy-armed, more than ten thouſand light-armed, a thouſand horſe, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was compoſed of Thebans and thoſe who ranked with them; the centre of the Haliartians and Coronéans and Copienſians, and others that live about the lake (Copæis); and the left of Theſpienſians, Tanagréans, and Orchomenians. In the wings were poſted the cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were drawn up in files of twenty five; the others variouſly, as circumſtances required. And ſuch was the order and diſpoſition of the Bœotians.

On the Athenian ſide, the heavy-armed, being in number equal to their enemies, were drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. Their cavalry was poſted on either wing. But light-armed ſoldiers, armed as was fitting, the Athenians had none at this juncture neither in the field nor in the city. The number which had taken the field at firſt to attend this expedition exceeded many times over the number of the enemy; but then moſt of them had no arms at all, ſince the ſummons had been extended to all who reſided in Athens, both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of theſe, ſo ſoon as ever the

route

route was pointed homewards, were, excepting a few, gone ſpeedily off. But, when they were drawn up in the order of battle, and were every moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates the general ſhewing himſelf in the front of the Athenians, animated them with the following harangue:

Speech of Hippocrates.

" THE admonition, Athenians, I intend to give you will be " very conciſe, but ſuch an one is ſufficient to the brave: I pretend " not to encourage Athenians, but merely to remind them of their " duty. Let the thought be a ſtranger to every heart amongſt you, " that we are going to plunge into needleſs hazards in the territory of " a foe. Be it the territory of a foe, yet in it you muſt fight for the " ſecurity of your own. And, if we conquer *now*, the Peloponne- " ſians will never again preſume, without the aid of the Bœotian " horſe, to repeat their inroads into Attica. By one battle therefore " you acquire this, and ſecure your own land from future annoy- " ance. Charge therefore your enemies, as you ought, with a ſpirit " worthy of the *State* of Athens, that *State* which every ſoul " amongſt you boaſts to be the firſt of Greece; and worthy of your " great forefathers, who formerly at Oenophyta, under the conduct " of Myronides, defeated theſe people in the field, and poſſeſſed for " a time all Bœotia as their prize."

Battle of Delium.

Hippocrates had not gone along half the line encouraging them in this manner, when he was compelled to deſiſt and leave the greater part of his army unaddreſſed. For the Bœotians, to whom Pagondas alſo had given but a ſhort exhortation and had this moment finiſhed the pæan of attack, were coming down from the eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and both ſides came running to the charge. The ſkirts of both armies could not come to an engagement, as ſome rivulets that lay between ſtopped them equally on both ſides. The reſt cloſed firm in a ſtubborn fight, and with mutual

mutual thruſts of their ſhields. The left wing of the Bœotians, even to the centre, was routed by the Athenians, who preſſed upon thoſe who compoſed it, but eſpecially on the Theſpienſians. For, the others who were drawn up with them giving way before the ſhock, the Theſpienſians were incloſed in a ſmall compaſs of ground, where ſuch of them as were ſlaughtered defended themſelves bravely till they were quite hewed down. Some alſo of the Athenians, diſordered in thus encompaſſing them about, knew not how to diſtinguiſh, and ſlew one another. In this quarter therefore the Bœotians were routed, and fled towards thoſe parts where the battle was yet alive. Their right wing, in which the Thebans were poſted, had the better of the Athenians. They had forced them at firſt to give ground a little, and preſſed upon them to purſue their advantage. It happened that Pagondas had detached two troops of horſe (which motion was not perceived) to fetch a compaſs round the eminence and ſupport the left wing which was routed. Theſe ſuddenly appearing in ſight, the victorious wing of Athenians, imagining a freſh army was coming up to the charge, was ſtruck into conſternation. And now being diſtreſſed on both ſides by this laſt turn, and by the Thebans who purſued their advantage cloſe and put them into a total diſorder, the whole Athenian army was routed and fled. Some ran towards Delium and the ſea, others to Oropus, and others towards mount Parnes; all, to whatever place they hoped was ſafe. But the Bœotians, eſpecially their horſe, and the Locrians who had come up to the field of battle juſt as the rout began, purſued them with great execution. But the night putting an end to the chace, the bulk of the flying army preſerved themſelves more eaſily.

Won by the Bœotians.

The day following, ſuch of them as had reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a garriſon in Delium, which ſtill remained in their poſſeſſion, tranſported themſelves by ſea to Athens. The Bœotians alſo, having erected a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled thoſe of the enemy, and having poſted a guard upon the field of battle

battle, retired to Tanagra, and called a conſultation about the method of aſſaulting Delium.

A herald, farther, diſpatched by the Athenians about their dead, meets upon his way a herald of the Bœotians, who turned him back by aſſuring him that his errand would be fruitleſs till he himſelf ſhould be again returned. The latter, being come to the Athenians, declared to them in the name of the Bœotians; *Diſpute about the dead.*

" THAT by their late proceedings they had enormouſly violated " the laws of the Grecians, amongſt whom it was an eſtabliſhed " rule, that amidſt their mutual invaſions religious places ſhould be " ever ſpared, whereas the Athenians had not only fortified, but " had made Delium a place of habitation, and whatever profanations " mankind can be guilty of had been there by them committed: " That the water, which it would even be impious for the Bœotians " themſelves to touch, unleſs by way of ablution, before they ſacri- " ficed, had been profanely drawn by them for common uſe: That, " for theſe reaſons the Bœotians, in the cauſe of the God and in " their own, invoking the aſſociated Dæmons and Apollo, gave them " this early notice to evacuate the ſacred place, and clear it of all in- " cumbrances.

This meſſage being thus delivered by the herald, the Athenians returned this anſwer to the Bœotians by a herald of their own:

" THAT they were hitherto guilty of nothing illegal in regard " to the holy place, nor would willingly be ſo for the future. They " had no ſuch intention when they firſt entered into it, and their " view was merely to give an ejection from thence to perſons who " had baſely injured them. It was a law among the Grecians for " thoſe who were maſters of any diſtrict, whether great or ſmall, " to be alſo proprietors of its temples, which are to be honoured by

" them

" them with the uſual forms, and with what additional ones they " may be able to appoint. Even the Bœotians, as well as many " other people, who this moment were poſſeſſed of lands from " which they had ejected the old proprietors, made a ſeizure firſt of " thoſe temples which had belonged to others, and continued in the " free poſſeſſion of them. For their own parts, could they conquer " more of their territory, they ſhould manfully retain it; and as to " the ſpot they now occupied, their poſition there was voluntary, " and as it was their own they would not quit it. It was neceſſity " alone made them uſe the water, which ought not to be aſcribed to " any inſolent or profane motive, but to the preceding invaſions their " enemies had made, ſelf-preſervation againſt which laid them un- " der a preſent neceſſity of acting as they did. It might with reaſon " be hoped, that every proceeding to which war and violence indiſ- " penſably obliged, would obtain forgiveneſs from the God: For the " altars are a refuge to involuntary offences, and tranſgreſſion is im- " puted only to thoſe who are bad without compulſion, and not to " ſuch as urgent neceſſities may render daring. The guilt of impiety " belonged more notoriouſly to ſuch as inſiſted on the barter of " temples for the bodies of the dead, than to thoſe who are content " to loſe their juſt demands rather than ſubmit to ſo baſe an ex- " change." They farther injoined him in their name to declare, that " they would not evacuate Bœotia, ſince the ground which they " occupied in it belonged to no Bœotians, but was now their own " property acquired by dint of arms. All they required, was a truce " for fetching off their dead, according to the ſolemn inſtitutions of " their common country."

The Bœotians replied thus —— " If they are now in Bœotia, let " them quit the ground which belongeth to us, and carry off what " they demand. But, if they are upon ground of their own, they " themſelves know beſt what they have to do." They judged indeed that Oropia, on which it happened that the bodies of the dead were

lying,

lying, as the battle had been fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to the Athenian juriſdiction, and yet that it was impoſſible for them to be carried off by force; and truce farther they would grant none, where the point related to Athenian ground; that it was therefore the moſt proper reply — "they ſhould quit their territory, and ſo ob- "tain their demands." The herald of the Athenians having heard this, departed without effect.

Delium *retaken.*

Immediately after, the Bœotians, having ſent for darters and ſlingers from the Melian bay, and being reinforced by two thouſand heavy-armed Corinthians, and the Peloponneſian garriſon which had evacuated Niſæa, and a party of Megaréans, all which had joined them ſince the battle, marched againſt Delium, and aſſaulted the fortification. They tried many methods, and took it at laſt by the help of a machine of a very particular ſtructure. —— Having ſplit aſunder a large ſail-yard, they hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together again in a very exact manner, ſo as to reſemble a pipe. At its extremity they faſtened a caldron by help of chains, into which a ſnout of iron was bent downwards from the yard. The inſide, farther, of this wooden machine was lined almoſt throughout with iron. They brought it from a diſtance to the fortification on carriages, and applied it where the work conſiſted chiefly of vines and timber. And when near enough, they put a large bellows to that extremity of the yard which was next themſelves, and begun to blow. But the blaſt, iſſuing along the bore into the caldron, which was filled with glowing coals and ſulphur and pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This ſet fire to the work, and burnt with ſo much fury, that not a ſoul durſt any longer ſtay upon it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled away amain: and in this manner was the fortreſs carried. Of the garriſon, ſome were put to the ſword, but two hundred were made priſoners. The bulk of the remainder, throwing themſelves on board their veſſels, eſcaped in ſafety to Athens.

It was the ſeventeenth day after the battle that Delium was taken. And not long after, a herald diſpatched by the Athenians came again, but quite ignorant of this event, to ſue for the dead, which were now delivered by the Bœotians, who no longer laid any ſtreſs upon their former reply.

In the battle, there periſhed of the Bœotians very little under five hundred; of the Athenians, few leſs than a thouſand, and Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed and baggage-men a conſiderable number indeed [2].

Demoſthenes. Somewhat later in time than this battle, Demoſthenes, who, on his appearance before Siphæ, had been diſappointed in his hope of having it betrayed to him, having the land-force ſtill on board his fleet, conſiſting of four hundred heavy-armed Acarnanians and Agræans and Athenians, made a deſcent on Sicyonia. But before all his veſſels could land their men, the Sicyonians had marched down to make head againſt them. They defeated thoſe that were landed, and chaced them again on board. Some they killed, and ſome they took alive;

2 The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on this occaſion. The Bœotians, a people heavy and ſtupid to a proverb, continued ever after the terror of the Athenians, the politeſt and moſt enlightned people upon earth. Nay, that groſs and ſtupid people had, this day, well nigh compleated the deſtruction of all that was pre-eminently wiſe and good at this time upon earth; and done an irreparable miſchief to ſound reaſon and good-ſenſe for ever after. When the two troops of horſe, after fetching a compaſs round the hill, had compleated the rout of the Athenians, who were now flying away with the utmoſt ſpeed, the divine Socrates was left almoſt alone, facing the enemy, and fighting and retreating like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who ſerved in the cavalry, was making off on horſeback; but, ſeeing Socrates in ſuch imminent danger, he rode up to him, covered his retreat, and brought him off ſafe. He thus repaid him the great obligation he had formerly received from him at Potidæa. Strabo relates further (Geog. l. 9.) that Xenophon alſo the ſame day owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horſe, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took him upon his ſhoulders, and carried him to a place of ſafety. Upon the whole, brutal ſtrength and mere bodily merit were never ſo near getting a total conqueſt over all the light and underſtanding which human nature hath to boaſt of, that did not come directly down from heaven.

and

and after erecting their trophy, they delivered up the dead by truce.

During the former tranſactions at Delium, Sitalces alſo king of the Odryſians was killed in an expedition he had formed againſt the Triballians, who encountered and vanquiſhed him. And Seuthes the ſon of Sparodocus, his nephew by the brother, ſucceeded him in the kingdom of the Odryſians and the reſt of Thrace over which he had reigned. Sitalces.

The ſame winter, Braſidas, in conjunction with the allies of Thrace, marched againſt Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the river Strymon.—— Braſidas.

The ſpot of ground on which this city now ſtandeth, Ariſtagoras the Mileſian formerly, when he fled from king Darius, had endeavoured to plant, but was beat off by the Edonians. Two and thirty years after, the Athenians made the ſame attempt, having ſent thither a colony conſiſting of ten thouſand of their own people and ſuch others as voluntarily came in, all of whom were deſtroyed by the Thracians at Drabeſcus. But after an interval of twenty nine years, the Athenians came hither again with a freſh colony led by Agnon the ſon of Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians built this city upon that ſpot of ground which had formerly been called the *nine-roads*. They ruſhed to the ſeizure from Eïon, a maritime emporium ſituated at the river's mouth, and belonging to them. Eïon is diſtant * twenty ſtadia from the ſpot where the city now ſtandeth, and which by Agnon was named Amphipolis, becauſe it is almoſt ſurrounded by the Strymon which floweth along it on both ſides. Running therefore a wall from the river to the river, he planted his colony on a ſpot conſpicuous both to the land and to the ſea. Amphipolis.

* *About two* Engliſh *miles.*

Againſt this place, Braſidas, decamping from Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army. About ſun-ſet he arrived at Aulon and Bromiſcus, where the lake Bolbé iſſueth into the ſea. From hence, after taking the evening-repaſt, he continued his march by night. It Braſidas *endeavours to ſurprize it.*

was winter, and a ſnow was falling. This favoured and encouraged his enterprize, as he intended to ſurpriſe the people of Amphipolis, except ſuch as were privy to his deſign. For there reſided in the place a body of Argillians, who are an Andrian colony, and others who acted in combination with him, ſome of them at the inſtigation of Perdiccas, and others at that of the Chalcideans: But in a more particular manner the Argillians, who had a place of reſidence very near it, who farther had ever been ſuſpected by the Athenians, and were really intent on the ruin of the place when now a fair opportunity was within their reach, and Braſidas at hand (who long before had been tampering with theſe inhabitants of foreign mixture) in order to have the city betrayed to him. The Argyllians at this juncture received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians led his army forwards that very night to the bridge laid over the Strymon. The city is ſeated at ſome diſtance from this paſs; and it was not then defended by a fort as it is now, but was only the ſtation of a ſmall party of guards. Braſidas therefore eaſily forced the guard, being favoured in ſome degree by treachery, not a little alſo by the ſeaſon and his own unexpected approach. He then paſſed the bridge, and was immediately maſter of all the effects of thoſe Amphipolitans who reſide in all the tract without the walls. This paſſage was ſo ſudden, that thoſe within the city had no notice of it; and as to thoſe without, many of them being ſeized, and others flying for preſervation within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into vaſt confuſion, increaſed by their mutual ſuſpicions of one another. And it is ſaid, that if Braſidas, inſtead of permitting his troops to diſperſe for plunder, had advanced directly againſt the city, it muſt unavoidably have fallen into his hands. But he on the contrary, having ordered them to halt, employed himſelf in the ravage of what lay without; and, finding nothing effectuated in his favour by accomplices within, he for the preſent deſiſted. But thoſe his accomplices were overpowered in number by the oppoſite party, who prevented their

their opening the gates immediately to Braſidas; and, acting in concert with Eucles their commandant, who reſided there by the orders of the Athenians to guard the place, they diſpatch a meſſenger to the other commander in Thrace, THUCYDIDES the ſon of Olorus, who compiled this hiſtory, and was then in Thaſus (Thaſus is an iſland, a colony of the Parians, and diſtant about half a day's ſail from Amphipolis), preſſing him to come inſtantly to their relief.

Thucydides to ſave it.

Thucydides no ſooner received this notice, than with the utmoſt expedition he put to ſea with ſeven ſhips that happened to be at hand. He deſigned nothing ſo much as to prevent if poſſible the loſs of Amphipolis; or, if that was impracticable, to throw himſelf into Eïon, and ſecure it in time.

He is too late.

Braſidas in the mean while, fearing at the approach of this ſuccour from Thaſus, informed beſides that Thucydides drew an ample revenue from the working of his gold-mines in this quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of great credit amongſt the principal perſons of this part of the continent, tried all poſſible expedients to get poſſeſſion of the city before his arrival, leſt his appearance amongſt them might animate the Amphipolitans with the hope of ſuccour by ſea and from Thrace, which the credit of Thucydides might eaſily obtain for their effectual preſervation, and in purſuance of this they might refuſe to capitulate. He ſent them therefore very moderate terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that "the Amphipolitans and Athe-" nians within the city ſhould, if they deſired it, be continued in " the free poſſeſſion of their property, and of all their rights and li-" berties whatever: But thoſe, who refuſed to ſtay, ſhould have " the ſpace of five days allowed them to quit the town and remove " their effects."

This propoſal was no ſooner heard, than the inclinations of the *many* took a new turn. The Athenian intereſt had but a few ſupporters in the city: The bulk of the inhabitants were a mixture of foreign nations. There were alſo *within* many perſons, relations of

thoſe

thoſe who had been made priſoners *without*. And thus, in their preſent conſternation, the propoſal was generally received as mild and gentle. The Athenians for their part, who thought themſelves more expoſed to danger than the reſt, and had beſides no hope of ſpeedy relief, were delighted with the offer of quitting the place. So alſo were all the reſt, that they were not to loſe their rights and liberties as citizens, and ſhould thus eſcape the danger they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. Upon this, the agents of Braſidas expatiated only on the mildneſs and generoſity of the terms he had offered, becauſe now they perceived that the multitude had altered their ſentiments, and would no longer hearken to the Athenian commandant. In ſhort, an accommodation was perfected, and they opened the gates to Braſidas, upon the conditions he had propoſed by his herald. And in this manner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis.

Put ſecures Eïon.

But in the evening of the ſame day, Thucydides and the ſquadron came over to Eïon. Braſidas was already in poſſeſſion of Amphipolis, and deſigned that very night to ſeize Eïon alſo. And unleſs this ſquadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been loſt.

Thucydides inſtantly took care to put Eïon in a poſture of defence, in caſe Braſidas ſhould attack it; and to provide farther for its future ſecurity, when he had opened a refuge there for ſuch as were willing to remove thither from Amphipolis, according to the articles of the late ſurrender.

Braſidas *in vain attempts it.*

But Braſidas on a ſudden fell down the river with a large number of boats towards Eïon, deſigning if poſſible to ſeize the point of land that juts out from the walls, which would have given him the command of the river's mouth. He endeavoured at the ſame time alſo to aſſault it by land, but was repulſed in both attempts. And now he effectually employed his care in reſettling and ſecuring Amphipolis.

Myrcinus

Myrcinus alſo, a city of Edonia, revolted to him upon the death of Pittacus king of the Edonians, who was killed by the ſons of Goaxis and his own wife Braures. Gapſelus ſoon after did the ſame, and Oeſyme: They are colonies of the Thaſians. Theſe events were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who came thither in perſon immediately after the ſurrender of Amphipolis. *Myrcinus revolts.*

The loſs of that city caſt the Athenians into great conſternation, and with reaſon, becauſe it was a place of great importance to them, ſince from thence they had materials for building ſhips and a pecuniary revenue; and farther, becauſe, after a ſafe conduct through Theſſaly, the route was now open to the Lacedæmonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy their dependents. Yet had they not poſſeſſed themſelves of the bridge, the large lake formed above by the river, and the check given by the triremes ſtationed at Eïon, would have hindered the Lacedæmonians from penetrating further. But all obſtacle appeared to the Athenians now quite eaſy to be ſurmounted; and their apprehenſions, that their dependents would revolt, alarmed them much. For Braſidas in the reſt of his conduct gave conſtant proofs of an excellent temper; and the declaration was ever in his mouth, that "he had been ſent thither to reſtore the liberty of "Greece." Accordingly the cities, which were ſubject to the Athenians, had no ſooner heard of the ſurrender of Amphipolis together with the brave exploits and the mild engaging deportment of Braſidas, than they conceived the moſt ardent inclination to ſhake off the yoke. They ſecretly diſpatched their agents to him, earneſtly deſiring a viſit from him, with reſpective aſſurances from each, that *they* would be the firſt to revolt. They judged, there was no longer room to apprehend any bad conſequences from ſuch a ſtep; falſly eſtimating the Athenian power to be much leſs conſiderable than it afterwards appeared. But this their judgment was founded more upon uncertain preſumption than deliberate prudence. It is the turn of mankind when their paſſions are warm, to give themſelves up to blind *All the reſt ready to do it.*

blind and ſanguine hope, and to throw aſide with deſpotic ſcorn whatever ſeemeth to be counter to their wiſhes. It was but lately that the Athenians had been vanquiſhed by the Bœotians; and Braſidas had been making ſuch recitals as might perſuade, tho' in fact they were colluſive, that at Niſæa with his ſingle force he offered battle to the Athenians and they declined it. This made them confident, and they became perfectly convinced, that there was no longer a ſtrength ſufficient to chaſtiſe them. But what had the greateſt influence on their thoughts, and diſpoſed them entirely to run all hazards, was the immediate pleaſure they promiſed themſelves in a change, and that now they were going for the firſt time to experience the ſweets of Lacedæmonian friendſhip.

But ſecured by garriſons.

Theſe inclinations were perceived by the Athenians, who ſent garriſons into each of theſe cities in order to curb them, with as much expedition, as the ſhortneſs of time and the wintry ſeaſon would permit.

Braſidas alſo had ſent to Lacedæmon, ſoliciting a ſpeedy reinforcement, and was buſy himſelf in providing materials to build triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians neglected to ſupply him, partly through the envy which the leading men at Sparta had conceived againſt him, and partly becauſe their attention was principally confined to the recovery of their people made priſoners in Sphacteria, and to bring the war to a concluſion.

The ſame winter, the Megaréans having recovered their *long-walls*, which were in the poſſeſſion of the Athenians, levelled them with the ground.

Braſidas *marcheth into* **Acté.**

Braſidas thus maſter of Amphipolis gathereth together the allies, and leadeth them into the diſtrict called Acté. It is the tract, which ſtretcheth out into the ſea from the canal which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the higheſt mountain in Acté is its utmoſt verge upon the Ægean ſea. The cities in it are; Sane, a colony of Andrians, ſeated cloſe to the canal and on that part which faceth the ſea towards Euboœa;

bœa; Thyſſus farther, and Cleone, and Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Dium, which are promiſcuouſly inhabited by various ſets of Barbarians, who ſpeak both languages. There is alſo a ſmall number of Chalcidéans amongſt them, but the bulk are Pelaſgians (the iſſue of thoſe Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lemnos and Athens), and Biſaltians, and Creſtonians, and Edonians: They reſide in ſmall fortreſſes. Moſt of them went over to Braſidas; but Sane and Dium ſtood out. He therefore made his army halt on their lands, and laid them waſte. Yet as this had no effect, he marched from thence to Torone of Chalcidica then poſſeſſed by the Athenians. He haſtened thither at the invitation of a ſmall party, who were ready to betray the city to him. Being arrived whilſt yet it was dark, he ſat down about break of day with his army near the temple of the Dioſcuri, which lieth not at moſt above * three ſtadia from the city. The bulk of the Toronéans and the Athenian garriſon were ignorant of his approach: But the accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, ſent ſome of their body unperceived to obſerve his approach. When theſe were thus certainly aſſured he was at hand, they conducted back with them to their friends ſeven men armed only with daggers. Twenty had at firſt been ſelected for this ſervice, but only ſeven of *them* now had the courage to proceed: Lyſiſtratus the Olynthian was the perſon who commanded. They got in by the wall towards the ſea without cauſing an alarm, and aſcending from thence ſlaughtered the guard in the citadel which is ſeated upon the moſt eminent ſpot, the whole city being built on the declivity of a hill, and burſt open the poſtern toward Canaſtræum. Braſidas, having ſince advanced a little with the reſt of his force, halted again. But he ordereth a hundred targeteers to go before, that, when the gates ſhould be opened and the ſignal given which was before agreed on, they might break in firſt. Theſe after an interval of time wondered at the delay, and by gradually advancing were got cloſe to the city. Such of the Toronéans within, as acted in concert with thoſe who had

* *Above* $\frac{1}{4}$ *of a mile.*

entered, when once the poſtern was burſt, and the gates leading to the *forum* were thrown open after burſting the bar, in the firſt place conducting ſome of them about led them in at the poſtern, that they might ſtrike a ſudden panic on the ignorant inhabitants when attacked in rear and in flank and on all ſides. This done they lifted up the appointed ſignal of fire, and gave inſtant admittance to the reſt of the targeteers through the gates which led to the *forum*.

Surpriſal of Torone.

Braſidas, when once he ſaw the ſignal, rouzed up his army and led them running towards the place, ſhouting all at once aloud, and thus ſtriking the greateſt conſternation into the inhabitants. Some immediately ruſhed in at the gates; others mounted over the ſquare wooden machines, which, as the wall had lately fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay cloſe to it for the raiſing of ſtones. Braſidas, with the bulk of his force, betook himſelf immediately to the upper parts of the city; intending to ſeize the eminence, and poſſeſs himſelf effectually of the place. The reſt diſperſed themſelves equally through every quarter.

Amidſt this ſurpriſal, the majority of the Toronéans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in vaſt confuſion. But the agents in it and all their party were quickly ranged with the aſſailants. The Athenians, (for of them there were about fifty heavy-armed aſleep in the *forum*,) when they found what was done, ſome few excepted who were ſlain inſtantly on the ſpot, fled away for preſervation; and ſome by land, others in the guard-ſhips ſtationed there, got ſafe into Lecythus, a fort of their own. They kept this in their own hands, as it was the extremity of the city towards the ſea ſtretched along on a narrow iſthmus. Hither alſo thoſe of the Toronéans, who perſevered in their fidelity, fled to them for refuge.

It being now broad day and the city firmly ſecured, Braſidas cauſed proclamation to be made to thoſe Toronéans who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, that "ſuch as were willing might return to "their old habitations, and ſhould enjoy their rights without any "moleſtation."

" moleſtation." But to the Athenians a herald was ſent expreſly, commanding them " to evacuate Lecythus which rightfully be-" longed to the Chalcidéans, and a truce ſhould be granted them " to remove themſelves and their baggage." An evacuation they abſolutely refuſed, but requeſted one day's truce to fetch off their dead: He ſolemnly accorded two. During this ſpace he was very buſy in ſtrengthening the houſes adjacent to Lecythus, and the Athenians did the ſame within.

Braſidas *harangues the* Toronéans.

He alſo convened the Toronéans to a general aſſembly, and harangued them very nearly in the ſame manner, as he had done at Acanthus, — that " it was unjuſt to look upon thoſe, who had been " his coadjutors in the ſurpriſal of the city, as men worſe than their " neighbours, or as traitors; they had no inſlaving views, nor were " biaſſed to ſuch a conduct by pecuniary perſuaſions; the welfare " and liberty of the city had been their only object. Neither ſhould " they, who had no ſhare in the event, be more abridged than thoſe " who had. He was not come thither to deſtroy the city, or ſo " much as one private inhabitant of it. For this very reaſon he had " cauſed the proclamation to be made to thoſe who had ſheltered " themſelves amongſt the Athenians, becauſe ſuch an attachment " had not in the leaſt impaired them in his eſteem, ſince it was en-" tirely owing to their ignorance that they had thus undervalued the " Lacedæmonians, whoſe actions, as they were always more juſt, " would for the future entitle them much more to their benevo-" lence; their terror hitherto had been merely the reſult of inexpe-" rience." He then exhorted them in general " to take care for " the future to be ſteddy and firm allies, ſince ſhould they hence-" forth offend, they would be made anſwerable for the guilt. They " were not chargeable for the paſt, as they had rather been ſufferers " themſelves from ſuperior force; the preceding oppoſition therefore " deſerved forgiveneſs."

He attacks Lecythus.

Having ſpake thus and revived their ſpirits, when the truce was expired, he made aſſaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians defended themſelves from a paltry rampart and the battlements of the houſes. One whole day they effectually repulſed them. But on the following, when a machine was to be planted againſt them by the enemy, from whence they intended to throw fire upon their wooden fences, and the army was now approaching to the ſpot which ſeemed convenient for lodging their machine and whence it might be played off with effect; they raiſed for prevention a wooden turret, the baſe of which was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and carried up many buckets and tubs of water and heavy ſtones; and upon it alſo many defendents were mounted. But the edifice, too heavily laden, on a ſudden was cruſhed by the weight. The craſh with which it fell was great; and thoſe of the Athenians, who ſtood near and ſaw it, were rather concerned than terrified. But thoſe at a diſtance, and eſpecially ſuch as were moſt remote, imagining the place was already taken in that quarter, fled amain to the ſea and to their veſſels.

And carries it. When Braſidas perceived they were quitting the battlements, and had himſelf beheld the accident, he led his army to the aſſault, and immediately carrieth the fortreſs. Such as were found within it were inſtantly deſtroyed. And the Athenians in boats and ſhips, after having thus abandoned it to the enemy, croſſed over to the Pallene.

But Braſidas, (for in Lecythus there is a temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded to the aſſault he had publicly proclaimed, that a reward of thirty * *minæ* of ſilver ſhould be given the man who firſt mounted the rampart,) concluding now that it was taken leſs by human than ſome other means, repoſited the thirty *minæ* in the temple, as an offering to the Goddeſs. And having demoliſhed Lecythus and cleared all away, he conſecrated the whole ſpot as ſacred to her. During the remainder of the winter, he provided for the ſecurity of the places already in his poſſeſſion, and was planning future

* 96 *l.* 15 *s. Sterling.*

future conqueſts. And with the end of this winter the eighth year of the war expired.

YEAR IX.

VERY early in the ſpring of the enſuing ſummer, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians made a truce to continue for a year. The motives on the Athenian ſide were theſe — — That "Braſidas might no "longer ſeduce any of their towns to revolt, before they were en- "abled by this interval of leiſure to act againſt him; and beſides, "that if they reaped any advantage from this truce, they might pro- "ceed to a farther accommodation." On the Lacedæmonian ſide it was imagined that "the Athenians were under ſuch terrors as in fact "they were; and, after a remiſſion of calamities and misfortunes, "would more eagerly come into ſome expedients for a future recon- "ciliation; of courſe, would deliver up to them their *citizens*, and "come into a truce for a larger term." The recovery of *theſe* Spartans was a point on which they layed a greater ſtreſs than ever, even during the career of ſucceſs which attended Braſidas. They foreſaw, that in caſe he extended his conqueſts, and even brought them to a balance with their foes, of *theſe* they muſt for ever be deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon equal advantages the dangers alſo would be equal, and the victory ſtill in ſuſpence.

Before Chriſt, 423.

Truce for a year.

Upon theſe motives, both parties and their allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor:

"AS to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it ſeemeth "good unto us, that acceſs be granted to all who deſire it, without "fraud and without fear, according to the laws of our country. The "ſame is approved of by the Lacedæmonians and their allies now "preſent; and they promiſe to ſend heralds on purpoſe, and to "ſpare no pains to procure the conſent of the Bœotians and Pho- "cians.

Articles of Peace.

"As

" As to the treaſure belonging to the God, care ſhall be taken by
" us to find out thoſe who have preſumed to embezzle it; and this
" fairly and honeſtly, according to the laws of our country, both
" by you, and by us, and by all others who are willing; all pro-
" ceeding reſpectively according to the laws of their ſeveral con-
" ſtitutions.

" It hath farther ſeemed good to the Lacedæmonians and their
" other allies, if the Athenians agree to the truce, that both parties
" ſhall keep within their own bounds, and hold what we are at pre-
" ſent reſpectively poſſeſſed of: that is to ſay; the former to keep in
" Coryphaſium *, within the mountains of Bouphras and Tomeus;
" the latter in Cythera; without enlarging the communication for
" the procuring of alliance, neither on our ſide againſt you, nor on
" your ſide againſt us. That thoſe in Niſæa and Minoa paſs not
" beyond the road that leads from the gates of Megara adjacent to
" the temple of Niſus towards the temple of Neptune, and from
" the temple of Neptune carrieth directly to the bridge laid acroſs to
" Minoa: That neither the Megaréans nor their allies paſs beyond
" the ſame road, nor into the iſland which the Athenians have
" taken; both keeping within their bounds, and upon no occaſion
" whatever to have any intercourſe with one another: The Mega-
" réans ſtill to retain what they poſſeſs in Trœzen, and whatever they
" hold by compact with the Athenians; to have farther the free uſe
" of the ſea upon their own coaſts, and thoſe of their alliance.

" That the Lacedæmonians and allies ſhall not navigate the ſea in
" a long ſhip *, but in any other veſſels rowed with oars, and of
" no larger burden than † five hundred talents.

" That by virtue of this truce, ſafe-conduct be granted both of
" paſſage and repaſſage, either by land or ſea, either to Peloponneſus
" or to Athens, to all heralds and embaſſadors, and their whole re-
" tinue how numerous ſoever, commiſſioned to negotiate the deter-
" mination of the war, or to get controverted points adjudged.

" That

* *In which ſtood the fort of* Pylus.

* *A ſhip of war*

† *Five and twenty tons.*

" That ſo long as this truce be in force, no deſerters be entertained,
" neither by you, nor by us, whether they be freemen or ſlaves.
" You ſhall do juſtice in our cauſes, and we ſhall do the ſame
" for you, according to the laws of our reſpective conſtitutions, to
" the end that all controverſies may be judicially ſettled without
" a war.
" Theſe articles have the approbation of the Lacedæmonians and
" their allies. But, if any thing more honourable or more juſt oc-
" curs to you, you are to repair to Lacedæmon, and propoſe it
" there. For whatever points you may demonſtrate to be juſt, will
" in no degree whatever be rejected, neither by the Lacedæmonians
" nor by their allies: Provided the perſons charged with theſe new
" commiſſions be ſent with full powers to put to them the finiſh-
" ing hand, in the ſame manner as you require the ſame conditions
" from us.
" This truce ſhall be in force for a year."

Ratified by the People.

The Acamantine Tribe preſided. Phanippus was the Notary public. Niciades was in the chair. Laches pronounced — " Be it
" for the welfare and proſperity of the Athenians, that a ſuſpenſion
" of arms is granted upon the terms offered by the Lacedæmonians
" and allies."

Agreed in the public aſſembly of the people,

" That this ſuſpenſion ſhall continue for a year.
" That it ſhall take place this very day, being the fourteenth day
" of the month Elaphebolion.
" That during this interval, embaſſadors and heralds ſhall paſs be-
" tween them, to adjuſt the terms upon which the war ſhould be de-
" finitively concluded.

" That

" That the generals of the *State* and the preſidents in courſe ſhall
" firſt at Athens convene an aſſembly of the *people*, to adjuſt the terms
" upon which their embaſſy ſhould be impowered to put an end to
" the war. And

" That the embaſſadors, who were now preſent in the aſſembly,
" ſhall give a ſolemn ratification that they will punctually abide by
" this truce for a year."

The Lacedæmonians and their allies agreed to theſe articles, and pledged their oath for the obſervation of them to the Athenians and their allies at Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the month Geraſtius.

The perſons who ſettled the articles and aſſiſted at the ſacrifice were,

For the Lacedæmonians — Taurus the ſon of Echetimidas, Athenæus the ſon of Periclidas, Philocharidas the ſon of Eryxidaïdas. For the Corinthians — Æneas the ſon of Ocytus, Euphamidas the ſon of Ariſtonymus. For the Sicyonians — Damotimus the ſon of Naucrates, Onaſimus the ſon of Megacles. For the Megaréans — Nicaſus the ſon of Cecalus, Menecrates the ſon of Amphidorus. For the Epidaurians — Amphias the ſon of Eupæïdas. For the Athenians — Nicoſtratus the ſon of Diotrephes, Nicias the ſon of Niceratus, Autocles the ſon of Tolmæus, Generals of the *State*.

In this manner was a ſuſpenſion of arms concluded, during which they continued without interruption to hold conferences with one another, about ſettling the terms of a firm and laſting peace.

Braſidas *goes to* Scion.

During the interval theſe matters were thus in agitation, Scione a city in the Pellene revolted from the Athenians to Braſidas. The Scionéans indeed in the Pellene give out that they are of Peloponneſus; that their anceſtors who ſettled in theſe other ſeats were driven there

there originally by a ſtorm, which in their return from Troy diſperſed the Achæans. When they had notified their revolt to him, Braſidas paſſed over to Scione by night. A party of his friends ſailed before him in a trireme, and he followed at ſome diſtance in a fly-boat, to the end that if he ſhould fall in with any veſſel larger than this boat, the trireme might make head againſt her; but if another trireme of equal ſtrength ſhould come up to them, he judged ſhe would neglect his ſmaller boat, and would attack the ſhip, which would give him time to complete his paſſage in ſecurity.

When he was ſafe landed, and had convened an aſſembly of the Scionéans, he harangued them as he had done before at Acanthus and Torone. But he added farther that "they were a people moſt "deſerving of applauſe, ſince tho' the communication with the Pel-"lene, as being an iſthmus, was cut off by the Athenians who "were maſters of Potidæa, and they were by this means become "iſlanders to all intents and purpoſes, yet they had, without prior "ſolicitation, advanced boldly towards liberty, nor could bear to lie "in cowardly inactivity till neceſſity forced them to ſuch meaſures "as tended to their manifeſt welfare. This was ample proof that "they were ready to undergo any other the greateſt perils, to obtain "the wiſhed-for ſettlement of their *State*. He therefore regarded "them, as in truth the moſt gallant friends of the Lacedæmonians, "and would in all reſpects do proper honour to their worth."

His honourable reception.

The Scionéans were elevated by theſe handſom commendations. All of them became full of ſpirits, not even thoſe excepted to whom the prior ſteps had been by no means agreeable. They chearfully determined to ſuſtain all future war, and in every ſhape gave Braſidas honourable entertainment. By public vote they placed upon his head a golden crown as the deliverer of Greece, whilſt every ſingle Scionéan was buſy in adorning him with ribbands, and careſſing him like a victor in the ſolemn games. His ſtay at preſent was ſhort; he only placed a ſmall party in the town to ſecure it, and

then repaſſed to Torone. But ſoon after, he tranſported thither the greater part of his force, deſigning with the aid of the Scionéans to make attempts upon Mende and Potidæa. He concluded however that the Athenians would loſe no time in throwing in a ſuccour as into an iſland, and ſo he endeavoured to be beforehand with them.

His farther projects.

He had already formed an intelligence to the prejudice of thoſe cities to get them betrayed: And he was now intent on executing his ſchemes againſt them. But during this pauſe, Ariſtonymus diſpatched by the Athenians, and Athenæus by the Lacedæmonians to circulate the news, arrive in a trireme, and notify to him the ſuſpenſion of arms. His forces were then tranſported back to Torone.

The truce notified to him.

The perſons employed communicated the articles of the truce to Braſidas, and all the Lacedæmonian confederates in Thrace declared their acquieſcence in what had been done. Ariſtonymus was well ſatisfied in other reſpects, but finding, by computing the days, that the revolt of the Scionéans was too late in point of time, he proteſted againſt their being intitled to the benefit of the truce. Braſidas on the other hand urged many arguments to prove it prior in time, and refuſeth to reſtore that city. When therefore Ariſtonymus had reported this affair at Athens, the Athenians in an inſtant were ready to take up arms again for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedæmonians, by an embaſſy purpoſely diſpatched, remonſtrated that "they ſhould regard ſuch a proceeding as a breach of the truce," and aſſerted "their right to the city as they repoſed entire "credit on Braſidas; however, they were ready to refer the diſpute "to a fair arbitration." The others refuſed to abide by ſo hazardous a deciſion, but would recover it as ſoon as poſſible by force of arms. They were irritated at the thought, that perſons ſeated as it were upon an iſland ſhould preſume to revolt from them, and place ſuch confidence in the unprofitable land-power of the Lacedæmonians. There was farther more truth in the date of the revolt than at preſent the Athenians could evince: For, in fact, the Scionéans revolted

two

two days too late. But at the inſtigation of Cleon they immediately paſſed a decree, that " the Scionéans ſhould be reduced by force, " and then put to the ſword." And their attention was recalled from all other points, to expedite the needful preparations for the execution of this.

Revolt of Mende.

In the mean time, Mende alſo a city in the Pallene, and a colony of Eretrians, revolted from them. Braſidas received them into his protection, thinking himſelf juſtified, as they had openly come over to him in the time of truce. Beſides, he had himſelf ſome reaſons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as violators of the articles. Upon this account the Mendéans were more encouraged to the ſtep, as they ſaw Braſidas was determined to ſupport them; and were convinced, by the affair of Scione, that he would not abandon them. The deſign farther had been originally ſet on foot by the *few*; who, tho' they delayed it for a time, were reſolved to puſh it into execution: for they apprehended that a diſcovery might prove fatal to themſelves; and ſo forced the bulk of the *people* to act againſt their inclination. But the Athenians, who had a quick intelligence of it, were now exaſperated much more than before, and redoubled their preparations againſt both thoſe places.

Braſidas, who ſoon expected the arrival of their armament, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scionéans and Mendéans to Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them eſcorted thither by five hundred heavy-armed Peloponneſians and three hundred Chalcidic targeteers: The commander of the whole eſcorte was Polydamidas. Thoſe left behind, expecting ſoon to be viſited by the Athenians, united their endeavours to get things in good order for their reception.

Braſidas and Perdiccas invade Lyncus.

In the interval, Braſidas and Perdiccas march together a ſecond time into Lyncus againſt Arribæus. They commanded their ſeparate bodies; one, the forces of the Macedonians ſubject to himſelf, and the heavy-armed Grecians who dwelled amongſt them; the

other, the remainder of his own Peloponneſians reinforced by Chalcideans and Acanthians, and quotas from other cities ſuch as they were able to furniſh. The number of heavy-armed Grecians computed together amounted to about three thouſand: The cavalry that attended, both of Macedonians and Chalcideans, was upon the whole little leſs than a thouſand: And the remaining crowd of Barbarians was great.

An engagement. Breaking thus into the territory of Arribæus, and finding the Lynceſtians already in the field to oppoſe them, they alſo ſat down and faced them. The infantry on each ſide were poſted on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. This yielding room for the excurſions of the horſe, the cavalry of both began a ſkirmiſh firſt. But then Braſidas and Perdiccas, ſo ſoon as the Lynceſtian heavy-armed were moving firſt from the eminence to the aid of their cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched alſo down into the plain to oppoſe them, where they charged and routed the Lynceſtians. A large number of the latter were ſlain, the reſt fled for preſervation to the eminences, and there ſtood quiet.

They jar. The victors after this, having erected a trophy, continued for two or three days in the ſame poſt, waiting for the Illyrians who were coming up to join Perdiccas for a ſtipulated pay. And then Perdiccas intended to advance farther againſt the villages of Arribæus, and ſit no longer inactive. Mende however was ſtill uppermoſt in the care of Braſidas: — That place muſt be loſt, ſhould the Athenians arrive before it in the interval: — The Illyrians beſides were not yet come up. He reliſhed not the project, and was more inclined to go back. This engendered ſome diſputes between them, in the midſt of which the news was brought, that the Illyrians had deſerted Perdiccas, and joined themſelves with Arribæus. Upon which it was ſoon reſolved between them to retire, as there was reaſon to dread the acceſſion of men ſo renowned for military valour. Yet the diſagreement between them prevented their fixing on any certain time for filing off.

Night

Night came on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd of Barbarians being ſtruck with a ſudden panic (as numerous armies are apt to be, without any certain cauſe,) and imagining that much larger numbers were coming againſt them than in fact was true, and that they were only not near enough to attack them, they inſtantly took to their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas for a time knew nothing of the matter, and when informed of it, was compelled by the flying troops to diſlodge in their company, without being able to get a ſight of Braſidas. For they were encamped at a diſtance from each other.

The retreat of Braſidas.

At the dawn of day, Braſidas perceived that the Macedonians had diſlodged, and that the Illyrians and Arribæus were approaching to attack him. He therefore drew his forces together, forming a ſquare with his heavy-armed, in the centre of which he diſpoſed all the croud of light-armed; and in this form he intended to retreat. He appointed the youngeſt men to ſally out, in caſe the enemy any where attacked them: And he himſelf with a picked body of three hundred determined to bring up the rear in perſon, in order to ſuſtain and make good their retreat againſt the van of the enemy who ſhould preſs upon their rear. And before the enemy came near, as well as the hurry would admit, he animated his ſoldiers thus:

Speech of Braſidas.

" DID I not ſuſpect, ye men of Peloponneſus, that thus abandoned as you are and ready to be attacked by Barbarians, and thoſe numerous too, you were in ſome conſternation, I ſhould judge it needleſs to inſtruct or to encourage you. But now, againſt this deſertion of our friends, and this multitude of our enemies, I ſhall endeavour by a ſhort admonition and exhortation to raiſe within you the full grandeur of your ſouls. Upon you it is incumbent to behave with gallantry in every martial ſcene, upon the account, not merely of acting in the open field in the preſence of ſo many confederates, but of your own hereditary valour. Your ſouls

" ought

" ought not to be diſmayed at a multitude of foes, ſince you were
" not born under governments where the *many* control the *few*, but
" where the *few* command the *many*. And the only means, by
" which you acquired this noble privilege, was victorious perſeverance
" in the fields of battle. Yet of theſe Barbarians, your fears of
" whom are the reſult of your ignorance, you ought to be informed,
" from what you have learned yourſelves in former conflicts againſt
" them with the Macedonians, as well as from what I conjecture, and
" what I depend upon from the accounts of others, that in action
" they will be by no means terrible. For when an hoſtile force,
" tho' in reality weak, carrieth with it the appearance of ſtrength, a
" true diſcovery of its ſtate is no ſooner obtained, than it redoubleth
" the courage of their opponents. But men, in whom valour is
" firmly implanted, none can aſſault with extraordinary ſpirit but
" ſuch as know them not. Theſe enemies of yours are dreadful for
" a while, merely till brought to trial. Their multitude rendereth
" them terrible to the fight; the loudneſs of their ſhouts is inſup-
" portable to the ear. Their weapons, brandiſhed about and claſh-
" ing in the air, have a frightful and menacing look. But their
" ſpirit will not anſwer their ſhew, when charging againſt ſuch as
" will ſuſtain their ſhock. They are not drawn up with ſkill, nor
" will they bluſh when compelled to quit their ground. To fly
" from or to fly after an enemy is equally a matter of glory to
" them: By ſuch things is their valour eſtabliſhed and reſcued
" from reproach. For a battle, where every combatant is his own
" commander, leaveth a ſpecious and handſome opportunity to each
" of providing for his ſafety. They this moment judge it more ſafe
" to intimidate us at a diſtance than to run to the charge: for other-
" wiſe, before this they had attacked us. And you plainly ſee, that
" all the terror which now runs before them, will vaniſh at the on-
" ſet, as terrible only to fight and hearing. When therefore they
" advance to the charge, ſuſtain it and repulſe them; and when

" opportunity

" opportunity ſerveth, fall back into your ranks again with regularity
" and order. You ſhall thus the ſooner ſecure your retreat, and be
" convinced for the time to come, that ſuch rabbles, to men who
" can ſtand the firſt fury of their onſet, have only made, at a diſ-
" tance and by their pauſing, a vain and menacing parade of valour;
" but ſuch, as will give ground and fly before them, they purſue
" with eagerneſs; and are excellently brave, when there is no
" reſiſtance."

He perfects his retreat.

After this exhortation, Braſidas cauſed his army to file leiſurely off. The Barbarians perceiving it preſſed forwards with great noiſe and clamour, ſuppoſing that he fled, and that they might intercept and cut him off. But when the appointed parties ſallied out from all quarters to receive them, and Braſidas himſelf with his picked body ſuſtained their charge, they repulſed them at their firſt aſſault, to the great ſurprize of the enemy. Afterwards, receiving every repeated attack, they beat them off continually; and then during the intervals of pauſe, retreated in good order; till at length, the bulk of the Barbarians diſcontinued their efforts in the plain againſt the Greeks under Braſidas, and leaving only a part of their body to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the reſt wheeled ſpeedily off to purſue the flying Macedonians, and ſuch as they overtook they ſlaughtered. To the narrow paſs farther between two hills, which was the entrance into the territories of Arribæus, they hurried before in order to ſecure it, knowing it to be the only route by which Braſidas could retreat. He was now drawing near it, and in the moſt difficult part of the paſſage they were ſpreading themſelves circularly to incompaſs him on all ſides. But Braſidas, perceiving their deſign, ordered the three hundred that marched with him to advance full ſpeed up that hill which he thought was moſt practicable and poſſeſs themſelves of it, and this with the utmoſt expedition, each as he was able without regarding form, and endeavour to drive the Barbarians thence,

thence, who were already poſting themſelves upon it, before they were joined by larger numbers and could inveſt him on all ſides. They did ſo, attacked, and made themſelves maſters of the hill, which enabled the main body of the Grecians to march up without obſtruction. For now the Barbarians were thrown into conſternation, when their detachment had in this manner been beat off from the eminence. And here they diſcontinued the purſuit, imagining the enemy had already paſſed the frontier, and ſecured their retreat.

Braſidas, when once he was maſter of the eminences, marched on without moleſtation; and the very ſame day reached Arniſſa, the firſt place within the dominions of Perdiccas. His ſoldiers indeed, who were exaſperated againſt the Macedonians for having thus precipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of oxen they met with on their route, or whatever baggage lay dropped upon the ground, (as ſuch things it was likely ſhould happen in a retreat by night and confuſed by fear,) the former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and ſecreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here, Perdiccas firſt began to regard Braſidas as his enemy, and ever after forced himſelf againſt his inclinations to hate the Peloponneſians; not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athenians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of his own affairs, he caſt about for the means of being again reconciled to the latter, and diſentangling himſelf from the former.

Mendé reduced.

Braſidas, having retreated through Macedonia to Torone, findeth the Athenians already in poſſeſſion of Mendé. Judging it impoſſible now to paſs over into the Pallene and drive out the enemy, he choſe to remain there and ſecurely to garriſon Torone. For, during the time of the expedition into Lyncus, the Athenians had put to ſea againſt Mendé and Scione with the armament they had provided, conſiſting of fifty ſhips, ten of which were Chian, of a thouſand heavy-armed of their own citizens, ſix hundred archers, a thouſand mercenary Thracians, and a body of targeteers furniſhed by their adjacent

adjacent dependents: Nicias the ſon of Niceratus and Nicoſtratus the ſon of Diotrephes had the command of the whole. They weighed from Potidæa, and landing at the temple of Neptune marched directly for Mende. The Mendéans, with their own force and three hundred Scionéans who were come to their ſuccour, and the Peloponneſian auxiliaries, in all ſeven hundred heavy-armed under the command of Polydamidas, were encamped without the city upon a ſtrong eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred and twenty light-armed Methonéans and ſixty picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, and all the archers, attempted to mount by a path that led up the eminence; but, being galled by the enemy, was not able to force the aſcent. Nicoſtratus, with all the reſt of the force, having fetched a compaſs about, in order to mount in a remote quarter, where the aſcent was impracticable, was quite thrown into diſorder; and thus the whole Athenian army narrowly eſcaped a total defeat. As therefore the Mendéans and allies maintained their poſt the whole day, the Athenians drew off and encamped. And, when night came on, the Mendéans withdrew into the city.

The next day, the Athenians ſailing round to the Scione-ſide poſſeſſed themſelves of the ſuburbs, and ſpent the whole day in ravaging the country, as not a ſoul ſallied out to obſtruct them: For ſome buſtles now were on foot in the city inclining to a ſedition. The three hundred Scionéans departed alſo in the ſucceeding night to their own home: And the day following Nicias, advancing with a moiety of the force within their frontier, ravaged the diſtrict of the Scionéans; whilſt Nicoſtratus, with the remainder, ſat down before the upper gates of Mende, from whence the road leadeth to Potidæa. But Polydamidas, as the Mendéans and the auxiliaries had chanced to ground their arms in this quarter within the wall, drew them up in order of battle, and exhorted the Mendéans to ſally out. It was replied in a ſeditious manner by one of the popular faction, that "they "would not ſally, and would have nothing to do with the war."

At ſuch a refuſal Polydamidas having layed hands upon the perſon, a tumult at once enſued, in which the *people* ran immediately to arms, and, furious with anger, made towards the Peloponneſians, and all thoſe of the oppoſite faction who ſided with them. They fell upon and routed them in an inſtant, terrified as they were at this ſudden aſſault; and the gates were thrown open at the ſame time to the Athenians. They ſuppoſed this inſurrection had been made againſt them in conſequence of ſome previous combination; and as many as eſcaped out of the ſcuffle with life, fled away to the citadel, which was before in their poſſeſſion.

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now returned before the city) burſting into Mende, for it was not opened by compoſition, with their whole united force, plundered it as tho' taken by ſtorm; nay, the generals had ſome difficulty to reſtrain their ſoldiers from putting the inhabitants to the ſword. And after this they iſſued their commands to the Mendeans to continue their government in the uſual form, and to proceed judicially againſt thoſe of their body whom they eſteemed the principal authors of the revolt. Thoſe in the citadel they ſhut up with a wall extending on both ſides to the ſea, and poſted a guard to ſecure the blockade.

Siege of Scione.

When in this manner they had poſſeſſed themſelves of Mende, they marched againſt Scione. The inhabitants, with the Peloponneſian aids, coming out to receive them, poſted themſelves on a ſtrong eminence before the city; which, unleſs the enemy could take it, would infallibly prevent their walling them about. But the Athenians ſtormed the poſt, and after an engagement forcing them to diſlodge, they formed their camp, and having erected a trophy, got every thing in readineſs for the circumvallation. And no long time after, whilſt they were buſied in this work, the auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, having forced the guard poſted near the ſea, get away by night; and the major part of them, eſcaping privily through the Athenian camp before Scione, got ſafe into that town.

When

When the circumvallation of Scione was in hand, Perdiccas, having diſpatched a herald for the purpoſe to the Athenian generals, ſtrikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. He took this ſtep out of pure enmity to Braſidas, ariſing from the retreat out of Lyncus; and had begun from that time to act in their favour. For it happened, that at this very juncture of time Iſchagoras the Lacedæmonian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to Braſidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, commanded him to give ſome conſpicuous proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as to gratify his own reſentment in refuſing the Peloponneſians a paſſage through his dominions, had gained the concurrence of his Theſſalian friends, ſince with the chief perſons of that country he had ever been cloſely united by the hoſpitable ties, and ſo ſtopped the reinforcement and their convoy that they durſt not attempt to paſs through Theſſaly. Iſchagoras however, and Aminias and Ariſteus reached Braſidas in perſon, being commiſſioned by the Lacedæmonians to inſpect the poſture of their affairs, and brought with them ſome young men of Sparta, tho' contrary to their laws, who were to take upon them the government of the cities which were no longer to be truſted to their former managers. In effect, Clearidas the ſon of Cleonymus they place as governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas the ſon of Hegeſander in Torone. Perdiccas.

This ſame ſummer, the Thebans demoliſhed the walls of the Theſpienſians, alledging as the reaſon, that they were practiſing with the Athenians. This demolition had ever been intended, but its execution was now become more eaſy, as the flower of their youth had periſhed in the late battle fought againſt the Athenians.

This ſummer alſo, the temple of Juno at Argos was deſtroyed by fire. Chryſis the prieſteſs had placed a burning torch too near the

the garlands, and unawares fell faſt aſleep. The flames broke out and were raging all around before they were perceived. Chryſis indeed inſtantly, for fear of the Argives, flies away by night to Phlius. They, according to the law enacted for that purpoſe, appointed another prieſteſs in her room, whoſe name was Phaeinis. Eight years of this war were elapſed, and it was the middle of the ninth when Chryſis fled.

Scione. The circumvallation of Scione alſo was compleated about the cloſe of this ſummer; and the Athenians, leaving behind a ſufficient body to guard it, drew off the reſt of their army.

Battle of Laodicea. In the enſuing winter, things were quiet between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, becauſe of the ſuſpenſion of arms. But the Mantinéans, and Tegeatæ, and the confederates on both ſides, engaged at Laodicéa of Oreſtis: But the victory was doubtful. Each party routed a wing of their opponents, and both ſides erected trophies, and ſent the ſpoils to Delphi. Many however were ſlain on both ſides, and the battle was drawn, the night putting an end to the conteſt. The Tegeatæ indeed paſſed the night upon the field, and immediately erected a trophy. But the Mantinéans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards erected their trophy in oppoſition.

Attempt of Braſidas *on* Potidæa. In the cloſe of this winter, and when the ſpring was already approaching, Braſidas farther made an attempt upon Potidæa. For having approached it in the night, and applied his ladders, ſo far he proceeded without cauſing an alarm. For the bell being paſſed by, during that interval, before he that carried it forwards could return, the moment was ſeized for applying them [3]. However

3 The officers regularly went their rounds to ſee that all the centinels were at their poſts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung to which the centinel was to anſwer, in proof that he was at his poſt and awake. The interval between the rounds was ſo conſiderable, and the vigilance of the centinel, as the bell was juſt gone by, might be ſo relaxed, that Braſidas hoped he might execute his ſcheme.

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the alarm was taken before he could poſſibly ſcale, upon which he drew off his army without loſs of time, not caring to wait for the return of day. And thus ended the winter; and with it the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the Hiſtory.

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE FIFTH.

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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK V.

YEAR X.

IN the following ſummer, the truce made for a year expired of courſe at the time of the Pythian Games. And during this relaxation from war, the Athenians cauſed the Delians to evacuate the iſle of Delos; imagining that, upon the taint of ſome crimes long ſince committed, they were not ſufficiently pure to perform due ſervice to the God, and that *this* yet was wanting to render that work of purgation compleat, in which, as I have already related, they thought themſelves juſtified in demoliſhing the ſepulchres of the dead. The Delians ſettled again, ſo faſt as they could remove themſelves thither, at Atramyttium, beſtowed upon them for this purpoſe by Pharnaces.

Before Chriſt 422.

The truce expireth.

Cleon *goes commander into* Thrace.

Cleon [1], having obtained the commiſſion from the Athenians, went by ſea into the Thracian dominions, ſo ſoon as the ſuſpenſion of arms expired, having under his command twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred horſemen, and larger numbers of their allied forces. His whole armament conſiſted of thirty ſail. Touching firſt at Scione, yet blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy-armed ſtationed there as guards; and, ſtanding away, entered

1 Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he is a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the people of Athens to be of the ſame mind, ſince ſeriouſly and deliberately they intruſt him with a moſt important and delicate commiſſion. He now imagines he can carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Braſidas from the head of that accompliſhed Spartan, even without having Demoſthenes for his ſecond. We may gueſs to what an height of inſolence he was now grown from the *Knights* of Ariſtophanes. And to ſet it in the moſt ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Nicias and Demoſthenes, whom he paints in a very injurious manner: and, no doubt, it muſt have been very grating to them, to ſee themſelves repreſented in ſo low Buffoonery upon the ſtage at Athens. "Demoſthenes begins with a ſhower of "curſes on that execrable Paphlagonian, "Cleon. Nicias ſeconds him; and then, "both of them howl together in a moſt "lamentable duetto. They next lay their "heads together about ſome means of re-"dreſs. Demoſthenes propoſeth getting "out of their maſter Cleon's reach. *Let* "*us go then*, ſays Nicias. *Ay*; *let us* "*go*, cries Demoſthenes. *Say more*, ſays "Nicias, *let us go over to the enemy*. *Ay*, "*over to the enemy*, adds the other. *But* "*firſt*, ſays Nicias, *let us go and proſtrate* "*ourſelves before the images of the Gods*. "*What images?* ſays Demoſthenes; *doſt* "*thou think then there are any Gods? I do*. "*Upon what grounds? Becauſe I am un-*"*deſervedly the object of their hatred.* —— "Such are the daring miſrepreſentations "Ariſtophanes makes of characters that "by no means deſerved it! Demoſthenes, "afterwards, deſcribes the arrogance of "Cleon thus --- *He hath one foot fixed in* "*Pylus, and the other in the aſſembly of the* "*people. When he moves, he ſtruts and* "*ſtretches at ſuch a rate, that his bum is in* "*Thrace, his hands in Ætolia, and his at-*"*tention amongſt the tribes at home.* --- "Nicias then propoſeth poiſoning them-"ſelves by drinking bull's blood like "Themiſtocles; --- *Or rather*, ſays De-"moſthenes, *a doſe of good wine*. This "is agreed upon in order to chear up their "ſpirits, and enable them to confront "Cleon and play off againſt him the ſel-"ler of black-puddings. Nicias accord-"ingly goes and ſteals the wine."—— Yet, in ſpite of the moſt outragoeus ridicule, and the oppoſition of all wiſe and honeſt men at Athens, we ſee Cleon now at the head of an army, to ſtop the rapid conqueſts of Braſidas.

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the haven of the Colophonians, lying at no great diſtance from Torone. Being here informed by the deſerters, that Braſidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants able to make head againſt him, he marched his forces by land towards that city, and ſent ten of his ſhips about to ſtand into the harbour. His firſt approach was to the new rampart, which Braſidas had thrown up quite round the city in order to incloſe the ſuburbs within its cincture, and thus by the demolition of the old wall had rendered it one intire city. When the Athenians came to the aſſault, Paſitelidas the Lacedæmonian (who was commandant) and the garriſon under his command, exerted themſelves in its defence. But when they could no longer maintain it, and at the ſame time the ſhips ſent round on purpoſe had entered the harbour, Paſitelidas fearing leſt the ſhips might take the town now left defenceleſs, and, when the rampart was carried by the enemy, he himſelf might be intercepted, abandons it immediately, and retired with all ſpeed into the town: But the Athenians were already diſembarked and maſters of the place. The land-force alſo broke in inſtantly at his heels, by ruſhing along through the aperture in the old wall. And ſome, as well Peloponneſians as Toronéans, they ſlew in the moment of irruption. Some alſo they took alive, amongſt whom was Paſitelidas the commandant. Braſidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but receiving intelligence on his march that it was taken, he retired; ſince he was * forty ſtadia off, too great a diſtance to prevent the enemy.

He carrieth Torone.

** About 4 miles.*

But Cleon and the Athenians now erected two trophies; one upon the harbour, the other at the rampart. They farther doomed to ſlavery the wives and children of the Toronéans. The male-inhabitants together with the Peloponneſians and every Chalcidéan that was found amongſt them, amounting in all to ſeven hundred, they ſent away captives to Athens. The Peloponneſians indeed were afterwards releaſed by virtue of the ſubſequent treaty; the reſt were fetched away by the Olynthians, who made exchanges for them, body for body.

Panactum. About the ſame time the Bœotians by treachery got poſſeſſion of Panactum, a fort upon the frontier belonging to the Athenians.

Cleon. As for Cleon, having eſtabliſhed a garriſon at Torone, he departed thence and ſailed round Athos, as bound againſt Amphipolis.

Sicily. But two veſſels about this time, bound for Italy and Sicily, ſailed out of the harbour of Athens, having on board Phæax the ſon of Eraſiſtratus, with whom two other perſons were joined in commiſſion, to execute an embaſſy there. For the Leontines, after the departure of the Athenians from Sicily, in conſequence of the joint-accommodation, had inrolled many ſtrangers as denizons of their city, and the *populace* had a plan in agitation for a diſtribution of the lands. The *noble*, alarmed at this, gain the concurrence of the Syracuſans and eject the *commons*. They were diſperſed and wandered up and down as ſo many vagabonds: whilſt the *noble*, ſtriking up an agreement with the Syracuſans, abandoned and left in deſolation their own city, ſettling at Syracuſe as free citizens of that place. And yet ſoon after, ſome of this number, diſſatisfied even here, forſook Syracuſe again, and ſeize upon Phoceæ a quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinniæ, which is a fortreſs in the Leontine. Hither the greater part of the ejected *commons* reſorted to them, and adhering firmly together, from theſe ſtrong holds they annoyed the country by their hoſtilities.

When the Athenians had intelligence of this, they ſend out Phæax, to perſuade by all proper methods their old allies in that country, and to gain, if poſſible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians, to take up arms for the preſervation of the people of Leontium againſt the incroaching power of the Syracuſans. Phæax, upon his arrival, recommendeth the ſcheme ſucceſsfully to the Camarinéans and Agrigentines. But his negotiations meeting with ſome obſtacles at Gela, he deſiſted from addreſſing himſelf to the reſt, ſince he was aſſured he could not poſſibly ſucceed. Retiring therefore through the diſtrict of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on his road at Bricinniæ, and having

having encouraged the malecontents there to perſevere, he departed. Not but that in this Sicilian voyage, both paſſing and repaſſing, and alſo upon the coaſt of Italy, he had urged to ſeveral cities, "how "expedient for them was the Athenian friendſhip."

He met alſo in his courſe with thoſe Locrians, who were going to another ſettlement, after expulſion from Meſſene. They had been driven to this neceſſity by ſeditious factions at Meſſene, one of which had invited them thither ſince the joint-accommodation among the Sicilians; and now they were forced to ſhift again, tho' Meſſene had for a time been entirely in their power. Phæax therefore, meeting with theſe in their removal, gave them no annoyance: For the Locrians had been at a conference with him, to concert the meaſures of an agreement with the Athenians. Theſe however were the only party of all the confederates, who, when the Sicilians had amicably ended their diſputes, refuſed to treat with the Athenians, and were brought to ſuch ſubmiſſion ſince merely by a war, in which they were embroiled againſt the Itonians and Meléans, who bordered upon them, and were colonies of their own. And ſome time after this Phæax truly returned to Athens.

Proceedings of Cleon in Thrace.

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone about by ſea againſt Amphipolis, marching away from Eïon, maketh an aſſault upon Stagirus a colony of Andrians, but without ſucceſs: Yet, Galepſus a colony of the Thaſians he taketh by ſtorm. He ſent farther embaſſadors to Perdiccas, to ſummon his attendance in the expedition, according to the tenour of the new alliance. He ſent others into Thrace to Polles king of the Odomantians, that he would hire as large a body of Thracians as could be got, and bring them up under his own orders. And during this interval he himſelf lay quiet at Eïon.

But Braſidas, informed of theſe proceedings, placed himſelf in an oppoſite poſt at Cerdylium. This place belongeth to the Argilians, and is ſeated on an eminence on the other ſide of the river and at no great

great diſtance from Amphipolis. From hence he had a perfect view of all Cleon's motions; ſo that now it was impoſſible for the latter to make any approach with his army from thence to Amphipolis, without being diſcovered. Braſidas however ſuſpected that Cleon would approach, and from a contempt of his opponents would certainly advance thither without waiting for reinforcements.

He had at the ſame time provided himſelf with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and had aſſembled all the Edonian targeteers and horſemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcidéans he had a thouſand targeteers, beſides thoſe in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy-armed of all ſorts amounted to about two thouſand; and he had three hundred Grecian horſemen. With a detachment, conſiſting of fifteen hundred of theſe, Braſidas had poſted himſelf at Cerdylium; the reſt were left in Amphipolis, under the orders of Clearidas.

He appears before Amphipolis.

Cleon remained without ſtirring for the preſent, but was ſoon forced to ſuch a ſtep as Braſidas expected. The ſoldiers were chagrined at their inactivity, and were diſparaging his conduct by invidious parallels "againſt how much ſkill and courage, with how "much unſkilfulneſs and cowardice he was matched;" and that "with the higheſt regret they had attended him from Athens "on this expedition." Senſible of their diſcontent, and unwilling to diſguſt them more by too long a continuance in the ſame poſt, he drew them up and led them on. He acted now upon the vain conceit, with which his ſucceſs at Pylus had puffed him up, as a man of great importance. It could not enter his heart, that the enemy would preſume to march out againſt and offer him battle. He gave out, that "he was only advancing in order to view the place; he "waited indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if they were "needful to his ſecurity ſhould the enemy attack him, but to enable "him compleatly to inveſt the city and to take it by ſtorm." Being advanced, he poſted his troops upon a ſtrong eminence before Amphipolis,

phipolis, and went in perſon to view the marſhes of the Strymon, and the ſituation of the city on the ſide of Thrace, *how* it really was. He judged he could retreat at pleaſure, without a battle. Not ſo much as one perſon appeared upon the works, or iſſued out at the gates: for they were all ſhut faſt. He now concluded himſelf guilty of a miſtake in coming ſo near the place without the machines, "as the town muſt infallibly have been taken, becauſe aban-doned."

Braſidas however had no ſooner perceived that the Athenians were in motion, than deſcending from Cerdylium, he marcheth into Amphipolis. He there waved all manner of ſally and all ſhew of oppoſition againſt the Athenians. He was afraid of truſting too much to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to the enemy, not truly in numbers, for ſo far they were nearly balanced, but in real worth. For the Athenian force appointed for this ſervice was compoſed of the very flower of Athens, and the choiceſt troops of the Lemnians and Imbrians. For this reaſon, he prepared to aſſail them with art: becauſe, in caſe he gave the enemy a view of his numbers and of the ſorry manner in which they were armed, he judged he ſhould be leſs likely to gain a victory, than by concealing them till the moment of action and avoiding that contempt which their real ſtate would have inſpired. Picking out therefore a party of one hundred and fifty heavy-armed for himſelf, and appointing Clearidas to command the reſt, he deſigned to fall ſuddenly upon the Athenians in their retreat; concluding, he ſhould never again find them in this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements they expected were come up. Calling therefore all his ſoldiers around him, as he was deſirous of animating them and letting them into his ſcheme, he harangued them thus:

Braſidas throws himſelf into Amphipolis.

"YE men of Peloponneſus, let it ſuffice that I briefly put you in mind, that we are natives of that country which hath ever by

Speech of Braſidas.

"valour

" valour preſerved itſelf free, and that *you* of the Doric are now
" going to attack your opponents of the Ionic deſcent, whom you
" are inured to defeat. My words are chiefly deſigned to inform
" you, in what manner I have planned the method of attack, leſt
" hazarding the event with ſo ſmall a party, and not with our intire
" force, may ſeem unequal to the work, and may too much diſpirit
" you. The enemy, I conjecture, from an utter contempt of us
" and a ſtrong preſumption that we durſt not come out into the field
" againſt them, have ſhewn themſelves before this city; and, this
" very moment diſorderly ſcattered as they are to view the ſituation,
" they heartily deſpiſe us. The leader therefore, who hath the moſt
" acuteneſs in detecting ſuch blunders in a foe, and then ſeizeth the
" proper moment to fall upon them, as beſt enabled by his own
" ſtrength; not ſo much in the open and regular manner of a me-
" thodical fight, as with a ſurpriſe moſt advantageous in the preſent
" juncture, — ſuch a leader may for the moſt part be aſſured of
" ſucceſs. Such ſtealths as theſe draw after them the higheſt glory:
" By theſe, the man, who over-reacheth his enemy the moſt, per-
" formeth the moſt ſubſtantial ſervice for his friends. Whilſt there-
" fore, haughtily preſuming on their own worth, they remain thus
" diſordered, and by what appeareth to me are bent more on draw-
" ing off than remaining here, — during this their intermiſſion of
" purpoſe, and before their reſolutions can be regularly adjuſted, I
" myſelf at the head of my choſen party will be amongſt them, if
" poſſible, and will ruſh with vigour into the centre of their army.
" And then, Clearidas, when once you perceive that I am engaged,
" and, as in probability it muſt be, have thrown them into diſor-
" der; then, at the head of yours accompanied by the Amphipo-
" litans and the reſt of the confederates, throw open the gates on a
" ſudden for your ſally, and advance with your utmoſt ſpeed to the
" charge. And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the enemy muſt
" be thrown into the utmoſt conſternation: becauſe, a ſecond body,

" thus

" thus running to the charge, is more terrible to foes than the pre-
" ſent which is already engaged. — And ſhew yourſelf now, Clea-
" ridas, that gallant man, which in honour, as a Spartan, you
" ought to be.

" You in general, ye confederates, I exhort to follow with manly
" reſolution, and to remember that good ſoldiers are bound in duty,
" to be full of ſpirit, to be ſenſible of ſhame, and to obey com-
" manders; that, this very day, if you behave with valour, you
" are henceforth free, and will gain the honourable title of *Lacedæ-*
" *monian allies*: Otherwiſe, muſt continue to be the ſlaves of the
" Athenians; where the beſt that can befal you, if neither ſold for
" ſlaves nor put to death as rebels, will be a heavier yoke of tyranny
" than you ever yet have felt, whilſt the liberty of the reſt of
" Greece muſt by you for ever be obſtructed. But ſo daſtardly be-
" haviour I conjure you to ſcorn, as you know for what valuable
" prizes you are to enter the liſts. I myſelf ſhall convince you,
" that I am not more ready to put others in mind of their duty,
" than perſonally to diſcharge my own through the whole ſcene
" of action."

Braſidas, having ended his harangue, prepared to ſally out himſelf, and placed the main body under the orders of Clearidas at the gates which are called the Thracian, to be ready to ruſh out at the appointed time.

Cleon's *blun-ders.*

To Cleon now — For Braſidas had been plainly ſeen coming down from Cerdylium; and, as the proſpect of the city lay open to thoſe without, had been ſeen alſo when ſacrificing before the temple of Minerva and forming the proper diſpoſitions — To Cleon, I ſay, who was now in a remote quarter to view the poſts, advice is brought, that " the whole force of the enemy was viſibly drawn up
" within the city, and that under the gates many feet of horſes and
" men might be diſcerned, as ready for a ſally." Upon hearing this,

this, he went to the place, and was convinced by his own ſight. He determined however not to hazard a battle before his ſuccours were arrived; and, tho' he knew his motions could not be concealed, he went off and ordered the ſignal to be given for a retreat; commanding farther that the *left* wing ſhould file off firſt, which indeed was the only method of drawing off ſecurely to Eïon. But as they ſeemed to him to be long about it, he wheeled off himſelf at the head of the *right*, and thus expoſing his men to the miſſive weapons of the enemy, was drawing off his army.

Battle of Amphipolis.

At this inſtant Braſidas, perceiving it was time to attack ſince the army of the Athenians was already in motion, ſays to thoſe about him and to all that were near — "Theſe gentlemen wait not for "us: that plainly appeareth by the ſhaking of their ſpears and heads: "For thoſe who make ſuch motions are not uſed to ſtay for the "enemy's approach. But, let ſome body throw me open the ap-"pointed gates, and let us boldly and with all ſpeed ſally out againſt "them." In effect Braſidas, iſſuing at the gates of the intrenchment and the firſt of what was then the *long-wall*, advanced with all ſpeed directly along the road, where now ſtandeth the trophy to be ſeen by thoſe who paſs along by the ſtrongeſt part of the town, and falling upon the Athenians, diſmayed not only at their own irregular ſituation but alſo terrified at his bold attack, in the very centre of their army, he putteth them to the rout. And now Clearidas, ſallying out according to order at the Thracian gates, was advancing to ſecond him. The conſequence was, that by ſuch an unexpected and ſudden aſſault on both ſides, the Athenians were thrown into the higheſt confuſion. Their left wing, which inclined the moſt towards Eïon as having filed off firſt, was inſtantly broke, and fled. Theſe were no ſooner diſperſed in flight, than Braſidas, advancing to the attack of the right, is wounded: —— He dropped; — but the Athenians are not ſenſible of it. Thoſe who were near him took him up, and carried him off. This accident however enabled the

Braſidas *drops.*

right

right wing of the Athenians to maintain their ground the longer, tho' Cleon, who from the firſt had never intended to ſtand an engagement, flies inſtantly away; and, being intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, is ſlain. But his heavy-armed, embodying together and gaining an eminence, repulſed Clearidas who twice or thrice attacked them, and maintained their ground 'till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry and the targeteers, ſurrounding and pouring in their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. Thus the whole Athenian army was diſtreſſed in a laborious flight: They ran different ways amongſt the mountains: Numbers had been deſtroyed in the charge; others by the Chalcidic horſe and targeteers: But the remainder eſcaped in ſafety to Eïon. Cleon *ſlain.*

Thoſe who took up Braſidas, when he dropped in the action, and bore him off, carried him into the city yet alive. His ſenſes remained 'till he heard his party were victorious, and ſoon after that he expired [2]. Braſidas *dies.*

The reſt of the army with Clearidas, being come back from the purſuit, rifled the dead and erected a trophy,

This done, all the confederates aſſiſted under arms at the funeral of Braſidas, whom they interred at the public expence within the city near the place where the *forum* now ſtandeth. And afterwards the Amphipolitans, having incloſed his monument, performed ſacrifice to him as a Hero. They alſo enacted ſolemn games in his honour and annual ſacrifices. Nay, they aſcribed their colony to him as founder, after demoliſhing the edifices of Agnon and defacing every memorial, which might continue the memory of his foundation. *The funeral of* Braſidas.

2 The firſt embaſſy, which came from the Grecians in Thrace to Sparta after the death of Braſidas, made a viſit to his mother Argileonis. The firſt queſtion ſhe asked them was, *Did my ſon die bravely?* And when the embaſſadors expatiated largely in his praiſe, and ſaid at laſt, There was not ſuch another Spartan left alive. —— *You miſtake, gentlemen*, ſaid the mother, *my ſon was a good man; but there are many better men than he in Sparta.* Plutarch's Laconic *Apothegms.*

They acted thus, partly out of real gratitude to Braſidas, whom they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at this juncture to ſhew their high reſpect for the Lacedæmonian alliance, as they ſtood in great dread of the Athenians. For, conſidering their hoſtile embroilments with the Athenians, they thought it neither for their intereſt nor ſatisfaction to continue the honours of Agnon.

To the Athenians they alſo delivered the bodies of their dead. The number of them on the Athenian ſide amounted to ſix hundred, whereas the enemy loſt but ſeven men. This was owing to the nature of the fight, which had not been carried on in a regular manner, but was rather a ſlaughter in conſequence of a ſurprize and ſudden conſternation. After the reception of their dead the Athenians ſailed away for Athens: But thoſe under the orders of Clearidas applied themſelves to re-ſettle and ſecure Amphipolis.

About the ſame time in the cloſe of this ſummer, Ramphias and Autocharidas and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were conducting up for the Thracian ſervice a reinforcement conſiſting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being arrived at Heraclea in Trachis, they regulated there ſuch things as ſeemed to require an amendment: And during the ſeaſon they halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was fought, and the ſummer ended.

But early as poſſible in the ſucceeding winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of Theſſaly. But, the Theſſalians oppoſing their farther paſſage, and Braſidas being now dead to whom they were conducting this Supply, they returned home. They imagined that their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athenians, in conſequence of their overthrow, had quitted that country; and themſelves had not ſufficient ability to carry the plans into execution which Braſidas had been meditating. But the principal motive of their return was their own conſciouſneſs at ſetting out, that the Lacedæmonians were more inclined to peace.

It

Both ſides inclined to peace.

It ſo fell out indeed, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ramphias from Theſſaly, that neither of the parties meddled any longer with the operations of war, but were more inclined to a peace. The motives on the Athenian ſide were theſe—They had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a ſecond lately at Amphipolis: Hence, they no longer entertained that aſſured confidence of their own ſtrength, which had formerly occaſioned them to reject all accommodations, as they imagined in their then career of ſucceſs they ſhould ſoon give law to their enemies. Now alſo they were under apprehenſions of their dependents, leſt buoyed up by the late misfortunes of Athens, they might the ſooner be induced to revolt. And they heartily repented now, that they had neglected the fine opportunity which their ſucceſs at Pylus gave them, of bringing the diſpute to a happy determination.

On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians acted on theſe motives.—They found themſelves ſtrangely miſtaken in the events of war. At its commencement, they imagined that in the ſpace of a few years they ſhould intirely have demoliſhed the power of the Athenians, by laying their territory waſte: But they had ſuffered a terrible calamity in the affair of Sphacteria, ſuch as never before had been the lot of Sparta. Devaſtations now were extended over all their country from Pylus and Cythera. Their Helots had alſo in numbers deſerted to the foe: And they lived in conſtant expectation, that thoſe, who yet perſevered in their allegiance, gained by the ſolicitations of thoſe who were fled, might in the preſent low ebb of Sparta attempt to ſubvert their conſtitution, as had formerly been the caſe. It happened farther, that the thirty-years truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring; and the Argives were unwilling to renew it, unleſs the Cynuria was previouſly reſtored. They judged it therefore a plain impoſſibility, to make head at the ſame time againſt both Argives and Athenians. They had alſo a ſuſpicion that ſome cities of Pelopon-

Peloponneſus would revolt from them to the Argives, which proved afterwards true.

Both parties then being reſpectively influenced by ſuch conſiderations, an accommodation was judged to be expedient. The anxiety of the Lacedæmonians about it was not the leaſt, as they were eagerly bent on recovering their priſoners that had been taken at Sphacteria: For they were all citizens of Sparta of the firſt rank, and allied to the moſt honourable families. They had begun to ſolicit their liberty ſo ſoon as ever they were taken: But the Athenians, fluſhed with conqueſt, at that time diſdained to treat. Yet after the blow received at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing then they were become more tractable, laid hold of the favourable juncture, and obtained a ceſſation of arms for a year, in which ſpace they were by article to hold mutual conferences, in order to ſettle an accommodation for a longer time. And ſince the Athenians had now again more lately been totally defeated at Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Braſidas were dead, both of whom had moſt ſtrenuouſly oppoſed an accommodation; the latter, becauſe he was ſucceſsful and reaped glories in war; the former, becauſe in a ſeaſon of tranquillity his villainies muſt needs be detected, and his bold calumniations loſe all credit; the perſons, who at preſent were chief in the management of either State, were more ſtrongly diſpoſed than ever to adjuſt diſputes. Theſe were, Pleiſtionax the ſon of Pauſanias king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias the ſon of Niceratus by far the moſt ſucceſsful general of that age. Nicias deſired it, as hitherto he had never been defeated, and was bent on ſecuring his own proſperity on a laſting foundation, on obtaining a relaxation of toils for himſelf, and of their preſent burdens for his fellow-citizens, and on leaving his name illuſtrious to poſterity as one who had never involved his country in calamity. Theſe views, he judged, could only be accompliſhed by vacuity from danger, by expoſing himſelf as little as poſſible to the uncertainties of fortune;

fortune; and vacuity from danger was compatible ſolely with peace. Pleiſtionax had been calumniated by his enemies on the account of his reſtoration; and they invidiouſly ſuggeſted to his prejudice, upon every loſs whatever which the Lacedæmonians ſuſtained, that ſuch was the conſequence of tranſgreſſing the laws in the repeal of his baniſhment. For they laid to his charge, that, in concert with his brother Ariſtocles, he had ſuborned the prieſteſs of Delphi to give one general anſwer to all the deputations ſent by the Lacedæmonians to conſult the oracle, that "they ſhould bring back the ſeed of the "demi-god ſon of Jove from a foreign land into their own country; "if not, they ſhould plow with a ſilver plow-ſhare;" and thus at length ſo ſeduced the Lacedæmonians in the favour of an exile reſiding at Lycæum, upon account of his precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though purchaſed by bribes from the enemy, and from a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a houſe one half of which was part of the temple of Jupiter, that nineteen years after they conducted him home with the ſame ſolemn proceſſions and ſacrifices as thoſe, who were the original founders of Lacedæmon, had appointed for the inauguration of their kings. Repining therefore at theſe calumniations, and judging that as peace giveth no room for miſcarriage, and that farther if the Lacedæmonians could recover the priſoners, his enemies would be debarred of a handle for detraction; whereas, whilſt the chances of war ſubſiſt, the perſons at the helm of government muſt be liable to reproaches for every diſaſter; he was earneſtly deſirous to bring about an accommodation.

This winter therefore they proceeded to a conference; and, at the approach of ſpring, great preparations were openly in hand on the Lacedæmonian ſide, and a ſcheme for fortifying in Attica was circulated through all the *States*, in order to render the Athenians more compliant. Many meetings were held, and many demands with large juſtifications were urged on both ſides, till at length it was agreed that "a peace ſhould be concluded, each party reſtoring *Conference about a peace.*

"what

" what they had conquered in the war, but Niſæa to remain in the " hands of the Athenians." Platæa was redemanded by the latter, but the Thebans urged that it had not fallen into their hands by force or by treachery, but they poſſeſſed it in purſuance of a free and voluntary ſurrender. And upon the ſame plea the Athenians kept Niſæa.

Things being ſo far adjuſted, the Lacedæmonians called together their confederates; and all their voices, excepting thoſe of the Bœotians and Corinthians and Eléans and Megaréans, who were not at all ſatisfied with theſe proceedings, concurring for a peace, they ratify the accommodation, and ſolemnly pledged the obſervance of it to the Athenians, who in exchange ſwore the ſame to the Lacedæmonians, in effect as followeth ——

The Nician *Peace.*

" THE Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their Allies have " made peace on theſe terms, and every *State* hath ſworn to their " obſervance.

" In regard to the common temples — permiſſion is granted to all " who deſire it, to ſacrifice, to viſit, to conſult the oracles, to ſend " public deputations, in the preſcribed forms of every people, both " by land and ſea, without any moleſtation.

" That the ſacred ſoil and the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and " Delphi itſelf, be ruled after its own model, be taxed at its own " diſcretion, and be adminiſtred by its own magiſtrates, whoſe deter- " minations to be final both in regard to life and property, according " to the primitive laws of the place.

" That this peace continue for the ſpace of fifty years, between " the Athenians and the confederates of the Athenians on the one " ſide, and the Lacedæmonians and the confederates of the Lacedæ- " monians on the other, without fraud and without moleſtation, both " at land and ſea.

" Be it farther unlawful for either party to take up arms to the " detriment of the other —— neither the Lacedæmonians and their " allies

" allies againſt the Athenians and their allies —— nor the Athenians
" and their allies againſt the Lacedæmonians and their allies — with-
" out any fraud or evaſion whatſoever. And, if any difference in-
" tervene between the contracting parties, let it be adjuſted ac-
" cording to equity and upon oath, in ſuch manner as they ſhall
" agree.

" Agreed farther — That the Lacedemonians and allies deliver
" up Amphipolis to the Athenians.

" That whatever cities the Lacedæmonians deliver up to the Athe-
" nians, leave be given to the inhabitants to remove at their own diſ-
" cretion, with all their effects.

" That the cities which pay the aſſeſſments rated by Ariſtides, en-
" joy all their rights and privileges whatever.

" And — be it unlawful for the Athenians and their allies to take
" up arms to the annoyance of thoſe cities which pay that aſſeſſ-
" ment, from the time that this treaty be in force. Thoſe cities are
" Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. — Theſe
" cities to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality, forming no engagements with
" either Lacedæmonians or Athenians. — Provided, that if the Athe-
" nians can by fair means prevail upon theſe cities, it be lawful
" for the Athenians to admit them confederates at their own free
" choice.

" That the Mecybernéans and Sanéans and Singéans ſhall inhabit
" their own cities in the ſame manner as the Olynthians and Acan-
" thians.

" Agreed farther — That the Lacedæmonians and allies reſtore Pa-
" nactum to the Athenians.

" That the Athenians reſtore to the Lacedæmonians * Corypha-
" ſium, and Cythera, and Methone, and Pteleum, and Atalanta,
" and all the Lacedæmonians now priſoners of the State at Athens,
" or public priſoners in any quarter ſoever within the dominions

* This includes the fort of Pylus ſeated on the cape of Coryphaſium.

" of Athens; and, to give leave of departure to all the Peloponne-
" ſians blocked up in Scione, and to all the confederates of the Pe-
" loponneſians whatever in Scione, and to all perſons whatever
" whom Braſidas placed there. —— This article alſo to extend to
" any confederates of the Lacedæmonians now public priſoners at
" Athens, or public priſoners in any other quarter of the Athenian
" dominions.

" That, in return, the Lacedæmonians and allies releaſe all the
" priſoners, both Athenians and confederates, which are now in their
" hands.

" That in regard to the Scionéans, Toronéans, and Sermylians,
" and any other city belonging of right to the Athenians, the Athe-
" nians to proceed with the cities ſpecified, and all the others, at
" their own diſcretion.

" That the Athenians ſhall ſwear obſervance to the Lacedæmo-
" nians and their allies ſeparately, according to their cities. Let both
" ſides ſwear in the moſt ſolemn manner, according to the forms of
" each ſeparate *State*; and the oath to be conceived in theſe words
" —— *I abide by my compacts and the preſent articles, honeſtly,*
" *and without equivocation.* —— Be an oath taken to the Athenians
" by the Lacedæmonians and allies to the ſame purport.

" Be this oath renewed annually by the contracting parties.

" Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythus, at the Iſthmus, and
" at Athens in the Citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the Amycléum,
" with this treaty inſcribed upon them.

" If any point be in any manner or degree for the preſent, through
" forgetfulneſs on either ſide, omitted; or, if any thing, upon a ſe-
" rious conſultation held, be judged more proper; the Lacedæmo-
" nians and Athenians are impowered, with all due regard to
" their oaths, to make additions and alterations, at their joint diſ-
" cretion.

" Pleiſtolas

" Pleiſtolas preſiding in the college of Ephori, putteth this treaty
" in force at Sparta on the twenty ſeventh day of the month Artemi-
" ſius: At Athens, Alcæus the Archon, on the twenty fifth day of
" the month Elaphebolion.
" Thoſe who took the oath and ſacrificed, were

" On the Lacedæmonian ſide — Pleiſtolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Iſchagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Telles, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Lamphilus.

" On the Athenian——— Lampo, Iſthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thraſycles, Theagenes, Ariſtocœtes, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demoſthenes."

The author adjuſts the time.

This treaty was perfected upon the cloſe of the winter, in the firſt commencement of the ſpring, immediately after the Bacchanalian feſtivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and ſome few days over, were elapſed ſince the firſt irruption into Attica and an open commencement of the war. And let him, that would be aſſured of the truth, compute only by the ſeaſons of the year, and not by thoſe who in the contending *States* were either Archons, or by the offices they bore had events diſtinguiſhed by an enumeration of their names. For it cannot be exactly known in what determinate part, whether in the beginning or middle or any other portion of a magiſtracy, any important event occurred. But if the computation proceed by ſummers and winters, which method I have obſerved, ſuch an inquirer will find, that theſe two halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten

complete ſummers and the ſame number of winters elapſed in the courſe of this firſt part of the war.

Lacedæmonians *begin the reſtitutions.*

The Lacedæmonians, for to them it fell by lot to make the firſt reſtitutions, releaſed immediately what priſoners they had in their hands; and, having diſpatched Iſchagoras and Menas and Philocharidas in the quality of their embaſſadors to the cities of Thrace, ordered Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and all the confederates there to ſubmit to the terms of the treaty, according to the ſtipulation given for them. But this they poſitively refuſed, as they judged the treaty prejudicial. Clearidas alſo, to ingratiate himſelf with the Chalcideans, would not deliver up Amphipolis; alledging that without their concurrence he could not poſſibly do it. He himſelf returned in perſon ſoon after with the embaſſadors, in order to make his defence at Lacedæmon, ſhould Iſchagoras accuſe him there of diſobeying orders. His view was farther to try, if the accommodation could by any means be evaded. But when he found it faſt confirmed, he poſted back with all ſpeed to his government, having expreſs orders from the Lacedæmonians to deliver up Amphipolis; or, if that was beyond his power, to cauſe all the Peloponneſians within that garriſon inſtantly to evacuate the place.

Clearidas *refuſeth to reſtore* Amphipolis.

The confederates diſſatisfied.

The confederates happened at this juncture to be at Lacedæmon, where ſuch of them as had hitherto refuſed to accept the treaty were ordered by the Lacedæmonians to accede to it. But this they poſitively refuſed, alledging the ſame reaſon as before; and plainly affirming that "they would not come in, till better terms than the preſent were obtained for them." Their remonſtrances had no effect upon the Lacedæmonians, who ſent them away without redreſs, and ſtruck up forthwith an alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Athenians. They had reaſon to conclude, that "the Argives would come to no agreement with them," ſince they had lately declared a negative to their embaſſadors Ampelidas and Lichas; "and yet, theſe Argives," they judged, "could be no dreadful foe without the Athenians;

" Athenians; and that the reſt of Peloponneſus would not now pre-
" ſume to interfere, who without this method of prevention would
" certainly have gone over to the Athenians." An Athenian embaſſy therefore being at this criſis reſident amongſt them, a conference was held, and the terms completely adjuſted. The ratification was made by ſolemn oath, and the articles of this alliance offenſive and defenſive were theſe:

Alliance between Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

" THE Lacedæmonians enter into this alliance for the term of
" fifty years.—Provided that,

" If any enemy enter the territories of the Lacedæmonians, and
" commit any manner of hoſtilities to their prejudice, the Athenians
" march forthwith to their ſuccour, with all the poſſible means of
" redreſs, and with their whole united force.

" And in caſe ſuch invaders ſhall have withdrawn themſelves,
" that the *State* under which they acted be declared an enemy both
" to the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, both which are to
" join in acting offenſively againſt that *State*, nor to lay down
" their arms without the mutual conſent of both the contract-
" ing *States*.

" Theſe terms to be obſerved with honour, with alacrity, and
" without any fraud whatever.

" Provided farther—That if any enemy enter the territories of
" the Athenians, and commit hoſtilities to the prejudice of the
" Athenians, the Lacedæmonians march forthwith to their ſuccour,
" with all the poſſible means of redreſs, and with their whole
" united force.

" And in caſe ſuch invaders ſhall have withdrawn themſelves,
" that the *State* under which they acted be declared an enemy
" both to Lacedæmonians and Athenians, both which are to join
" in acting offenſively againſt that *State*, nor to lay down their
" arms without the mutual conſent of both the contracting *States*.

" Theſe

" Theſe terms alſo to be obſerved with honour, with alacrity,
" and without any fraud whatever.

" Provided farther — That if there happen any inſurrection
" among the Helots, the Athenians march to the ſuccour of
" the Lacedæmonians with their whole ſtrength, to the full extent
" of their power.

" The ſame perſons on both ſides ſhall ſwear to the obſervance of
" theſe articles, who ſwore to the former treaty.

" The oaths to be annually renewed; for which purpoſe, the
" Lacedæmonians ſhall give their attendance at Athens, at the Bac-
" chanalian feſtival; and the Athenians theirs at Lacedæmon, at the
" Hyacinthian.

" Both parties to erect their pillar; one at Lacedæmon, near
" Apollo's in the Amycléum; the other at Athens, near Minerva's
" in the citadel.

" And, in caſe the Lacedæmonians and Athenians think proper to
" make any additions or alterations in the terms of this alliance,
" the ſame lawfully to be done by both, at their joint-diſcretion.

" The oath of obſervance was ſworn,

" On the Lacedæmonian ſide, by * Pleiſtionax, * Agis, Pleiſtolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Iſchagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus.

" On the Athenian ſide, by Lampo, Iſthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thraſycles, Theagenes, Ariſtocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demoſthenes."

* The kings ſign this alliance, but did not ſign the former treaty.

This

This alliance was concluded in a very little time after the treaty of peace. And the Athenians now releaſed to the Lacedæmonians their *Spartans*, who were made priſoners at Sphacteria. The ſummer alſo of the eleventh year was now begun. And ſo far the tranſactions of theſe firſt ten years of this war cloſely carried on have been regularly compiled.

YEAR XI.

AFTER the treaty of peace and the alliance offenſive and defenſive between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians; both which were concluded after the ten years war, at the time when Pleiſtolas preſided in the college of *Ephori* at Sparta and Alcæus was *Archon* at Athens, the peace became in force amongſt the acceding parties. But the Corinthians and ſome of the Peloponneſian *States* were endeavouring the overthrow of all theſe proceedings. And immediately there aroſe another great combuſtion amongſt the confederates againſt Lacedæmon. More than this, as time advanced, the Lacedæmonians became ſuſpected by the Athenians, as they ſhewed no great punctuality in executing the conditions of the peace. For the ſpace of ſix years and ten months they refrained indeed from entering one another's territory in an hoſtile manner; but, during ſuch a correſpondence which abounded in ſuſpicions, they were in all other reſpects active in a reciprocal annoyance. And at length, neceſſitated to diſſolve the treaty concluded at the ten years period, they engaged afreſh in open war.

Before Chriſt 421.

Jealouſies on all ſides.

The ſame THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, hath alſo compiled an account of theſe latter tranſactions in a regular ſeries, according to the ſummers and winters, down to that period of time when the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became maſters of the *long-walls* and the Piræus. The whole continuance of the war to this period was twenty-ſeven years. And, if

The war . . . fact goes on

any

any man be inclined to think that this intervening accommodation ſhould not be reckoned as war, he will find no arguments to ſupport his opinion. For let him only ſurvey the tranſactions as they are diſtinctly related, and he will find it an abſurdity to pronounce *that* an interval of peace, in which neither all the reſtitutions were made nor the benefits obtained which the mutual ſtipulations required. And ſetting theſe conſiderations aſide, in the Mantinéan and Epidauric and other wars, tranſgreſſions were committed on both ſides. The confederates alſo of Thrace continued ſtill to be as great enemies as ever. And the Bœotians never agreed to more than a bare ceſſation of arms, renewable every tenth day.

Thucydides. Including therefore the firſt war which laſted ten years, and that ſuſpicious interval which enſued and ended at laſt in a ſecond open rupture, the whole continuance, if computed by ſummers and winters, will turn out upon enquiry to have been ſo many years, and ſome few additional days. And ſuch as laid ſtreſs upon the predictions of oracles, can aſſent only to this computation as genuine. For my own part, I perfectly well remember, that not only at the commencement, but even during the whole courſe of the war, many ſuch predictions were given out, that "it muſt needs continue three "times nine years." I alſo lived through its whole extent, in the very flower of my underſtanding and ſtrength, and with a cloſe application of my thoughts to gain an exact inſight into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot to ſuffer a twenty years exile from my country, after my employment in the buſineſs of Amphipolis; and to be preſent at the tranſactions of both parties, and not the leaſt at thoſe of the Peloponneſians, in conſequence of my baniſhment; by which means I had leiſure to gather more ample informations about them. I ſhall relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the treaty ſubſequent to the firſt ten years, and the incidents of the war which afterwards enſued.

UPON

UPON the concluſion of the treaty of peace for fifty years and the ſubſequent alliance, the embaſſies from the different *States* of Peloponneſus, who had been ſummoned thither to give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedæmon. The reſt of them indeed went directly home: But the Corinthians, ſtopping in their return at Argos, began firſt at a conference with ſome of the magiſtracy there to inſinuate, "that, ſince the Lacedæmonians, not in order to "ſerve but to inſlave Peloponneſus, had entered into a treaty and an "alliance offenſive and defenſive with their once moſt inveterate foes "the Athenians, it highly behoved the Argives now to watch over "the preſervation of Peloponneſus, and to form a publick reſolu-"tion—That any Grecian *State* which is free and uncontroled, which "enjoyeth and ſupporteth an equal ſhare of rights and privileges, "might enter into an alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Ar-"gives, for the guard of their mutual properties againſt their com-"mon foes:—This to be communicated only to the *few* who were "abſolute maſters of the deciſions of each *State*, and every where "to ſhun all conference with the bulk of the *people*, leſt the ſcheme "might be detected in caſe the *multitude* ſhould refuſe their concur-"rence." They aſſured them that the majority of the *States* were ſo exaſperated againſt the Lacedæmonians, that they would infallibly come in. And, after ſuggeſting ſuch a courſe, the Corinthians alſo returned home.

Continuation of the hiſtory.

The Corinthians *in freſh ſchemes.*

The perſons at Argos, who had liſtened to theſe inſinuations, reported the ſcheme in the next place to the whole magiſtracy and people of Argos. The Argives reſolved *accordingly*, and elected a committee of twelve, with whom ſuch Grecians as deſired it might agree upon an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians excepted. Neither of theſe *States* were permitted to treat with the Argives, without the public conſent of the whole *people*.

The Argives.

The Argives were the more readily perſuaded to ſuch a meaſure, as they plainly ſaw a war was unavoidable between themſelves and

the Lacedæmonians: for the truce between them was on the point of expiring. They were alſo animated by the hope of gaining into their hands the ſovereignty of Peloponneſus. For, at this juncture of time, Lacedæmon lay under the greateſt diſcredit, and was fallen into utter contempt upon account of their late diſaſters: whereas, the Argives were in the high vigour of their ſtrength in all reſpects, as they had never interfered in the Attic war; and, having obſerved an exact neutrality with both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. The Argives therefore in this manner invited thoſe Grecians who were willing to enter into their alliance.

Mantinéans. The Mantinéans and allies were the firſt who, out of a dread of the Lacedæmonians, accepted the propoſal. For theſe Mantinéans, in the heat of the war againſt the Athenians, had ſeized and appropriated to themſelves a certain diſtrict of Arcadia ſubject to Lacedæmon, and now concluded that the Lacedæmonians would never leave them in the quiet poſſeſſion of it, when they were at liberty to act for its recovery. This readily induced them to have recourſe to the league of Argos, regarded by them as a powerful *State*, which had ever been at variance with Lacedæmon, and like their own was democratical.

No ſooner had the Mantinéans revolted, than the reſt of Peloponneſus began to mutter that "they ought alſo to take the ſame ſtep;" imagining that revolt to have been founded upon ſome ſtronger reaſons than yet appeared; exaſperated alſo againſt the Lacedæmonians for ſundry reaſons, and above all for this article in the peace with Athens — that "in caſe the two *States* of Lacedæmon and Athens "think proper to make any additions or alterations, the ſame to be "lawful." For this was the clauſe which gave the greateſt alarm to Peloponneſus, and inſpired a jealouſy that the Lacedæmonians might ſtrike up a bargain with the Athenians to inſlave the other *States*; ſince, in juſtice, no alteration ought to be made without the concurrence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed therefore at theſe

theſe proceedings, many of them made inſtant application to the Argives, exerting their ſeveral endeavours to obtain their alliance.

But the Lacedæmonians, perceiving what a combuſtion was ariſen in Peloponneſus, principally owing to the inſinuations of the Corinthians, who were alſo going to enter into this league with Argos, they diſpatch embaſſadors to Corinth from a deſire to prevent what might enſue. Here they repreſented to them — "how criminal "their conduct had been in having thus originally fomented the "preſent tumult; and that, in caſe they abandoned the Lacedæ-"monians and went over to the Argive league," they aſſured them that "by ſuch a ſtep they muſt break the moſt ſacred oaths; in-"juſtice they had already committed in refuſing to accede to the "Athenian peace, ſince purſuant to old ſtipulations between them, "*whatever a majority of the confederates reſolved was to be binding* "*on all, unleſs ſome God or Hero injoined a diſſent.*" But the Corinthians, in the preſence of all thoſe of the confederacy who had not accepted the peace and whoſe attendance they had previouſly invited, replied to the Lacedæmonians, without entering into a particular detail of the injuries they had done them in not covenanting with the Athenians for the reſtitution of Solium, or Anactorium, or any other point, in which they thought themſelves aggrieved, but ſpecioufly pretending, that "they could never abandon their allies in Thrace, "whom by ſolemn oaths they were bound to ſupport; oaths, "which they had ſeverally ſworn when they firſt revolted in con-"cert with the Potidæans, and had on other occaſions ſince re-"newed;" arguing from hence, that "they could not have violated "the common oath of the confederates in refuſing their acceſſion to "the Athenian peace, ſince as they had ſworn upon the faith of "the Gods to the former, they could not betray them without the "guilt of perjury; the ſtipulation indeed ran thus, *unleſs ſome God* "*or Hero injoined a diſſent*; their preſent diſſent therefore appeared "to them to be a divine injunction." So far they argued from their

Lacedæmonians with Corinth.

former oaths. And in regard to the alliance offenſive and defenſive with Argos — " they would hold conſultations with their friends, " and take ſuch ſteps as were expedient and juſt." And with this anſwer the Lacedæmonian embaſſadors departed home. An Argive embaſſy happened alſo at the ſame time to be at Corinth, who preſſed the Corinthians to enter into their league, without any farther heſitation. They deſired them to attend, at the next public meeting they held, for a final anſwer.

Eléans. There arrived ſoon after an embaſſy from the Eléans, who made in the firſt place an alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Corinthians; and then, from Corinth, repairing to Argos, became allies of the Argives, according to the ſcheme pre-eſtabliſhed for this purpoſe: For a miſunderſtanding had aroſe between them and the Lacedæmonians about Lepréum. In a former war of the Lepreatæ againſt a province of Arcadia, the Eléans had been prevailed upon to join the Lepreatæ for a moiety of the land that ſhould be conquered; and, at the concluſion of the war the Eléans left all the land in the management of the Lepreatæ, ſubject to the annual tri-

* 193 *l.* 15 *s. Sterling.* bute of a * talent to Olympian Jove. This was regularly paid 'till the Athenian war. But that war being then made a pretence of its diſcontinuance, the Eléans would have exacted it by force. The others had recourſe to the Lacedæmonians. The diſpute was referred to the Lacedæmonian arbitration: But the Eléans, taking up a ſuſpicion that they ſhould not have juſtice, would not abide the reference, but began to ravage the territory of the Lepreatæ. The Lacedæmonians notwithſtanding this procceded to a ſentence — that " the Lepreatæ were maſters of their own conduct, and that the Eléans " were guilty of injuſtice;" and, as the latter would not abide by their arbitration, they threw a garriſon of heavy-armed into Lepréum. But the Eléans, regarding this ſtep as the reception of a city by the Lacedæmonians which had revolted from them, and alledging the treaty in which it was ſtipulated — that " of whatever

" places

" places the parties were poſſeſſed upon the commencement of the " Attic war, the ſame they ſhould continue to hold at its expira- " tion," — as if they had met with injuſtice, they revolt to the Argives: And the Eléans entered into that league offenſive and defenſive, as hath been already related.

The Corinthians ſoon followed their example, and, with the Chalcidéans alſo of Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the Bœotians and Megaréans, tho' they had threatned the ſame thing, thought proper to drop it. They had been ill-uſed by the Lacedæmonians, but judged however that the democracy of the Argives would be leſs compatible with their intereſts, whoſe form of government was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedæmonians.

The Athenians get Scione.

About the ſame time of this ſummer, the Athenians becoming maſters of the Scionéans after a long blockade, put all who were able to bear arms to the ſword, and made their wives and children ſlaves; and gave the land to be cultured by the Platæans.

Delos.

They alſo again brought back the Delians to Delos, induced to it by the many defeats they had ſuffered in battle, and the expreſs oracle of the God at Delphi.

The Phocians alſo and Locrians began about this time to make war upon one another.

The Corinthian politicks.

And now the Corinthians and Argives, united in league, go together to Tegea, to perſuade its revolt from the Lacedæmonians. They ſaw it was a large diſtrict; and, in caſe they compaſſed its acceſſion, they imagined the whole of Peloponneſus would be at their beck. But, when the Tegeatæ declared that " they would in no ſhape op- " poſe the Lacedæmonians," the Corinthians, who till now had acted with great alacrity, ſlackened in their zeal for contention, and began to fear that no more of the *States* would come in. They proceeded however to the Bœotians, and ſolicited them " to accede to the " league between themſelves and Argives, and to co-operate with " them for the common welfare." — And, as there were truces for

ten

ten days between the Athenians and Bœotians, which were agreed upon ſoon after the peace for fifty years was made, the Corinthians now preſſed the Bœotians " to accompany them to Athens, and ſo- " licit for truces of the ſame nature for them; but in caſe the Athe- " nians refuſed to grant them, to renounce the ſuſpenſion of arms, " and for the future never to treat without their concurrence." The Bœotians, thus ſolicited by the Corinthians, deſired a longer time to conſider about their acceſſion to the Argive league. To Athens indeed they bore them company, but could not obtain the ten-days truces: For the Athenians anſwered —— " The Corinthians have a " peace already, if they are confederates of the Lacedæmonians." And upon the whole, the Bœotians abſolutely refuſed to renounce their own truces, tho' the Corinthians inſiſted upon it, and urged with ſome warm expoſtulations that it had been ſo covenanted between them. So there was only a mere ceſſation of arms between the Corinthians and Athenians, without any ſolemn ratification.

The Lacedæmonians *take the field.*

This ſame ſummer, the Lacedæmonians took the field with their whole united force, under the command of Pleiſtonax the ſon of Pauſanias king of the Lacedæmonians, and marched to the Parrhaſians of Arcadia. Theſe were ſubject to the Mantinéans, and in conſequence of a ſedition had invited this expedition. But it was alſo deſigned, if poſſible, to demoliſh the fortreſs of Cypſela which the Mantinéans had erected, and, as it was ſituated in Parrhaſia towards the Skiritis of Laconia, had placed a garriſon in it. The Lacedæmonians therefore ravaged the territory of the Parrhaſians. But the Mantinéans, leaving their own city to the guard of the Argives, marched themſelves to the ſupport of their dependents. But finding it impoſſible to preſerve the fortreſs of Cypſela and the cities of the Parrhaſians, they retired. The Lacedæmonians alſo, when they had ſet the Parrhaſians at liberty, and demoliſhed the fortreſs, withdrew their forces.

The

The ſame ſummer alſo, upon the return from Thrace of thoſe ſoldiers who had ſerved under Braſidas, and who came home after the peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the Lacedæmonians decreed "thoſe Helots who had ſerved under Braſidas to be free, and to "have permiſſion to reſide wherever they pleaſed." And no long time after, they placed them together with ſuch perſons as were newly enfranchiſed, at Lepréum: It is ſituated between Laconia and Eléa: and they were now at variance with the Eléans. As for thoſe *Spartans* who had been made priſoners in Sphacteria, and had delivered up their arms, conceiving ſome fears about them, leſt ſhould they lay their late diſgrace too much to heart, as they were perſons of the greateſt rank, they might introduce ſome innovations in the *State*, they declared them *infamous*, even tho' ſome of the number were at this time poſſeſſed of poſts in the government. But this *infamy* extended no farther than to diſqualify them from offices, and from buying and ſelling. Yet, in a ſhort time afterwards, they were again reſtored to their full privileges.

The ſame ſummer alſo the Dictidéans took Thyſſus, a town ſeated upon the Athos, and confederate with the Athenians. Thyſſus.

Jealouſy between Lacedæmonians *and* Athenians.

Through the whole courſe of the ſummer, the communication was open between the Peloponneſians and Athenians. Not but that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians began to be jealous of one another immediately after the peace, as the reciprocal reſtitution of places was not punctually performed. For tho' it had fallen to the Lacedæmonians lot to begin theſe reſtitutions, yet they had not reſtored Amphipolis and other cities. They had compelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor the Bœotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept the peace, always pretending that "ſhould they refuſe it, they were "ready to join with the Athenians in their compulſion;" nay, they limited to them a time, tho' not by a regular written notice, "within which ſuch as did not accede were declared enemies to both." The Athenians therefore, ſeeing none of theſe points were put in actual

actual execution, became jealous of the Lacedæmonians, as men who acted insincerely in every step: insomuch that when Pylus was redemanded, they refused its restitution, and heartily repented that they had released the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. They also kept possession of other places, and intended to do so, till the other side had performed their engagements. But the Lacedæmonians alledged "they had done every thing in their power; that, for instance, they "had released such Athenians as were prisoners amongst them, had "recalled their soldiers from Thrace, and wherever they were "masters of the execution had performed it. As to Amphipolis," they said "they were not so far masters of it as to make an actual "surrender. They had omitted no endeavours to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to a compliance, to recover the disposal of "Panactum, and to obtain the dismission of those Athenians who "were prisoners of war in Bœotia. Pylus however," they insisted, "should be immediately restored to them, at least that the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, as their people had been "from Thrace; and then the Athenians, if they pleased, might "continue to garrison that fortress themselves." Many meetings were held, and much argumentation passed between them this summer; and at last, they prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians and others, as well Helots as all deserters whatever out of Laconia. These they transplanted to Crania of Cephallene. This summer therefore was a season of inaction, and the intercourse was open between them.

A political turn at Lacedæmon.

In the ensuing winter — For other Ephori were in office, as the authority of those under whom the peace was made was now expired, and some who were averse to the peace had succeeded — embassies attending from the whole confederacy, the Athenians and Bœotians and Corinthians also being present, and after much reciprocal altercation, coming to no regular agreement; the rest of them separated to their own homes without effect. But Cleobulus and Xenares, those two

of

of the *Ephori*, who were moſt inclined to diſſolve the peace, detained the Bœotians and Corinthians for a private conference. In this they exhorted them " to act unanimouſly in promotion of their ſcheme, " in purſuance of which the Bœotians ſhould firſt make themſelves a " party in the Argive league, and then employ their good offices to " form an alliance between the Argives and Lacedæmonians. For by " theſe methods, the Bœotians could leaſt of all be neceſſitated to " take part in the Attic peace; as the Lacedemonians would prefer " the renewal of friendſhip and alliance with the Argives to the en- " mity of the Athenians and the diſſolution of the peace; ſince, to " their certain knowledge, the Lacedæmonians had ever been de- " ſirous to have the friendſhip of Argos conſiſtently with their ho- " nour; knowing it would facilitate the ſucceſs of their war without " Peloponneſus." — They alſo requeſted the Bœotians " to deliver " up Panactum to the Lacedæmonians, that exchanging it if poſſible " for Pylus, they might get clear of the main obſtacle to a freſh " rupture with the Athenians."

The Bœotians and Corinthians, inſtructed by Xenares and Cleo- Bœotians.
bulus and the party in their intereſt at Lacedæmon, departed *both* to report this ſcheme to their principals. But two perſons of the greateſt authority in the *State* of Argos were attending upon the road for their return. They met and conferred with them " about the " means of gaining the concurrence of the Bœotians in this league, " upon the ſame footing with the Corinthians and Eléans and Man- " tinéans. For they were confident, were this point once com- " pleated, they might eaſily become the arbiters of war or peace, " either in relation to the Lacedæmonians (if they ſo determined, " and would act together with firm unanimity) or to any other *State* " whatever."

The Bœotian embaſſadors were highly delighted with this diſ- courſe. The ſolicitations of theſe Argives happened to coincide with the inſtructions recommended to them by their friends at Lacedæ-

mon. And the Argives, finding them ſatisfied with their motion, aſſured them they would ſend embaſſadors to the Bœotians, and ſo they parted.

But the Bœotians, at their return, reported to the *Rulers* of Bœotia the propoſals from Lacedæmon, and thoſe from the Argives upon the road. The Bœotian-Rulers were delighted, and grew now more zealous than ever; becauſe, on both ſides, from their Lacedæmonian friends and alſo from the Argives the ſolicitations were concurrent. And very ſoon after the Argive embaſſadors arrived to forward the diſpatch of the treaty. The Bœotian-Rulers however at preſent gave only a verbal approbation of the ſcheme, and then diſmiſſed them, promiſing to ſend an embaſſy of their own to Argos, to perfect the alliance.

But in the mean time, it was judged to be previouſly expedient, that the Bœotian-Rulers and the Corinthians and the Megaréans and the embaſſadors from the allies of Thrace ſhould mutually interchange their oaths " to act in ſupport of one another, if upon any oc- " caſion ſuch ſupport might be requiſite, and to enter neither into " war nor peace without joint-conſent;" and then the Bœotians and Megaréans (for theſe acted in union) to form a league with the Argives. But before ſuch exchange of oaths, the Bœotian-Rulers communicated the whole of the plan to the four Bœotian *councils*, in whom the ſovereignty is lodged; recommending it, as worthy their confirmation, that " whatever cities were willing might mutually in- " terchange ſuch oaths for their reciprocal advantage." Yet the Bœotians, who compoſed the councils, refuſed a confirmation; apprehenſive, it might tend to embroil them with the Lacedæmonians, ſhould they pledge ſuch an oath to the Corinthians, who were now abandoning the Lacedæmonian intereſt. For the *Rulers* had not made them privy to the ſcheme from Lacedæmon, how " Xenares " and Cleobulus of the college of *Ephori* and their friends adviſe " them, to enter firſt into league with the Argives and Corinthians, " and

" and then to extend it to the Lacedæmonians :" They had preſumed that the ſupreme council, tho' they ſecreted theſe lights, would not reſolve againſt a plan which *themſelves* had pre-digeſted and recommended to them. But now, as this affair took ſo wrong a turn, the Corinthians and embaſſadors from Thrace went home without effect. And the Bœotian-Rulers, who had all along intended, in caſe their ſcheme had paſſed, to perfect an alliance with the Argives, made no farther report to the *councils* in relation to the Argives, ſent no embaſſy to Argos in conſequence of their promiſe, but ſuffered the whole plan to ſink away in careleſs and dilatory unconcern.

In this ſame winter, the Olynthians after a ſudden aſſault took Mecyberne, which was garriſoned by Athenians. Mecyberne.

After the former proceedings — For conferences were ſtill continued between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about thoſe places they held from one another — the Lacedæmonians, conceiving ſome hope, that if the Athenians could recover Panactum from the Bœotians, they alſo might regain Pylus, addreſſed themſelves in ſolemn embaſſy to the Bœotians, and importuned them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian priſoners, that they in return might get Pylus from *them*. But the Bœotians perſiſted in a refuſal, unleſs they would make a ſeparate alliance with them, as they had done with the Athenians. Upon this, the Lacedæmonians, tho' covinced that ſuch a ſtep would be injuſtice to the Athenians, ſince it had been ſtipulated that " without joint-conſent they ſhould neither make peace " nor war ;" yet bent on the recovery of Panactum that they might exchange it for Pylus ; the party at the ſame time amongſt them, who were meditating a freſh rupture, inclining to the Bœotian intereſt ; made the requiſite alliance in the very cloſe of this winter, on the approach of ſpring. The conſequence was, that Panactum was immediately levelled with the ground ; and the eleventh year of the war was brought to a concluſion. Panactum.

YEAR XII.

Before Chriſt 420.

Argives.

EARLY in the ſpring of that ſummer which was now approaching, the Argives --- when the expected embaſſy from Bœotia was not arrived in purſuance of promiſe; when they found that Panactum was demoliſhed, and a ſeparate alliance ſtruck up between the Bœotians and Lacedæmonians; ---- began to fear they ſhould be totally abandoned, and that their whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedæmonians. They concluded that, through the prevalence of the Lacedæmonian arguments, the Bœotians had been perſuaded to level Panactum and accede to the treaty made with Athens, and that the Athenians were privy to all theſe ſteps; and ſo, of conſequence, they themſelves were now utterly excluded from an alliance with the Athenians, and their former hopes entirely blaſted that, in caſe diſputes ſhould ariſe and their treaty with the Lacedæmonians not be renewed, they might at worſt depend on gaining the Athenian alliance. The Argives therefore, amidſt theſe perplexities, and the dread of being attacked at once by the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the Bœotians and Athenians, as they had formerly refuſed an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, and had graſped in thought at the ſovereignty of Peloponneſus; — the Argives, I ſay, had no longer one moment to loſe, but diſpatched inſtantly Euſtrophus and Æſon, whom they judged to be perſons moſt agreeable there, in embaſſy to Lacedæmon. They now judged it their intereſt to procure the beſt peace which the preſent poſture of affairs would allow from the Lacedæmonians, and then quietly to attend the event of things. In this view, the embaſſadors on their arrival had a conference with the Lacedæmonians about the terms of a peace. And at firſt, the Argives inſiſted, that " to ſome State or private perſon ſhould be referred for equitable arbitration the controverſy between them about " the diſtrict of Cynuria," concerning which, as it is frontier to both,

both, they are eternally at variance: in this diſtrict ſtand the cities of Thyrea and Anthena; and the poſſeſſion of it is in the hands of the Lacedæmonians. But at length, when the Lacedæmonians would not ſuffer any mention to be made of this, declaring only that "were they willing to renew the former truce, they ſhould find "them complying;" the Argive embaſſadors however prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to agree to theſe propoſals, that "for the "preſent a peace ſhould be concluded for the term of fifty years; "provided notwithſtanding, that liberty remain to either party to "ſend a challenge, when neither was embaraſſed by plague or war, "and the right of this diſtrict be then decided by arms between La-"cedæmon and Argos, as had formerly been done [3] when the vic-"tory was equally claimed on both ſides; and that in this caſe it be "not lawful to carry the purſuit beyond the boundaries of either "Argos or Lacedæmon." Theſe propoſals, it is true, appeared at

3 Herodotus relates this remarkable piece of hiſtory, in *Clio*. "They had a con-"ference (ſays he) and came to an agree-"ment, that three hundred men on each "ſide ſhould decide the point by combat, "and the land conteſted ſhould remain "the property of the victors; that both "armies in the mean time ſhould retire "within their reſpective dominions, nor "be preſent at the combat, leſt by being "ſpectators of it either of them, ſeeing "their countrymen defeated, might run "to their aſſiſtance. When articles were "ſettled, both armies drew off. Thoſe "ſelected on each ſide for the combat ſtaid "behind, and engaged. They fought it out "with equal reſolution and fortune. Of "ſix hundred men only three were left "alive; two of them Argives, Alcinor "and Chromius; and one Lacedæmo-"nian, Othryades. Theſe were all the "ſurvivors, when night came on. The "Argives, as victors, ran in haſte to "Argos; but Othryades, for the Lace-"dæmonians, having ſtripped the dead "bodies of the Argives, and carried off "their arms to the place where his own "ſide had encamped, continued upon the "field of battle. Next morning both "parties came to learn the event. And "then truly each party alſo claimed the "victory; one averring, that a majority "ſurvived on their ſide; the other main-"taining, that even thoſe had fled whilſt "their own combatant had kept his "ground and ſpoiled the dead. In ſhort, "from wrangling they came again to blows "and a general engagement; in which, af-"ter great ſlaughter on both ſides, the La-"cedæmonians obtained the victory."

firſt

firſt to the Lacedæmonians to be fooliſh; but at length, as their neceſſary intereſt made them vaſtly deſirous of the Argive friendſhip, they complied with the demand, and the terms agreed on were digeſted into writing. But the Lacedæmonians, before they put the laſt hand to the treaty, inſiſted on their previous return to Argos and reporting it to the *people*, and in caſe the ratification was given, to repair again to Lacedæmon at the Hyacinthian feſtival and ſwear obſervance. And upon this they returned to Argos.

Lacedæmonians *and* Athenians.

Whilſt the Argives were employed in this negotiation, the Lacedæmonian embaſſadors, Andromenes and Phædimus and Antimenidas, who were commiſſioned to receive Panactum and the priſoners of war from the Bœotians and deliver them over into the hands of the Athenians, found upon their arrival that Panactum was already demoliſhed by the Bœotians, upon pretext that "in former times, "upon occaſion of ſome diſpute about it, an oath had been taken by "the Athenians and Bœotians *that* neither ſhould inhabit that place "excluding the other, but ſhould jointly poſſeſs it;" ---- but what Athenian priſoners of war were in the hands of the Bœotians, were delivered up to Andromenes and his collegues, who carried and releaſed them to the Athenians. They alſo reported the demolition of Panactum, declaring this to be equivalent to a reſtitution, as no enemy to Athens could occupy that poſt for the future.

Theſe words were no ſooner heard than the Athenians conceived the deepeſt reſentments. They thought themſelves injured by the Lacedæmonians, not only in the demolition of Panactum which ought to have been reſtored ſtanding; but alſo, in the ſeparate alliance made lately with the Bœotians, of which now they had notice, in open contradiction to their own declaration "of joining them to "compel by force ſuch as would not accede to the treaty." They reflected alſo upon other points, in which the engagements of the treaty had been in no wiſe fulfilled, and concluded themſelves overreached.

reached. For theſe reaſons, they gave a rough anſwer to the embaſſadors, and an inſtant diſmiſſion.

Upon ſo much umbrage taken by the Athenians againſt the Lacedæmonians, ſuch perſons at Athens, as were willing to diſſolve the peace, ſet themſelves inſtantly at work to accompliſh their views. Others were labouring the ſame point, but none more than Alcibiades the ſon of Clinias [4]; a perſon, in reſpect of age even then but a youth, at leaſt he would have paſſed for ſuch in other *States*, tho' for the dignity of his birth he was much honoured and careſſed. It ſeemed to him the moſt expedient ſtep, to form a good underſtanding with the Argives. Not but that his oppoſition to other meaſures was the reſult of his ambition and a ſtudy of contention, becauſe the Lacedæmonians had employed their intereſt in Nicias and Laches to

Alcibiades ſchemes a rupture.

4 Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, to open the field for his own ſoaring and enterpriſing genius to dilate itſelf more at large. Pericles was his near relation and guardian; Socrates was his friend and guide, ſo long as virtue was his care. Warmer paſſions ſoon gained the aſcendent over him; and he plunged into all the buſy ſcenes of life, with that intenſe application and flexible addreſs to all perſons and all occaſions as ſurpriſed the world; "more changeable than a "camelion, (as Plutarch expreſſeth it,) "ſince that creature cannot put on a fair "or white appearance." His character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and maſterly pen of Cornelius Nepos. "Na-"ture (ſays he) ſeems to have exerted "her utmoſt power in Alcibiades. It is "agreed by all writers, who have made "him the ſubject of their pens, that a "more extraordinary man never lived, "either for virtues or vices. Born in a "moſt noble republic, of a moſt ho-"nourable family, by far the handſomeſt "perſon of his age, fit for every thing, "and full of addreſs. He was a com-"mander that made the greateſt figure "both by land and ſea; an orator, whom "none could ſurpaſs; nay, his manner "and matter when he ſpoke were quite "irreſiſtible. Exactly as occaſions re-"quired, he was laborious, perſevering, "indefatigable, generous, ſplendid in all his "outward appearance and at his table; "full of affability, profuſe of civility, and "of the utmoſt dexterity in adapting him-"ſelf to the exigences of time. And yet, "in the ſeaſons of relaxation, and when "buſineſs no longer required him to keep "his faculties on the ſtretch, he was luxuri-"ous, diſſolute, lewd, and intemperate. The "whole world was aſtoniſhed that ſo vaſt "an unlikeneſs and ſo different a nature "ſhould be united in the ſame perſon."

perfect

perfect the treaty, ſlighting his aſſiſtance upon account of his youth, nor paying him the deference he expected from the ancient hoſpitality between that *State* and the family from which he was deſcended. This indeed his grandfather had renounced; but he himſelf, in the view of renewing it, had ſhewn extraordinary civilities to the *Spartans* who were made priſoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himſelf therefore in all reſpects ſlighted, at this criſis he began openly to oppoſe them. He affirmed that "the Lacedæmonians were a people who "could not be truſted; that they had treacherouſly entered into the "peace, in order to divert the Argives from their alliance, that again "they might attack the Athenians when left alone." Nay farther, upon the firſt diſſatisfaction between them, he ſecretly diſpatcheth his emiſſaries to Argos, exhorting them "at his invitation to come to "Athens in company with the Mantinéans and Eléans and ſolicit an "alliance, ſince opportunity favoured, and his whole intereſt ſhould "be exerted in their ſupport."

The Argives, having heard theſe ſuggeſtions; and being now convinced, that the Bœotian ſeparate alliance had been made without the privity of the Athenians, who on the contrary were highly diſcontented at the Lacedæmonian proceedings; took no farther notice of their embaſſy at Lacedæmon, tho' ſent expreſly there to negotiate an accommodation, but recalled all their attention from thence to the Athenians. They reflected, that Athens, a *State* which from long antiquity had been their friend, which was governed by a *democracy* in the ſame manner as their own, and which was poſſeſſed of a great power at ſea, could moſt effectually ſupport them in caſe a war ſhould break out againſt them. In ſhort, they loſt no time in diſpatching their embaſſadors to the Athenians to propoſe an alliance, who were accompanied by embaſſies from the Eléans and Mantinéans.

A Lacedæmonian embaſſy alſo arrived in great haſte, compoſed of Philocharidas and Leon and Endius, perſons who were judged moſt acceptable

acceptable at Athens. They were afraid, leſt the Athenians in the heat of their reſentments ſhould clap up an alliance with the Argives. They ſent alſo by them a demand of the reſtitution of Pylus in lieu of Panactum, and excuſes for the ſeparate alliance they had made with the Bœotians, "which had been concluded without any "deſign of prejudicing the Athenians." Upon theſe points they ſpoke before the ſenate [5], notifying at the ſame time that "they were come "with

5 The Lacedæmonian embaſſy have on this occaſion their firſt audience from the *Senate*. The buſineſs of this hiſtory hath been hitherto tranſacted in the *aſſembly of the people*. For, as the Generals of the *State* were the chief miniſters in time of war, and had a power of convening the people at their own diſcretion, all points that required a ſpeedy determination were brought before the people in the firſt inſtance; and the influence of the ſenate, which operated on *ordinary* occaſions, was checked and ſuſpended in time of war, which ſtarts many *extraordinary* occaſions; or left it in the will of the Generals of the *State* to call and treat as *extraordinary* whatever they pleaſed. By this means the people had ingroſſed the power; the balance which Solon deſigned always to preſerve was in a great meaſure loſt, and the *ariſtocratical* influence was quite ſuſpended.

As therefore the *popular aſſembly* had its *note* at firſt ſetting out, the form and conſtitution of the *ſenate* now requires an explanation.——At this time it conſiſted of five hundred perſons; and, for that reaſon is often ſtiled The council of *five hundred*, and ſometimes by Thucydides The council of the *bean* from the manner of their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each tribe returned the names of their members, who were qualified and ſtood candidates for this honour. The names were engraved on pieces of braſs, and caſt into a veſſel: The ſame number of beans were caſt into another veſſel, fifty of which were white and the reſt black. They then proceeded to draw out a name and a bean; and the perſons, to whoſe names the white beans were drawn, became the ſenators of the year. Each ſenator had a drachma, that is, ſeven pence three farthings a day for his ſalary.

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown into a veſſel, and into another nine black beans and one white one. The tribe, to whoſe name the white bean was drawn, took the firſt courſe of *preſidency* for a tenth part of the year; and the order of the ſucceeding courſes was determined in the ſame manner by the bean. How the fifty in courſe were again ſubdivided into *tens*, and from theſe *tens* a chairman choſe for a day hath been already explained in the *note* on the popular aſſembly, Book I.

The *ſenate* ſat every day in the *prytaneum* or *ſtate-houſe*, where the *preſidents* had alſo their diet. They were the grand council of ſtate, took into conſideration all the affairs of the commonwealth, debated, and voted by beans: And whatever determinations were thus made in the *ſenate*

were

" with full powers to put an end to all diſputes," by which they gave ſome alarm to Alcibiades; leſt, ſhould they make the ſame declaration before the aſſembly of the *people*, it might have an influence upon the *multitude*, and an alliance with the Argives might prove abortive.

A fineſſe of Alcibiades.

But Alcibiades now contriveth to baffle them by art. He prevaileth upon the Lacedæmonians, by ſolemnly pledging his faith to them, that " in caſe they would diſown before the *people* the full powers " with which they were inveſted, he would engage for the reſtitu- " tion of Pylus: For he himſelf would then perſuade the Athenians " to it with as much zeal as he now diſſuaded, and would get all " other points adjuſted to their ſatisfaction." His view in acting thus was to detach them from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of inveighing againſt them in the aſſembly of the *people* as men who had nothing ſincere in their intentions, and whoſe profeſſions were diſſonant with themſelves, and ſo to perfect an alliance with the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans. And this artifice in the ſequel took effect. For when they were admitted to an audience before the *people*, and replied to the demand when put, contrary to what they had ſaid in the ſenate, that " they had no ſuch powers," the Athenians in an inſtant loſt all patience. And now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud againſt the Lacedæmonians with much more vehemence than he had ever done before, they liſtened greedily to all he ſaid, and were ready inſtantly to call in the Argives and their companions, and to make them confederates. But the ſhock of an earthquake being felt,

were afterwards carried down to the *aſſembly of the people* to be ratified and paſſed into laws. By Solon's original conſtitution, nothing was to be propoſed to the people, before it had been canvaſſed and approved in the ſenate. But this ſeems to have been eluded by the Generals of the ſtate, who had all military buſineſs in their department, and a power to convene the people at their pleaſure, and lay matters before them in the firſt inſtance. To reſtore the *ariſtocratical* power, and reduce that of *the people*, occaſioned an uſurpation and ſad confuſion in Athens, as will be ſeen in the eighth book of this hiſtory.

before

before any thing could be formally concluded, the aſſembly was adjourned.

At the next day's aſſembly, Nicias — tho' the Lacedæmonians had been thus overreached, and he himſelf enſnared by their public acknowledgment that they had no full powers — ſpoke however on the Lacedæmonian ſide, inſiſting " on the neceſſity of maintaining a good " correſpondence with them, and deferring all agreement with the " Argives, till they could ſend to the Lacedæmonians, and be di- " ſtinctly informed of their final reſolutions." —— " It maketh, ſaid " he, for your credit but for their diſgrace, that a war ſhould be " averted. For as your affairs are in a happy poſture, it is above all " things eligible for you, to preſerve your proſperity unimpaired; " but they, in their preſent low ſituation, ſhould put all to hazard in " the hopes of redreſs." He carried it in ſhort, that embaſſadors ſhould be diſpatched, he himſelf to be one in the commiſſion, " earneſtly to require of the Lacedæmonians, that if their intentions " were honeſt, they ſhould ſurrender Panactum ſtanding and Am- " phipolis; and ſhould farther renounce the alliance with the Bœo- " tians in caſe they ſtill refuſed to accede to the peace — this in pur- " ſuance of the article that *Neither ſhould make peace without joint-* " *conſent*." They ordered it to be added farther, that " they them- " ſelves, could they have deigned to act unjuſtly, had concluded be- " fore this an alliance with the Argives, as they were already attend- " ing and ſoliciting ſuch a meaſure." And having ſubjoined their inſtructions, in relation to all other points in which they thought themſelves aggrieved, they ſent away the embaſſadors in commiſſion along with Nicias. Theſe, being arrived and having reported their inſtructions, added in concluſion, that " unleſs they would renounce " their alliance with the Bœotians if ſtill refuſing their acceſſion to " the peace, they would admit the Argives and their aſſociates into " league;" — the Lacedæmonians replied, " They would never re- " nounce their alliance with the Bœotians:" For the party of Xenares

the *Ephorus*, and all who acted in the same combination, had still the majority: However, at the request of Nicias they renewed the oaths. Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart without settling any one point of his commission, and of falling under public censure (which really came to pass) as undoubted author of the peace with the Lacedæmonians. And when, upon his return, the Athenians had heard that no one point was adjusted at Lacedæmon, they immediately conceived the warmest indignation: And looking upon themselves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing the Argives and their associates, who were still at Athens, they entered into treaty and an alliance offensive and defensive with them, as followeth:

Alliance between Argos and Athens.

" THE Athenians and Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans for " themselves and their respective dependents on all sides, have made " a peace, to continue for the term of a hundred years, without fraud " and without violence, both at land and at sea.

" Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms —— either by the Ar- " gives and Eléans and Mantinéans, or their dependents, against the " Athenians and dependents of the Athenians —— or, by the Athe- " nians and their dependents against the Argives and Eléans and Man- " tinéans and their dependents, without any artifice or evasion " whatsoever. —— On these conditions the Athenians and Argives " and Eléans and Mantinéans to be confederates for one hundred " years.

" Provided, that in case an enemy invade the territory of the Athe- " nians, the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans march to the suc- " cour of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a summons received " from Athens, in the most vigorous manner they may be able, to " the fulness of their abilities.

" But if the enemy after ravaging be again withdrawn, the *State* under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the " Argives

" Argives and Mantinéans and Eléans and Athenians, and to be
" purſued with the offenſive arms of all thoſe confederate *States*.
" And farther, that it be not lawful for any of the contracting
" *States* to lay down their arms againſt that *State* which hath ſo of-
" fended, without the conſent of all the reſt.
" The Athenians alſo to march to the ſuccour of Argos and Man-
" tinea and Elis, in caſe an enemy invade the territory of the Eléans
" or that of the Mantinéans or that of the Argives, in ſtrict con-
" formity to a ſummons received from any of thoſe *States*, in the
" moſt vigorous manner they may be able, to the fulneſs of their
" abilities.
" But if the enemy after ravaging be again withdrawn, the *State*
" under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Athenians
" and Argives and Mantinéans and Eléans, and to be purſued with
" the offenſive arms of all theſe confederate *States*.
" And farther, that it be not lawful to lay down arms againſt the
" *State* which hath ſo offended, without the joint-conſent of all theſe
" contracting *States*.
" That no armed force be admitted to paſs in order for war
" through any of their reſpective dominions, or thoſe of their re-
" ſpective dependents; nor along their ſea; unleſs ſuch a paſſage be
" granted unanimouſly by all the contracting parties, by the Athe-
" nians and Argives and Mantinéans and Eléans.
" Agreed farther, that when the auxiliaries attend, the *State*
" which ſummoned them ſupply them with thirty days provi-
" ſion ſo ſoon as they ſhall have entered the territory of the *State*
" which ſummoned their attendance, and the ſame at their de-
" parture.
" And, if there be occaſion for the attendance of ſuch an auxi-
" liary force for a larger ſpace, that the *State* which ſent for it
" maintain that force by paying to every ſoldier heavy-armed and
light-

" light-armed and every archer, three *oboli* of Ægina [6] a day, and a " *drachma* of Ægina to every horſeman.

" But the *State* which ſent for auxiliaries to have the ſupreme " command, ſo long as the war continueth within its diſtrict.

" If farther, it be agreed by the contracting *States* to act offenſively " with their united forces, the command then to be equally divided " among all the *States*.

" That the Athenians ſwear to obſerve theſe articles, in their own " names and thoſe of their dependents; but the Argives and Manti- " néans and Eléans and the dependents of theſe are to ſwear ſepa- " rately, each *State* for itſelf.

" Each party to take the oath in the moſt ſolemn faſhion of their " own country, in the moſt ſacred manner, with the choiceſt vic- " tims. The terms of the oath to be thus conceived, — *I will ſtand* " *by the alliance according to covenant, juſtly, honeſtly, and ſincerely;* " *and I will not tranſgreſs its obligation by any fraud or evaſion* " *whatſoever.*

" To be ſworn ——

" At Athens, by the ſenate and city-magiſtrates: The Preſidents " in courſe to adminiſter the oath.

" At Argos, by the ſenate and the eighty and the Artynæ: The " eighty to adminiſter the oath.

" At Mantinea, by the Demiurgi and the ſenate and the other ma- " giſtrates: The Theori and Polemarchs to adminiſter the oath.

" At Elis, by the Demiurgi, and the officers of ſtate and the ſix " hundred: The Demiurgi and the keepers of the ſacred records to " adminiſter the oath.

6 The value of three oboli of Ægina is about ſix pence, and the drachma of Ægina nearly one ſhilling *Engliſh*. For, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the talent of Ægina conſiſted of a hundred Attic *minæ*, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent, in the proportion of one hundred to ſixty.

" Theſe

" Theſe oaths to be renewed. — For which purpoſe, the Athenians to repair to Elis and to Mantinéa and to Argos thirty days before the Olympic games. But the Argives and Eléans and Mantinéans are to repair to Athens ten days before the great Panathenæa.

" The articles relating to this peace and theſe oaths and this alliance to be inſcribed on a column of ſtone,

" By the Athenians, in the citadel:

" By the Argives, in the forum, in the temple of Apollo:

" By the Mantinéans, in the temple of Jupiter in the forum: And,

" All jointly to erect, by way of memorial, a brazen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now approaching.

" If it be judged expedient by any of the contracting *States* to make any additions to theſe articles already agreed, whatever in purſuance of this be deemed proper by the joint-determination of all parties, the ſame to be valid."

A peace and alliance offenſive and defenſive was in this manner concluded. And thoſe ſubſiſting between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, were not, upon this account, renounced by either ſide.

The Corinthians however, who were confederates of the Argives, refuſed to accede; but, what is more, they had never ſworn to the alliance made previous to this between the Eléans and Argives and Mantinéans — " to have the ſame foes and the ſame friends." They pretended, that the defenſive league already made was quite ſufficient — " to ſuccour one another, but not to concur in an offenſive " war." In this manner the Corinthians were drawing off from the league, and again warped in their inclinations towards the Lacedæmonians. Corinthians.

The

Lacedæmonians *forbid to be preſent at the* Olympic *games.*

The Olympics were ſolemnized this ſummer, in which Androſthenes the Arcadian was for the firſt time victor in the *pancrace*, and the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple by the Eléans, ſo that they could neither ſacrifice nor enter the liſts. They had not diſcharged the fine ſet upon them by the Eléans, by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged them with a conveyance of arms into the fort of Phyrcon and with throwing ſome of their heavy-armed into Lepréum, during the Olympic ceſſation. The fine impoſed was * two thouſand *minæ*, at the rate of two *minæ* for every heavy-armed ſoldier, agreeably to the letter of the law.

The Lacedæmonians upon this diſpatched an embaſſy to remonſtrate againſt the injuſtice of the ſentence, that "the ceſſation had "not been notified at Lacedæmon, when they threw in their "heavy-armed."

The Eléans replied, that "the ceſſation was already in force: "For they proclaim it firſt amongſt themſelves; and ſo, whilſt they "were quiet, and expected no ſuch uſage, they had been wronged "by a ſurpriſe."

The Lacedæmonians retorted, that "if ſo, it was needleſs for "them to proceed to a publication of it in Lacedæmon, if the "Eléans had already judged themſelves wronged. But the fact was "far different in the light they ſaw it, and treſpaſs had not been "cómmitted in any ſhape whatever."

But the Eléans adhered to their firſt charge, that "they could "not be perſuaded the Lacedæmonians had not wronged them; yet "in caſe they are willing to ſurrender Lepréum to them, they are "ready to remit their ſhare of the fine, and to pay for them that "part of it which was due to the God."

But when this would not content, it was urged again by the Eléans, that "if they were unwilling to part with it they ſhould by no "means ſurrender Lepréum; but then, as they were deſirous to

* 2000 minæ = 6458 *l.* 6 *s.* 8 *d.* Sterling.

"have

" have the uſe of the temple, they muſt go up to the altar of " Olympian Jupiter, and ſwear in the preſence of the Grecians that " they would hereafter pay the fine." — But, as they alſo refuſed to comply with this, the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple, the ſacrifice, and the games, and performed their own ſacrifices at home. Yet the reſt of the Grecians, except the Lepreatæ, were admitted to aſſiſt at the ſolemnity.

The Eléans however, apprehenſive they would ſacrifice by force, ſet a guard of their armed youths around the temple. Theſe were reinforced by the Argives and Mantinéans, a thouſand of each, and a party of Athenian horſe who were at Argos in readineſs to attend the feſtival. But a great conſternation had ſeized the whole aſſembly of united Greece, leſt the Lacedæmonians ſhould return with an armed force; more eſpecially, when Lichas the ſon of Arceſilaus a Lacedæmonian was ſcourged in the courſe by the under-officers; becauſe, when his chariot had gained the prize and the chariot of the Bœotian *State* was proclaimed victor, purſuant to the excluſion of the Lacedæmonians from the race, he ſtepped into the midſt of the aſſembly and crowned the charioteer, deſirous to make it known that the chariot belonged to him. Upon this, the whole aſſembly was more than ever alarmed, and it was fully expected that ſome ſtrange event would follow. The Lacedæmonians however made no buſtle; and the feſtival paſſed regularly through its train.

After the Olympics, the Argives and their confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to ſolicit the concurrence of that *State*. A Lacedæmonian embaſſy happened alſo to be there. Many conferences were held, and nothing finally determined; but upon feeling the ſhock of an earthquake they parted each to their reſpective cities. And here the ſummer ended.

In the enſuing winter, a battle was fought by the Heracleots of Trachis againſt the Ænianians and Dolopians and Melienſians and ſome of the Theſſalians. For the bordering nations were enemies to Heraclea.

the city of Heraclea; as this latter place had been fortified for their more eſpecial annoyance. From its foundation they had ever oppoſed it, preventing its growth to the utmoſt of their power; and at this time they defeated the Heracleots in a battle, in which Xenares the ſon of Cnidis, the Lacedæmonian commandant, was ſlain: A number alſo of the Heracleots periſhed. And thus the winter ended: And the twelfth year of the war came alſo to an end.

YEAR XIII.

Before Chriſt 419. THE ſucceeding ſummer was no ſooner begun than the Bœotians, viewing the low eſtate to which it had been reduced by the late battle, took into their own hands the city of Heraclea, and diſcharged Hegeſippidas the Lacedæmonian commandant, as guilty of male-adminiſtration. They took this city into their own hands, from the apprehenſion that, during the embroilments of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponneſus, the Athenians might ſeize it. The Lacedæmonians however were chagrined at this ſtep of the Bœotians.

Alcibiades. This ſame ſummer alſo, Alcibiades the ſon of Clinias being general of the Athenians, with the concurrence of the Argives and their allies, entered Peloponneſus with a ſmall party of heavy-armed Athenians and archers; and enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids of the confederates in thoſe quarters; where, he not only made ſuch a diſpoſition of affairs as might beſt anſwer the views of the alliance, but alſo traverſing Peloponneſus with his force, he both perſuaded the Patreans to continue their works quite down to the ſea, and intended alſo to execute a plan of his own for erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia [7]. But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and

7 This was a grand project indeed. It aimed at no leſs than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all the navigation of that trading and opulent

and all ſuch as were alarmed at the annoyance this fort might give them, ruſhed out to prevent him, and obliged him to deſiſt.

War between the Epidaurians *and* Argives.

The ſame ſummer, a war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The pretext was grounded on a victim due from the Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an acknowledgment for their paſtures: For the Argives were now the chief managers of the temple. But, this pretended grievance ſet apart, it had been judged expedient by Alcibiades and the Argives to get poſſeſſion if poſſible of Epidaurus, in order to prevent moleſtation on the ſide of Corinth, and to render the paſſage of Athenian ſuccours more expeditious from Ægina than by fetching a compaſs about Scyllæum. The Argives therefore were intent on their preparations, as reſolved to take the field and act againſt Epidaurus, in order to exact the victim by force of arms.

The Lacedæmonians *take the field and ſoon retire.*

But about the ſame time, the Lacedæmonians alſo marched out with their whole force as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, towards Lycéum, under the command of Agis the ſon of Archidamus their king. Not a man was privy to the deſign of their thus taking the field, not even the *States* from which the quotas were furniſhed out. But when the victims they ſacrificed for a ſucceſsful campaign, proved inauſpicious, they again marched home; and circulated freſh orders to their confederates to be ready to take the field again after the next month, which was the month Carneïus [8], the grand

lent city through the bay of Criſſa. The Athenians were already intire maſters of the ſea on the other ſide of the iſthmus.

8 This feſtival was obſerved by moſt cities in Greece, but with the greateſt pomp and ſolemnity at Sparta, where it began the thirteenth of the month Carneïus according to the Lacedæmonian ſtile, and laſted nine days. A camp was formed for its celebration, in which they continued during the whole ſolemnity, and obſerved ſtrict military diſcipline. By this means, as we find a little lower, the Argives, in this inſtance no ſlaves to ſuperſtition, attended to the feſtival and warfare at the ſame time, and annoyed the Epidaurians,

The Argives *take the field.*

grand feſtival of the Dorians. But when they were thus withdrawn, the Argives, taking the field on the twenty-ſeventh day of the month preceding Carneïus, and tho' celebrating their own feſtival that very day, continued all this intermediate time to make incurſions and ravages upon Epidauria. The Epidaurians ſent about to ſolicit the ſuccours of their allies, ſome of whom excuſed themſelves as bound to obſerve the approaching feſtivals; tho' others advanced as far as the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refuſed to act. And, during the ſpace of time that the Argives were in Epidauria, embaſſies from the ſeveral *States* held a congreſs at Mantinéa, at the requeſt of the Athenians; and proceeding to a conference, Ephamidas the Corinthian remonſtrated, that "their words were by no means "conſiſtent with their actions. For whilſt they were here ſitting "together upon the terms of peace, the Epidaurians and allies, and "the Argives were oppoſing one another in arms: That, conſe-"quently, the firſt thing to be done, was to ſend deputations on both "ſides to diſband thoſe armies, and then orderly to proceed to treat "of peace." Yielding therefore to the juſtice of ſuch a remonſtrance, they fetched the Argives out of Epidauria; and returning to the congreſs, they were not able even then to agree together; upon which the Argives once more entered Epidauria, and reſumed the ravage.

And the Lacedæmonians *again, but again retire.*

The Lacedæmonians now had taken the field, and were advanced to Caryæ. But, as now again the victims ſacrificed portended no ſucceſs to a campaign, they once more withdrew.

The Argives *retire.*

The Argives alſo, after ruining about a third of the territory of Epidauria, were returned home. In this incurſion they were aſſiſted by one thouſand heavy-armed Athenians with Alcibiades at their head, who having heard that the Lacedæmonians had now left the Epidaurians, whilſt religious awe reſtrained the friends of the latter from acting in their defence. See *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. i. p. 408.

field,

field, as their ſervice now was no longer needful, marched away. And in this manner the ſummer paſſed.

In the beginning of the next winter, the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, threw a body of men, to the number of three hundred with Ageſippidas as commandant, into Epidaurus by ſea. Upon this, the Argives repaired inſtantly to Athens with remonſtrances, that " tho' it was explicitly mentioned in the treaty " that no enemy ſhould be ſuffered to paſs through their reſpective do- " minions, yet they had permitted the Lacedæmonians to make this " paſſage by ſea without moleſtation [9]: Unleſs therefore they would " replace the Meſſenians and Helots in Pylus to annoy the Lacedæ- " monians, they ſhould deem themſelves aggrieved." Upon this the Athenians, at the inſtigation of Alcibiades, underwrote this charge upon the Laconic column, that " the Lacedæmonians were " guilty of perjury," and removed the Helots from Crania into Pylus to reſume their depredations, but refrained from any other act of hoſtility. Epidaurus.

In the courſe of this winter, tho' the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no regular battle was fought between them. The hoſtilities conſiſted of ambuſcades and ſkirmiſhes, in which according to the chance of action, ſome perſons periſhed on both ſides.

But in the cloſe of winter when the ſpring was now approaching, the Argives, provided with ladders for ſcale, came under Epidaurus, hoping to take it by ſurpriſe, as inſufficiently manned by reaſon of the war: But failing of ſucceſs, they ſoon withdrew. And then the winter ended; and with it ended alſo the thirteenth year of the war.

9 The Argives in this remonſtrance acknowledge the dominion of the ſea, even on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, to belong to Athens.

YEAR

YEAR XIV.

Before Christ 418.

ABOUT the middle of the enſuing ſummer, when their confederates the Epidaurians were ſadly diſtreſſed, when ſome of the Peloponneſians were already revolted and others ſhewed plainly a ſpirit of diſcontent, the Lacedæmonians were clearly convinced, that unleſs expeditiouſly prevented the miſchief would ſpread abroad. Upon this they took the field againſt Argos with their whole force, both themſelves and their Helots: and Agis the ſon of Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians commanded in chief. They were attended in the field by the Tegeatæ, and all the other Arcadians whatever confederated with the Lacedæmonians. But the allies of the other parts of Peloponneſus, and thoſe without the Iſthmus, were aſſembled at Phlius; — The Bœotians, conſiſting of five thouſand heavy-armed, and the ſame number of light-armed, five hundred horſemen each attended by a ſoldier on foot; — The Corinthians, of two thouſand heavy-armed; — The other confederates, with their ſeveral quotas; — but the Phliaſians, with the whole of their force, becauſe the army was aſſembled in their diſtrict.

The Lacedæmonians *march out again.*

And the Argives.

The Argives, who had ſome time before intelligence of the Lacedæmonian preparations and that *ſince* they were filing towards Phlius in order to join the forces aſſembled there, now took the field themſelves. They were joined by a ſuccour of the Mantinéans, ſtrengthened by the addition of their dependents, and three thouſand heavy-armed Eléans. Upon their march, they fell in with the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party poſts itſelf on a riſing ground. The Argives got every thing in readineſs to attack the Lacedæmonians, whilſt yet they were alone. But Agis, diſlodging by night and ſtealing a march, compleated his junction with the body of confederates at Phlius. When this was perceived by the Argives, they drew off early the next dawn, firſt of all to Argos, and then to the

the pafs upon the route of Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedæmonians with their confederates would fall into their country. Yet Agis took not that route which they expected ; but, having communicated his defign to the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians and Epidaurians, he took a different route tho' much lefs practicable, and defcended into the plains of Argos. The Corinthians and Pellenians and Phliafians followed, by another more direct route. And orders had been given to the Bœotians and Megaréans and Sicyonians, to take the route that leadeth to Nemea, on which the Argives were pofted, that in cafe the Argives fhould march into the plain to make head againft the Lacedæmonians, the laft with their cavalry might prefs upon their rear.

After thefe difpofitions and fuch a defcent into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and other places ; upon intelligence of which the Argives, fo foon as it was day, diflodged from Nemea to ftop the depredations, and on their march met with the body of Phliafians and Corinthians ; and, encountering, flew fome few of the Phliafians, whilft a not much greater number of their own men were deftroyed by the Corinthians. The Bœotians alfo and Megaréans and Sicyonians took the route of Nemea conformably to orders, and found the Argives already diflodged. But the latter, upon entering the plain and a view of the ravage made upon their lands, drew up in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians ftood regularly drawn up on the other fide. And now the Argives were fhut up in the middle of their enemies. For on the fide of the plain, the Lacedæmonians and thofe in their body intercepted their return to the city : On the high ground above them were the Corinthians and Phliafians and Pellenians : On the other part towards Nemea, were the Bœotians and Sicyonians and Megaréans. Cavalry they had none : For the Athenians were the only party of their confederacy, who were not yet come up.

The bulk indeed of the Argives and confederates apprehended not the danger, which at preſent environed them, to be ſo great; but rather concluded they might engage with advantage, and that they had caught the Lacedæmonians faſt within their territory and near to Argos itſelf. Two Argives however, Thraſyllus one of the five in command, and Alciphron the public hoſt of the Lacedæmonians, the very inſtant the armies were moving to the charge, had addreſſed themſelves to Agis and propoſed expedients to prevent a battle, giving their word that "the Argives were ready to do and to ſubmit to "juſtice, upon a fair and equitable arbitration, in caſe the Lacedæ-"monians had any charge againſt them; and for the future "would live at peace, if a preſent accommodation could be "effected."

In this manner theſe Argives preſumed to talk, merely of themſelves, and without the public authority. Agis alſo, by his own private determination, accepted the propoſals; and, without reporting them to the council of war, without canvaſſing things maturely himſelf, or at leaſt communicating only with one perſon of the number

A truce. which had authority in the army, grants them a four months truce, "in which ſpace they were to make good what engagements they "had now made:" and then, inſtantly drew off the army, without imparting the reaſons of his conduct to the other confederates. The Lacedæmonians indeed and confederates followed when he led them off, becauſe their laws exacted ſuch obedience; yet, amongſt themſelves were laviſh of their cenſure againſt Agis, that when ſo fine an opportunity of engaging was in their power, when their enemies were hemmed in on all ſides both by their horſe and their foot, they were drawn off without performing any thing worthy of ſuch mighty preparations: For, to this very day, a finer army of Grecians had never appeared in the field. A moſt gallant figure in truth it made, whilſt they were all together at Nemea. The Lacedæmonians were there to be ſeen with the whole collected force of their *State*, accompanied

companied by the Arcadians, and Bœotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Pellenians, and Phliaſians, and Megaréans. The troops which compoſed their ſeveral quotas were all picked men, and were judged a match in the field of battle, not only for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition of double ſtrength. This great army however, laying all the time moſt heavy imputations on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and were diſbanded to their ſeveral habitations.

On the other part alſo, the Argives were ſtill much more exaſperated againſt thoſe, who had made this ſuſpenſion without public authority. They imagined the Lacedæmonians had eſcaped them when they had the fineſt opportunity of ſtriking a blow, inaſmuch as the conteſt muſt have been decided under the very walls of Argos, and in company with a numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, upon their return, at the Charadrum, the place where the crimes committed in an expedition are adjudged before they enter the city, they were beginning to ſtone Thraſyllus, who flying to an altar eſcapeth with life: His effects however they confiſcated to public uſe.

But after this came up the Athenian ſuccour, conſiſting of a thouſand heavy-armed and three hundred horſemen commanded by Laches and Nicoſtratus. The Argives, who after all were afraid to break the agreement with the Lacedæmonians, ordered them "to be "gone forthwith;" and, tho' they requeſted a conference, refuſed to introduce them into the aſſembly of the people, till the Mantinéans and Eléans, who were not yet departed, by great importunity obtained a compliance. Here the * Athenians, in the preſence of Alcibiades their embaſſador, aſſembled with the Argives and their allies, averred that "the ſuſpenſion was not valid, ſince agreed to "without the conſent of the body of the confederates; now there-"fore, as themſelves were come up opportunely to their aſſiſtance, "they were obliged in honour to proſecute the war." The confederates allowed the force of this argument; and the whole alliance,

* Laches and Nicoſtratus.

except the Argives, marched inſtantly away againſt Orchomenus of Arcadia. But even the Argives, tho' they ſtayed behind at firſt, were perſuaded by ſuch reaſoning, and ſoon after went alſo to take part in the expedition. Thus united, they ſat down before and beſieged Orchomenus. They made ſeveral aſſaults upon it, deſirous for other reaſons to get it into their hands, but more particularly becauſe the hoſtages from Arcadia were lodged in that city by the Lacedæmonians.

Orchomenus beſieged.

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakneſs of their walls and the multitude of the beſiegers, and leſt as no relief appeared they ſhould ſoon be exhauſted, thought proper to capitulate on theſe conditions — "to be received into the confederacy; — to give hoſtages "of their own body; — and, to deliver up to the Mantinéans thoſe "whom the Lacedæmonians had lodged with them."

Having thus got poſſeſſion of Orchomenus, the confederates in the next place held a conſultation, "againſt what other city in their plan "of conqueſt they ſhould next proceed." The Eléans exhorted them to march againſt Lepréum; but the Mantinéans againſt Tegea: and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the Mantinéans. The Eléans upon this were offended, that they had not voted for the ſiege of Lepréum, and ſeparated to their own home. But the reſt of the confederates ſet about preparations at Mantinéa, as fully bent on the ſiege of Tegea. And even ſome of the citizens of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that city to betray it to them.

Complaints againſt Agis.

But the Lacedæmonians, after they were withdrawn from Argos in purſuance of the ſuſpenſion of arms for four months, laid heavy charges upon Agis for not conquering Argos at ſo fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they had reaſon to expect; — "ſince ſo numerous "and ſo gallant a body of confederates could never again without "greater difficulty be aſſembled together." And when afterwards the news arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their indignation became more violent than ever. In ſuch a ferment they inſtantly reſolved,

ſolved, tho' not conſiſtently with the calm Lacedæmonian temper, that " his houſe muſt needs be demoliſhed and a fine of * one hun- * 2000 l. Sterling.
" dred thouſand drachmas be impoſed upon Agis." He earneſtly pleaded againſt the execution of the ſentence, that " in another ex-
" pedition he would purge the charge by ſome notable ſervice to the
" *State*; if not, they might then proceed to puniſh him at plea-
" ſure." Upon this they ſuſpended the fine and demolition, but paſſed a law on the preſent occaſion, ſuch as never before had been made amongſt them: For they elected a committee of ten *Spartans* to attend him as a council, without whoſe concurrence he was not permitted to lead out their army into the field.

In the mean time a meſſage is brought them from their friends at Tegea, that " unleſs they come thither with the utmoſt expedition,
" Tegea will revolt from them to the Argives and their confederates,
" and is only not revolted already."

The Lacedæmonians take the field again.

To prevent this, the whole Lacedæmonian ſtrength both of citizens and Helots is levied with more ſharpneſs, than had ever been known before; and taking the field they marched to Oreſtéum of Mænalia. An order was ſent beforehand to their Arcadian allies to aſſemble and follow them directly towards Tegea.

But when the whole Lacedæmonian ſtrength was thus marched to Oreſtéum, the ſixth part of the number, conſiſting of the more aged and younger claſſes, was from thence again diſmiſſed to Sparta to take upon them the guard of that place, whilſt the reſt of their military force marcheth to Tegea: and not long after their Arcadian confederates join them.

They ſent alſo to Corinth, to the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, a ſummons of ſpeedy aid into the Mantinéan. But for ſome of theſe the ſummons was too ſhort; and for the reſt it was by no means an eaſy taſk to take the field in ſeparate bodies, and waiting for their mutual junction, to force their paſſage through an enemy's country; for ſuch lay between to obſtruct their advance: However,

they were earneſtly bent to attempt it. The Lacedæmonians, in the mean time, inlarged with ſuch Arcadian parties as were already come up, marched on and broke into the Mantinéan; and having formed their camp near the temple of Hercules, thèy ravaged the country.

The armies in ſight of one another.

The Argives and their allies, when their enemy was thus in ſight, having poſted themſelves on a ſpot of ground by nature ſtrong and difficult of approach, drew up in order as ready to engage. The Lacedæmonians alſo immediately advanced towards them, and even approached ſo near as within the caſt of a ſtone or a dart. But one of the old experienced *Spartans*, perceiving that they were to attack ſo difficult a poſt, roared out aloud to Agis [1] that "he was "going to repair one evil by another;" as if by his preſent ill-judged eagerneſs, he was bent on making reparation for his cenſured retreat from Argos. Upon this, either ſtruck with ſuch an exclamation, or whether upon a ſudden his own thoughts ſuggeſted to him a different conduct, he drew off his army again with all poſſible expedition before the battle could be joined. And wheeling from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a ſtream of water into the Mantinéan, about which, as apt to do great damage to the lands on which ſide ſoever it flowed, the Mantinéans and Tegeatæ are eternally at blows. It was his ſcheme, to draw down the Argives and their allies from their ſtrong poſt on the eminence in order to prevent the turning of this ſtream ſo ſoon as they knew it was in agitation, and thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the plain. In purſuance of this, he halted the whole

1 Plutarch ſays it was an apothegm of this Agis, that Lacedæmonians never ask concerning their enemies, "How many "are they?" but, "where are they?" And, that when he was hindered from fighting at Mantinéa, he ſaid, "They, "who would rule over many, muſt "fight againſt many:" And, being asked what was the number of the Lacedæmonians, he replied, "Enow to "beat cowards."

day

day upon the ſtream, and accompliſhed its diverſion. But the Argives and their allies, ſurpriſed at this ſudden and precipitate retreat, had been at firſt unable to conjecture what it meant. At length, when the enemy was totally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, after lying inactively in their poſts and no orders received for a purſuit, they began a ſecond time to lay heavy imputations on their own commanders, — that " on the former occaſion the Lacedæmonians, " when fairly caught near Argos, had been ſuffered to eſcape; that " now again, tho' they were openly flying, not a ſoul muſt purſue " them, but through ſhameful indolence their enemies are preſerved, " and themſelves are treacherouſly betrayed." The commanders, upon the firſt noiſe of theſe clamours were highly chagrined, but afterwards they marched them down from the eminence, and advancing into the plain incamped them there, as determined to fight the enemy. The day following the Argives and allies were drawn up to be in readineſs for action ſhould the enemy appear. And the Lacedæmonians, marching away from the ſtream to re-occupy their former camp near the temple of Hercules, on a ſudden perceived that the whole body of their foes were ready drawn up in order of battle, and had quitted their ſtrong poſt on the eminence.

At this criſis, the Lacedæmonians were ſtruck with a greater aſtoniſhment than the memory of man could parallel. For now, in an interval of time exceeding ſhort, they were bound to get every thing in readineſs for fight: Yet, ſuch was their diligence, that in an inſtant they were formed into a beautiful array, Agis their king iſſuing all the neceſſary orders according to the law: For, when a king leadeth their armies, all orders are given by him. He himſelf declareth what he willeth to be done to the * *General-Officers*: They carry his orders to the † *Colonels*: Theſe, to the ‡ *Captains*; who afterwards forward them to the § *Subalterns*; by whom they are communicated to all the private men under their reſpective commands. The orders, when any ſuch are requiſite, are in this method diſperſed and circulated

* Polemarchs.
† Lochages.
‡ Pentecontators.
§ Enomatarchs.

circulated with the greateſt expedition. For in the Lacedæmonian armies, almoſt the whole ſoldiery, few only excepted, have a command aſſigned in regular ſubordination; and the care of executing orders is incumbent upon numbers.

In their preſent array, the left wing conſiſted of the Skiritæ, who of all the Lacedæmonians ever claim this poſt as their peculiar right: Next them were poſted the Braſidéan ſoldiers who had ſerved in Thrace, accompanied by thoſe who had lately been honoured with the freedom of Sparta: Then along the line were regularly poſted all the troops which were compoſed of pure Lacedæmonians: Next to them ſtood the Heréans of Arcadia; and beyond them the Mænalians. In the right wing were the Tegeatæ, but in the utmoſt extent of it ſome few Lacedæmonians. Their cavalry was equally poſted on both the wings. And in this form was the Lacedæmonian diſpoſition made.

On the ſide of the enemy, the Mantinéans had the right wing, becauſe the buſineſs fell upon their ground: Next to them were the allies from Arcadia: Then a picked body of Argives, to the number of a thouſand, who long had been exerciſed in the ſtudy of arms in the public ſchool at Argos; and next to them ſtood the reſt of the Argive forces: Theſe were followed by their own confederates, the Cleonéans and Orneatæ. The Athenians were ranged in the outermoſt body, and compoſed the left wing, ſupported by their own cavalry. Such was the order and diſpoſition on both ſides.

The army of the Lacedæmonians had the appearance of ſuperior numbers. But exactly to write the number either of the ſeveral bodies on each ſide, or of their whole force, I own myſelf unable. The amount of the Lacedæmonians was not known, becauſe of the profound ſecrecy obſerved in their polity; and the amount of their enemies, becauſe of the oſtentation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their own ſtrength, hath been ſtill diſbelieved. However from the following computation, an inquirer may diſcover the number of

of the Lacedæmonians, who on this occaſion were drawn up in the field.

Beſides the Skiritæ, who were in number ſix hundred, ſeven *battalions* were in this engagement. Now in every *battalion* there were four *companies*; and in every *company*, four *platoons*. In the firſt rank of every *platoon* were four fighting ſoldiers. In regard to depth they were not equally formed, as every *colonel* determined the depth at his own private diſcretion, but generally they were drawn up eight deep. The front-line of their whole force, excepting the Skiritæ, conſiſted of four hundred and forty-eight men [2].

When both ſides were ready, the ſmall reſpite before the engagement was employed by the ſeveral commanders in animating the ſoldiers under their reſpective orders.

To the Mantinéans it was urged —— That "the points, for which "they were going to fight, were their country and their future fate, "either rule or ſlavery; that of rule, whoſe ſweets they had known, "they might not be diveſted, and that they might never feel again "what ſlavery is."

To the Argives —— It was "for their ancient ſovereignty, and "the equal ſhare of dignity they had once enjoyed in Peloponneſus, "now timely to prevent an eternal ſubmiſſion to ſuch loſſes, and earn "revenge for the many injuries a neighbouring *State*, unrelenting in "its enmity, had done them.

2 The Lacedæmonian *mora* or brigade conſiſted of four *lochi* or battalions = 2048 men. For a *lochos* or battalion conſiſted of four *pentecoſties* or companies = 512 men; a *pentecoſty* or company of four *enomatiæ* or platoons = 128 men; and each *enomatia* or platoon conſiſted of 32. This is the account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 in front and 8 in depth. The platoon conſiſted therefore of 32, which × by 4 = 128 the number of a company, which alſo × by 4 = 512 the number of a battalion. The number of battalions was ſeven, which ſhews the number of the Lacedæmonians to have been 3584; and then, with the addition of 600 *Skiritæ* who were poſted on the left, [illegible] in the whole to 4184 men. Or [illegible], the whole front line = 448 × 8, the number in depth, is equal to 3584 + 600 *Skiritæ* = 4184.

L[illegible]

But, to the Athenians —— That " in honour they were obliged to " ſignalize their valour in a conſpicuous manner, in the company of " numerous and gallant allies: That, ſhould they gain a victory over " the Lacedæmonians on Peloponneſian ground, their own empire " would be eſtabliſhed and inlarged, and no enemy would ever again " preſume to invade their territories."

And in this manner were the Argives and their confederates animated to the fight.

But the Lacedæmonians were encouraging one another, and during martial ſtrains injoined by their diſcipline, like men of bravery as they were, each animated his neighbour with a recital of the gallant acts they had performed together. They were perſons who knew, that a long experience in the toils of war conduceth more to preſervation than a ſhort verbal harangue how finely ſo ever delivered.

And now the armies were mutually approaching. The Argives and their allies advanced in a brisk and angry manner; but the Lacedæmonians moved ſlowly forwards to the ſound of many flutes, the muſic which their laws ordain; not from any religious motive, but for advancing with equal ſteps, keeping time with the notes to prevent all diſorders in the ranks, accidents very frequent in large armies whilſt drawing to an encounter [3].

But

3 *Milton* hath made uſe of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn and raiſe his own noble poetry. It was full and ſtrong in his imagination, when he wrote the following lines. *Paradiſe Loſt*, Book I.

---- Anon they move
In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and ſoft recorders; ſuch as rais'd
To height of nobleſt temper Heroes old
Arming to battle; and inſtead of rage,
Deliberate valour breath'd, firm, and unmov'd
With dread of death to flight or foul retreat;
Nor wanting pow'r to mitigate and ſwage,
With ſolemn touches, troubled thoughts and chace
Anguiſh, and doubt, and fear, and ſorrow, and pain,
From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they

Breathing

But during the approach, Agis the king bethought himſelf of making a new diſpoſition. — It is the conſtant caſe with all armies, that upon the right their wings, whilſt they approach one another, extend themſelves too far, ſo that conſtantly on both ſides the left wing is over-reached and flanked by the enemy's right. This proceedeth from the dread every ſoldier lieth under of being expoſed on his unarmed ſide, which maketh him eager to get it covered by the ſhield of the next perſon on his right, and poſitive that a firm cloſing together in this manner will render them impenetrable to the ſhock of the enemy. This turn of the body is firſt begun by the right-hand man of the whole front, and is the reſult of his conſtant care to ſhift his defenceleſs ſide from the aim of the foe; and the dread of being in the ſame manner expoſed obligeth all the reſt to follow his motion. And thus, in the preſent approach, the Mantinéans in their wing had far over-reached the Skiritæ; but the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ had done ſo more in regard to the Athenians, in proportion as they exceeded them in numbers. — Agis therefore, fearing leſt the left wing of the Lacedæmonians might be quite ſurrounded, and judging that the Mantinéans quite too far over-reached them, ſent orders to the Skiritæ and Braſideans to wheel away from the ſpot where they were firſt poſted, and fill up the extremity of the line ſo as to render it equal to the Mantinéans: And to ſupply the void thus made, he ordered from the right wing two *battalions*, commanded by *general-officers*, Hipponoïdas and Ariſtocles, to repair thither and falling

Breathing united force, with fixed thought
Mov'd on in ſilence to ſoft pipes, that charm'd
Their painful ſteps o'er the burnt ſoil: and now
Advanc'd in view, they ſtand, a horrid front
Of dreadful length, and dazling arms, in guiſe
Of warriors old with order'd ſpear and ſhield,
Awaiting what command their mighty Chief
Had to impoſe: he through the armed files
Darts his experienc'd eye, and ſoon traverſe
The whole battalion views their order due.

in to close up the ranks; judging, that their own right would still be more than sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing opposed to the Mantinéans might by this disposition be properly strengthened. But as he issued these orders in the very onset and close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and Hipponoïdas absolutely refused to change their post (tho' for such disobedience, as apparently the result of cowardice, they were afterwards banished from Sparta); and, before the new disposition could be compleated, the enemy had begun to charge. Upon the refusal of these two battalions to change their post, Agis countermanded those marching to strengthen the Skiritæ to their former places, who now were unable to fall into the ranks or close together with those whom they had quitted: But on this occasion more remarkably than ever, the Lacedæmonians, tho' in all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their superiority in true manly valour.

Battle of Mantinea.

For, to come to particulars, when once they were at blows with the enemy, the right wing of the Mantinéans routs their Skiritæ and Brasidéans. Then the same Mantinéans, supported by their confederates and the thousand picked Argives, falling in at the void in the Lacedæmonian line which was not yet filled up, did great execution upon them: For taking them in flank they intirely broke them, drove them for shelter among their carriages, and made a slaughter of the old men who were appointed for their guard. And in this quarter the Lacedæmonians were clearly vanquished.

But in the other quarters, and especially in the centre where Agis the king was posted, and round him the horse-guards stiled *The three hundred*, falling upon those troops, which were composed of the elder Argives and them which are called the *Pentelochi*, and upon the Cleonéans and Orneatæ and those Athenians who ranked along with them, they broke them in an instant, so that many of them durst not stand to exchange a blow, but so soon as they felt the Lacedæmonian shock turned about at once, and others were trampled under foot in the great hurry they were in to secure their escape. But

But when the main body of the Argives and their allies was in this quarter routed, their foot on both the flanks were inſtantly diſcomfited. Now alſo the right of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the advantage of ſuperior numbers, had over-reached and incompaſſed the Athenians. Theſe now on all hands were beſet with danger; in this quarter they were ſurrounded by their enemies, in another they were already vanquiſhed: And they muſt have ſuffered the moſt of any part of the army, had it not been for the excellent ſupport their own cavalry gave them. It happened alſo, that Agis, when he perceived that the Mantinéans and the thouſand Argives had got the better on the left, commanded the whole army to wheel off to the ſupport of the vanquiſhed. And whilſt this was executing, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, which this motion of the enemy and their drawing off from around them occaſioned, to ſecure their own eſcape without any oppoſition, accompanied by the Argives who were alſo vanquiſhed with them.

But the Mantinéans, and thoſe who fought in company with them, and the picked band of Argives, were now no longer intent on preſſing upon their adverſaries; but, perceiving their own ſide to be compleatly vanquiſhed, and the Lacedæmonians approaching to their attack, they turned about and fled. Yet numbers of them periſhed, and thoſe chiefly Mantinéans; for the greateſt part of the picked band of Argives compleated their eſcape.

The flight however was not precipitate, nor the diſtance to a place of ſafety great. For the Lacedæmonians, till the enemy flieth, maintain their combats with long and ſteddy toil; but after a rout purſue them neither long nor far.

Victory on the Lacedæmonian *ſide.*

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the procedure of the whole battle, the greateſt that for many ages had been fought amongſt Grecians, and where the competition lay between moſt renowned and flouriſhing *States*. The Lacedæmonians, amaſſing together the arms of their enemies who had been ſlain, immediately erected a trophy,

and rifled the bodies of the dead. They alſo took up their own *dead* and carried them to Tegea, where they received the rights of ſepulture; and alſo delivered upon truce the ſlain of their enemy. There fell of the Argives and Orneatæ and Cleonéans ſeven hundred, and two hundred of the Mantinéans; two hundred alſo of the Athenians including the Æginetæ and their ſeveral commanders. On the Lacedæmonian ſide — as the confederates were never hard preſſed, what loſs they ſuffered is ſcarcely deſerving of notice; and the exact number of their own dead it is difficult to diſcover; but it was reported to have been about three hundred.

When a battle was certainly to be fought, Pleiſtionax the other king marched out to their ſupport with the whole body of citizens, both old men and youths. But when he was advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians alſo ſent meſſengers to countermand their allies from Corinth, and from without the Iſthmus. And, being themſelves returned to Sparta, after giving diſmiſſion to their allies, as the Carneian ſolemnities were at hand, they celebrate the feſtival. The imputation alſo of cowardice, at that time laid to their charge by the reſt of Greece, becauſe of their misfortune at Sphacteria, and ſome other inſtances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by this one action they compleatly purged away. Now it was determined, that their depreſſion had been merely the reſult of fortune, but that in inward bravery they were ſtill themſelves.

The day before this battle was fought, it happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole of their ſtrength, had made an incurſion into Argia as left defenceleſs, and had done great execution on the guards left behind at the general march of the Argives.

Epidaurus. Three thouſand heavy-armed Eléans, as auxiliaries to the Mantinéans, came up after the battle; as did alſo a thouſand Athenians to join the former body; upon which the whole alliance marched immediately againſt Epidaurus, whilſt the Lacedæmonians were ſolemnizing

lemnizing the Carneian feſtival. After an equal diſtribution of the work, they began to raiſe a circumvallation around that city. The reſt indeed ſoon deſiſted, but the Athenians conformably to their orders compleated theirs round the eminence, on which ſtood the temple of Juno. To guard this work the whole alliance left behind a ſufficient number draughted from their ſeveral bodies, and then departed to their reſpective homes: And the ſummer was now at an end.

In the firſt commencement of the ſucceeding winter, and after the celebration of the Carneian feſtival, the Lacedæmonians immediately took the field, and advancing as far as Tegea ſent from thence to Argos propoſals for an accommodation. There was already in that city a party in their intelligence, who were alſo bent on overturning the popular government at Argos; and, ſince the event of the late fatal battle, they were enabled to uſe more cogent arguments to perſuade the *many* into the accommodation. Their ſcheme was, firſt to enter into truce with the Lacedæmonians, as preparatory to an alliance offenſive and defenſive, which was next in agitation; and, this point carried, then immediately to execute their plot againſt the *people*. Lacedæmonians.

Lichas ſon of Arceſilaus, the public hoſt of the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, charged to make two demands in the name of the Lacedæmonians: the one, "whether war be ſtill their option?" the other, "how? if their choice be peace." Upon this a ſtrong debate aroſe, for Alcibiades was preſent. But the party, who acted in the Lacedæmonian intereſt, prevailed with the Argives to accept their propoſals of an accommodation, which were as followeth:

Preliminaries between Lacedæmonians and Argives.

"THUS reſolved by the Lacedæmonian council to compound "with the Argives ——

"Theſe to reſtore their children to the Orchomenians, and their "men to the Mænalians; to reſtore alſo to the Lacedæmonians their

"citizens

" citizens now detained at Mantinéa, to evacuate Epidaurus and de-
" moliſh their works.

" And the Athenians, if they will not quit Epidaurus, to be de-
" clared enemies to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and to
" the confederates of the Lacedæmonians and to the confederates of
" the Argives.

" And if the Lacedæmonians have in their power any young men,
" to releaſe them to all the *States*.

" In relation to the God [4], we conſent that an oath be adminiſtered
" to the Epidaurians, and we grant the form to be preſcribed by the
" Argives.

" The *States* of Peloponneſus, both ſmall and great, to be,
" none excepted, free, according to their own primitive con-
" ſtitutions.

" And if any *State* without Peloponneſus ſhall enter offenſively
" into the lands of Peloponneſus, ſuccours to be united, in purſu-
" ance of a general conſult of Peloponneſians about the determinate
" and moſt expedient methods.

" All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever without Pe-
" loponneſus ſhall enjoy the ſame privileges as thoſe of the Lacedæ-
" monians and thoſe of the Argives enjoy, each remaining in free
" poſſeſſion of their territories.

" Theſe articles to be communicated to the confederates, and ra-
" tification to be made, if they approve. If different methods ſeem
" adviſeable to the confederates, all parties to deſiſt and return di-
" rectly home."

Theſe propoſals, by way of preliminary, the Argives accepted; and the army of the Lacedæmonians was drawn off from Tegea to their own home. And afterwards, in the courſe of mutual negotia-

4 The *Pythian* Apollo. This article ſeems deſigned to adjuſt the quarrel about the victim, related in the tranſactions of the laſt year.

tion,

tion, the ſame party at Argos prevailed upon their countrymen to renounce their alliance with the Mantinéans and Eléans, and even with the Athenians, and to ſtrike up a peace and an alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Lacedæmonians. The tenor of it was this:

" RESOLVED thus by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives on a peace and an alliance offenſive and defenſive for the term of fifty years. *Alliance between* Argos *and* Sparta.

" They ſhall do juſtice to each other reciprocally, with impartiality and equity, according to their ſeveral forms of law.

" The other *States* in Peloponneſus, comprehended in this peace and alliance, ſhall continue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their own independence, holding the ſame territories, doing juſtice with impartiality and with equity, according to their ſeveral forms of law.

" All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever without Peloponneſus ſhall enjoy the ſame privileges with the Lacedæmonians themſelves; and the Argive confederates ſhall enjoy the ſame with the Argives themſelves; each holding their reſpective territories.

" If a joint-expedition be at any time requiſite, a conſultation to be held by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives about the determinate and moſt expedient methods of iſſuing orders to the reſt of the alliance.

" But if any controverſy ariſe between the *States*, either thoſe within or thoſe without Peloponneſus, either concerning their boundaries or any other point, it ſhall be determined by judges.

" And if any confederate *State* have a diſpute with another *State*, they ſhall go with a reference to that *State*, which to the contending *States* ſhall be thought moſt impartial: Private perſons

" however

" however to be judged by the laws of that *State* to which they are " ſubject."

This peace and ſuch an alliance was now perfected; and the reciprocal damages of war and all other offences were now buried in oblivion. And having already ſettled all points to general ſatisfaction, they concurred in a ſuffrage " to receive no herald nor embaſſy " from the Athenians, 'till they were withdrawn out of Peloponneſus, and had given up their fortifications at Epidaurus;" and farther " for the future to make neither peace nor war but with joint " *concurrence.*" Their attention was alſo extended to objects more remote; and in conjunction, they diſpatched embaſſadors to the cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and ſeduced Perdiccas to ſwear adherence to their league. Not that he inſtantly declared his revolt from the Athenians; but he was bent on accompliſhing it, ever ſince he ſaw the Argives had done it: For he was originally deſcended from Argos. They renewed alſo their ancient oaths to the Chalcidéans, and ſtrengthened them by the addition of new.

Epidaurus. The Argives alſo diſpatched an embaſſy to the Athenians, requiring them to quit the works they had raiſed at Epidaurus. The latter, ſenſible that their ſoldiers there were but a handful of men when compared with thoſe who were aſſociated with them in that ſervice, ſent Demoſthenes to draw them off. He, upon his arrival pretending to ſolemnize ſome martial game without the fortreſs, when the reſt of the garriſon was gone out to the ſpectacle, barred faſt the gates. And afterwards the Athenians, having renewed the peace with them, ſurrendered the fortifications they had raiſed into the hands of the Epidaurians.

Mantinéans. When the Argives had in this manner gone off from the alliance, the Mantinéans alſo, who at firſt ſtood out, finding at length that without the Argives they could do nothing of themſelves, thought proper

proper to accommodate their diſputes with the Lacedæmonians, and reſigned their command over the cities of Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians alſo and Argives, to the number of a thouſand each, marched in company to Sicyon; where, principally by the preſence of the Lacedæmonians, the government was ſhifted into the hands of a ſmaller number. And after tranſacting ſuch points in concert, they ſoon procured the demolition of the popular government at Argos, and an oligarchy, ſuited to the Lacedæmonian model, was erected in its ſtead. *Democracy overturned at Argos.*

As the winter was now in its cloſe, theſe tranſactions ran out nearly into the ſpring; and the fourteenth year of the war expired.

YEAR XV.

IN the following ſummer, the Dictidéans of Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidéans: And the Lacedæmonians re-ſettled the ſtate of Achaia, which for a time had been under a management not agreeable to them. *Before* Chriſt 417.

The *people* of Argos alſo, combining gradually together and reſuming their ſpirits, made an aſſault upon the *few*. They waited for a favourable opportunity, 'till the feſtival of the *naked games* was celebrating at Lacedæmon. A battle was fought within the precincts of Argos, in which the *people* was the victor. Some of their opponents they ſlew, and others they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedæmonians, when their adherents implored their ſuccour, were too dilatory in moving; but at laſt they adjourned the games, and marched away to their ſupport. And hearing when they were come to Tegea that "the *few* were vanquiſhed," they determined to proceed no farther, maugre all the intreaties of the new exiles; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, they reſumed the celebration of the games. Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations from thoſe in Argos, as well as by ſuch as had been lately baniſhed, in the preſence of the whole *Sedition at Argos.*

confederacy, after many arguments had been urged on both ſides, they came to a reſolution, that " the Argives in the city were guilty of " injuſtice;" and a decree was paſſed that " they ſhould march againſt " Argos." But after all, their proceedings were dilatory and remiſs.

In the mean time, the *people* of Argos, dreading the Lacedæmonian ſtrength, and re-addreſſing themſelves again to Athens for a renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute a plan which they thought the ſtrongeſt expedient of preſervation, built long walls quite down to the ſea, that in caſe they ſhould be blocked up by land, all proper ſupplies might be thrown into the city by ſea, through the good offices of the Athenians. To this ſcheme of new fortifications ſome cities alſo of Peloponneſus were privy underhand. The whole body of Argives without diſtinction, the citizens, their wives and their ſervants, forwarded the work; and from Athens they were ſupplied with carpenters and maſons. And here the ſummer ended.

The Lacedæmonians *march againſt* Argos.

Winter now ſucceeding, the Lacedæmonians, when advertiſed of theſe new fortifications, marched their forces againſt Argos, their own and all thoſe of their allies, excepting the Corinthian. Some new projects in their favour were now alſo in agitation within Argos itſelf. The whole army was commanded by Agis the ſon of Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians. The new turns they expected for their ſervice took not effect within the city: But they made themſelves maſters of the new-erected walls, and levelled them with the ground. They alſo took Hyſiæ a town in Argia; and, having put all the freemen found within that place to the ſword, they drew off and diſperſed to their ſeveral cities.

After this the Argives marched their force into Phliaſia; and, after ravaging that diſtrict, becauſe the exiles from Argos had met with a reception there, they again retired: For many of thoſe exiles had taken up their reſidence at Phlius.

In

In the ſame winter, the Athenians, exaſperated againſt Perdiccas, prevented all manner of importations into Macedonia. They charged him "with taking part in the late treaty confirmed by the "ſanction of oaths between the Argives and Lacedæmonians; that "farther, when they had made great preparations againſt the Chal-"cidéans of Thrace and Amphipolis, and Nicias the ſon of Nice-"ratus was appointed to command in that ſervice, he had violated "his obligations to act in concert, and *that* expedition came to no-"thing, purely through his receſſion: He was therefore an enemy "to Athens." Perdiccas.

The winter expired in this manner; and with it the fifteenth year of the war came alſo to an end.

YEAR XVI.

WHEN ſummer came on, Alcibiades with twenty ſail arrived at Argos, where he ſeized three hundred of the citizens, whoſe fidelity to the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacedæmonian intereſt was ſtill ſuſpected. And theſe the Athenians ſecured in the neighbouring iſlands, which were ſubject to their dominion. *Before* Chriſt 416. Alcibiades.

The Athenians alſo undertook the reduction of Melos with a naval force, conſiſting of thirty ſail of Athenians, ſix of Chians, and two of Leſbians, on board of which were tranſported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred archers, and twenty who drew the bow on horſeback. The number alſo of their dependents from the continent and iſlands which attended was about fifteen hundred heavy-armed. The Melians [5] are a colony of the Lacedæmonians; *Expedition againſt* Melos.

5 The original of this colony is curious according to the account given of it by Plutarch —— "When the Tyrrhenes were "maſters of Lemnos and Imbrus, and "made a practice of raviſhing the wives "of the Athenians at Brauron, a mixed "breed was the conſequence; whom, as "half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out "of the iſles. Thus exiled, they repaired "to Tænarus, and were uſeful to the Spartans

nians; and had therefore refuſed to receive law from the Athenians, in the ſame manner as the inhabitants of the other iſlands received it. At firſt however they had obſerved a ſtrict neutrality; but in proceſs of time, when the Athenians by ravaging their country would have obliged them to act offenſively, they openly took part in the war againſt them.

With a force ſo ſtrong as hath been deſcribed Cleomedes the ſon of Lycomedes and Tiſias the ſon of Tiſimachus landed and incamped upon the iſland. Yet, before they proceeded to hoſtilities, they ſent a deputation from the army to demand a conference, whom the Melians refuſed to introduce into the aſſembly of the people, but in the preſence only of the magiſtrates and the *few* commanded them to deliver their inſtructions. Upon this the Athenian deputation expreſſed themſelves as followeth:

" Spartans in their war againſt the Helots.
" They were afterwards rewarded for their
" good ſervices with the freedom of Sparta
" and liberty of intermarriage. Yet, not
" being allowed the honour of ſerving the
" offices of the ſtate or a ſeat in the coun-
" cil, they became afterwards ſuſpected,
" as caballing together for bad deſigns and
" projecting to overthrow the conſtitution.
" The Lacedæmonians therefore appre-
" hended them all, and throwing them
" into priſon, kept them confined under a
" ſtrong guard, till they could find out clear
" and inconteſtable evidence againſt them.
" The wives of the priſoners came in a
" body to the priſon, and after much prayer
" and intreaty were at length admitted by
" the guard to the ſight and diſcourſe of
" their husbands. When once they had
" gained acceſs, they ordered them imme-
" diately to ſtrip and change clothes with
" them, to leave them their own, and
" dreſſed in thoſe of their wives to make
" their eſcape directly in that diſguiſe.
" It was done; the women ſtaid behind,
" determined to endure whatever might
" be the conſequence; and the guards de-
" ceived by appearances let out the hus-
" bands inſtead of the wives. They
" marched off and ſeized Taygeta, then
" ſeduced the Helots to revolt and promiſed
" to ſupport them, which ſtruck a great
" terror amongſt the Spartans. They ſent
" to treat with them, and made up the
" matter on theſe conditions; that they
" ſhould have their wives reſtored ſafe to
" them, ſhould be furniſhed with money
" and veſſels for removal, and when ſettled
" in another country, ſhould be reckoned
" a colony and kinſmen of the Lacedæ-
" monians — A body of them ſettled ſoon
" after in the iſle of Melos." *Of the virtues of women.*

" SINCE

Conference at Melos.

" SINCE to the people in full aſſembly we are precluded from " ſpeaking, leſt the *many*, — hearing their true intereſt declared at " once by us in a continued diſcourſe, and proved by arguments fit- " ted to perſuade and too ſtrong to be refuted — might be wrought " into our views: For ſuch, we are ſenſible, is the plain conſtruction " of this our guarded audience by the *few*: To you alſo, who now " ſit here, we recommend a method of making that point yet more " ſecure, that to the reaſons we offer you reſerve not your objections " for one formal deliberate reply, but in caſe we offer any ſeeming " incongruity, you immediately interrupt us, and diſcuſs the point. " And tell us firſt, whether or no this propoſal be agreeable."

The Melians, who compoſed the ſynod, anſwered thus:

" THE candor of ſuch leiſurely debate for mutual information " is not to be diſapproved. And yet, there ſeemeth to be great in- " conſiſtency between ſuch candor and thoſe warlike preparations, " with which you no longer intend hereafter but in preſent act have " already beſet us. For we perceive, that hither you are come to " be authoritative judges of your own plea, and that the deciſion " muſt needs prove fatal to us; ſince, if ſuperior in debate, we for " that reaſon refuſe ſubmiſſion, our portion muſt be war; and, " if we allow your plea, from that moment we become your " ſlaves."

ATHENIANS.

" TO what purpoſe *this?* If here you are met together to re- " tail your ſuſpicions of future events, or to talk of any thing but " the proper means of extricating and preſerving your *State* from " the preſent and manifeſt dangers which environ it, we had better " be ſilent. But, if the latter be your purpoſe, let us come to " the point."

MELIANS,

MELIANS.

" THERE is reaſon for it; and there ought to be forgiveneſs,
" when men, ſo ſituated as we are, are liable to much diſtraction
" both in ſpeech and thought. The point for which we are aſſem-
" bled is, it is true, no leſs than our future preſervation. If
" therefore it muſt be ſo, let the conference proceed in the method
" you require."

ATHENIANS.

" AS therefore it is not our purpoſe to amuſe you with pompous de-
" tails—how, after compleatly vanquiſhing the Mede we had a right to
" aſſume the ſovereignty; or how, provoked by the wrongs received
" from you, we come hither to earn redreſs; — we ſhall wave all
" parade of words that have no tendency towards conviction: And
" in return inſiſt from you, that you reject all hopes of perſuading
" us by frivolous remonſtrances — that, as a colony of the Lacedæ-
" monians you were incapacitated from accompanying our arms;
" or, that wrongs in any ſhape you have never done us. But theſe
" things apart, let us lay all ſtreſs on ſuch points as may really on
" both ſides be judged perſuaſive; ſince of this you are as ſtrongly
" convinced as we ourſelves are ſenſible of it, that in all human
" competitions equal wants alone produce equitable determination;
" and, in what terms ſoever the powerful injoin obedience, to thoſe
" the weak are obliged to ſubmit."

MELIANS.

" IF this be ſo, we boldly aver —— for as you have diſcarded
" juſtice from the queſtion, and ſubſtituted intereſt in its place, we
" muſt follow the precedent — that you alſo it concerneth, we
" ſhould not be deprived of the common privilege of men, but that
" to human creatures ever liable to ſo dangerous a loſs the pleas of
" reaſon

" reaſon and equity, even tho' urged beyond their exact limitations,
" ſhould be indulged and allowed their weight. And more to you
" than to others is this proper to be ſuggeſted, leſt, after ſatiating
" revenge in all its fury, ſhould you ever be overthrown, you may
" teach your enemies how you ought to be treated."

ATHENIANS.

" THAT affecteth us not: For, tho' to our ſhare an overthrow
" of empire fall, the event would render us neither abject nor de-
" ſponding; becauſe men inured to inlarged command, as the La-
" cedæmonians for inſtance, are never terrible to the vanquiſhed.
" But our conteſt at preſent is not againſt the Lacedæmonians. *That*
" revenge alone is terrible, when ſubjects tumultuouſly rebel and
" gain the aſcendant over ſuch as were once their maſters. And
" truly, to avert ſuch dangerous extremities, be the care intruſted
" to us. But on the preſent occaſion, that we are here for the in-
" largement of our own power, and that what we have to urge con-
" cerneth the preſervation of the *State* of Melos, — theſe are the
" points we are to eſtabliſh. We are deſirous to have our power
" extended over you without obſtruction, and your preſervation to
" be amply ſecured for the common benefit of us both."

MELIANS.

" AND how can it turn out as beneficial for us to become your
" ſlaves, as it will for you to be our maſters?"

ATHENIANS.

" PLAINLY thus; — becauſe inſtead of ſuffering the extre-
" mities of conqueſt, you may merely become our ſubjects; and
" we, by exempting you from a total deſtruction, ſhall gain your
" ſervice."

MELIANS.

MELIANS.

" BUT will not theſe terms content you — that, we be per-
" mitted to perſevere in quiet, to be friends to you inſtead of ene-
" mies, but in regard to war to be ſtrictly neutral?"

ATHENIANS.

" NO. For all your enmity cannot hurt us ſo much as the ac-
" ceptance of ſuch friendſhip from you. The latter to thoſe over
" whom we rule would ſuggeſt intimations of our weakneſs: Your
" enmity is a proof of our power."

MELIANS.

" ARE your ſubjects then ſuch ſorry judges of equity and right,
" as to place upon the ſame level thoſe, who are under no man-
" ner of tie and who were never indebted for their ſettlement to
" you, and thoſe, who revolting from you have been again
" reduced?"

ATHENIANS.

" WHY ſhould they not? They know ſuch a ſenſe of things
" may be well grounded in regard to both; inaſmuch as thoſe,
" who are exempted from our yoke, owe ſuch exemption to their
" own ſuperior ſtrength, and if we attack them not, it is the pure
" reſult of fear. And hence, the reduction of you, beſides inlarg-
" ing our empire, will inveſt it with more ample ſecurity, eſpeci-
" ally when ſeated on an iſland you are bound to ſubmit to the
" maſters of the ſea, and to remain henceforth too weak for reſiſ-
" tance, unleſs you are victorious at the preſent criſis."

MELIANS.

" DO you then conclude that what we have propoſed is incom-
" patible with your own ſecurity? — For, ſince excluding us from
" the

" the plea of juſtice you endeavour merely to perſuade us into ſub-
" ſerviency to your intereſt, we alſo are again neceſſitated to inſiſt once
" more on the *profitable* to ourſelves, and by ſhewing that with our
" welfare your own alſo coincideth, endeavour to prevail. — What
" think you of all *thoſe* States, which now ſtand neutral in your diſ-
" putes? How will you avoid their implacable hatred, when, terri-
" fied at ſuch your uſage of us, they muſt live in conſtant expectation
" of your hoſtilities? And whither can ſuch conduct tend, but to en-
" large the number of your declared enemies, and to conſtrain others,
" who never deſigned to be your foes, to take up arms againſt you,
" tho' to their own regret?"

ATHENIANS.

" THAT never can be: Since from *States* ſeated on the continent
" we have nothing to apprehend: they are under no immediate ne-
" ceſſity of guarding their liberty againſt attacks from us. Thoſe
" alone we dread who are ſeated in iſlands, and who like you refuſe
" our government, or who having felt the pains of ſubjection are ir-
" ritated againſt us. Such are moſt likely to have recourſe to violent
" meaſures, and to plunge themſelves and us into imminent dangers."

MELIANS.

" IF this be ſo; and if you, ye Athenians, can readily embark
" into ſo many perils to prevent the diſſolution of your own empire;
" if *States*, by you inſlaved, can do as much to throw off your
" yoke; muſt it not be wretchedly baſe and cowardly in us, who
" yet are free, to leave any method, even to the laſt extremity, un-
" tried of averting ſlavery?"

ATHENIANS.

" IF you judge of things as wiſe men ought, we anſwer — *Not*.
" For the point, in which you are at preſent concerned, is not a

" trial of valour upon equal terms, in order to eſcape the reproach
" of cowardice; but, your deliberations proceed at preſent about
" the means of ſelf-preſervation, that you may not be obliged to en-
" counter thoſe who muſt by far overpower you."

MELIANS.

" BUT we on the contrary know, that the enterprizes of war
" have ſometimes very different events to thoſe which ſuperiority of
" numbers gave reaſon to expect; and, in regard to ourſelves, that
" if we yield at once eternal deſpair muſt be our fate, but by acting
" reſolutely in our own defence, we may yet entertain an hope of
" ſucceſs."

ATHENIANS.

" HOPE in this manner is ever applied to be the ſolace of
" danger. And truly, in ſituations which can afford to be diſap-
" pointed, tho' ever prejudicial, it is not always fatal. But ſuch as
" idly laviſh their laſt reſource their very *all* upon Hope (for it is
" prodigal by nature) are only by their own ruin convinced of its
" deluſion; nay, when its deluſion is thus by ſad experience diſco-
" vered, and men ſhould guard themſelves againſt it, it will not yet
" let go its hold in the human heart. Chuſe not therefore ſo fatal
" a reſource for yourſelves in your preſent deſtitute ſituation, hang-
" ing as you are on the very brink of ruin. Let not your conduct
" reſemble the fooliſh behaviour of the mob of mankind, who,
" tho' by human means their ſafety might be earned, yet when cala-
" mity hath chaced away all viſible hopes of redreſs, betake them-
" ſelves to others of a darker caſt, to divinations and to oracles
" and all ſuch vain expedients as hope ſuggeſteth, to draw them to
" their deſtruction."

MELIANS.

MELIANS.

"DIFFICULT indeed, as we apprehend and you well "know, the conteſt muſt prove to us againſt your ſtrength and "fortune, matched as we are ſo unequally together. Yet the con-"fidence ſtill ſupporteth us, that in fortune, ſince of divine diſpoſal "we ſhall not be inferior, as with innocence on our ſide we ſtand "againſt injuſtice; that farther, our deficiencies in ſtrength will be "amplified by the addition of Lacedæmonian aid, ſince it is incum-"bent upon them to ſupport us, if from no other motive yet from "the ties of blood and a ſenſe of honour. And thus it is not in-"tirely without good grounds that we can form the reſolution to "withſtand your efforts."

ATHENIANS.

"NOR have we any reaſon to apprehend on our own account, "that the divine benevolence will not equally exert itſelf for us, "becauſe neither our opinious nor our acts are worſe than thoſe of "the reſt of mankind, either in regard to the worſhip of the Gods, "or an acknowledgment of their providence. For of the divine "nature we think like the reſt of the world; and of men, that be-"yond a ſcruple they are impelled by the neceſſary bent of their na-"ture, to ſeize dominion wherever they have power. As for "ourſelves, we were not the authors of this conſtitution; nor were "we the firſt who digeſted it into practice. We found it already in "force; we have accordingly applied it, and ſhall leave it behind "us for the practice of every future age; conſcious, that you your-"ſelves, and every other *State* inveſted with equal power, would "make the ſame exertion of it. And truly, ſo far as relateth to "the Gods, we have no more reaſon to diſtruſt their protection than "our neighbours. But your ſentiments of the Lacedæmonians are "ſuch, that you are confident of ſupport from them becauſe it will

" baſe in them to refuſe it. Here we bleſs your ſimplicity, but envy
" not your folly. The Lacedæmonians, we allow, amongſt one
" another and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country,
" give ample proofs of honour and virtue. But their behaviour to-
" wards the reſt of mankind, tho' it would open a large field of
" cenſure, were it to be minutely examined, yet at preſent ſhall be
" ſhewn by one conciſe declaration, that, according to the beſt
" lights we have been able to collect, they repute as honourable the
" things which pleaſe them, and as juſt the things which promote
" their intereſt. Such maxims are not in the leaſt conducive to your
" preſervation: It is all chimera.

MELIANS.

" NO. We ground our hopes of relief from them upon their
" own clear conviction of what their intereſt injoineth them. This
" never can ſuffer them to entertain a thought of abandoning the
" Melians who are a colony of their own, of being faithleſs to the
" *States* of Greece who wiſh them well, or of promoting the
" ſchemes of the common foe."

ATHENIANS.

" OF conſequence you imagine, that their intereſt is connected
" with your ſecurity, that the duties of juſtice ſhould in honour be
" obſerved tho' attended with dangers. But theſe are maxims
" which the Lacedæmonians, leaſt of all men, have reſolution
" enough to obſerve in fact."

MELIANS.

" WE have the ſtrongeſt grounds to imagine, that in our defence
" they will hazard any dangers, from a ſenſe, that their own pre-
" ſervation dependeth more on us than any other people, as we
" are finely ſituated for doing them ſervice in Peloponneſus, and in
" affection

" affection are more faithfully attached to them through the bands
" of conſanguinity."

ATHENIANS.

" BUT the certainty of obtaining ſuccour in the intervals of
" need ſeemeth not to depend ſo much on the merit of thoſe who
" implore it, as on the conſciouſneſs of ſuperior ſtrength in thoſe
" who are implored to give it: A maxim this, to which no *State*
" adheres ſo ſtrictly as the Lacedæmonian. Hence ever, through a
" diffidence of their own domeſtic force, they never dare even to
" invade their neighbours, without the concurrence of numerous al-
" lies. There cannot therefore be the leaſt room to expect, that they
" will tranſport an aid into an iſland, whilſt we are maſters of the
" ſea."

MELIANS.

" NOT perhaps of their own forces; but they have confederates
" enow to employ in this ſervice. The ſea of Crete is wide and ſpa-
" cious. A paſſage through it even the lords of the ſea will find it
" more difficult to obſtruct, than thoſe who are intent on ſtealing it
" to effect with ſafety. Or, grant they miſcarry in the attempt; at
" worſt, they can make a diverſion upon your territory or againſt the
" remainder of your dependants who eſcaped the efforts of Braſidas.
" And then, your attention and your arms muſt be drawn from a
" quarter where you have no right to fix them, for the neceſſary de-
" fence of your own home and your own appendage."

ATHENIANS.

" THO' ſuch turns may intervene, your own experience ſhould
" teach you to diſtruſt them: For you are not, cannot be ignorant
" that the Athenians never yet would condeſcend to raiſe a ſiege
" through hoſtile dread. But we cannot avoid obſerving, that in the

" whole

" whole courſe of this debate, tho' declared by you to be held as
" the means of your preſervation, you have not ſo much as ſt rted
" one ſingle point, upon which wiſe men can preſume to faſten the
" leaſt confidence of redreſs. Your firmeſt ſecurity is placed in the
" faint hope of ſome diſtant contingencies; but your preſent ſtrength
" is merely trifling againſt the extenſive ſcope of your antagoniſts.
" Nay victims you muſt fall to your own abſurd preſumptions, un-
" leſs, when we are once withdrawn to give you time to conſult, you
" determine to try ſome other expedient. You will then no longer
" be controled by that ſenſe of ſhame, which, when diſhonour
" glareth before and danger preſſeth on, precipitateth men into ruin.
" For, tho' they ſee with their eyes quite open into what an abyſs
" they are going to plunge, yet to avoid the imputation of what the
" world ſtileth diſhonour — ſo prevalent is the force of one bewitch-
" ing ſound! — tho' vanquiſhed by it, they ſcorn to yield to reaſon,
" wilfully embarraſſing themſelves with incurable calamities, and
" contracting a more ſhameful weight of diſhonour through their
" own mad obſtinacy than fortune could award them. Such conſe-
" quences you are now concerned by mature deliberations to avoid.
" You are next to reflect, that no ſhame can attend your plying un-
" der the force of a moſt formidable *State*; a *State* which deſigneth
" to make the moderate demands alone — that, you would accept
" her alliance; and, ſecurely enjoy your territory upon the condi-
" tion only to pay her tribute; and, when war or ſafety are left to
" your own option, that you would not peeviſhly prefer the worſt.
" For thoſe are the men to maintain themſelves in credit and pro-
" ſperity, who never ſuffer their equals to inſult them, who pay pro-
" per regard to their ſuperiors, and towards their inferiors behave
" with moderation. Reflect on theſe points whilſt we withdraw; and
" remember again and again, that your country now calleth for all
" your prudence, ſince by the ſingle deliberation of this ſingle day, as
" either it taketh a proſperous or ſiniſter turn, her fate will be deter-
" mined."

Here

Here the Athenians withdrew from the conference. And the Melians, after being ſome time alone, and reſolving finally to reject what they had already refuſed, gave in their anſwer thus:

" WE continue, Athenians, in the very ſame ſentiments we have " already declared. We ſhall not in an inſtant of time abandon " that liberty, which, in the free poſſeſſion of our own *State* we " have enjoyed for the ſpace of ſeven hundred years; which ſtill we " ſhall ſpare no endeavours to preſerve; intruſting it to that fortune " which by divine permiſſion hath hitherto preſerved it, and to that " redreſs we expect from human aid and the Lacedæmonians. But, " thus much again we offer — To be friends to you, enemies to " neither, on condition you quit our lands, after an accommo- " dation ratified between us to our reciprocal ſatisfaction."

The Melians in this manner delivered their final anſwer. But the Athenians, the very moment they quitted the place of conference, uttered themſelves thus:

" YOU Melians alone of all mankind are the perſons, ſo far as " we can judge, who regard future contingencies as an over-balance " for inſtant dangers, and through mad preſumption value things yet " inviſible as really actual. But, the greater your dependence, the " more raſh your confidence upon Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, " and upon hope, the more abundantly fatal your deluſions will " prove."

And this ſaid, the Athenian deputation returned to their camp.

But the Athenian commanders, upon this refuſal of ſubmiſſion from the Melians, applied themſelves inſtantly to the acts of war; and dividing the work in ſhares to the ſeveral parties in their army, compleatly ſhut up the Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, when

Hoſtilities begin.

when this was perfected and a ſufficient number both of the Athenians and their dependents were appointed to ſtay behind and continue the blockade both by land and ſea, they departed with the bulk of their forces. Thoſe farther, who were left for this ſervice, ſtaid behind and continued the blockade.

Argives. About the ſame time, the Argives, making an irruption into Phliaſia and caught in an ambuſcade laid for them by the Phliaſians and their own exiles, were ſlaughtered to the number of eighty.

Pylus. The Athenians by their excurſions from Pylus committed many depredations on the Lacedæmonians. But theſe had not influence enough upon the Lacedæmonians to cauſe a renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the war. They only proclaimed, that "their peo-"ple had free leave to make repriſals on the Athenians."

Corinthians. The Corinthians alſo had a war with the Athenians, on account of ſome private differences between them, but the reſt of Peloponneſus interfered not in the quarrel.

Proceedings at Melos. The Melians, farther, aſſaulting it by night, carried that part of the Athenian circumvallation which lay cloſe to their market. They ſlew the guards who were poſted there; and, having gained a conveyance into the town for proviſions and all neceſſary ſtores they could procure by money, they afterwards withdrew and diſcontinued all efforts of reſiſtance: But the Athenians took care for the future to place a ſtronger guard upon their works. And here the ſummer ended.

Lacedæmonians. In the winter which followed, the Lacedæmonians drew out their forces in order to begin an expedition into Argia; but, when the victims offered on the frontiers boded no ſucceſs to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet the Argives, as ſuch an invaſion had been intended againſt them, ſuſpected it was owing to the intrigues of a faction within their city; ſome of whom they immediately ſecured, but the reſt eſcaped by flight.

About

About the ſame time alſo, the Melians carried another part of the Athenian circumvallation, as the party by which it was guarded was not numerous. But, upon ſuch diſturbances, a ſtrong reinforcement was ſent from Athens under the command of Philocrates the ſon of Demeas. The Melians were now cloſely inveſted on all ſides, and ſome ſchemes to betray the town being in agitation amongſt them, they thought proper to make a voluntary ſurrender. This they did "at the diſcretion of the Athenians," who put to death all they found within the place able to bear arms, and made the women and children ſlaves. The town they afterwards repeopled by ſending thither a colony of five hundred.

Melos *ſurrendered.*

Plan of SYRACUSE

The Great Harbour

Ortygia

Isles of Æolus, or Vulcanian & Liparean

Didyme

Lipara

Strongyle

Hiera

TYRRHENE SEA

Portus Herculis

Medama

Metaurum

Pelorus P.

Scylla

Rhegium

Mylæ

Messene once Zancle

Strait of Messene

Petra

Agathyrna

Cephaloedis

Halesa

Hermæan Mountains

Onobala or Tauromenius R.

Tauromenium

Asines R.

Acesines R.

Naxus

Aetna

Centuripa

Inessa

Catana

Acis R.

Rocks of the Cyclops

Hybla major

Simethus R.

Morgantina

SICILIAN SEA

Ancient SICILY

Leontium

Pantacias R.

Trias R.

Alabus R.

Xiphonia

Megara Hyblæa

Thapsus

Syracuse

Plemmyrium

Anapus R.

Cacyparis R.

Panormus

Solous

Himera

Erete

Hyccara

Port of Egesta

Egesta

Eryx

ELIMI

SICANIANS

Mount Hebrodes

Mount Nebrodes

Himera R.

Petra

Engyum

Phorbantia

Aponiana

Motya

Hypsas R.

Halycus R.

Halicyæ

Sosyrus R.

Hiera Maritima

Lilybæum P.

Selinus

Heraclea

Agrigentum

Minera R.

Lindii

Gela

Camarina

Hybla minor

Cyane R.

Ciane

Asinarus R.

Helorum

Cismenæ

Pachynum P.

LIBYAN OF AFRICAN SEA

35 36 37 38 39

History of Thucydides, Book 6.

R. W. Seale, sculp.

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE SIXTH.

CONTENTS.

THE Athenians reſolve on the expedition to Sicily. Deſcription of that iſland.

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Year XVIII. *The Athenians land again at Syracuſe, take Epipolæ by ſurprize, and begin to inveſt Syracuſe in form. Battles: The Athenians carry on their works: Counterwork of the Syracuſans. Aid ſent to Syracuſe from Peloponneſus under the command of Gylippus: He arrives at Tarentum. The Athenians by openly joining the Argives againſt the Lacedæmonians violate the treaty of peace in Greece.*



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VI.

IN the ſame winter, the Athenians come to a reſolution, to make a ſecond expedition againſt Sicily with a larger force than had been ſent thither heretofore under Laches and Eurymedon, and to attempt its total reduction. The bulk of the people was in truth ignorant of the largeneſs of the iſland, and of the multitude of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it was inhabited; ignorant further, that they were going to embark in a war not much leſs conſiderable than the Peloponneſian. *The grand expedition to Sicily reſolved at Athens.*

The compaſs of Sicily is little under eight days ſail for a trading veſſel; and, tho' it be ſo large, it is ſevered from the main-land, ſo as not to be part of the continent, by a gut in breadth but * twenty ſtadia. The manner in which it was inhabited in the earlieſt ages was *this*; and the ſeveral nations which poſſeſſed it, *theſe*. Sicily deſcribed.

*Almoſt two miles.

The

Cyclops. The Cyclops and Leſtrigons are ſaid to be the moſt ancient inhabitants of ſome part of this country: But from what ſtock they were derived, or from whence they came hither, or what is become of them ſince, I have nothing to relate. Poetical amuſements muſt here ſuffice, or ſuch information as every man picks up for his own uſe.

Sicanians. The Sicanians appear to be the firſt people, who next to thoſe inhabited this country: Tho', according to their own accounts, they are prior; becauſe they claim to themſelves the original tenure. But, according to the trueſt diſcoveries, they are found to have been Iberians, who were compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus in Iberia by the Libyans. And from them at that time this iſland received the name of Sicania, having before been called Trinacria. They continue to this day to inhabit the weſtern parts of Sicily.

Trojans. After the taking of Troy, ſome of the Trojans, who had eſcaped the Achæans, arrive in their veſſels upon the Sicilian ſhore, and forming a ſettlement adjacent to the Sicanians, they all took jointly the name of Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egeſta. They were alſo increaſed by the acceſſion of ſome Phocians from Troy, who having firſt been driven to Libya by a ſtorm, paſſed over afterwards from thence into Sicily.

Siculi. The Siculi paſſed over firſt into Sicily from Italy; for there they originally dwelled. They fled before the Opici; and, as the ſtory is told not without probability, having obſerved how the current ſet within the ſtrait and ſeized a favourable gale, they croſſed over upon rafts, and perhaps by ſome other methods. There are even to this very day a people in Italy called Siculi; and that region in a ſimilar manner obtained its name of Italy, from a certain Arcadian king who bore the name of Italus. Theſe croſſing into Sicily with formidable numbers, and vanquiſhing the Sicanians in battle, drove them into the ſouthern and weſtern parts, cauſed the name of the iſland to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, ſettled themſelves in and kept poſſeſſion

poſſeſſion of the richeſt tracts in the country, ſince their paſſage hither was near three hundred years earlier than the landing of any Grecians in Sicily. Nay, they continue to this very day in poſſeſſion of the midland and northerly parts of the iſland.

Phœnicians. The Phœnicians alſo had ſettlements quite round the coaſt of Sicily. They ſecured the capes on the ſea and the ſmall circumjacent iſles, for the ſake of trafficking with the Sicilians. But when the Grecians in conſiderable numbers began to croſs over and fix their reſidence here, the Phœnicians abandoned their other ſettlements, and uniting together ſeated themſelves at Motya and Soloeis and Panormus, near to the Elymi; ſecure of their own continuance in theſe quarters from their friendſhip with the Elymi, and becauſe from this part of Sicily the paſſage to Carthage is exceeding ſhort. — So many were the Barbarians ſeated in Sicily; and ſuch the order of their ſettlements.

Chalcidéans. Naxus. The firſt Grecians who came hither were the Chalcidéans of Eubœa. Thucles led the colony, which ſettled at Naxus, and erected the altar of Apollo the *Guide*, which is ſtill to be ſeen without the city; and on which the *deputations*, ſent from hence to the oracles, offer ſacrifice, before they begin their voyage.

Syracuſe. In the year following, Archias a Corinthian, of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuſe, having previouſly expelled the Sicilians out of that iſland on which the *inner-city* is ſeated, tho' now no longer waſhed round about by the ſea. And in proceſs of time, the *upper-city* alſo, being taken in by a wall, became exceeding populous.

Leontium. In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuſe, Thucles and his Chalcidéans ſallied forth out of Naxus, and having by force of arms drove away the Sicilians, they build Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the Catanéans themſelves declared Evarchus their founder. Catana.

Thapſus. About the ſame point of time, Lamis alſo leading a colony from Megara arrived in Sicily, and planted them on a ſpot called Trotilus-

lus upon the river Pantacias. But removing afterwards from thence to Leontium, he aſſociated himſelf a ſhort time with the Catanéans for the protection of his party; yet being ejected by them, and then having founded Thapſus, he dies. His followers upon this removed from Thapſus; and, Hyblon a Sicilian king betraying another place into their hands, and becoming himſelf their conductor, they ſettled

Megara. thoſe Megaréans who are called Hyblæan; and after a continued poſſeſſion of two hundred forty-five years, they were expelled out of their city and territory by Gelon tyrant of the Syracuſans. Yet before this ejectment, about an hundred years after their ſettlement

Selinus. there, they had ſent out Pammilus and built the city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither more lately from Megara their mother-city, and aſſiſted them in making this new ſettlement at Selinus.

Gela. Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, each leading a ſeparate colony, founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuſe. The name of this new city was taken from the river Gela. Yet the ſpot, where the city now ſtands, and which was firſt walled round, is called Lindii. But their polity was framed upon the Doric model.

Acragas. In the hundred and eighth year, as near as poſſible, after this laſt ſettlement, the Geloans built Acragas, giving the city its name from the river Acragas. They declared Ariſtonous and Pyſtilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil inſtitutions of Gela.

Zanclé. Zanclé was originally founded by a band of pirates, who arrived

Meſſene. there from Cymé, a Chalcidic city in Opicia; tho' afterwards a numerous reinforcement from Chalcis and the reſt of Eubœa joined them, and poſſeſſed that diſtrict in community. The founders were Perieres and Cratæmenes; one of them, from Cymé, the other, from Chalcis. But the name of Zanclé was firſt of all given it by the Sicilians, becauſe in ſhape it bears reſemblance to a ſcythe, and the Sicilians call a ſcythe *zanclum*. But in proceſs of time theſe people were driven from thence by the Samians and other Ionians, who flying from

from the Medes had landed in Sicily. And after a ſhort interval Anaxilas tyrant of the Rhegians ejected the Samians, repeopled the city with a number of mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to Meſſene, in honour of the country from whence he was originally deſcended. Himera alſo was founded from Zanclé by Euclides and Simus and Sacon. Into this colony came alſo a very numerous body of Chalcidéans. Some exiles further from Syracuſe, who had been worſted in a ſedition and were diſtinguiſhed by the title of Miletidæ, took up their reſidence amongſt them. Hence their dialect became a mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric; but the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil inſtitutions. *Himera.*

Acræ and Caſmenæ were founded by the Syracuſans; Acræ, ſeventy years after Syracuſe, and Caſmenæ, near twenty after Acræ. Camarina alſo was firſt founded by the Syracuſans, very nearly one hundred thirty five years after the building of Syracuſe: Its founders were Daſcon and Menecolus. But the Camarinéans being afterwards driven out by the arms of the Syracuſans becauſe of a revolt, in proceſs of time Hippocrates tyrant of Gela received the lands of the Camarinéans as a ranſom for ſome Syracuſan priſoners of war, and taking upon himſelf to be their founder replanted Camarina. Yet, once more again it was demoliſhed by Gelon; and replanted a third time by the ſame Gelon. So many nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited Sicily. *Acræ.* *Caſmenæ.* *Camarina.*

An iſland ſo large and ſo populous the Athenians were paſſionately bent on invading. Their trueſt and final view was, to compaſs its total reduction; but the pretext alledged for a colour was, their readineſs to ſuccour ſuch as by blood were related, or by prior alliances had been attached to them. An Egeſtéan embaſſy, now reſiding at Athens, laboured the point with all poſſible induſtry, and with extraordinary earneſtneſs preſſed them to engage in it. For the Egeſtéans, who bordered upon the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war with the latter about ſome connubial points, and a certain tract *Pretext and real deſign of this expedition.*

of land to which both laid claim. The Selinuntians further, aſſiſted by their Syracuſan allies, preſſed hard upon them both by land and by ſea. And hence, the Egeſtéans were now ſuggeſting at Athens, that " they ought not to forget their alliance with the Leontines " made by Laches in the former war;" requeſting further, that a naval force might be ſent thither for their ſuccour. To this purpoſe many other arguments were alledged by them, but the principal was this;—" If the Syracuſans, who have overthrown the Leontines, be " left in the unmoleſted enjoyment of their conqueſt, and proceed " ſtill further to deſtroy the remaining parties of that alliance, they " will get into their hands the whole power of Sicily. Such an " event would be attended with the utmoſt danger, leſt in conſe- " quence of it, as they were Doric by deſcent, they might think " themſelves bound by the ties of blood to aſſiſt with a powerful ar- " mament their kindred Dorians, and in quality of colonies might " ſuccour thoſe Peloponneſians by whom they were originally planted, " and thus form a combination to demoliſh the Athenian empire. In " policy therefore the Athenians were obliged to ſupport the allies " who yet remained, in order to make head againſt the Syracuſans; " and this the more readily, as they themſelves would undertake to " furniſh them with ſums of money equal to the exigencies of the " war." With ſuch diſcourſe the Athenians were frequently entertained in their popular aſſemblies, as the Egeſtéan embaſſadors, ſtill urging their point, had gained many advocates to ſecond their arguments. And at length it was decreed, that " embaſſadors ſhould be " previouſly diſpatched to Egeſta, to inſpect the ſtate of their wealth, " whether they had ſuch ſums as they talked of in the public trea- " ſury and the temples; and alſo to draw up a report of the preſent " poſture of their war againſt the Selinuntians." And in purſuance of this, the embaſſadors from the Athenians were ſent to Sicily.

The

The Lacedæmonians in the ſame winter joined by their allies, thoſe of Corinth excepted, and marching into Argia, ravaged a ſmall part of that territory and carried off the corn, having brought ſome carriages for that purpoſe. They alſo removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and left them a ſmall detachment from their main army, for the ſecurity of their perſons. A temporary truce being alſo made, during which the Orneatæ and Argives were to abſtain from all hoſtilities againſt one another, they drew off the army to their reſpective homes. *Argia invaded by the Lacedæmonians.*

However, not long after this, the Athenians arrived with thirty ſail of ſhips and ſix hundred heavy-armed. The Argives, in conjunction with the Athenians, took the field with all their ſtrength, and beſieged thoſe in Ornea for the ſpace of a day. But, as at night the beſiegers removed to a diſtance in order for their repoſe, thoſe of Ornea made their eſcape. On the day following, the Argives, when ſenſible of their eſcape, levelled Ornea with the ground, and then withdrew. And afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for Athens.

The Athenians alſo threw in by ſea a party of horſemen into Methone, a frontier-town on Macedonia. With theſe, conſiſting of their own citizens and ſuch Macedonians as had refuged amongſt them, they haraſſed the country belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedæmonians ſent a ſummons of aid for Perdiccas to the Chalcidéans of Thrace, who kept terms with the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth day: Theſe however refuſed to march. Thus ended the winter, and with it the ſixteenth year of the war of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory. *The Athenians ſeize Methone in Macedonia.*

YEAR XVII.

Before Chriſt 417.

IN the ſucceeding ſummer, very early in the ſpring, the Athenian embaſſadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egeſtéans. They brought ſixty talents of uncoined ſilver, being a month's pay for *The grand debate at Athens about the expedition.*

for ſixty ſail of ſhips, the equipment of which for their ſuccour they were inſtructed to ſolicit from the Athenians. Upon this an aſſembly of the people was called, and the reports of the Egeſtéan and their own embaſſadors were received, conſiſting of many points, ſpecious indeed, but falſe in fact; and ſo far as related to their treaſure, that "ſums ample enough are already repoſited in their temples and their "public treaſury." In conſequence of this a decree was made, that "a fleet of ſixty ſhips ſhould ſail for Sicily; the commanders, Alci-"biades the ſon of Clinias, Nicias the ſon of Niceratus, and [1] La-"machus the ſon of Xenophanes, to be inveſted with full powers to "act at their own diſcretion; the whole armament to act as an aid "to the Egeſtéans againſt the Selinuntians; to replace alſo the Le-"ontines in their former habitations, if the ſtate of the war gave "them leiſure to execute that ſervice; and to manage all other points "in Sicily, as they ſhould judge moſt beneficial for the Athenian "intereſt."

[1] Lamachus, the third in this commiſſion, ſeems to have been picked out for the command, for the peculiar conſtitution of his own character, which was a proper mean between the cautious and phlegmatic diſpoſition of Nicias, and the fiery impetuous ardor of Alcibiades. He was now (according to Plutarch) a brave old experienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable for heat and fire; a length of ſervice and years had mellowed him into the right temper, to deliberate beforehand, and then gallantly to carry a point into execution. But then, he wanted the means of properly ſupporting the authority and dignity of his poſt. He was now ranked with two of the moſt wealthy and noble Athenians; whereas his own condition was low; nay, he was (according to Plutarch) ſo exceedingly poor, that, before he went to any foreign command, he was uſed to petition the *State* for a little money to furniſh him out and even to buy him ſome ſhoes. Mr. *Waſſe*, in his notes on Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of Ariſtophanes (*The Acharnians*;) that is, to enquire after the character of a plain blunt officer from a profeſſed droll, or to ſeek truth from him who ridiculed all mankind. Ariſtophanes hath repreſented Lamachus, as a vain-glorious roaring bully, a mere thing of arms, a creature of verbal pomp and parade, contrary to all the truth of hiſtory. Writers, who live by turning great and good men into ridicule, ſhould never be reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of characters, when hiſtory diſſents.

But

But the fifth day after this, another aſſembly of the people was held upon the *ways* and *means* to expedite the equipment of the fleet; and by proper decrees to ſupply the commanders with what might yet be requiſite to accelerate their departure. Nicias, who againſt his will had been named for a commander, was perſuaded that the public determinations were raſh and premature, ſince on ſhort examination and motives merely ſpecious they were bent on the total reduction of Sicily, an arduous undertaking! Now therefore he ſtood up, and having a mind to ſtop proceedings, he adviſed the Athenians as follows:

Speech of Nicias.

"I AM aware that the preſent aſſembly is held, to concert the "means of expediting our preparations, and to get all in readineſs "for the expedition to Sicily. But in my ſentiments we ought once "more to reſume the conſideration of the previous point, "Whe-"ther upon the whole it be adviſeable to equip out ſuch a fleet," "and not by raſh and premature reſolves on points of ſuch vaſt im-"portance, through too eaſy compliance with foreign ſolicitations, to "embroil ourſelves in an unneceſſary war. For my own part truly, "I am inveſted with honour by the preſent meaſures, and no man "upon earth is ſo little anxious about his own perſonal ſafety. But "at the ſame time I pronounce that perſon to be a valuable member "of the public, who makes uſe of all his prudence to preſerve his "own life and property: For ſuch an one, purely for his own pri-"vate benefit, muſt be deſirous that the public welfare flouriſh and "abound. But however, neither in the preceding aſſemblies could "the preeminence of honour awarded to me bias me to ſpeak in "contradiction to my judgment; nor ſhall it bias me at preſent; "but, what I think tends moſt to the public good, that only ſhall "I utter.

"I am alſo ſenſible, that what I can urge may have but little in-"fluence on Athenian tempers, when I attempt perſuading you to

"ſecure

" ſecure what you already poſſeſs, and not to hazard the preſent for
" things inviſible and future. But, that your eagerneſs is quite unſea-
" ſonable; and, that the ends, which you too ſanguinely propoſe,
" are not eaſy to be accompliſhed, — theſe things I ſhall clearly
" demonſtrate.

" To this purpoſe I aver, that if the intended expedition proceeds,
" you are going to leave many enemies behind you here, and to take
" the moſt certain method of fetching hither more numerous oppo-
" nents. You imagine perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly
" and conſtantly obſerved, tho' it is merely a nominal peace, and
" that only ſo long as you remain inactive. Nay, ſuch it hath been
" made by the conduct of ſome even of our own community.
" And ſhould any conſiderable force of ours have the unhappineſs to
" ſink under hoſtile efforts, our old enemies will be ſuddenly upon
" us; ſince merely by calamities they were reduced to an accommo-
" dation; and in a manner, more diſgraceful to themſelves than to
" us, were neceſſitated to treat. In the next place; we have found
" that in the treaty itſelf many articles are ſtill controverted. There
" are further diverſe *States*, and thoſe by no means the weakeſt,
" who have not yet accepted the accommodation, but on the con-
" trary are ſtill in arms againſt us; whilſt others are inhibited merely
" by ten-day truces, and that only becauſe the Lacedæmonian mea-
" ſures are hitherto pacific. But ſuddenly perhaps, when once they
" find our ſtrength divided, the very meaſure into which we are now
" precipitating ourſelves, they may fall upon us in general combina-
" tion, augmented by the ſtrength of Sicily, whoſe acceſſion to their
" former confederacy they would have been glad to purchaſe at any
" price. On theſe poſſibilities we are bound ſedately to reflect, that
" we may not plunge a *State* ſo highly exalted into ſuperfluous
" dangers, nor fondly covet to wreſt their empire from the hands of
" others, before we have adequately inſured our own; ſince the
" Chalcidéans of Thrace, tho' ſo many years are now elapſed ſince
" they

" they firſt revolted, are not yet reduced; and ſome other *States* on
" the continent render us only a precarious obedience.
" Yet — " to the Egeſtéans our old allies, who are injuriouſly
" oppreſſed, we are bound in honour to ſend a moſt ſpeedy ſuc-
" cour." — And in the mean time we continue to defer avenging
" ourſelves upon thoſe, whoſe revolt from us is of long ſtanding now,
" and whoſe injuſtice we are ſtill obliged to ſuffer. Tho' the latter,
" could we once bring them back to their duty, we might eaſily
" control for the future: But the former, ſhould we ever become
" their maſters, remote and numerous as they are, we ſhould not
" without difficulty be able to awe. It muſt be madneſs therefore
" to invade that people, whom tho' conquered you can never retain
" in their obedience; and who, in caſe the attempt againſt them
" miſcarry, will for the future be much more diſaffected towards
" you, than they were before that attempt was made.
" But it is further my real opinion, that the Sicilians, as their af-
" fairs are now circumſtantiated, would become leſs formidable to
" us, if once reduced to the Syracuſan yoke. — And yet on this re-
" mote contingency the Egeſtéans have chiefly inſiſted, in order to
" alarm us. Perhaps *now* it may come to paſs, that its ſingle *States*
" may combine againſt us to gratify the Lacedæmonians; but, in the
" other caſe, it is quite improbable, that an united empire would
" hazard its own welfare to demoliſh another. For, if acting from
" a political precaution, they may ſide with the Peloponneſians to
" overturn our empire, thoſe very Peloponneſians may probably,
" from the ſame principle, concur with us to demoliſh the Sicilian.
" As for us, the Grecians there may have reaſon to dread us moſt,
" if we go not at all amongſt them; and what is next to that, if we
" only give them a ſight of our power for a ſhort interval of time,
" and then withdraw. But if acting offenſively we incur miſcar-
" riage, they will inſtantly deſpiſe us, and join our neighbouring
" foes to annoy us here. For things that are placed moſt remotely

" from

" from us, as likewiſe thoſe, which yield no opportunity of adjuſting
" our opinion of them by experience; ſuch, it is univerſally
" known, are moſt apt to excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of
" Athens, that your preſent elevation of ſpirits is owing to your
" ſucceſs againſt the Lacedæmonians and allies. You crouched for
" fear under their firſt attacks, 'till having gained the ſuperiority over
" them to their utter diſappointment, you inſtantly deſpiſed them:
" And now, nothing leſs than Sicily can content you. We by no
" means ought to be too much buoyed up by the diſaſters of our
" foes, but only to be ſo far confident as we are able to awe their
" intriguing tempers. We ought to aſcribe no other view to the La-
" cedæmonians, than a vigilant care to ſeize the firſt opportunity of
" wiping off their late diſgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recover-
" ing their former reputation; and that they are moſt earneſt on ac-
" compliſhing this, ſince from time immemorial the glory of mili-
" tary valour hath been their warmeſt moſt prevailing paſſion. Our
" welfare therefore, if we knew in what our welfare conſiſts, by no
" means ſummons us to enter the liſts in behalf of the Egeſtéans of
" Sicily, a people who to us are mere Barbarians, but to exert our
" utmoſt vigilance to guard our own conſtitution from oligarchical
" incroachments.

" My duty obligeth me alſo to remind you, that we have had but
" ſhort reſpite to breathe from the havoc made amongſt us by peſti-
" lence and war, and to repair the prodigious waſte of our fortunes
" and our lives. Theſe, according to all the rules of equity, ſhould
" be reſerved for our own domeſtic exigencies, and not be la-
" viſhed away on a ſet of fugitives, who implore our protection,
" and are bound in intereſt to tell ſpecious falſhoods; tho', whilſt
" plunging their neighbours into hazards, they have nothing but
" words to contribute; and, ſhould we redreſs them, know not how
" to be grateful; but, in caſe we miſcarry in the attempt, muſt in-
" volve their friends in their own deſtruction.

" If

" If there be further a *perſon*, who elevated with his own de-
" ſignation to the command, incites you earneſtly to fail; heedful of
" nothing but his own private views, nor qualified by his years for
" ſo important a truſt; if his paſſion be merely to excite admiration
" for his fine breed of horſes, or by the gains of his commiſſion to
" repair the havoc of his fortune cauſed by prodigality; I conjure
" you, to afford no ſuch perſon an opportunity to make a ſplendid
" figure at the expence of your country. But reſt convinced, that
" men of ſuch a turn will be corrupt in public office, as they are
" bad œconomiſts in private life; that the enterprize in hand is a very
" arduous truſt, far beyond ſuch meaſures or ſuch exploits as a ſtrip-
" ling can deviſe or execute.

" I own myſelf intimidated by that crowd of youths who ſit by
" this *perſon* and abet his ſchemes. I am hence obliged to implore
" the men of years and experience who happen to ſit near them, by
" no means to dread that appearance of puſillanimity, which, in caſe
" this decree of war be revoked, might be objected to them; by no
" means to indulge the ſame raw paſſions by which boys are actu-
" ated, ſo as to dote upon remote contingencies. You, Gentlemen,
" by experience are convinced, that ſucceſs exceedingly ſeldom re-
" ſults from hot and ſanguine preſumption, but moſt frequently from
" calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf therefore of your coun-
" try, which is now on the brink of more critical dangers than ever
" it was known before, hold up your hands in oppoſition, and ſup-
" port what I am going to move, namely — That, " the Sicilians
" confining themſelves within their preſent limits which we do not
" pretend to abridge, with free navigation along the coaſt of the Ionian
" gulf, and tranſacting their own affairs at large through the whole
" extent of the Sicilian ſeas, be at liberty to take care of their own
" concerns without any moleſtation:" — And, in particular, to re-
" turn the Egeſtéans the following anſwer — " Since without the
" privity of the Athenians they have already involved themſelves

" in a war againſt the Selinuntians, let them alſo without the con-
" currence of the Athenians bring it to a concluſion: That, more-
" over, we ſhall form no alliance for the future, as hath formerly
" been the caſe, with men whoſe indirect behaviour we muſt be
" forced to abet, tho' when we ſtand in need of reciprocal aſſiſtance
" from them, we ſhall get none at all."

" And you, Sir, who at preſent preſide in this aſſembly, if you are
" conſcious that it is your duty to ſuperintend the public welfare, if you
" are deſirous to behave like a worthy patriot, put the queſtion, and
" call upon the Athenians once more to give their votes. And, in caſe
" you are afraid to act contrary to order, in propoſing what is counter
" to a former decree; reflect, that when ſo great a crowd of wit-
" neſſes are at hand to juſtify the ſtep, you only act the part of a
" phyſician to your country, which hath ſwallowed down pernicious
" counſels; and, that he beſt diſchargeth the duty of the firſt ma-
" giſtrate, who will render to his country all the ſervice he is
" able; at leaſt, with his eyes open will never ſuffer it to be
" hurt."

In this manner Nicias delivered his ſentiments. But the far greater part of the Athenians, who were preſent, declared for the expedition, and againſt the repeal of what had been already decreed. Some however there were, who made a fruitleſs oppoſition.

The perſon, who ſhewed moſt ardor and preſſed them moſt earneſtly to proceed, was Alcibiades the ſon of Clinias; partly from a reſolution to oppoſe Nicias, with whom in other political points he generally claſhed, and becauſe he had calumniouſly glanced at him in his ſpeech; but principally, becauſe he was ambitious of being at the head of this expedition. He preſumed, that not Sicily only but Carthage alſo might be reduced by himſelf; and when he ſhould be the author of ſo great a ſucceſs, that he muſt needs abound in wealth and glory. His credit was great at preſent amongſt the citizens:

But

But the warmth of his paſſions threw him into larger expences than his fortune could ſupport, being ſumptuous in every article of life, and eſpecially in horſes. And it was chiefly by him that the final overthrow of Athens was at length occaſioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed at the great irregularity of his private life, the exceſſive luxury of his dreſs and his diet, as alſo at that greatneſs of ſpirit which he ſhewed in every ſingle branch of his conduct, turned out enemies to him as a man who affected the tyranny. And tho' when in public commands, he conducted the war with the utmoſt bravery, yet at home each ſingle citizen was chagrined at his manners, and diſplaced him to make room for others, which ſoon drew after it the ſubverſion of the *State*. Upon this occaſion therefore Alcibiades ſtood up, and adviſed the Athenians as follows:

Speech of Alcibiades.

" YES, to me, ye citizens of Athens, in preference to others " this command is due;—for with this I muſt needs begin, ſince on " this point Nicias hath attacked me—and I alſo judge myſelf de- " ſerving of the truſt. In regard to thoſe things which have cauſed " me to be ſo loudly cenſured; thoſe very things give ſplendor to " my anceſtors and to myſelf, and are of public emolument alſo to " my country. The great magnificence I diſplayed at the Olympic " ſolemnities hath raiſed in the Grecians an idea of Athens far be- " yond its actual ſtrength; tho' previous to this, they entertained " the hope of being able totally to war her down. For I am the " man, who brought ſeven chariots thither, more than any private " perſon ever furniſhed out before; who carried off the firſt and the " ſecond and the fourth prize, and in all other reſpects ſupported " my quality as a victor. Such things, it muſt be owned, are de- " clared to be honour by the laws of Greece; and, whenever at- " chieved, they leave an high opinion of power behind them. The " ſplendid figure I have made at home, whether in exhibiting enter- " tainments for the public or any other method of munificence, may

" naturally excite the envy of Athenians, but are to ſtrangers in-
" ſtances of our grandeur. And that man's extravagant ſpirit is not
" uſeleſs to the public, who at his own private expence does ſervice
" not merely to himſelf but to a whole community. Nor can it
" imply injuſtice, for a perſon whoſe ſentiments are generous and
" exalted to ſoar above the ordinary level; ſince, ſhould he after-
" wards be reduced to a ſtate of depreſſion, no man is to ſhare
" in his reverſe of fortune. As therefore in calamity we are not to
" expect even civil ſalutations, let others in the mean time ſubmit,
" as in juſtice they ought, to that aſſuming behavior which proſperity
" inſpireth; or at leaſt, let equality of demeanor be firſt ſhewn by
" him, who demands it as a debt from another. I am indeed aware,
" that perſons of ſuch uncommon elevation, and all in general who
" in ſome ſplendid qualities outſhine the crowd, muſt ſo long as they
" live be the objects of ſpleen; chiefly to thoſe who claim equality
" with them; and, in the next place, to thoſe amongſt whom they
" are converſant; and yet, to ſucceeding generations they leave an
" ambition of claiming affinity to them, tho' quite groundleſs and
" chimerical; and to their country, whatever it be, the haughty
" boaſt, that they were not aliens, were not offenders, but citizens
" of its own growth, and patriots of true renown and worth. Of
" ſuch reverſionary honours I own myſelf ambitious; and, in order
" to ſucceed in the purſuit, have ever rendered my name illuſtrious
" in private life; and as to my public behaviour, reflect, Athenians,
" whether I am inferior to any perſon whatever in performing good
" ſervices to my country. For I am the perſon, who without
" throwing you into hazard or expence have brought the ſtrongeſt
" powers of Peloponneſus to act in your concurrence; who reduced
" the Lacedæmonians to ſtake their *all* upon the fortune of one
" day at Mantinéa. It is true, they came off victorious from the
" conteſt; but have not even yet ſo far reſumed their ſpirits, as to
" dare to act offenſively.

" Such

" Such are the exploits, which my greener years, nay even that
" unnatural giddineſs imputed to me hath atchieved; which by inſi-
" nuating language hath made the Peloponneſian ſtrength to ply be-
" fore it, and giving energy to my frantic humour hath now per-
" ſuaded the world that it is no longer to be dreaded. Whilſt there-
" fore I flouriſh in this manner, whilſt Nicias yet continues to be
" eſteemed *fortunate*, lay hold of that ſervice we are each of us
" able to perform: And by no means repeal the decree of our expe-
" dition to Sicily, as if intended againſt a people we are not able to
" encounter.

" For in Sicily the cities ſwarm with crowds of promiſcuous diſ-
" united inhabitants, inhabitants for ever uſed to ſudden revolutions
" and to perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of thoſe
" crowds is equipped with ſuch arms, as are requiſite to defend a na-
" tive ſoil, or to ſecure even perſonal ſafety; nor is the region ſup-
" plied with the needful ſtores of reſiſtance. It is the habit of
" each, either to execute his purpoſe by artful language, or to wreſt
" it from the public by ſedition. Theſe are all his reſources; and
" if they fail, at the worſt he barely ſhifts his habitation. It is
" therefore improbable, that a rabble ſo jumbled together will ever
" be unanimouſly guided by one concerted plan, or combine toge-
" ther for its juſt execution. Each moment they will be veering
" about to ſuch expedients as happen moſt to ſooth their caprice;
" and the more, upon account of theſe ſeditions, in which we are
" informed they are already embroiled.

" Their number of heavy-armed, it muſt alſo be obſerved, is not
" ſo large as the pompous accounts of fame have made it; nor does
" the ſum total of the Grecians amongſt them turn out ſo conſidera-
" ble, as each ſeparate city hath computed for her own. But Greece,
" in this manner ever addicted moſt terribly to belie her own num-
" bers, hath been found in the preſent war ſcarce able to provide
" herſelf with arms.

" Such,

" Such, according to the beſt informations I have been able to col-
" lect, is the preſent condition of affairs in Sicily. Nay, there are
" means within our reach ſtill more to facilitate its reduction. For
" we ſhall obtain the concurrence of many Barbarians ſeated there,
" who from inveteracy againſt the Syracuſans will join us to attack
" them. Neither can any obſtacles accrue from the ſituation of
" our affairs nearer home, if you only view it in the juſt and
" proper light.

" The bravery of our fathers, tho' oppoſed by the very ſame ene-
" mies, who at preſent, it is urged, ſhould we ſail for Sicily, muſt
" be left behind us, tho' further oppoſed by all the power of the
" Mede, erected this our empire by the ſole reſource of their ſupe-
" riority in naval power. The Peloponneſians further have never
" had leſs hopes of being a match for us than at this very juncture,
" even tho' their ſtrength be in all its maturity of vigour. It is true,
" they have it ever in their option to make inroads into our domi-
" nions, even tho' we wave this expedition; but, at ſea, they never
" can be able to hurt us: The fleet we ſhall leave behind will be
" amply ſufficient to make head againſt them.

" By what plauſible arguments therefore can we excuſe our be-
" haviour, ſhould we now puſillanimouſly deſiſt? what evaſion can
" we find to deny our confederates the ſuccour they demand? We
" are bound in honour, by the oaths we have ſworn, to undertake
" their redreſs. Unavailing is the pretext, that they have never
" done ſuch good offices for us. Our alliance with them was not
" made on the condition of their ſailing hither to bring us ſuccour,
" but of giving ſuch full employ to our enemies there, as might ef-
" fectually deter them from coming hither. The ready road to em-
" pire, as not Athenians only but every people who have riſen to a
" ſummit of power by experience know, is ever to ſuccour thoſe
" who implore our protection, whether they be Greeks or Barbari-
" ans. For had it been the conſtant method to cheriſh indolent in-
" active

" active meaſures, or minutely to litigate who in juſtice ought to be
" protected, the enlargements of our empire had been but trifling,
" or rather we had been liable to the loſs of our original portion.
" For a *State* inveſted with ſuperior power is not only openly op-
" poſed in the field, but recourſe is had to every precaution to pre-
" vent their appearance in it. Neither is it in our power to pre-
" ſcribe exact or arbitrary limitations to our own empire, but we are
" by neceſſity compelled to cabal againſt ſome, and with a high hand
" to keep others in ſubjection; becauſe, ſhould we relax our com-
" mand over others, we endanger our own authority, and thoſe we
" will not awe may become our maſters. Nor further ought peace to
" be ſo much the object of regard to you as it is to other people,
" unleſs you new-model your government, and render it conformable
" to that of your neighbours.

" Weigh therefore theſe arguments; and be convinced, that *thus*
" only our intereſt is capable of any conſiderable advancement, if
" we proceed againſt Sicily and execute the expedition in order to
" deject the haughty Peloponneſian ſpirit, by ſo plain an inſtance
" how much we deſpiſe them, how little fond we are at preſent of
" this inactive interval, and how eager to begin again with a Sicilian
" voyage. And by acting thus, there is probability on our ſide,
" that in caſe we ſubdue the people there, we may gain the ſove-
" reignty over all Greece, or at worſt we ſhall depreſs the Syracuſan
" power: The latter point alone will be an important ſervice to our-
" ſelves and our allies. But in caſe any meaſure of ſucceſs attends
" us, our ſhips will enable us to ſecure our acquiſitions, or at worſt
" our departure. For, tho' the whole body of the Sicilians combine
" together againſt us, we ſhall be abſolute maſters of our own
" retreat.

" Let not therefore the words of Nicias, calculated merely for the
" ſervice of ſloth and to raiſe diſſenſion between the young and the
" old, diſconcert your plan. But let the uſual decorum take place,

" obſervant

" obſervant of which our forefathers, at whoſe conſultations both
" the ſeniors and the youths aſſiſted, exalted this *State* to its preſent
" height; and do you now, adhering to the eſtabliſhed practice, en-
" deavour its further exaltation. Remember alſo, that youth and
" age, if debar'd one another's reciprocal aſſiſtance, loſe all their in-
" fluence and weight; that, on the other hand, from the wildneſs
" of youth, and the moderation of the middle-aged, and the con-
" ſummate prudence of the old, when tempered harmoniouſly to-
" gether, the moſt perfect ſtrength muſt infallibly reſult; that a
" *State*, which ſupinely gives way to ſloth, like other things for
" want of exerciſe, muſt infallibly droop and pine away, and the
" whole of her skill grow old and obſolete; but, when inured to
" uninterrupted conflict, it is continually improving by practice,
" and will gain a perfect habit of ſurmounting every obſtacle, not
" by a parade of words but by active perſeverance.

" Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced that a *State*, which
" hath been accuſtomed to full employ, muſt ſoon drop into deſtruc-
" tion, if it reſigns itſelf to the alternative of ſloth; and, that ſuch
" perſons take the beſt method of infallibly ſecuring their welfare,
" who adhere moſt ſteddily to their preſent cuſtoms and laws, tho'
" poſſibly better might be ſubſtituted in their ſtead."

In this manner Alcibiades ſpoke. And the Athenians, moved by his arguments, which were alſo ſeconded by the intreaties of the Egeſtéan and Leontine exiles, who ſtanding forth in the aſſembly implored their protection, and reminding them of their oaths adjured them to redreſs their wrongs, declared for the expedition with a warmer zeal than at any time before. Nicias was convinced by this, that whatever diſſuaſion he could alledge would be quite incapable to change their reſolves: Yet, as poſſibly, by a minute detail of the immenſe preparations he was going to demand, he might cauſe them at once to change their ſentiments, he ſtood up again, and re-addreſſed them as follows: " I

" I PERCEIVE, Athenians, that your reſolutions are fixed on this *Speech of Nicias.*
" expedition beyond the power of diſſuaſion, and — may its event
" be ſuch as your wiſhes portend! But I ſhall once more beg leave
" to communicate to you my own ſenſe of the affair.

" According to the beſt informations I have been able to procure,
" we are now going to invade a number of powerful cities, cities in-
" dependent one of another, nor ſtanding in need of public revo-
" lutions, which people who cringe under the yoke of ſlavery
" might readily embrace, in order to render their condition more
" ſupportable. Nor is it further to be preſumed, that they will readily
" exchange their own liberty for ſubjection to us, as they are nume-
" rous, at leaſt for one iſland, and many of them inhabited by Gre-
" cians. For, without reckoning Naxus and Catana, which I hope
" upon account of their affinity to the Leontines will ſide with us,
" there are no leſs than ſeven provided in all reſpects with as good
" martial habiliments and ſtores as our own armies; and more parti-
" cularly thoſe againſt which we chiefly bend our courſe, Selinus and
" Syracuſe. Theſe cities abound with ſoldiers heavy-armed, with
" archers and with darters. They have a great number of triremes,
" and plenty of hands to man them. They poſſeſs a large quantity
" of wealth not only in private purſes but in their public treaſuries.
" So rich are even the Selinuntians. And to the Syracuſans further
" a tribute is paid by ſeveral Barbarians. But the points, in which
" they moſt of all excel us, are that numerous cavalry of which
" they are poſſeſſed and corn of their own growth ſufficient to an-
" ſwer all demands without foreign importations. An armament
" therefore ſimply naval will by no means be ſufficient to cope with
" ſuch a ſtrength. A large land-force muſt accompany the naval,
" if we are deſirous of performing ſuch atchievements as may be
" worthy of the greatneſs of our plan, and would not be debar'd an
" opportunity of landing by their numerous cavalry. And this will
" be yet more needful, ſhould the cities alarmed at our approach

" combine together againſt us, and no other friends but the Egeſté-
" ans join us, or ſupply us with a body of cavalry ſufficient to
" countenance our landing. It would be a terrible diſgrace, ſhould
" we be compelled by force to give over our deſign, or to ſend for a
" larger ſupply, as if our councils at firſt ſetting out were raſh and
" ill-concerted. We muſt ſteer at once againſt them with prepara-
" tions in all reſpects well-proportioned to the deſign, ſince we know
" that we are bound to a land far remote from our own, and are
" under many diſadvantages to grapple with our foes. It will not be
" now your employment to march to the relief of your dependents
" ſeated near to Athens againſt an hoſtile invaſion, where all the
" needful ſupplies would be brought to your camp out of the terri-
" tories of friends; but you are to roam to a diſtant climate, where
" you cannot call one inch of ground your own, and from whence
" in the four winter months you will ſcarcely be able to ſend a meſ-
" ſenger to Athens.

" In my opinion therefore it is incumbent upon us, to carry thi-
" ther large numbers of heavy-armed, to be raiſed out of our own
" citizens, our allies and our dependents, and an additional ſtrength
" of Peloponneſians, if we are able to procure it by perſuaſion or by
" pay. Our archers and ſlingers muſt be alſo numerous, that we
" may be able to make good our deſcent in ſpite of the Sicilian
" horſe. We muſt alſo be attended by ſupernumerary veſſels, that
" we may be enabled with greater eaſe to fetch in neceſſaries for our
" army. We muſt alſo carry with us from Athens in our tenders,
" a great quantity of corn, ſuch as wheat and barley parched, with
" bakers, ſome of whom for certain wages muſt be obliged to grind,
" that if our armament lie any where weather-bound, we may not
" ſtand in need of the neceſſaries of life. For, ſo numerous as we
" muſt be, it will not be poſſible for every city to receive us. All
" other proviſions muſt be laid in by ourſelves to the utmoſt of our
" power, and we muſt truſt for nothing to the care of others.

" But

" But what concerns us moſt, is to carry from hence a fund of " money, as ample as we can raiſe. As for that, which the Egeſté- " ans pretend is already laid up for our uſe, conclude it to be only ſo " far as words are current. For unleſs we ſet out from Athens, not " barely provided as well as thoſe we are to encounter; but, equa- " lity in ſtrength for battle alone excepted, in all other reſpects far " ſurpaſſing them in every needful appointment, we ſhall hardly be " able to reduce who are to be reduced, or even to protect who are " to be protected. We ſhould regard ourſelves in the character of " people, who are going to ſeek a new ſettlement among aliens and " enemies; and, as ſuch, are neceſſitated to render themſelves victors " of the ſpot the very day they land; or, to reſt aſſured, if they " then miſcarry, that the whole of that region will be in arms " againſt them. Of this I own myſelf afraid; againſt this I am con- " vinced that by repeated conſultations we ought timely to provide; " and after all, muſt truſt ſtill further to the goodneſs of our fortune, " hazardous as we are but men. Yet hence, I ſhould be glad to ſet " out in this enterprize, with as little occaſion as poſſible to rely on " uncertain fortune; and to be amply provided with every expedi- " ent for a ſucceſsful expedition. For theſe, to my apprehenſion, are " the readieſt means to ſecure the public welfare, and the ſafety of " us who are deſtined for the voyage. But if any man thinks my " reaſons chimerical, I am ready to reſign my command to his ſu- " perior abilities."

In this manner Nicias delivered himſelf, with a view if poſſible to diſcourage the Athenians from proceeding by ſo vaſt a demand of articles requiſite to the deſign; or at leaſt, that in caſe he muſt be obliged to undertake the ſervice, he might ſet out with ſuch ample expedients of ſecurity.

Yet all this bulky and embarraſſing demand of appointments could not raiſe in the Athenians the leaſt averſion to the expedition, *The expedition reſolved upon.*

but rather faſtened their eagerneſs upon it more intenſly than ever: And Nicias prevailed on that ſide of the queſtion where he hoped to have been defeated. It was now univerſally agreed, that his advice was juſt and proper; and, if obeyed, the expedition muſt be attended with all imaginable ſecurity. All ranks of men were now equally ſeized with a fondneſs for the voyage. For ſuch as were advanced in years, were confident that a career of ſucceſs muſt attend the enterprize, and that ſo formidable an armament could not poſſibly miſcarry. The younger ſort were animated with the deſire of ſeeing ſo remote a clime, and gratifying at large the curioſity of their tempers; aſſured, that ſafety would attend their courſe. The bulk of the populace and the ſoldiery in general were pleaſed with their preſent aſſignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging dominion, which would afford them perpetual employ and ſubſiſtence. The paſſions of the generality were for theſe cauſes ſo vehemently elated with the project, that ſuch as could by no means approve were afraid to oppoſe it by a vote, leſt they might be cenſured as men who malevolently oppoſed the public glory. And by this all oppoſition was effectually quaſhed.

At length a certain Athenian, ſtanding forth from amongſt the crowd and calling aloud upon Nicias, told him — "He muſt no "longer caſt about for evaſions, nor meditate delays, but declare "expreſly now, in the preſence of them all, the particulars of the "preparations which the Athenians ſhould vote him."

Nicias demands the particulars.

Nicias, tho' ſorry at his heart, was obliged to reply — That "in "order to be exact, he ought to conſult more leiſurely with his "collegues. But ſo far as he could judge in this ſudden manner, "they ought to ſet out with a fleet conſiſting of at leaſt one hundred "triremes; that the Athenians themſelves ought to furniſh as many "tranſports for heavy-armed ſoldiers as was poſſible, and to ſend for "an additional number from their dependents; that the number of "heavy-armed, both of Athenians and dependents, ſhould at leaſt "be

" be five thouſand; and if poſſible, more; that, to theſe the reſt of
" their preparations ſhould be proportioned, ſuch as archers to be
" levied at home and procured alſo from Crete, not forgetting
" ſlingers; and in fine, that whatever ſhould be judged in any de-
" gree expedient ſhould be provided in good time, and carried along
" with them in the fleet."

This the Athenians had no ſooner heard, than they inſtantly voted -- *They are voted.*
" That the generals were inveſted with abſolute authority, to deter-
" mine the numbers of the expedition and the whole procedure of
" the voyage at their own diſcretion, as might beſt promote the pub-
" lic welfare."

In purſuance of this, the preparations were immediately in hand. *Preparations.*
Summons for the quotas adjuſted were ſent to their dependents, and the levies at home went briskly forwards. Athens was now finely recovered from the peſtilence and a long-continued deſtructive war, both in a multitude of young men now arrived at the vigor of their age, and an increaſe of the public revenues by favour of the peace. By this means all the needful ſupplies were more eaſily provided. And thus were the Athenians buſied for the preſent in fitting out their armament.

But, at this very juncture, almoſt all the ſtatues of Mercury, *The injury of the Mercuries.*
wherever found within the precincts of Athens, and according to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom they were very numerous both in the porches of private houſes and the public temples [2], * * * * * had their faces

2 I have omitted two words in the original, becauſe I cannot tranſlate them with any preciſion or clearneſs. They are ὁ τετράγωνος ἐργασία; *opus quadratum*, ſays one Latin tranſlator; *opus ex lapide quadrato*, ſays another. Mr. *Hobbes* hath it, Mercuries of *ſquare ſtone*: How ſuch a deſcription can be applicable to a ſtatue will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude to the incloſure in which the ſtatues were erected; or to the form of the pedeſtals; or whether a *Mercury* was carved on any or all the ſides of a ſquare ſtone, I am not able to decide. The *Mercuries* were very numerous; and many of them, it is certain, were ſtrange, uncouth, and very bungling performances.

diſfigured.

disfigured in the ſpace of one night. The authors of this outrage were not known. But large rewards were offered by the *State* in order to diſcover them, and a decree was alſo paſſed, that " if any " perſon knew of the commiſſion of any other impiety of the ſame " nature, he ſhould boldly inform the public of it, whether he were " a citizen, or a foreigner, or a ſlave.

This accident in truth made a deep impreſſion on their minds. For it was conſtrued as a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, and as an evidence of ſome terrible combination to introduce innovations and an overthrow of the *democracy*.

Informations againſt Alcibiades.

An information was at length given in by ſome ſojourners and their footmen, relating indeed not at all to the *Mercuries*, but to the defacements of other images committed formerly by ſome young men in a frolicſome and drunken mood; and how further, " they " had celebrated [3] *the Myſteries* in private houſes by way of " mockery;" and amongſt others they alſo accuſed Alcibiades. The party moſt inveterate againſt him caught readily at this charge. As he was the main obſtacle to the advancement of their own popularity and credit, they concluded, that in caſe they could rid themſelves of him, they might at once become leaders of the *State*. Hence they aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud that " thoſe " myſtic frolics and the defacements of the Mercuries ſtruck at the " very foundations of the democracy; and, that none of theſe " outrageous acts had been committed without his participation." They alledged, as a circumſtance that corroborated the charge, the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly licentious, and quite inconſiſtent with a democratical conſtitution.

3 The ſacred *Myſteries* celebrated by the Athenians at Eleuſis. *Plutarch* relates, that the informers were brought in by one Androcles a demagogue, a virulent foe of Alcibiades. They depoſed, that one Theodorus acted the part of *the Crier*, Polytion of the *Torch-bearer*, Alcibiades that of the *Hierophant*, and many of his intimates aſſiſted and were *initiated* in ſolemn and formal mockery.

Alcibiades

Alcibiades endeavour'd forthwith to clear himſelf the beſt he could from all appearances of guilt, and declared himſelf ready, before he enter'd upon the voyage, to ſubmit to a trial (for the armament was now almoſt compleated;) and, if proved to be guilty, to ſuffer the penalties of law; and only, if acquitted, to take upon him the command. He conjured them further, "to receive no calumnious accuſations againſt him in his abſence; but if he was really guilty to put him inſtantly to death; — that, in common prudence it could not be juſtified, to intruſt a perſon, ſo heavily charged, with the command of ſo large an armament, before his innocence had been regularly explored." *His plea.*

But his enemies — apprehenſive that in caſe he was brought to an immediate trial, he would be ſupported by all the favour of the ſoldiery; and, that the people, whoſe idol he was, might poſſibly relent, becauſe in compliment to him the Argives and ſome of the Mantinéans accompanied the expedition, — oppoſed, and put off the proſecution. They put the management of this point into the hands of a ſet of orators, who urged that "for the preſent he might proceed in his voyage, that the expedition ought not to be deferred on his account, and upon his return a day ſhould be aſſigned for his trial." Their deſign was to gather more heavy matter againſt him, which in his abſence could be more eaſily effected, and then to recal him and force him to his trial. In ſhort it was reſolved that "Alcibiades ſhould go the voyage." *He is ordered to proceed in the voyage.*

Things being thus determined, and the year now advanced to the middle of ſummer, the fleet ſet ſail for Sicily. Orders had been iſſued before for the bulk of the confederates, and victualling-ſhips, and ſmall craft, and all the tenders in general, to repair to and aſſemble together at Corcyra; that, from thence, in a body they might croſs the Ionian to the cape of Japygia. But ſuch as were ſubjects of Athens, and ſuch of the confederates as were then in the city, marching down to the Piræus on the appointed day by morning's *Departure of the grand fleet.*

dawn,

dawn, went on board the ſhips in order to weigh and be gone. They were conducted thither by a great crowd, it may be ſaid, by the whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and ſtrangers. The former attended, to perform the parting decorums where their ſeveral attachments claimed it; ſome to their friends, ſome to their relations, ſome to their own ſons. The whole company moved along with a medley of hope and lamentation; with hope, that ſucceſs would attend their courſe; with lamentation, leſt they might never meet again. The ſad recollection occurred — to how great a diſtance from their native ſoil they were going to be ſent! And now that the hour of departure was come, and when this moment they were going to be diſmiſſed into ſcenes of danger, the impreſſions of terror were felt with much keener ſenſe than when the expedition was only decreed. However, at the ſight of their preſent ſtrength, of the numerous expedients of a proſperous enterprize which their eyes beheld, their ſpirits were again elated.

As for the ſtrangers and bulk of the crowd, they attended merely for the pleaſure of gazing at the means intended to accompliſh a great and ſtupendous deſign. For never did any one *State* of Greece before this time equip by its own ſtrength ſuch a powerful armament. It was the fineſt and moſt glorious fleet, that to this day the world had ſeen. It is true, in number of ſhips and heavy-armed on board, *that* which ſailed againſt Epidaurus under command of Pericles, and *that* alſo againſt Potidæa under Agnon, were by no means inferior. For thoſe carried four thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers all native Athenians, with three hundred horſemen: The number of their triremes was a hundred; fifty more were furniſhed by the Lesbians and Chians, beſides a large number of confederates who attended thoſe expeditions. But then they were fitted for a voyage in compariſon trifling, and in a ſlight and penurious manner.

On the contrary, the preſent equipment was calculated for a length of time, and compleatly fitted out for both ſervices, as occaſion

occaſion might demand, either of the ſea or of the land. The ſhipping, at the great expence of the captains of the ſeveral triremes and of the *State*, was quite elaborate. The pay aſſigned by the public to every mariner was a * drachma a day. The number of new ſhips for the battle and chace was ſixty; that of tranſports for the heavy-armed, forty. The ſeveral captains of the triremes were very choice in making up their crews, and gave to ſuch of the mariners as rowed on the uppermoſt bench, and to the ſailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets over and above the public pay. They had further adorned their veſſels with images and all kind of ſumptuous decorations. It was the high ambition of every ſingle captain, to have his own ſhip excel all the reſt of the fleet in ſplendor and in ſwiftneſs.

* 7*d.* ½

The land-force was diſtinguiſhed by the choiceneſs of their levies and their arms; and all the individuals vied with one another in the goodneſs of their accoutrements and equipage whatſoever. It happened alſo on the ſame account that a warm contention was kindled amongſt them, under what officers they ſhould be ranged; and opportunity afforded to the reſt of Greece, to conſtrue the whole into a mere oſtentation of their power and opulence rather than an effective equipment againſt a foe. For were a computation to be formed, both of the public diſburſements of the *State* on this occaſion, and the private expences of the whole ſoldiery; — of the *State*, what prodigious ſums they had already advanced, and what additional ſums the generals were to carry along with them; — of the ſoldiery, what each had expended on his own equipage, every captain on the decoration of his veſſel, and to how much greater charges he was ſtill liable; — without taking into the account the vaſt liſt of neceſſaries which over and above the public allowance each private perſon was obliged to lay in for ſo long a voyage, or the goods which a ſoldier or trader might take with him on board for the ſake of traffic; —

the amount of talents now carried out of Athens would turn out exceeding large.

Nor was it merely for the ſtrangeneſs of the enterprize or the ſplendor of its ſhew, that the armament was noiſed abroad, but alſo for the numerous force with which it was provided to attack the foe; for the remoteneſs of the voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from their native clime, and that prodigious expectation which was raiſed of the event; in order to which the *State* had now exerted itſelf quite beyond its ſtrength.

When the whole force was got on board the fleet, when the ſtowage of all neceſſary ſtores and all baggage whatever was completely adjuſted, ſilence then was proclaimed by ſound of trumpet. But the ſolemn prayers for a ſucceſsful expedition were not offered from every veſſel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with wine ran the circle of the whole armament, and every crew as well as the commanders poured out the libations and drank *ſucceſs and happineſs* out of gold and ſilver cups. The whole crowd that ſtood upon the beach, both of citizens and ſuch ſtrangers as were there and wiſhed them proſperity, joined with them in the public prayer. And now the *pæan* being ſung and the *libation* finiſhed, they put out to ſea [4]. After moving off at firſt in a line

4 Many incidents are related by *Plutarch* in the life of *Nicias*, in regard to the denunciations of the prieſts againſt this expedition, the coining and wreſting of oracles both for and againſt it, and omens which portended nothing but misfortune. Mere human foreſight, and a conſciouſneſs, that the means were not equal to the end propoſed, gave the wiſeſt and ſteddieſt part of the Athenian community a ſad apprehenſion of the event. Socrates conſtantly declared againſt it; and aſſured his friends, it would draw after it the deſtruction of the *State*: This his pre-ſentiment ſoon became the public talk. Meton the *Aſtronomer*, who was named to a poſt of high rank in the expedition, feigned himſelf mad and ſet his houſe on fire. Others deny that circumſtance of his counterfeiting madneſs; and ſay, he ſet his houſe on fire by night, and appeared next morning on the forum in an abject manner, and begged of his fellow-

line a-head, each veſſel made afterwards the beſt of her way to Ægina. And this armament made all poſſible haſte to reach Corcyra, where the force of their allies by which they were to be joined was already aſſembled.

Sicily.

Tho' the intelligence of ſuch an intended invaſion had been brought to Syracuſe from ſeveral quarters, yet for a long courſe of time they would yield no credit to its truth. Nay more, when an aſſembly was convened, ſuch ſpeeches as follow were made by different perſons; ſome believing the accounts received in relation to this armament of the Athenians; others pronouncing them abſolutely falſe. On this occaſion Hermocrates the ſon of Hermon, ſtanding forth in the aſſemby and as one convinced in his own mind that all ſuch accounts were true, addreſſed and adviſed his countrymen thus:

A debate at Syracuſe.

Speech of Hermocrates.

" IT will probably be my own fate, as it hath been the fate of " others, to be disbelieved, when I ſpeak of this intended invaſion " as a matter of truth and certainty. And I alſo know by experi- " ence, that both thoſe who vent and thoſe who retail ſuch accounts " of things as ſeem incredible, are ſo far from effectually perſuading, " that they generally incur the imputation of madneſs. Yet no " ſuch apprehenſions ſhall intimidate or ſtrike me dumb, when ſuch " a weight of danger hovers over my country; when in my own

low-citizens, in order to comfort him under ſo great a misfortune, to excuſe his ſon, who was to have commanded a trireme, from going the voyage. An incident, further, at the very time of the departure of the grand fleet, gave many perſons vaſt concern. The women were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in which many repreſentations of deaths and funerals were exhibited all over Athens; and the women, according to cuſtom, were making heavy moan and lamentation. This ſtruck ſad forebodings into people, who laid ſtreſs on ſuch incidents, that this expenſive and mighty armament, tho' now ſo vigorous and magnificent, would ſoon moulder into ruin.

" heart I am convinced, that I am more clearly enlightened on the
" point than any other perſon whatever.

" For I aſſert *that* to be a matter of the higheſt certainty, which
" you hear only with a fit of ſtupid ſurpriſe, that the Athenians
" have already ſet ſail againſt us with a numerous force both for the
" ſervice of the ſea and the land. The pretext alledged by them is
" execution of treaties with the Egeſtéans, and the reſtoration of the
" Leontines; but the true motive is their ambition to inſlave Sicily,
" and above all this our own Syracuſe, which if once reduced, they
" are well aſſured that nothing will be able afterwards to give a
" check to their arms. Taking it therefore for granted that they
" will be immediately upon us, deliberate in what manner you may
" make the moſt gallant defence in the preſent poſture of your
" ſtrength; careful, that thro' contempt you be not taken unpro-
" vided; nor thro' incredulity abandon the means of preſervation.
" Nor further let thoſe, who are convinced of their immediate ap-
" pearance, be terrified at the boldneſs or ſtrength of their under-
" taking. For they will not be able to hurt us more than we ſhall be
" enabled to retaliate upon them. Nor are they more beyond our
" reach, becauſe they invade us with ſo vaſt an armament; ſince
" this, in regard to the other Sicilians, will plead more abundantly
" in our cauſe; for, terrified at the foe, they will be diſpoſed with
" higher warmth of friendſhip to co-operate with us. And if thus
" in the train of affairs, we are either enabled to defeat their arms,
" or merely to force their return, their ſchemes unexecuted and their
" ambition diſappointed (for I am not in the leaſt afraid that their
" ſanguine expectations can be glutted with ſucceſs) ſuch events
" would reflect the higheſt glory upon you, and compleat what I
" firmly hope.

" It is a truth evinced by facts, that few conſiderable armaments of
" either Grecians or Barbarians, which have been ſent out on remote
" expeditions,

" expeditions, have returned ſucceſsful. Nor, further, are our pre-
" ſent invaders more numerous than the Syracuſans themſelves or
" their friends of the neighbouring *States*, whoſe ſtrength mere
" hoſtile dread will cement and bind faſt together. If therefore,
" tho' merely for want of needful ſupplies, they incur miſcarriage on
" a foreign ſhore; if they prove unſucceſsful, tho' chiefly thro'
" their own miſconduct; the whole honour muſt however reſt with
" us, as if we had ruined their projects by art and management.
" Even theſe very Athenians were indebted to a parallel coincidence of
" events for the vaſt enlargement of their ſtrength and empire, when
" the *Mede* who gave out that he aimed the blow at Athens was,
" contrary to all human expectation, diſconcerted by a ſeries of er-
" rors that were purely his own. And ſome ſuch fortunate coinci-
" dence in our own behalf we have at preſent all imaginable reaſon
" to expect.

" Let us therefore with active reſolution put our domeſtic affairs in-
" to a poſture of defence, and diſpatch our embaſſadors to the Siculi,
" to keep firm in our friendſhip ſuch as are already our friends, and to
" endeavour to procure the friendſhip and concurrence of the reſt.
" Nay, let our embaſſies regularly compleat the whole circuit of Si-
" cily, where they may repreſent the common danger which equally
" threatens them all. Let them further croſs over to Italy to pro-
" cure for us their defenſive alliances, or at leaſt to negotiate a denial
" of reception to the Athenians. I alſo judge it adviſeable to ſend to
" Carthage: For even the Carthaginians are not exempted from the
" preſent dangers, but have been ever under apprehenſions of re-
" ceiving from them a viſit at Carthage. It may perhaps effectu-
" ally occur to their thoughts, that ſhould they now abandon us, the
" ſtorm muſt ſoon extend itſelf to them; by which they may be de-
" termined either ſecretly or openly, by ſome expedient or other, to
" vindicate our cauſe. And were their inclination equal to their
" power, no people on the globe could ſo eaſily redreſs us. For

" they

" they are poſſeſſed of an immenſity of wealth, which gives an
" eaſy and prompt completion to the ſchemes of war and to every
" human enterprize. Let us ſend further to Lacedæmon and Co-
" rinth, requeſting the diſpatch of immediate ſuccours hither, and
" the renewal of the war againſt the Athenians.

" There is one point more, which in my opinion is more critical
" and important than all the reſt; and which, tho' perhaps, inured
" as you are to domeſtic indolence, it may not gain your ready ap-
" probation, I ſhall however boldly recommend. Would all of us
" in general who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at leaſt would only we
" Syracuſans, with what other people we can get to aſſiſt us, put
" out inſtantly to ſea with all the ſhips we have in readineſs, and
" victualled but for the ſpace of two months; — would we then
" give theſe Athenians the meeting either at Tarentum or cape Ja-
" pygia, and there convince them, that before they enter the liſts of
" war for the conqueſt of Sicily, they muſt fight for their paſſage
" acroſs the Ionian; — we ſhould then ſtrike them with the utmoſt
" terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought " that from
" a friendly port we ſhall ſally forth to guard our out-works (for
" Tarentum will readily receive us,) whilſt they have a long tract
" of ſea to paſs with all their cumberſome train, and muſt find it
" hard, through ſo long a voyage, to be always ſteering in the regu-
" lar order." As their courſe muſt thus be ſlow and muſt advance
" only in exact conformity to orders, we ſhall have a thouſand op-
" portunities to attack them. If again they clear their ſhips for
" action, and in a body bear down expeditiouſly upon us, they muſt
" ply hard at their oars; and, when ſpent with their toil, we can
" fall upon them. Or, in caſe that may not be judged adviſeable,
" we have it always in our power to retire into the harbour of Ta-
" rentum. And thus the Athenians, if in conſtant expectation of
" being fought with at ſea they muſt make their paſſage with a ſmall
" portion only of their ſtores, will be reduced to great diſtreſs on
" coaſts

" coaſts which will afford them no ſupply. Should they chooſe to
" continue in their ſtation, they muſt infallibly be blocked up in it.
" Should they venture a paſſage, they muſt unavoidably leave their
" tenders and ſtoreſhips behind; and, as they have no aſſurance of a
" hearty reception from the cities on the coaſts, muſt be terribly
" diſmayed.

" It is my firm opinion, that amidſt that great perplexity of
" thought which muſt reſult from theſe obſtructions, they will never
" preſume to ſail from Corcyra; or at leaſt, whilſt they are agitating
" the forms of procedure and ſending out ſpy-boats to diſcover our
" numbers and poſition, the ſeaſon of the year muſt be protracted to
" winter; or, utterly diſpirited at ſo unexpected a reſiſtance, they
" will give up the voyage. This I more readily expect, as I am in-
" formed that their moſt experienced commander hath been forced
" into office againſt his inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the
" pretext to deſiſt, if ſuch a ſhew of reſiſtance could be made by us
" as would preſerve his honour from ſuſpicion. And I am perfectly
" convinced that rumour will increaſe and aggravate our ſtrength.
" Now the ſentiments of mankind are conſtantly adjuſted by ru-
" mours. Parity of danger is ſuppoſed, when an enemy declares he
" is ready to begin the attack: And ſuch an enemy is always more
" dreaded than he, who betrays an intention merely to defend him-
" ſelf againſt an enemy's aſſaults. Such exceſs of fear muſt now
" fall to the lot of the Athenians. They are invading us, with the
" fond preſumption that we ſhall not fight. They think they have
" grounds for ſuch a preſumption, becauſe we have not concurred
" with the Lacedæmonians in their demolition. But when, to their
" bitter diſappointment, they find we have the courage to act offen-
" ſively, the ſuddenneſs of our efforts will terrify them more
" than all the reality of our expected ſtrength could have done.

" Determine therefore to execute with bold and ready reſolution
" the plan I have propoſed; or, if this muſt not prevail, with the
" utmoſt

" utmoſt expedition to get all things at home in readineſs for war.
" And let each Syracuſan be firmly convinced, that contempt of an
" enemy ought never to be ſhewn but in the heat of action; that the
" conduct of thoſe men muſt tend moſt highly to the public pre-
" ſervation, who alarmed by a decent fear judge it needful to pre-
" pare with all caution and alacrity, as if the danger was inſtant at
" our doors. But theſe our enemies are actually coming; they are
" already (I know it well) upon the voyage; they are this mo-
" ment only not in ſight."

In this manner Hermocrates ſpoke his ſentiments. But the popular aſſembly of the Syracuſans was embroiled with much variance and contention. One party cried out, that " it was all a joke, the " Athenians durſt not think of invading them." Another, " Her- " mocrates hath truth and reaſon on his ſide." A third, " let " them come, what damage can they do us which we are not able " heartily to repay them?" Others betrayed an open contempt at the whole account, and laughed at it as downright ridiculous. The party was but ſmall, which gave credit to Hermocrates, and trembled for the future. At length, Athenagoras ſtood up, who being the firſt magiſtrate of the people, and whoſe credit at this time was higheſt with them, delivered himſelf as followeth:

Speech of Athenagoras.

" THE man, who wiſheth the Athenians may not be ſo mad as
" to come hither and run themſelves headlong into our ſubjection, is
" either a coward or a traitor to his country. But for thoſe, who
" vent ſuch news and endeavour to frighten you by the terrible re-
" cital, at their audaciouſneſs truly I am not in the leaſt ſurprized;
" but I am greatly ſo at their folly, if they imagine their views can
" eſcape detection! Poor abject ſouls, quite diſpirited within
" through their own puſillanimity, are glad to ſpread conſternation
" throughout a whole community; that under the general panic
" their

" their own may lie veiled and undiſtinguiſhed. And ſuch is the ef-
" fect, which the preſent informations may be able to produce; not
" from any grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions and
" falſhoods of an iniquitous cabal, who are ever dabling in the prac-
" tices of faction.

" But you, Syracuſans, I exhort, to apply your good-ſenſe on
" this occaſion, and ſearch after probability; not by conſidering
" ſuch accounts as theſe men have pompouſly detailed, but ſuch
" enterprizes as a wiſe and abundantly enlightened people (for ſuch
" I eſteem the Athenians) are likely to undertake. For what pro-
" bability is there, that leaving the Peloponneſians on their backs,
" when the war at home is not yet brought to any ſettled conclu-
" ſion, they would wilfully embark into another of no leſs import-
" ance? For my part, I am perſuaded they reſt well contented,
" that, ſo many and ſo powerful *States* as we Sicilians are, we have
" not yet thought proper to invade them.

" But, allowing theſe informations true, and that they are actu-
" ally coming, — I am firmly perſuaded that Sicily is better able
" than Peloponneſus to war them down, by how much in all
" reſpects it is better furniſhed with every reſource of war; and
" that this our Syracuſe alone is far ſuperior in ſtrength to that, nay
" double that armament, which by report now threatens its invaſion.
" For I know aſſuredly, that no horſe can follow in their train;
" that, farther, none can be procured for them in this country, if
" we abate an inconſiderable party which the Egeſtéans may furniſh.
" And I know, that a body of heavy-armed equal in number to our
" own can never be tranſported by them acroſs ſuch a length of ſea.
" The enterprize is bold indeed, to attempt ſo long a voyage hither
" with only light and nimble ſhips, and to bring all thoſe military
" ſtores, the roll of which muſt be exceſſively large, in order to at-
" tack ſo great a city. Shall I therefore be terrified at vain reports? I,
" who am firmly perſuaded, that if the Athenians were poſſeſſed

" of a city on our coaſts as conſiderable in all reſpects as Syracuſe it-
" ſelf, and ſhould dare to provoke us; if maſters of the neighbour-
" ing territory, they ſhould from thence make war upon us; — even
" with ſuch advantages they would with difficulty eſcape a total de-
" ſtruction? And what therefore in all human probability muſt be
" their fate, when all Sicily to a man will be combined to oppoſe
" them? For now their war muſt iſſue from a camp on the beach
" of the ſea, of which their ſhips muſt form the ramparts. They
" will not be able to make long excurſions from their tents and ma-
" gazines of needful ſtores, as our cavalry will bridle and control
" them. But in ſhort, it is my firm opinion that they never will
" be able to accompliſh a deſcent, ſo far am I convinced that our
" force is in all reſpects ſuperior.

" I am well perſuaded, that all thoſe obſtacles, which I have hi-
" therto recited, their own wiſe reflexions have ſuggeſted to the re-
" membrance of the Athenians and deterred them from hazarding
" their own ruin; and that our own malecontents amuſe us with
" fictitious accounts of things, that neither have nor can have exiſ-
" tence. This is by no means the firſt occaſion, on which I have
" been able to detect their ſchemes. I am no ſtranger to their con-
" ſtant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent as they are, by
" forgeries like theſe or more malicious than theſe, or even by the open
" efforts of ſedition, to ſtrike a panic amongſt the Syracuſan *people*,
" and to ſeize the helm of your government. And I have reaſon to
" apprehend, that amongſt the many projects they attempt, ſome one
" at length may be fatally ſucceſsful. But this muſt be charged to
" our own puſillanimity, who exert no precautions to avert impend-
" ing miſeries, nor bravely oppoſe the ſtorm, tho' we perceive it to
" be gathering around us. And from hence it unavoidably reſults,
" that our *State* is ſeldom bleſſed with a ſeaſon of tranquillity; but
" feels the bitter lot of ſedition on ſedition, of more nume-
" rous ſtruggles againſt factions within than public hoſtilities
" without;

" without; nay ſometimes tyranny and deſpotic rule hath been
" our portion.

" To guard the preſent times from ſuch diſaſtrous contingencies
" ſhall be my conſtant endeavour; and, if favoured with your con-
" currence, my care ſhall be ſucceſsful. To this end I muſt prevail
" upon you, who are the *many*, to co-operate with me, whilſt I in-
" flict upon theſe artificers of faction the puniſhment they deſerve,
" not barely for overt commiſſions (for in theſe they are not eaſily
" caught) but for all the treacherous plots which, how deſirous ſo-
" ever, they are not able to execute. For we ought not only to
" award our vengeance on the open outrages of an enemy, but to
" diſarm his malice by wiſe precaution; becauſe the man, who
" will not thus in time diſarm it, will feel its blow before he is
" aware.

" On the *few* I have alſo to beſtow, partly ſome reproofs, partly
" ſome cautions, and partly ſome inſtructions. For chiefly by theſe
" methods I judge it feaſible to deter them from their factious de-
" ſigns. Let me therefore requeſt from you, ye youths of Syracuſe,
" the ſolution of a point which hath frequently occurred to my own
" imagination. — What is it you would have? — An immediate poſ-
" ſeſſion of the government of your country? — Why, the very
" laws of that country declare you incapable of it. And theſe very
" laws were intended, rather to exclude you ſo long as you are un-
" equal, than to give you a diſgraceful rejection when you ſhall be
" equal to the truſt. But further — Are you not piqued in heart at
" being placed upon the ſame rank and level with the bulk of your
" fellow-citizens? And where would be the juſtice, in awarding
" diſtinctions of honour and truſt to thoſe, who are in no reſpect
" differenced from others? It may perhaps be urged, that a *demo-*
" *cracy* is repugnant to the dictates both of wiſdom and juſtice; that
" the moſt opulent members of a *State* are intitled to its higheſt
" honours, are beſt able to ſuperintend the public welfare. But to
" this

" this I reply, that in the firſt place by the word *people* is ſignified a
" whole community, including its every individual; but an *oligarchy*
" means only a party; — in the next place, that men of opulence
" are the moſt ſuitable guardians of the public treaſure; that men
" of underſtanding and experience are beſt qualified to adviſe; but
" the *many* after hearing are the beſt judges of meaſures. And thus
" by a *democracy* equality of right and of privilege is moſt fairly
" preſerved, as well to the ſeparate members as to the whole com-
" munity. An *oligarchy* indeed beſtows an ample portion of dangers
" on the *many*, but in beneficial points it not only aſſumes the larger
" ſhare to itſelf, but by an unbounded rapacity monopolizeth the
" public harveſt. Theſe are the ends, which the men of power
" and the raw unexperienced youths amongſt you ambitiouſly pur-
" ſue; ends, incompattible with the welfare of a great and flouriſhing
" *State*. The accompliſhment of theſe, I ſay, you have this very
" moment in agitation; tho' the world cannot furniſh ſuch a ſet of
" fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency of your ſchemes.
" Nor can any ſet of Grecians within my knowledge equal either
" your brutality or your villany, if with open eyes you dare proceed.
" Lay hold then at once of ſound information, or repent if already
" informed, and unite in the infallible advancement of the general
" welfare of the whole community. And let the men of probity
" amongſt you reſt perfectly ſatisfied, that thus they ſhall obtain a pro-
" per ſhare; nay more than a ſhare in thoſe emoluments, which will
" equally redound to all their country. But in caſe you give into
" different ſchemes, the hazard is great; the whole of your plan
" will be baffled and confounded.

" Trouble us therefore no further with your informations, as we
" are privy to and ſhall certainly diſconcert the views of their au-
" thors. For the Syracuſan *State*, even tho' the Athenians actually
" invade us, will repel their efforts with a magnanimity worthy of
" herſelf: And we have already a ſet of brave commanders, who
" will

" will effectually manage the point. But if not one tittle of theſe
" intended invaſions be true, which is my firm opinion, the *State*
" will not be ſtruck into a panic by your rumours, will never place
" the command of her forces in your hands, ſo as to rivet a volunary
" ſervitude upon herſelf. She on the contrary will exert her own
" vigilance and diſcretion; ſhe will interpret the rumours you have
" ſpread as ſo many acts againſt her welfare, and will not give up her
" liberty to accounts expreſly forged to terrify the ear; but aware in
" time, by no means to intruſt herſelf into your management, will
" leave no poſſible method of defence untried."

Thus ſpoke Athenagoras. But here one of the generals riſing up prevented any other perſon from continuing the debate, and put an end to the preſent heats by delivering himſelf thus:

Speech of a Syracuſan general.

" IT is contrary to all decorum, both for thoſe who ſpeak to
" pour forth calumniations againſt one another, or for thoſe who
" hear to receive them with attention. At preſent, we are rather
" concerned, to yield regard to the informations which are brought
" us, that every individual and this community may be timely pre-
" pared to repel the invaders. And if this ſhould prove at laſt to be
" mere ſuperfluity of care, yet what harm can poſſibly accrue from
" ſuch an equipment of the *State* with horſes, and arms, and ſuch
" other habiliments as are the glory of war? We ourſelves ſhall take
" all proper care of the proviſions of war and the levy of ſoldiers;
" and at the ſame time ſhall circulate our meſſengers to the cities
" around us, and to watch the appearance of the foe; and ſhall ex-
" pedite every point judged needful in the preſent emergence. Some
" care of theſe points hath already been taken, and what more we
" ſhall perceive to be expedient, we ſhall on the proper occaſions
" communicate to you."

When

When the general had expreſſed himſelf thus, the Syracuſans broke up the aſſembly and departed.

Proceedings of the grand fleet.

The Athenians, with the reinforcements of their allies, were by this time all arrived at Corcyra. And the firſt thing done by the commanders was, to take a review of the whole equipment, and to ſettle the order in which they were to anchor and form their naval ſtation. They alſo divided it into three ſquadrons, and caſt lots for the command of each; to the end that, in the courſe of the voyage, they might be well ſupplied with water, and harbours, and the proper neceſſaries wherever they might chance to put in; that, in other reſpects, a better diſcipline might be kept up, and the men be more inured to a ready obedience, as being under the inſpection of an able commander in each ſeveral diviſion. Theſe points being ſettled, they diſpatched three veſſels to Italy and Sicily, to pick up informations, what cities on thoſe coaſts would give them a reception. And their orders were, to come back in time and meet them upon the voyage, that they might be advertiſed into what ports they might ſafely enter.

Under ſail from Corcyra.

Account of its force.

Theſe previous points being adjuſted, the Athenians with an equipment already ſwelled to ſo great a bulk, weighing anchor from Corcyra, ſtood acroſs for Sicily. The total of their triremes was an hundred and thirty-four, to which were added two Rhodian veſſels of fifty oars. One hundred of theſe were Athenian, and of this number, ſixty were tight ſhips fit for ſervice; the reſt were tranſports for the ſoldiery. The remainder of the fleet conſiſted of Chians and the other allies. The total of the heavy-armed on board was five thouſand one hundred men. Of theſe fifteen hundred were citizens of Athens inrolled; ſeven hundred were Athenians of the loweſt claſs (called *Thetes*) who ſerved by way of marines. The reſt of the force conſiſted of the quotas of their alliance; ſome, of their own dependents; five hundred belonged to the Argives; the number of Mantinéans and mercenaries was two hundred and fifty; the archers

archers in the whole amounted to four hundred and eighty; and of theſe eighty were Cretans. There were ſeven hundred Rhodian ſlingers, and an hundred and twenty light-armed Megaréan exiles. And one horſe-tranſport attended, which carried thirty horſemen.

So great an equipment ſailed out at firſt to begin the war. And in the train of this equipment, went thirty ſtoreſhips laden with corn, and carrying on board the bakers, and maſons, and carpenters, and all things requiſite in the works of fortification; and alſo an hundred ſail of ſmall veſſels, which neceſſity demanded to attend the ſhips that carried the ſtores. A large number alſo of ſmall craft and trading veſſels ſailed voluntarily in company with the fleet, for the ſake of traffic. All which now, in one collected body, ſtood away from Corcyra acroſs the Ionian gulf.

Arrives on the coaſt of Italy.

The whole armament being got over to cape Japygia or to Tarentum, as they ſeverally could make the paſſage, ſailed along the coaſt of Italy — where not one city would receive them, would grant them a market, or ſuffer them to land, barely permitting them to anchor and to water, tho' at Tarentum and Locri even that was denied them, — 'till they arrived at Rhegium a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium the whole fleet was now aſſembled; and without the city (for an admiſſion into it was refuſed them) they formed an incampment within the verge of Diana's temple, where alſo they were accommodated by the Rhegians with a market.

Stays ſome time at Rhegium.

Here, having drawn their veſſels aſhore, they lay ſome time for refreſhment; and had a conference with the Rhegians, in which they preſſed them, as they were of Chalcidic deſcent, to ſuccour the Leontines who were alſo Chalcidéans. Their anſwer was that "they "ſhould ſide with neither party, but whatever meaſures were judged "expedient by the other Italians, they ſhould conform to thoſe." The Athenians counſels were now ſolely bent on the affairs of Sicily, in what manner they might moſt ſucceſsfully make their approaches. They alſo waited for the return of the three veſſels from Egeſta, which had previouſly

previouſly been diſpatched thither; longing earneſtly for a report about the ſtate of their treaſure, whether it was really ſuch as their envoys at Athens had repreſented.

The news received at Syracuſe.

To the Syracuſans in the mean time, undoubted advice is brought from ſeveral quarters and by their own ſpies, that "the fleet of the "enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this being unconteſted, they prepared for their defence with the utmoſt attention, and were no longer duped by incredulity. They alſo ſent about to the Siculi; to ſome places, their agents who were to keep a watchful eye upon their conduct; and to others, embaſſadors. And into thoſe towns upon the coaſt, which were expoſed to a deſcent, they threw a garriſon. In Syracuſe, they examined if the city was provided with the proper means of a defence, by a careful inſpection of the arms and the horſes; and all other points were properly adjuſted, as againſt a war coming ſwiftly upon them, and only not already preſent.

Diſappointments from Egeſta.

The three veſſels, detached beforehand to Egeſta, rejoin the Athenians yet lying at Rhegium, with a report that "the great ſums "which had been promiſed them were quite annihilated, ſince they "ſaw only * thirty talents in ſpecie." Upon this the commanders were inſtantly ſeized with a dejection of ſpirit, becauſe their firſt hope was thus terribly blaſted; and the Rhegians had refuſed to concur with their attempts, upon whom they had made their firſt eſſay of perſuaſion, and with whom they had the greateſt probability of ſucceſs, as they were by blood allied to the Leontines, and had ever ſhewn themſelves well-diſpoſed to the Athenian *State*. The Egeſtéan affair had indeed taken no other turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the other two commanders were quite amazed and confounded at it.

* 5812*l.* 10*s.* *Sterling.*

The trick of the Egeſtéans.

The trick made uſe of by the Egeſtéans, at the time that the firſt embaſſy went thither from Athens to take a ſurvey of their treaſures was this:— Having conducted them into the temple of Venus at

at Eryx, they ſhewed them the offerings repoſited there, the cups, the flagons, and the cenſers, and the other furniture of the temple, in quantity by no means ſmall. Theſe, being all of ſilver, preſented to the eye a vaſt ſhew of wealth, far beyond their intrinſic value. Having alſo made entertainments in private houſes, for thoſe who came in the veſſels of the embaſſy, they amaſſed together all the gold and ſilver cups of Egeſta; they borrowed others from the adjacent cities, as well Phœnician as Grecian; they carried their gueſts about from one houſe of feaſting to another; and each exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all of them diſplaying generally the ſame veſſels, and great abundance appearing at every place, the Athenians who made the voyage were prodigiouſly ſurpriſed at the ſplendid ſhows. Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, they inlarged, with a kind of emulation which ſhould magnify it moſt, on the immenſity of wealth they had ſeen at Egeſta. In this manner, being deceived themſelves, they obtruded the ſame fallacy upon others; but now, when the true account was ſpread amongſt them, that "there was no ſuch wealth at Egeſta," they were much cenſured and reproached by the ſoldiers.

A council of war.

The generals however held a conſultation about the methods of proceeding. And here, it was the opinion of Nicias; "That with "their whole armament they ſhould ſtand immediately againſt Seli-"nus, the reduction of which was the principal motive of the ex-"pedition; and, in caſe the Egeſtéans would furniſh the whole ar-"my with the proper ſupplies of money, their councils then might "be regulated accordingly: But otherwiſe, they ſhould inſiſt on "their maintaining the ſixty ſail of ſhips, which had been ſent ex-"preſly at their own requeſt; then, abiding by them, they ſhould "reconcile their differences with the Selinuntians, either by force of "arms or negotiation: They afterwards might viſit other cities, and "diſplay before them the mighty power of the Athenian *State*; "and, having given ſuch conſpicuous proofs of their alacrity to ſup-

" port their friends and allies, might return to Athens; provided,
" that no ſudden and unexpected turn of affairs might give them
" opportunity to do ſervice to the Leontines, or bring over ſome
" other cities to their intereſt; ever intent not to bring their own
" *State* into danger by a needleſs profuſion of blood and treaſure."

Alcibiades declared, " That it could never be juſtified, if after
" putting to ſea with ſo great an armament, they ſhould return with
" diſgrace, and no effectual ſervice done to their country; that, on
" the contrary, they ought, by heralds diſpatched expreſly, to notify
" their arrival in theſe parts to all the cities except Selinus and Syra-
" cuſe; that further, they ſhould try what could be done with the
" Siculi, in order to perſuade ſome of them to revolt from the Sy-
" racuſans, and to ſtrike up treaties of alliance and friendſhip with
" others, that ſo they might provide a reſource of proviſions and re-
" inforcements; that, the firſt trial of this kind ſhould be made up-
" on the Meſſenians, (who lay in the fineſt ſituation for favouring
" their paſſage and deſcent into Sicily,) which muſt open to them
" the moſt convenient harbour and ſtation for their armament:
" Thus gaining the concurrence of the cities, and certain from
" whom they might depend upon aſſiſtance, the way would then be
" open for them to make attempts upon Syracuſe and Selinus, in caſe
" the former refuſed to make up the quarrel with the Egeſtéans,
" and the latter to ſuffer the replantation of the Leontines."

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically oppoſite, ſince he adviſed it " to be the moſt judicious meaſure to ſtand at once againſt
" Syracuſe, and to try their fortune before that city with the utmoſt
" expedition, whilſt they were yet not competently provided for re-
" ſiſtance, and their conſternation was ſtill in its height: Becauſe
" every hoſtile force is always moſt terrible on its firſt approach;
" and, in caſe it protract the time of encountering the eyes of its
" foes, they muſt recover their courage through familiarity with
" danger, and then the ſight of an enemy is more apt to inſpire
" contempt;

" contempt; — But, ſhould they aſſault them on a ſudden whilſt yet " their approach is with terror expected, the victory muſt infallibly " be their own; — In this caſe, all things would co-operate with " them to terrify the foe; ſuch as, the ſight of their numbers which " now only could appear in their greateſt inlargement; the fore- " bodings of their hearts what miſeries were like to enſue; and, " above all, the inſtant neceſſity they muſt lie under of hazarding a " battle: That moreover, it was likely, that numbers of the enemy " might be ſurpriſed yet roaming abroad in the adjacent country, as " ſtill they were incredulous of the approach of the Athenians; Or, " even tho' the Syracuſans were ſafely retired with all their effects " into the city, the army muſt needs become maſters of prodigious " wealth, if they ſhould beſiege the city and awe all around it; " That, by taking this ſtep the other Sicilians would be more diſ- " couraged from ſuccouring the Syracuſans, and more eaſily inclined " to concur with the Athenians, and all ſhifts and delays to keep clear " of the conteſt, 'till one ſide was manifeſtly ſuperior, would be pre- " cluded." He added further, that " they ſhould take care to poſ- " ſeſs themſelves of Megara, which was now deſerted and not far " from Syracuſe either by ſea or land, as it would afford a fine ſta- " tion for their ſhips to lie in, would ſhelter them upon a retreat, and " give expedition to their approaches."

But, tho' Lamachus delivered his ſentiments thus, he ſoon gave up his own opinion and went over to that of Alcibiades. And in purſuance of this, Alcibiades with his own ſingle ſhip paſſed over to Meſſene; and having gained a conference with the Meſſenians about an alliance offenſive and defenſive; when no arguments he brought could perſuade, when on the contrary they returned this anſwer, that " into their city they would not receive them, tho' they were ready to " accommodate them with a market without the walls," he repaſſed to Rhegium. And immediately the generals, having manned out ſixty ſhips with the choiceſt hands of the whole fleet and taken in a

Alcibiades goes to Meſſene.

They all go to Naxus.

requiſite ſtock of ſubſiſtence, ſteered away for Naxus, leaving the reſt of the armament at Rhegium under the care of one of thoſe in the commiſſion.

To Catana. After a reception granted them into their city by the Naxians, they ſtood away from thence to Catana. And when the Catanéans refuſed to receive them, (for in that city was a party ſtrongly attached to the *To* Syracuſe. Syracuſans,) they put into the river Terias. After a night's continuance there, the next day they ſailed for Syracuſe; keeping the reſt of the fleet ready ranged in a line of battle a-head. But they had detached ten beforehand, who were ordered to enter the great harbour of Syracuſe, and to examine what naval force lay there ready lanched for ſervice, and to proclaim from their decks as they paſſed along the ſhore — That " the Athenians are come into thoſe parts to " replace the Leontines in their own territory, as they were bound " in point both of alliance and conſanguinity; that whatever Leon- " tines therefore were now reſiding at Syracuſe, ſhould without fear " come over to the Athenians, as friends and benefactors."

Return to and get maſters of Catana. When the proclamation had been made, and they had taken a view of the city and its harbours, and of the adjacent ground, what ſpots were moſt convenient for a deſcent and the commencement of the war, they ſailed back again to Catana. A council of war had been held in that city, and the Catanéans were come to a reſolution, " not to receive the armament;" but however they granted an audience to the generals. At which, whilſt Alcibiades harangued, and the inhabitants of Catana were all in the public aſſembly, the Athenian ſoldiers without giving any alarm pulled down a little gate of a very ſorry ſtructure, and then entering the city walked up and down in the market. But ſuch of the Catanéans, as were of the Syracuſan party, no ſooner found that the army was got in, than ſtruck into a ſudden conſternation, they ſtole preſently out of the city. The number of theſe was but trifling. The reſt of the inhabitants decreed an alliance with the Athenians, and encouraged them.

them to fetch over the remainder of their armament from Rhegium.

This point being carried, the Athenians having repaſſed to Rhegium were ſoon with the whole of their fleet under ſail for Catana, and on their arrival there they formed a proper ſtation for their ſhips and men.

They go to Camarina.

But now intelligence was brought them from Camarina, that "if they "would come to countenance them, that city would declare on their "ſide;" and that "the Syracuſans are buſy in manning their fleet." With the whole armament therefore they ſteered along the coaſt, touching firſt at Syracuſe. And when they fonnd that no fleet was there in readineſs to put to ſea, they ſtood off again for Camarina; and there, approaching the ſhore, they notified their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admittance was however refuſed them, the Camarinéans alledging that "they were bound by ſolemn oaths to receive "only one ſingle ſhip of the Athenians, unleſs of their own ac-"cord they ſhould require a larger number." Thus diſappointed, they put out again to ſea; and, having made a deſcent on ſome part of the Syracuſan territory, they picked up a booty, 'till the Syracuſan cavalry making head againſt them and cutting off ſome of their light-armed who were ſtraggled to a diſtance, they re-embarked, and went again to Catana.

Return to Catana.

Alcibiades *recalled to take his trial.*

On their return thither they find the *Salaminian* arrived from Athens, to fetch back Alcibiades, by public order of the *State* to take his trial for the crimes charged againſt him by his country, and alſo ſome others of the ſoldiery who attended him in the expedition, againſt whom informations had been given that they were guilty of impiety in the affair of the *Myſteries*, and againſt ſome of them in that of the *Mercuries*. For the Athenians, after the departure of the fleet, continued to make as ſtrict an inquiſition as ever into the crimes committed in regard to the *Myſteries*, and alſo in regard to the *Mercuries*. What ſort of perſons the informers were, was no

part

part of their concern, but, in their height of jealouſy, giving credit indiſcriminately to all, through too great a deference to men of profligate and abandoned lives, they apprehended and threw into priſon the moſt worthy citizens of Athens: eſteeming it more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the fact, than that a perſon of irreproachable character, when once accuſed through the villany of an informer, ſhould eſcape without the queſtion. For the people, having learned by tradition, how grievous the tyranny of Piſiſtratus and his ſons became at laſt; and what is more, that it was not overthrown by themſelves and Harmodius, but by the induſtry of the Lacedæmonians; lived in a conſtant dread of ſuch another uſurpation, and beheld all theſe incidents now with moſt ſuſpicious eyes. But in fact the bold attempt of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton took its riſe merely from a competition in love. The particulars of which I ſhall here unfold more largely, to convince the world, that no other people, no not even the Athenians themſelves have any certain account, either relating to their own tyrants, or the tranſactions of that period.

True ſtory of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton.

The truth is, that Piſiſtratus dying poſſeſſed of the tyranny in a good old age, not Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hippias the eldeſt of his ſons was his ſucceſſor in power. Harmodius being at this time in the flower of his youth and beauty, Ariſtogiton a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle rank, doted upon and had him in his poſſeſſion. But ſome attempts having been made upon Harmodius by Hipparchus the ſon of Piſiſtratus, he rejected his ſolicitations, and diſcovers the whole affair to Ariſtogiton. The latter received the account with all that anguiſh which a warm affection feels; and, alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, leſt by force he might ſeize the youth, he inſtantly forms a project, a project as notable as his rank in life would permit, to demoliſh the tyranny. And in the mean time, Hipparchus, who, after making a ſecond attempt upon Harmodius was equally unſucceſsful in his ſuit, could not prevail

vail upon himſelf to make uſe of force; but however determined, upon ſome remote occaſion which might cover his real deſign from detection, and was actually ſtudying an opportunity, to diſhonour the youth. —— For the power he had was never exerted in ſuch a manner as to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his deportment was neither invidious nor diſtaſteful. Nay, for the moſt part, this ſet of tyrants were exact obſervers of the rules of virtue and diſcretion. They exacted from the Athenians only a *twentieth* of their revenue; they beautified and adorned the city; took upon themſelves the whole conduct of the wars; and preſided over the religious ſacrifices. In other reſpects the *State* was governed by the laws already eſtabliſhed, except that they always exerted their influence to place their own creatures in the firſt offices of the government. Several of their own family enjoyed the annual office of *Archon* at Athens; and amongſt others, Piſiſtratus the ſon of Hippias the tyrant, who bore the ſame name with his grandfather, and in his *archonſhip* dedicated the altar of the twelve Gods in the public forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of *the Pythian*. The people of Athens, having ſince made additions to it in order to inlarge the altar in the forum, by that means effaced the inſcription: But that in *the Pythian* is yet legible, tho' the letters are wearing out apace, and runs thus:

Piſiſtratus from Hippias born
  Of Pythian Phœbus radiant God of day
Choſe thus the temple to adorn,
  And thus record his own ſuperior ſway.

But further, that Hippias ſucceeded in the government as the eldeſt ſon, I myſelf can poſitively aver; as I know it to be ſo, and have examined all the accounts of tradition with much greater accuracy than others. But any one may be convinced of the fact by what

what I am going to ſubjoin. — Now we have abundant light to prove, that he was the only one of the legitimate brothers who had any ſons. So much the altar atteſts, and the column erected for a perpetual brand of the injuſtice of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In the latter, the inſcription makes no mention of any ſon of either Theſſalus or Hipparchus; but nameth five ſons of Hippias, who were brought him by Myrrhine the daughter of Callias the ſon of Hyperochidas. It is certainly moſt probable, that the eldeſt ſon was married firſt; nay he is named the firſt after his father on the upper part of the column. And there were good reaſons for this preference; becauſe his ſeniority gave him this rank; and becauſe he ſucceeded to the tyranny. Nor can it in any light ſeem probable to me, that Hippias on a ſudden and with eaſe could have ſeized the tyranny, had Hipparchus died when inveſted with it, and he had only one day's time to effect his own eſtabliſhment. The reverſe is the truth; that, having for a length of time been familiarized to the expectation, having rendered himſelf awful to the citizens, and being ſupported by vigilant and truſty guards, he received and enjoyed his power with abundant ſecurity. He never had cauſe, as a younger brother muſt have had, to work his way through perplexities and dangers, as in that caſe he could not by practice have been made an adept in the affair of government. But it was accidental, and owing intirely to ſubſequent misfortunes, that Hipparchus got the title, and paſſed in the opinion of ſucceeding ages for one of the tyrants.

On Harmodius therefore, who was deaf to his ſolicitations, he executed his reſentment in the manner pre-determined. For, a ſummons having been delivered to a ſiſter of his, a young virgin, to attend and carry the basket in ſome public proceſſion, they afterwards rejected her; alledging, ſhe never had nor could have been ſummoned, becauſe ſhe was unworthy of the honour. This affront highly provoked Harmodius; but Ariſtogiton, out of zeal for him,

was

was far more exaſperated at it. The points needful to their intended revenge were concerted with the party who concurred in the deſign. But they waited for the great Panathenæa to ſtrike the blow; on which feſtival alone, without incurring ſuſpicion, ſuch of the citizens as aſſiſted in the proceſſion might be armed and gathered together in numbers. It was ſettled, that they themſelves ſhould begin; and then, the body of their accomplices were to undertake their protection againſt the guards of the tyrant's family.

The perſons made privy to this deſign were but few, from a view to a more ſecure execution of it. For they preſumed that even ſuch, as were not in the ſecret, when the attempt was once in whatever manner begun, finding themſelves armed would ſeize the opportunity, and readily concur to aſſert their own freedom. When therefore the feſtival was come, Hippias, repairing without the walls to the place called Ceramicus; and there attended by his guards, was preſcribing and adjuſting the order of the proceſſion. Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, each armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their parts. But, when they ſaw one of their accomplices in familiar converſation with Hippias, (for Hippias was affable and courteous to all men,) they were ſtruck with fear; they imagined the whole of their plot had been betrayed, and that already they were only not apprehended. Now therefore by a ſudden turn of reſolution, they determined if poſſible to ſnatch a timely revenge upon him by whom they were aggrieved, and on whoſe account they had embarked into ſo dangerous an affair. In this hurry of thought they ruſhed back into the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium; where, without any regard to their own ſafety, they made an inſtant aſſault upon him. And thus, in all the fury of paſſion, one actuated by jealouſy, and the other by reſentment, they wounded, and they kill him. As the people immediately ran together, Ariſtogiton by favour of the concourſe eſcapes for the preſent,

but being afterwards ſeized, was unmercifully treated: But Harmodius is inſtantly ſlain on the ſpot.

The news of this aſſaſſination being carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off immediately; not to the ſcene of action but towards the armed accomplices in the proceſſion, before they could be informed of the fact as they were ſtationed at a diſtance. He artfully ſuppreſſed on his countenance all ſenſe of the calamity; and, pointing to a certain ſpot, commanded them aloud, to throw down their arms, and file off thither. This command they obeyed, expecting he had ſomething to communicate to them. But Hippias, addreſſing himſelf to his guards, orders them to take away *thoſe* arms. He then picked out man by man from amongſt them ſuch as he deſigned to put to the queſtion and all upon whom a dagger was found: For, by ancient cuſtom, they were to make the proceſſion with a ſpear and a ſhield.

In this manner truly, from the anguiſh [5] of irritated love this conſpiracy took its riſe, and this deſperate attempt was executed by Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, from the impulſe of a ſudden conſternation. But after this, the tyranny became more grievous upon the Athenians. Hippias, who was now more than ever alarmed, put many of the citizens to death; and caſt his thoughts about towards foreign powers, to ſecure himſelf an aſylum abroad in caſe of a total

5 And yet ſo violently were tyrants deteſted at Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton was ever after honoured there, as martyrs for liberty, and firſt authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praiſes were publicly ſung at the great *Panathenæa*. No ſlave was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was employed to caſt their ſtatues, which were afterwards ſet up in the forum: Xerxes indeed carried them away into Perſia, but Alexander afterwards ſent them back to Athens. *Plutarch* hath preſerved a ſmart reply of Antipho the Orator, who will appear in this hiſtory, to the elder Dionyſius tyrant of Syracuſe. The latter had put the queſtion, which was the fineſt kind of braſs? "That, replied Antipho, of which the ſtatues of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton were made."

reverſe

reverſe at home. To Æantidas therefore the ſon of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampſacus, — to a *Lampſacene* tho' he himſelf was an *Athenian*, — he married his daughter Archedice, knowing that family to have a powerful intereſt with king Darius. And the monument of that lady is now at Lampſacus, and hath this inſcription,

From Hippias ſprung, with regal pow'r array'd,
Within this earth Archedice is lay'd;
By father, huſband, brothers, ſons, allied
To haughty thrones, yet never ſtain'd with pride.

For the ſpace of three years after this Hippias continued in poſſeſſion of the tyranny at Athens: but, being depoſed in the fourth by the Lacedæmonians and the exiled Alcmæonidæ, he retired by agreement to Sigæum; from thence, to Æantidas at Lampſacus; and, from thence, to king Darius: and, with a command under him, he marched twenty years after to Marathon; and, tho' much advanced in years, ſerved in that war with the Medes.

Athens in alarm about the plot.

The People of Athens, reflecting on theſe paſt tranſactions, and recollecting all the diſmal narratives about them which tradition had handed down, treated with great ſeverity and deep ſuſpicions all ſuch as were informed againſt in relation to the *myſteries*: and they conſtrued the whole procedure, as the dawning of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic power. And, as their paſſions were inflamed by ſuch apprehenſions, many worthy and valuable citizens were already thrown into priſon. Nay, it ſeemed as if their inquiſition was to have no end, ſince from day to day their indignation gave into more increaſing ſeverity, and numbers were conſtantly arreſted. Here, one of thoſe [6] who had been impriſoned on ſuſpicion (and a ſuſpicion too

6 This perſon, according to *Plutarch* in *Alcibiades*, was Andocides the Orator, a man always reckoned of the *oligarchical* faction. And one Timæus, his intimate friend,

of being moſt deeply concerned in the crime) is perſuaded by one of his Fellow-priſoners, to turn an evidence, no matter whether of truth or falſhood. Many conjectures have paſſed on both ſides; but no one, neither at that time nor ſince, hath been able to diſcover the men who were really concerned in the affair. The argument which prevailed upon this perſon was, "the neceſſity for his taking ſuch a "ſtep, even tho' he had no hand in the commiſſion, ſince by this he "would infallibly procure his own ſafety, and deliver the city from its "preſent confuſions. For he muſt be much more ſecure of ſaving his "life by ſuch voluntary confeſſion on a promiſe of indemnity, than "he could poſſibly be ſhould he perſiſt in an avowal of his innocence, "and be brought to a trial." In ſhort, this man became an evidence both againſt himſelf and againſt others, in the affair of the *Mercuries*.

Great was the joy of the Athenian people at this (as it was thought) undoubted diſcovery. And, as they had been highly chagrined before at their inability to detect the criminals, who had ſo outrageouſly inſulted the *multitude*; they immediately diſcharged this informer; and all other priſoners, whom he did not name as accomplices. Upon ſuch as he expreſly named the judicial trials were held. Some of them they put to death, as many as were prevented by timely arreſts from flying from juſtice; but they pronounced the ſentence of death againſt the fugitives, and ſet a price on their heads. Yet all this while it was by no means clear, that thoſe who ſuffered were not unjuſtly condemned. Thus much however is certain, that by ſuch proceedings the public tranquillity was reſtored.

In regard to Alcibiades; the Athenians were highly incenſed againſt him, ſince the party, which were his enemies, and had made their attacks upon him before his departure, continued ſtill to inflame them. And now, as they preſumed the truth had been detected in

friend, who was a man of ſmall conſideration at Athens but remarkable for a penetrating and enterpriſing genius, was the perſon who perſuaded him to turn informer.

relation

relation to the *Mercuries*, it appeared to them beyond a ſcruple, that he muſt alſo have been guilty of the crimes charged againſt him about the *myſteries*, upon the ſame ground of a ſecret combination againſt the *democracy*.

At this critical period of time, when the public confuſion was in all its height, it further happened, that a Lacedæmonian army, tho' by no means large, advanced as far as to the Iſthmus, to execute ſome ſcheme along with the Bœotians. This was interpreted to the prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now taken the field at his inſtigation, and not on any account of obliging the Bœotians; and that, "had they not happily apprehended in time ſuch as had been in-"formed againſt, Athens had now been infallibly betrayed." Nay, for the ſpace of a night, they kept guard under arms within the city, in the temple of Theſeus.

About the ſame time alſo, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were ſuſpected of a deſign to aſſault the *people*. And thoſe hoſtages of the Argives, who were kept in cuſtody among the iſlands, the Athenians on this occaſion delivered up to the *people* of Argos, to be put to death on theſe ſuſpicions.

Thus reaſons flowed in from every quarter for ſuſpecting Alcibiades. Deſirous therefore to bring him to a trial and to execution, they accordingly diſpatch the *Salaminian* to Sicily, to order him and ſuch others as they had informations againſt to repair to Athens. But it had been given them in charge to notify to him, that "he ſhould "follow them home in order to make his defence," and by no means to put him under arreſt. This management was owing to a deſire of preventing all ſtirs in the army or in the enemy; and, not leaſt of all, to their willingneſs that the Mantinéans and Argives ſhould continue in the ſervice, whoſe attendance in the expedition they wholly aſcribed to the intereſt Alcibiades had with them.

In purſuance of this, Alcibiades on board his own ſhip, and accompanied by all thoſe who were involved in the ſame accuſation, *has* failed Alcibiades

ſailed away from Sicily with the *Salaminian* for Athens. And, when they were got to the height of Thuria, they no longer followed; but quitting their ſhip were no longer to be ſeen. Cenſured as they were, they durſt not in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the *Salaminian* exerted themſelves immediately in the ſearch after Alcibiades and his companions: But, when they found the ſearch was ineffectual, they gave it up, and ſteered away for Athens. And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, paſſed over in a veſſel ſoon after from Thuria [7] to Peloponneſus. But the Athenians, upon his thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the ſentence of death againſt him, and his aſſociates.

Proceedings of the fleet in Sicily.

After theſe tranſactions, the Athenian generals who remained in Sicily, having divided their whole armament into two ſquadrons and taken the command of each by lot, ſet ſail with all their united force for Selinus and Egeſta. They were deſirous to know, whether the Egeſtéans would pay down the money; to diſcover alſo the preſent poſture of the Selinuntians; and to learn the ſtate of their quarrels with the Egeſtéans. In their courſe, keeping on the left that part of Sicily which lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in this part of Sicily; and, when denied reception here, they reſumed their courſe. Touching afterwards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortreſs but an annoyance to the Egeſtéans, they ſurpriſe it; for it was ſituated cloſe upon the ſea; and having doomed the inhabitants to be ſlaves, they delivered the place into the hands of the Egeſtéans, whoſe cavalry was now attending

7 Some body at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked him, why he would not ſtand a trial, and truſt his country? "In "other points I would; but when my "life is concerned, I would not truſt my "own mother, leſt ſhe ſhould make a "miſtake, and put in a black bean inſtead of a white one." And, when he was afterwards told, that his countrymen had paſſed the ſentence of death againſt him, he briskly replied —— "But I'll "make them know that I am alive." *Plutarch* in *Alcibiades*.

on

on the Athenian motions. The land-forces marched away from hence through the territories of the Siculi, till they had again reached Catana; but the veſſels, on board of which were the ſlaves, came back along the coaſts.

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly to Egeſta, where after tranſacting other points and receiving * thirty talents, he rejoined the grand armament at Catana. And here they ſet up the ſlaves to ſale [8], and raiſed by the money paid for them * one hundred and twenty talents.

* 5812 l. 10 s. *Sterling.*

* 23250 l. *Sterling.*

They alſo ſailed about to their Sicilian allies, ſummoning them to ſend in their reinforcements. With a diviſion alſo of their force they appeared before Hybla, a hoſtile city in the diſtrict of Gela, but were not able to take it. And here the ſummer ended.

The Athenians reſolve on the attack of Syracuſe.

Winter now ſucceeding, the Athenians began immediately to get all things in readineſs for an attempt upon Syracuſe. The Syracuſans were equally intent on making an attack upon *them*. For, ſince the Athenians had not thought proper, during their firſt panic and conſternation, to fall inſtantly upon them, ſuch a protraction re-inſpired them day after day with new reviving courage: Since further, by cruizing on the other ſide of Sicily, they ſeemed to affect a remoteneſs from them; and, tho' ſhewing themſelves before Hybla, and attempting the place they had not been able to carry it, the Syracuſans began now to treat them with an open contempt. They even inſiſted, as might be expected from a populace who are high in ſpirits, "that "their generals ſhould lead out towards Catana, ſince the enemy "durſt not venture to march againſt them." The Syracuſan horſemen alſo, ſent daily out to obſerve their motions, rode boldly up to the camp of the Athenians, inſulting them in other reſpects but eſpecially with this ſneering demand, "Whether they were not rather

8 Among the reſt, Nicias ſold at this time a very young girl, whom her purchaſers carried to Corinth, where ſhe ſet up and drove a prodigious trade indeed. *Plutarch* in *Nicias*.

"come

" come to gain a ſettlement for themſelves on a foreign ſhore, than " to replace the Leontines in their old poſſeſſions ?"

Schemes of the commanders.

The Athenian generals, informed of theſe bravadoes, were deſirous to ſeduce the whole ſtrength of Syracuſe to as great a diſtance as poſſible from that city, that they might ſnatch an opportunity of tranſporting thither their own forces by favour of the night, and ſeize a proper ſpot whereon to fix their incampment, without any obſtruction from the enemy. They were well convinced, that their point could not be ſo eaſily accompliſhed, ſhould they endeavour to force a deſcent in the face of the enemy, or by a land-march ſhould give them an early notice of their deſign. For in ſuch caſes their own light-armed, and that cumberſome train which muſt attend, as they had no horſe to cover their motions, muſt ſuffer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the Syracuſans: But, by the other ſcheme, they might pre-occupy a ſpot of ground, where the cavalry could not give them any conſiderable annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracuſan exiles, who followed their camp, had informed them of a piece of ground convenient for their purpoſe, near Olympiæum.

Stratagem.

In order therefore to accompliſh the point, the generals have recourſe to the following artifice. —— They diſpatch an emiſſary, of whoſe fidelity they were well aſſured, and who might alſo paſs with the generals of Syracuſe as well affected to their cauſe. The perſon employed was a Catanéan. He told them " he was ſent by " their friends in Catana" with whoſe names they were acquainted and knew well to be of that number in Catana, which perſiſted in ſtedfaſt attachment to them: He ſaid further, that " the Athenians " repoſed themſelves by night within the city, at a diſtance from " their arms; and that in caſe they (the Syracuſans) on a day pre- " fixed, would with all the forces of their city appear by early dawn " before the Athenian camp, the Catanéans would ſhut up thoſe " within the city and ſet fire to their ſhipping, by which means they " might

" might force the intrenchments, and render themſelves maſters of
" the camp; that further, the party of Catinéans, that would co-
" operate with them in this ſcheme was very large, and already
" prepared to execute theſe points he was now ſent to propoſe."

The Syracuſan generals, whoſe ardor other contingencies had al- *It ſucceeds.*
ready inflamed, and who had formed a reſolution, even previous to ſuch encouragement, to march their forces towards Catana, without the leaſt reſerve gave implicit credit to this emiſſary; and, having inſtantly pitched upon a day for execution, diſmiſſed him. They alſo (for by this time the Selinuntian and ſome other auxiliaries had joined them) iſſued out their orders for the whole military ſtrength of Syracuſe to march out on the day appointed. No ſooner therefore were all the needful preparations adjuſted, and the time at hand at which they were to make their appearance, than —on the march for Catana, they halted one night upon the banks of the Symæthus in the Leontine diſtrict. But the Athenians, when aſſured they had thus taken the field, decamping inſtantly with the whole of their force, and with all the Sicilian and other auxiliaries who had joined them, and embarking themſelves on board their ſhips and tranſports, ſteered away by night for Syracuſe. And, early the next dawn, *They land at* they landed on the intended ſpot near Olympiæum, intent on form- *Syracuſe.* ing and ſecuring their incampment. The cavalry of the Syracuſans, in the mean time, came up firſt to Catana; and diſcovering, that the whole Athenian army had put to ſea by night, they return with this intelligence to their foot. Upon this, the whole army, ſoon wheeling about, returned with all ſpeed to the defence of Syracuſe.

In the mean time, the Athenians, as the enemy had a long way to *They incamp in* march, formed an incampment on an advantageous ſpot without the *a ſtrong poſt.* leaſt obſtruction. On it, they were poſſeſſed of the advantage of fighting only at their own diſcretion; and the Syracuſan horſe could give them the leaſt annoyance, either during or before an engagement. On one ſide, they were flanked by walls, and houſes, and

trees, and a marſh; and on the other by precipices. They alſo felled ſome trees that grew near; and, carrying them down to the ſhore, they piled them into a barricade for the defence of their ſhips, and to cover them on the ſide of Daſcon. They alſo expeditiouſly threw up a rampart, on the part which ſeemed moſt acceſſible to the enemy, of ſtones picked out for the purpoſe and timber, and broke down the bridge of the Anapus.

Return of the Syracuſan *army.*

Thus buſied as they were on fortifying their camp, not ſo much as one perſon ventured out of the city to obſtruct their proceedings. The firſt, who appeared to make any reſiſtance, were the Syracuſan cavalry; and, when once they had ſhewn themſelves, the whole body of their infantry was ſoon in ſight. They advanced firſt of all quite up to the Athenian works; but when they perceived that they would not ſally out to fight them, they again retreated: And having croſſed the road to Helorum, repoſed themſelves for the night.

Both armies prepare for battle.

The ſucceeding day, the Athenians and allies prepared for engagement, and their order of battle was formed, as follows:—The Argives and Mantinéans had the right, the Athenians the centre, and the reſt of the line was formed by the other confederates. One half of the whole force, which was ranged in the firſt line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The other half, being poſted near the tents, formed a hollow ſquare, in which the men were alſo drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good look-out and advance to their ſupport. And within this hollow ſquare they poſted all the train who attended the ſervice of the army.

But the Syracuſans drew up their heavy-armed, which body conſiſted of the whole military ſtrength of Syracuſe and all the confederates who had joined them, in files conſiſting of ſixteen. Thoſe, who had joined with auxiliary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians; and next, the horſe of the Geloans, amounting in the whole to about two hundred: The horſe alſo of the Camarinéans, about twenty

twenty in number, and about fifty archers. But their horſemen they poſted to the right, being not fewer in number than twelve hundred; and next to them, the darters.

The Athenians being now intent on advancing to the charge, Nicias, addreſſing himſelf in regular order to the troops of the ſeveral *States*, animated them to the fight by the following harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army.

Speech of Nicias.

" WHAT need, my fellow-ſoldiers, of a long exhortation, ſince " we are here, determined, and reſolute for action? For this our " preſent arrangement ſeems to me a ſtronger confirmation of your " courage, than any words could be how eloquently ſoever delivered, " if we were inferior in ſtrength. But when, Argives, and Man- " tinéans, and Athenians, and the flower of the iſles, we are here " aſſembled together — how is it poſſible, when ſuch brave and nu- " merous allies are to fight in company, that we ſhould not enter- " tain a ſtedfaſt, nay the warmeſt hope that the victory will be our " own? Nay more, as we have to do with a promiſcuous crowd, " the mob of a city, not ſelected for ſervice, as we have had the " honour to be; and who, it muſt be added, are but Sicilians; who, " tho' affecting to deſpiſe us, will never ſuſtain our charge, becauſe " their skill is far beneath their courage.

" Let every ſoldier further recal to his remembrance, that he is " now at a vaſt diſtance from his native ſoil, and near no friendly " land but what you ſhall render ſuch by the efforts of your valour. " Such things I am bound to ſuggeſt to your remembrance, the re- " verſe I am well convinced of what our enemies utter for their " mutual encouragement. They undoubtedly are roaring aloud — " It is for your country you are now to fight. But I tell *you*, that " from your country you are now remote; and as ſuch, muſt either " conquer, or not without difficulty ever ſee it again, ſince the nu- " merous cavalry of the enemy will preſs hard upon our retreat.

" Call therefore to mind your own dignity and worth; advance
" with alacrity to aſſault your foes; convinced, that your preſent ne-
" ceſſities and wants are far more terrible than the enemy you are to
" engage."

The battle. When Nicias had finiſhed this exhortation, he led on his army towards the encounter. But the Syracuſans were not yet prepared, as by no means expecting to be charged ſo ſoon; and ſome of the ſoldiers, as the city lay ſo near, were ſtraggled thither. Theſe however came running with all eagerneſs and ſpeed to gain their poſts; too late upon the whole; but as each of them met with any number intent on action, he ranged himſelf in their company. The Syracuſans, to do them juſtice, were not deficient in alacrity or courage, neither in the preſent battle, nor any of the following. They maintained their ground gallantly ſo long as their competence of skill enabled them; but when that failed them, they were forced tho' with reluctance to ſlacken in their ardor. However, tho' far from imagining that the Athenians would preſume to begin the attack, and tho' obliged in a hurry to ſtand on their defence, they took up their arms, and advanced immediately to meet their foe.

In the firſt place therefore, the ſlingers of ſtones with either the hand or the ſling, and the archers on both ſides began the engagement; and alternately chaced one another, as is generally the caſe among the bodies of the light-armed. In the next place, the ſoothſayers brought forwards and immolated the ſolemn victims; and the trumpets ſummoned the heavy-armed to cloſe firm together, and advance.

All ſides now began to face; the Syracuſans to fight for their country; each ſoldier amongſt them for his native ſoil, to earn for the preſent his preſervation, and for the future his liberty. — On their enemies ſide; the Athenians to gain poſſeſſion of a foreign country, and not to damage their own by a daſtardly behaviour: The Argives,

and

and voluntary part of the confederates, to procure for the Athenians a happy accompliſhment of their ſchemes, and again to viſit their own country, to which they were endeared, victorious and triumphant; and that part of the confederacy, which attended in obedience to the orders of their maſters, were highly animated by the thought, that they muſt earn their ſafety now at once, or if defeated now muſt for for the future deſpair, and then ſecretly actuated perhaps by the diſtant hope, that were others reduced to the Athenian yoke, their own bondage might be rendered more light and eaſy.

The Athenians gain the victory.

The buſineſs being now come to blows, they for a long time maintained the ground on both ſides. It happened further, that ſome claps of thunder were heard attended with lightning and a heavy rain. This cauſed a ſudden conſternation in the Syracuſans, who now for the firſt time engaged the Athenians, and had gained very little experience in the affairs of war. But by the more experienced enemy theſe accidents were interpreted as the ordinary effects of the ſeaſon; and their concern was rather employed upon the enemy, whom they found no eaſy conqueſt. But the Argives having firſt of all defeated the left wing of the Syracuſans, and the Athenians being afterwards ſucceſsful in their quarter of the battle, the whole Syracuſan army was ſoon thrown into diſorder, and began the flight. The Athenians however did not continue the purſuit to any great diſtance: for the Syracuſan cavalry, as they were numerous and unbroke, put a ſtop to the chace by aſſaulting thoſe parties of heavy-armed, whom they ſaw detached for the purſuit, and driving them back into their own line. Having purſued only ſo far as they could in an orderly and ſecure manner, they again retreated and erected a trophy.

But the Syracuſans, who had rallied again in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up as well as the preſent poſture of affairs would permit, ſend a ſtrong detachment from their body for the guard of Olympiæum; apprehenſive, that the Athenians might otherwiſe ſeize

the treaſures that were repoſited there. And, this being done, with the remainder of their force they retired within the walls of Syracuſe.

The Athenians in the mean time made no advances againſt Olympiæum; but, after gathering together the bodies of their ſlain, and laying them upon the funeral-pyre, they paſſed the night on the field of battle.

They ſail back to Catana.

The next day they delivered up their dead under truce to the Syracuſans, of whom and their allies there had periſhed about two hundred and ſixty men; and then gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their allies about fifty in all were ſlain. And now with all the pillage they had made of the enemy, they ſailed back to Catana.

The reaſons why.

This was owing to the ſeaſon of the year now advanced to winter. It was no longer judged poſſible for them, to be able to continue the war in their preſent poſt, before they had procured a ſupply of horſe from Athens, and had aſſembled others from their confederates in Sicily, that they might not be entirely expoſed to the horſe of the enemy. They were alſo intent on collecting pecuniary aids in thoſe parts, and ſome were expected from Athens. — "They might alſo "obtain the concurrence of ſome other cities, which they hoped "would prove more tractable, ſince they had gained a battle: They "wanted, further, to furniſh themſelves with proviſions and all "neceſſary ſtores, which might enable them early in the ſpring to "make new attempts on Syracuſe." Determined by theſe conſiderations, they ſailed back to Naxus and Catana, in order to winter there.

The Syracuſans *aſſemble in council.*

The Syracuſans, after they had performed the obſequies of their ſlain, called a general aſſembly of the people. And on this occaſion Hermocrates the ſon of Hermon (a man who was inferior to none, in all other branches of human prudence, who for military ſkill was in high reputation, and renowned for bravery) ſtanding forth among them,

them, endeavoured to encourage them, and prevent their being too much diſpirited by their late defeat.

Advice of Hermocrates.

He told them, " that in courage they had not been worſted, but " their want of diſcipline had done them harm: and yet, the harm " ſuffered by that was not near ſo great as they might juſtly have ex- " pected; eſpecially, when no better than a rabble of mechanics they " had been obliged to enter the liſts againſt the moſt experienced " ſoldiery of Greece: That what hurt them moſt was too large a " number of generals, and the multiplicity of commands which was " thence occaſioned (for the number of thoſe who commanded was " fifteen), whilſt the bulk of their army obſerved no diſcipline, and " obeyed no orders at all: But, were only a few ſkilful generals ſe- " lected for the truſt, would they only be intent this winter on train- " ing their bodies of heavy-armed, and furniſh others with arms who " had none for themſelves, in order to enlarge their number as much " as poſſible, and inure them to ſettled exerciſe and uſe, — he aſſured " them, *thus* in all probability they muſt upon the whole be too hard " for their foes, as their natural portion of valour was great, and " ſkill would be attained by practice: That both of theſe would pro- " greſſively become more perfect; diſcipline, by being exerciſed " through a ſeries of dangers; and inward bravery would merely of " itſelf increaſe in gallant confidence, when aſſured of the ſupport " of ſkill: As to *generals*, that few only, and thoſe inveſted with " abſolute power, ought to be elected and confirmed by a ſolemn " oath from the *people*, — that they were permitted to lead the army " where and how they judged beſt for the public ſervice. For by " this means, what ought to be concealed would be leſs liable to de- " tection, and all the ſchemes of war might be directed with order " and a certainty of ſucceſs."

The Syracuſans, who had liſtned to this diſcourſe, decreed whatever he propoſed. They elected Hermocrates himſelf to be a general, and Heraclides the ſon of Lyſimachus, and Sicanus the ſon of Hexeceſtus;

ceſtus; theſe three. They alſo appointed embaſſadors to go to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to procure the alliance of thoſe *States*, and to perſuade the Lacedæmonians to make hotter war upon the Athenians, with an open avowal that they acted in behalf of the Syracuſans; that, by this means, they might either be obliged to recal their fleet from Sicily, or might be leſs able to ſend any reinforcements to the army already there.

The Athenians *miſcarry in their attempt on* Meſſene.

The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, ſoon made an excurſion from thence to Meſſene, expecting to have it betrayed into their power. But all the ſteps, taken previouſly for the purpoſe, were totally diſconcerted. For Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command when recalled to Athens, being convinced within himſelf that exile muſt be his portion, betrayed the whole project (as he had been in the ſecret) to ſuch perſons at Meſſene as were attached to the Syracuſans. The firſt ſtep this party took was to put to death all the perſons againſt whom he informed. And, at the time of this attempt being quite in a ferment and under arms, they carried their point, ſo that thoſe who wiſhed to give it were obliged to refuſe admiſſion to the Athenians. The Athenians therefore after thirteen days continuance on that coaſt, when the weather began to be tempeſtuous, when their proviſions failed, and no hope of ſucceſs appeared, returned to Naxus * *, [9] where having thrown up an intrenchment round their camp, they continued the reſt of the winter. They alſo diſpatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a ſupply of money and horſemen to join them without fail by the beginning of the ſpring.

Syracuſe *fortified.*

The Syracuſans employed themſelves this winter in fortifying their city. They incloſed Temenites within their new works, and carried their wall through all that length of ground which faceth Epipolæ,

9 In the original is added ϰ᾽ Θρῦκας: But all the editors and note-writers give it up, and own they can make nothing of it.

that,

that, in caſe they ſhould be unable to keep the field, the enemy might have as little room as poſſible to raiſe counterworks of annoyance. They alſo placed a garriſon at Megara, and another in Olympiæum. And all along the ſea they drove rows of piles, wherever the ground was convenient for deſcents. Knowing alſo, that the Athenians wintered at Naxus, they marched out with all their force againſt Catana. They ravaged the territory of the Catanæans; and after burning the tents and camp of the Athenians, they returned home.

Both ſides apply to the Camarinians.

Having alſo had intelligence, that the Athenians had ſent an embaſſy to Camarina, under favor of a treaty made formerly with them by Laches, to try if it were poſſible to procure their concurrence; they alſo diſpatched an embaſſy thither, to traverſe the negotiation. For the Camarinéans were ſuſpected by them, as if they had not cordially ſent in their quota of aſſiſtance for the firſt battle, and, leſt for the future they might be totally averſe from acting in their ſupport, as in that battle they had ſeen the Athenians victorious, and ſo, induced by the former treaty they had made with the latter, might now declare openly on their ſide.

When therefore Hermocrates and others were arrived at Camarina from Syracuſe, and from the Athenians Euphemus and his collegues in the embaſſy; an aſſembly of the Camarineans was held; in which, Hermocrates, deſirous to give them a timely diſtaſte againſt the Athenians, harangued them thus; —

Speech of Hermocrates.

" OUR embaſſy hither, ye men of Camarina, hath not been occa-
" ſioned by any fears we were under, that you might be too much
" terrified at the great equipment with which the Athenians have
" invaded us; but rather, by our knowledge with what kind of
" arguments they would impoſe on your underſtanding, by which,
" before we had an opportunity to remonſtrate, they might ſeduce
" you into a concurrence. Sicily in fact they have invaded, upon

" ſuch pretext as you have heard them give out; but with ſuch
" intentions, as we have all abundant reaſon to ſuſpect. And to me
" it is clear, that their ſchemes have no tendency to replant the
" Leontines, but rather to ſupplant us all. For how is it reconcile-
" able with common-ſenſe, that a people, who have ever been em-
" ployed in the ruin of the *States* which are neighbouring to Athens,
" ſtould be ſincere in re-eſtabliſhing a Sicilian people; or, by the
" bonds of conſanguinity hold themſelves obliged to protect the
" Leontines who are of Chalcidic deſcent, whilſt on the Chalcidéans
" of Eubœa from whom theſe others are a colony, they hold faſt ri-
" vetted the yoke of ſlavery? No; it is the ſame cruel policy, that
" ſubjugated the Grecians in that part of the world, which now
" exerts itſelf to glut their ambition in this.

" Theſe are thoſe very Athenians, who formerly having been
" elected their common leaders by the well-deſigning Ionians and
" that confederate-body which derived from them their deſcent, on
" the glorious pretence of avenging themſelves on the Perſian Mo-
" narch, abuſed their truſt by inſlaving thoſe who placed confidence
" in them; charging ſome, with deſerting the common cauſe; others
" with their mutual embroilments; and all at length, with different
" but ſpecious criminations. And, on the whole, theſe Athenians
" waged war againſt the Mede, not in the cauſe of Grecian liberty,
" as neither did the other Grecians in the defence of their own: The
" former fought, not indeed to ſubject the reſt of Greece to the Mede,
" but to their own ſelves; the latter, merely to obtain a change of
" maſter, a maſter not inferior in policy but far more abundant in
" malice.

" But, tho' Athens on manifold Accounts be obnoxious to univerſal
" cenſure and reproach, yet we are not come hither to prove how
" juſtly ſhe deſerveth it, ſince your own conviction precludes the long
" detail. We are much more concerned at preſent to cenſure and
" reproach ourſelves, ſince with all the examples before our eyes of
" what

" what the Grecians in thoſe parts have ſuffered, who for want of
" guarding againſt their incroachments have fell victims to their am-
" bition — ſince with the certain knowledge that they are now play-
" ing the ſame ſophiſtries upon us," — " the replantation of their
" kindred Leontines," — " the ſupport of the Egeſtéans their Allies,"
" — we ſhew no inclination to unite together in our common de-
" fence, in order to give them moſt ſignal proofs, that in Sicily are
" neither Ionians nor Helleſpontins nor iſlanders, who will be ſlaves,
" tho' ever changing their maſter; one while, to the *Mede*, and ſoon
" after, to whoever will pleaſe to govern; — but on the contrary,
" that we are Dorians, who from Peloponneſus, that ſeat of liberty
" and independence, came to dwell in Sicily. Shall we therefore
" protract our union, till city after city we are compelled to a ſub-
" miſſion? we —? who are convinced that thus only we can be con-
" quered, and when we even behold that thus our foes have dreſſed
" up their plan; amongſt ſome of our people ſcattering diſſenſions;
" ſetting others to war down each other for the mighty recompence
" of their alliance; cajoling the reſt, as may beſt ſooth the pride or
" caprice of each; and avail themſelves of theſe methods to work
" our ruin? We even indulge the wild imagination, that tho' a re-
" mote inhabitant of Sicily be deſtroyed, the danger can never come
" home to ourſelves; and that he, who precedes us in ruin, is un-
" happy only in and for himſelf.

" Is there now a man amongſt you who imagines, that merely a
" Syracuſan and not himſelf is the object of Athenian enmity? and
" pronounceth it hard, that he muſt be expoſed to dangers in which
" I only am concerned? Let ſuch an one with more ſolidity reflect;
" that, not merely for what is mine, but equally alſo for what is his
" own, he ſhould aſſociate with me, tho' within my precincts; —
" and, that this may be done with greater ſecurity now, ſince as yet
" I am not quite deſtroyed, ſince in me he is ſure of a ſtedfaſt ally,
" and before he is bereaved of all ſupport may hazard the contention.

" And let him further reſt aſſured, that it is not the ſole view of the " Athenian to bridle enmity in a Syracuſan; but, under the colour " of that pretext, to render himſelf, the more ſecure by gaining for " a time the friendſhip of another.

" If others again entertain any envy or jealouſy of Syracuſe, for " to each of theſe great *States* are generally obnoxious, and would " take delight in ſeeing us depreſſed in order to teach us moderation, " tho' not totally deſtroyed from a regard to his own preſervation, " — Theſe are ſuch ſanguine wiſhes, as in the courſe of human " affairs can never be accompliſhed: Becauſe it is quite impoſſible, " that the ſame perſon ſhall build up airy ſchemes to ſooth his own " paſſions, and then inſure their ſucceſs. And thus, ſhould ſome " ſiniſter event take place, quite ſunk under the weight of his own " calamity, he would perhaps be ſoon wiſhing again, that I was ſo " replaced as to excite his envy. Impoſſible this, for one who aban- " doned my defence, who refuſed before-hand to participate my " dangers; — dangers, tho' not in name yet in reality, his own! " For if names alone be regarded, he acts in the ſupport of my " power; but if realities, of his own preſervation.

" Long ſince, ye men of Camarina, it was incumbent on you, " who are borderers upon us and muſt be our ſeconds in ruin, to " have foreſeen theſe things, and not to have abetted our defence " with ſo much remiſſneſs as you have hitherto done it. You ought " to have repaired to our ſupport with free and voluntary aid; with " ſuch, as in caſe the Athenians had begun firſt with Camarina, you " would have come with earneſt prayers to implore from us. So " cordial and ſo alert you ſhould have appeared in our behalf, to " avert us from too precipitate ſubmiſſions. But theſe things never " were; not even you, nor any other people, have ſhewed ſuch " affection or alacrity for us.

" From timorouſneſs of heart you will ſtudy perhaps a manage " both with us and the invaders; and alledge, that there are treaties " ſubſiſting

" ſubſiſting between yourſelves and the Athenians. Yet, theſe treaties
" you never made to hurt your friends, but to repel the efforts of
" your foes ſhould they dare to attack you. By *them* you are bound,
" to give defenſive aid to the Athenians when attacked by others;
" and not, when they (as is the preſent caſe) injurioufly fall upon
" your neighbours. Remember that the Rhegians, tho' even of
" Chalcidic deſcent, have refuſed to concur with them in replanting
" the Leontines, who are alſo Chalcidéans. Hard indeed is your
" fate, if they, ſuſpecting ſome bad deſign to lie lurking under a fair
" juſtification, have recourſe to the wary moderate behaviour which
" appearances will not warrant; whilſt you, on the pretended ground
" of a rational conduct, are eager to ſerve a people who are by na-
" ture your foes; and join with moſt implacable enemies to deſtroy
" your own kindred, to whom nature hath ſo cloſely attached
" you!

" In ſuch a conduct there is no juſtice: The juſtice lies in abetting
" our cauſe, and not daſtardly ſhrinking before the terror of their
" arms. Theſe arms are not terrible, would we only all combine in
" our mutual defence. They are only ſo, if on the contrary we
" continue diſunited, the point which the Athenians labour with ſo
" much aſſiduity. For, even when ſingly againſt *us* they entered the
" liſts and were victorious, yet they were not able to effectuate their
" deſigns, but were obliged precipitately to re-embark. If united
" therefore, what further can we have to fear? What hinders us from
" aſſociating together with inſtant alacrity and zeal? Eſpecially as
" we ſhall ſoon receive an aid from Peloponneſus, who in all the
" buſineſs of war are far ſuperior to Athenians. Reject, I ſay, the
" vain preſumption, that either it will be equitable in regard to us
" or prudential in regard to yourſelves, to *take part with neither ſide*,
" on pretence that you have treaties ſubſiſting with *both*. There is a
" fallacy in it, which, tho' veiled under plauſible words, the event

" will

" will ſoon detect. For, if through your determination to abandon
" his ſupport, the party already attacked be vanquiſhed, and the aſ-
" ſailant be invigorated by ſucceſs, what can ſuch abſenting of your-
" ſelves avail, but to help forwards the ruin of the one, and afford
" free ſcope to the pernicious ſchemes of the other? And how
" glorious would the reverſe of this conduct be, would you exert
" your efforts to redreſs the injured, who alſo by the ties of conſan-
" guinity have a right to expect it from you, to guard the common
" welfare of Sicily, and not ſuffer your friends, your good friends
" the Athenians, to run out into a courſe of outrage?

" In a word; we Syracuſans have now only this to add, that ar-
" guments are ſuperfluous either for the inſtruction of you or of
" others in points, whoſe tendency you know as clearly as ourſelves.
" But we earneſtly conjure you, and if prayers will not avail, we
" boldly proteſt againſt you, that, as the worſt deſigns are formed
" againſt us by our eternal foes the Ionians, you would act as you
" ought; — if not, that by you we are baſely betrayed, Dorians by
" Dorians. If ſuch muſt be our fate, if by the Athenians we muſt
" be deſtroyed, they will be indebted for their ſucceſs to your deter-
" minations; but the glory of it will be totally aſſumed by them-
" ſelves. Nay, the chief reward they will reap from the victory
" will be this, to inſlave the perſons who enabled them to gain it. But
" then, ſhould the victory reſt with us, you are the men from whom
" we ſhall exact revenge for all the dangers to which we have been
" expoſed. Examine things therefore, and declare your reſolution,
" either at once, without embarking into dangers, to put on the
" Athenian chains, or with us to face the ſtorm and earn your pre-
" ſervation; not baſely bending to the yoke of foreign tyrants, and
" preventing an enmity with us, which will not quickly be
" appeaſed."

In

In theſe words Hermocrates harangued the Camarinéans. And, when he had ended, Euphemus embaſſador of the Athenians reply'd as follows:

Speech of Euphemus.

" OUR journey hither was intended for the renewal of a for-
" mer alliance; but as this Syracuſan hath taken the liberty to be
" ſevere upon us, we lie under an obligation to ſhew the juſtice of
" our title to that ſhare of dominion which we now poſſeſs. And
" the ſtrongeſt evidence of this he himſelf hath been pleaſed to give,
" by affirming that Ionians have been eternal foes to Dorians. The
" fact is inconteſtibly true: Since we, who are Ionians, have been
" neceſſitated to ſtand ever upon our guard againſt the incroaching
" deſigns of the Peloponneſians, who are Dorians, who are our ſu-
" periors in number, and are ſeated upon our borders. When there-
" fore, in the cloſe of the Perſian invaſion, we ſaw ourſelves maſters
" of a navy, we aſſerted our own independence from the government
" and guidance of the Lacedæmonians; ſince no ſhadow of reaſon
" could be found, why we ſhould be obedient to them any more
" than they to us, ſave only that in this critical period their ſtrength
" was greater. We were afterwards appointed, by free election, the
" leaders of thoſe Ionians who had formerly been ſubject to the
" *Monarch*. And the preference awarded to us we continue to ſup-
" port; aſſured, that only thus we ſhall eſcape ſubjection to the
" Peloponneſian yoke, by keeping poſſeſſion of a power, which can
" effectually awe all their incroachments. And further, (that we
" may come to particulars,) it was not with injuſtice that we exacted
" ſubjection from thoſe Ionians and inhabitants of the iſles, whom
" the Syracuſans ſay we thought proper to inſlave tho' connected
" with us by the ties of blood. For they marched in company with
" the *Mede* againſt their mother-country, againſt us their founders.
" They had not the courage to expoſe their own homes to ruin and
" devaſtation by an honeſt revolt, tho' we with magnanimity aban-
" doned

" doned even Athens itſelf. They made ſlavery their choice, and
" in the ſame miſerable fate would have been glad to invelope us.
" Thus ſolid are the grounds, on which we found our title to that
" extenſive rule we now enjoy. We honeſtly deſerve it; ſince, in
" the cauſe of Greece, we equipped the largeſt fleet, and exerted
" the greateſt ardor without the leaſt equivocation; and, ſince thoſe
" others, acting with implicit obedience to the *Mede*, did all they
" could to diſtreſs us. To which let it be added, that we were at
" the ſame time deſirous to obtain a ſtrength ſufficient to give a
" check to the ambition of Peloponneſians. Submiſſive therefore to
" their dictates we are not, will not be; becauſe, either in return
" for the repulſe of the *Barbarian* by our ſingle efforts, or in re-
" quital of the dangers we bravely encounter'd in defence of the li-
" berty of thoſe Ionians, greater than all the reſt of Greece or even
" they themſelves durſt hazard for their own, we have an undoubted
" right to empire.

" But further, to guard its own liberties and rights is a privilege
" which without either murmur or envy will be allowed to every
" *State*. And now, for the ſecurity of theſe important points to
" ourſelves, have we ventured hither to beg your concurrence;
" conſcious at the ſame time, ye men of Camarina, that your wel-
" fare too coincides with our own. This we can clearly demonſtrate
" even from thoſe criminations, which our adverſaries here have la-
" viſhed upon us; and, from thoſe ſo terrible ſuſpicions, which you
" yourſelves are inclined to entertain of our proceedings. We are
" not now to learn, that men, who with ſome high degrees of hor-
" ror ſuſpect latent miſchief, may for the preſent be ſoothed by an in-
" ſinuating flow of words; but when ſummoned to action, will ſo
" exert themſelves as is expedient for their welfare. And conſonant
" to this, we have already hinted, that through fear alone we ſeized
" that power which we now poſſeſs in Greece; that, through the
" ſame motive we have ventured hither to eſtabliſh our own ſecurity
" in

" in concert with that of our friends; ſo far from the view of in-
" ſlaving them to ourſelves, that we are ſolely intent on preſerving
" them from being inſlaved by others.

" Let no man here retort upon us — that all our ſolicitude for
" you is unmerited and ſuperfluous. Such an one muſt know, that
" ſo long as you are ſafe, ſo long as you are able to employ the Sy-
" racuſans, the leſs liable they will be to ſend reinforcements from
" hence to the Peloponneſians for our annoyance: And as this is the
" real ſtate of things, our concern ſhould moſt largely be beſtowed
" upon you. By parity of reaſon it alſo highly concerns us to re-
" plant the Leontines; not in order to render them vaſſals to our-
" ſelves as their relations of Eubœa are, but to make them as ſtrong
" and powerful as we are able; that, ſeated as they then will be on
" her confines, they may compenſate our remote ſituation, in afford-
" ing a diverſion to Syracuſe. For if the view be carried back to
" Greece, we ourſelves are there a match for our foes. The Chal-
" cidéan there, whom after unjuſtly inſlaving we are taxed with ab-
" ſurdity for pretending to vindicate here, is highly ſerviceable to
" us; becauſe he is diſarmed, and becauſe he furniſheth us with a
" tribute. But here in Sicily, our intereſt demandeth, that the Le-
" ontines and the whole body of our friends be reſtored to the full
" enjoyment of all their liberty and ſtrength.

" Now to a potentate inveſted with ſuperior power, or to a *State*
" poſſeſſed of empire, nothing that is profitable can be deemed ab-
" ſurd, nothing ſecure that cannot be ſafely managed. Incidents
" will ariſe, with which we muſt temporize, and determine accord-
" ingly our enmity or our friendſhip. But the latter makes moſt for
" our intereſt here, where we ought by no means to weaken our
" friends; but, through the ſtrength of our friends, to keep down
" and diſable our enemies. Of this you ought not to reſt incredu-
" lous, as you know that over our dependents in Greece we either
" hold tight or ſlacken the rein, as ſquares beſt with the public ſer-

" vice. We permit to the Chians and Methymnéans the free uſe of
" their liberties and laws for a quota of ſhipping; we do the ſame
" to many for an annual tribute, exacted perhaps with ſomewhat of
" rigor. Others amongſt them, who fight under our orders, are ab-
" ſolutely free, tho' ſeated upon iſlands, and eaſy to be totally re-
" duced, becauſe they are commodiouſly ſituated to annoy the Pelo-
" ponneſian coaſt. And hence it may be depended upon, that we
" ſhall make ſuch diſpoſitions alſo here as are moſt expedient for
" our own intereſt, and may beſt leſſen the dread, which, as was
" ſaid before, we entertain of the Syracuſans.

" The point at which they aim is an extent of their rule over you;
" and when by alarming your ſuſpicions of us, they have wrought
" you to their own purpoſe, either by open force or taking advan-
" tage of your deſolate condition, when we are repulſed and obliged
" to abandon your defence, they intend to ſubdue all Sicily to their
" yoke. Such the event will unavoidably prove, if at preſent you
" adhere to them. For never again will it be eaſy for us to aſſemble
" together ſo large an armament to give a check to their ambition; nor,
" when we are no longer at hand for your ſupport, will their
" ſtrength againſt you be inſufficient. It is vain in any man to
" indulge an opinion that this may not be the caſe, ſince the very
" train of things evinceth its truth. For, when firſt you incited us
" hither, it was not upon the ſuggeſtion of any other fear than this,
" that ſhould we ſuffer you to be ſubjected by the Syracuſans, the
" danger then would extend itſelf to us. And highly unjuſt it
" would be now, if the argument you ſucceſsfully inforced with us,
" ſhould loſe all its influence upon you; or, ſhould you ground ſuſpi-
" cions on our preſent appearance againſt them with a force ſuperior to
" theirs, when you ought much more to entertain an endleſs diſtruſt
" of them. The truth is this, that without your concurrence we
" are not able to continue here. And in caſe, with perfidy open and
" avowed, we make ſeizure of your cities; yet we are unable to re-
" tain

" tain their poſſeſſion, remote as they lie from Athens; as cities ſo
" large we never could garriſon; and as they are further provided in
" all reſpects as well as any on the continent. But, on the contrary,
" the Syracuſans will not ruſh upon you from a camp upon the
" beach; but, poſted in a city more formidable in ſtrength than the
" whole of our armament, they are ever meditating your ruin; and,
" when they have ſeized a proper opportunity, will ſtrike the
" blow. They have afforded you inſtances of this already, and a
" flagrant one indeed in the caſe of the Leontines. And yet they
" have the effrontery now, by words, as if you were ſo to be deluded,
" to exaſperate you againſt us, who have hitherto controled their
" views, and deterred them to this moment from making all Sicily
" their prey.

" Our arguments have a tendency directly oppoſite. We have
" nothing in view but your certain and aſſured preſervation; when
" we earneſtly conjure you, not wilfully to betray the means which
" at preſent will reſult from our union, which we can mutually exert
" in one another's behalf; — and ſtrongly to repreſent to your own
" reflexions, that even without the concurrence of allies, a road to
" your reduction will at any time be open to theſe Syracuſans
" through their own ſuperior numbers; but an opportunity exceed-
" ingly ſeldom afforded you, to make head againſt them with ſo
" large an auxiliary body. And, if from groundleſs ſuſpicions you
" ſuffer now ſo large a body to depart either unſucceſsful or de-
" feated; yet, a time will come, when you will ardently wiſh to
" ſee them return tho' in a much leſs proportion of ſtrength, and
" they have it no longer in their power to croſs the ſea for your ſup-
" port. Take care, therefore, Camarinéans, that neither yourſelves
" nor others be deceived by a too credulous belief of the bold ca-
" lumniations theſe Syracuſans utter. We have now laid before
" you the true ground of all thoſe ſad ſuſpicions which are fo-
" mented againſt us; but ſhall again recal them to your re-

" membrance by a ſhort recapitulation, that they may have the
" proper influence upon you.

" We declare therefore, that we rule in Greece merely to prevent
" our being inſlaved; but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily,
" to ſuppreſs that annoyance, which might otherwiſe be given us
" from hence; — that mere neceſſity obligeth us to embark in
" many undertakings, becauſe we have many ſiniſter incidents to
" guard againſt; — that now, and formerly, we came hither to
" ſupport thoſe Sicilians who have been unjuſtly oppreſſed; not un-
" invited, but ſolemnly conjured to take ſuch ſteps. Attempt not
" therefore to divert our purſuits, either by erecting yourſelves into
" cenſors of our proceedings, or into correctors of our politics, a
" point too difficult for you to manage. But ſo much of our acti-
" vity or conduct as you can mould into a conſiſtency with your
" own welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your beſt advan-
" tage. And never imagine, that our politics are equally prejudi-
" cial to all the world beſides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of
" the Grecians. For through every quarter, even thoſe which we
" cannot pretend to control, both ſuch as dread impending miſchiefs
" and ſuch as meditate incroachments, — laying hold on both ſides
" of the ready expectation; the former, that redreſs may be obtained
" by our interpoſition; the latter, that if we think proper to oppoſe
" them their own ſafety will be greatly endangered; — both ſides, I
" ſay, are hence obliged; the latter, to practiſe moderation tho' with
" regret; the former, to enjoy tranquillity without previous embroil-
" ments of the public peace. The ſecurity therefore which now of-
" fers itſelf to your acceptance, and is always ready for thoſe who
" want it, you are conjured by no means to reject; but, relying
" like other communities on that quantity of ſupport we are able to
" afford you, put the change for once on the Syracuſans; and, in-
" ſtead of being ever on the watch againſt them, force them at
" length to be watchful and alarmed for themſelves."

Such

Such was the reply of Euphemus. — In the mean time the real diſpoſition of the Camarinéans was this. — At bottom they were well-affected to the Athenians, ſave only for the ambition they ſhewed of inſlaving Sicily; but had ever been embroiled with the Syracuſans, through that jealouſy ever to be found in a neighbouring *State*. But as the dread of victory on the ſide of the Syracuſans, who were cloſe upon their borders, if earned without their concurrence, had influenced their meaſures, they ſent a ſmall party of horſe to ſuccour them on the former occaſion; and looked upon themſelves as obliged in policy to ſerve them underhand in future exigences, but with all poſſible frugality and reſerve; and, at the preſent juncture, that they might not betray any the leaſt partiality againſt the Athenians, as they were come off victorious from a battle, to return the ſame impartial reply to both. Determined therefore by theſe conſiderations, they anſwered — that "ſince a war had broke out between two "*States*, each of which was in alliance with themſelves, they judged "the only method of acting conſiſtently with their oaths would be, "to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality." Upon this, the embaſſadors of both parties took their leaves and departed. And the Syracuſans, within themſelves, exerted their utmoſt applications to get all things in readineſs for war.

The Camarinéans *declare a neutrality.*

The Athenians, who were now incamped at Naxus, opened negotiations with the Siculi, to draw over as many of them as was poſſible into their adherence. Many of theſe, who inhabited the plains and were moſt awed by the Syracuſans, ſtood reſolutely out: but the generality of thoſe, who were ſeated in the midland parts, as they were now and had ever kept themſelves uncontroled, ſided at once with the Athenians: They furniſhed them with corn for the ſervice of the army; and there were ſome, who ſupplied them with money. And then the Athenians, taking the field againſt ſuch as refuſed to accede, forced ſome to a compliance, and prevented others from receiving garriſons and aids from Syracuſe: During winter alſo, they

Farther meaſures of the Athenians.

they removed again from Naxus to Catana; and, having repaired their camp which had been burnt by the Syracuſans, choſe to paſs the remainder of the winter there.

They alſo diſpatched a trireme to Carthage, to aſk their friendſhip and whatever aſſiſtance could poſſibly be obtained. They ſent alſo to Tuſcany, as ſome cities on that coaſt had made them voluntary offers of aſſiſtance. And further, they circulated their orders amongſt the Siculi, and diſpatched in particular one to the Egeſtéans, "to "ſend them as large a number of horſes as they could poſſibly pro-"cure." They buſied themſelves in collecting materials for circumvallation, ſuch as bricks and iron, and all other neceſſary ſtores; being determined to carry on the war with vigor on the firſt approach of ſpring.

Succeſs of the Syracuſan *embaſſy at* Corinth.

The embaſſadors, who from Syracuſe were ſent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, endeavoured in their paſſage to prevail with the Italians, "not to look with unconcern on the Athenian proceedings, ſince "they alſo were equally involved in the danger." But when arrived at Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, in which they inſiſted on a ſpeedy ſupply, upon the plea of conſanguinity. And the Corinthians came at once to a reſolution, by way of precedent to others, that, "with all poſſible ardor they would join in their defence." They even appointed an embaſſy of their own to accompany them to Lacedæmon, whoſe inſtructions were to ſecond them in ſoliciting the Lacedæmonians "to declare open war at home againſt the Athe-"nians, and to fit out an aid for the ſervice of Sicily."

And at Lacedæmon, *ſupported by* Alcibiades.

At the time that theſe joint-embaſſies arrived at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was alſo there. He had no ſooner made his eſcape, attended by his companions in exile, than in a trading-veſſel he paſſed over from Thuria to Cyllene in Eléa; and from thence he repaired to Lacedæmon. But, as the Lacedæmonians had preſſed to ſee him, he went thither under the protection of the public faith. For he had with reaſon dreaded his reception there, ſince he had acted ſo large a part in the affair of Mantinéa.

It

It happened further, that when a public aſſembly was convened at Sparta, the Corinthians, and the Syracuſans, and Alcibiades, all urged the ſame requeſt, and were ſucceſsful. Nay, tho' the College of Ephori and thoſe who preſided at the helm of the *State* had dreſſed up a plan, in purſuance of which they were only to ſend their embaſſadors to Syracuſe to hinder all accommodations with the Athenians, and were quite averſe to the ſupplying them with real ſuccours; yet Alcibiades ſtanding up inflamed the Lacedæmonian fury, and wrought them to his purpoſe by the following harangue:

A grand council at Sparta.

" I LIE under a neceſſity, in the beginning of my diſcourſe, to " vindicate myſelf from the calumny, which hath been charged " againſt me: leſt a jealouſy of me might divert your attention " from thoſe points which equally affect the common cauſe. My " anceſtors therefore having, upon ſome reaſonable grounds of com- " plaint, renounced the privilege of being the public hoſts of your " embaſſies at Athens. I am the man, who again re-eſtabliſhed this " hoſpitable intercourſe; who in many other reſpects endeavoured " with great aſſiduity to oblige you, and particularly in the calamity " which fell to your ſhare at Pylus. I chearfully perſevered in theſe " my favourable inclinations towards you, till you yourſelves, bent " on accommodating your differences with the Athenians, employed " my adverſaries to negotiate your affairs; and, as thereby you in- " veſted *them* with authority, you of courſe reflected diſgrace on " *me*. With reaſon therefore, after ſuch provocations, you were " afterwards thwarted by me, when I ſupported the intereſt of the " Mantinéans and the Argives, and introduced new meaſures into the " *State*, in oppoſition to you. Let therefore ſuch of your number, " as chagrined at what they ſuffered then, continue unjuſtly their " reſentments againſt me, weigh now the force of thoſe reaſons " on which I acted, and return to better temper. If again I ſuffer

Speech of Alcibiades.

' in the opinion of any man, becauſe I have ever manifeſted an

" attachment

" attachment to the intereſt of the *people*, let him alſo learn that his
" enmity to me on that account is not to be defended. We have
" born from time immemorial a ſtedfaſt unrelenting averſion to
" tyrants: Now, the whole of oppoſition to the deſpotic power of *one*
" is expreſſed by this word the *people*, and on this principle alone,
" our firm and conſtant adherence to the *multitude* hath been hitherto
" carried on and ſupported. Beſides, as the *State* of which I was a
" Member was purely *democratical*, I lay under a neceſſity in many
" reſpects of conforming my conduct to the eſtabliſhed model; and
" yet I endeavoured to give the public meaſures a greater ſhare of
" moderation, than the frantic humour of the Athenians was judged
" capable of brooking. But incendiaries ſtarted up, ſuch as not only
" in earlier times, but even in our own, have driven the *people* to
" more furious meaſures, and have at length effected — the exile of
" Alcibiades. But ſo long as the *State* was in my own management
" I thought myſelf juſtified, could I preſerve it in that height of
" grandeur and freedom and on the ſame model of government in
" which I found it. Not but that the judicious part of our com-
" munity are ſenſible what ſort of a government a *democracy* is, —
" and I myſelf no leſs than others, who have ſuch abundant occa-
" ſion to reproach and curſe it; — but for madneſs open and avowed
" new terms of abhorrence cannot be invented — tho' totally to
" ſubvert it, we could in no wiſe deem a meaſure of ſecurity, whilſt
" you had declared yourſelves our foes, and were in the field againſt
" us. And all thoſe proceedings of mine, which have proved moſt
" offenſive to you, are to be charged entirely to ſuch principles as
" theſe.

" And now, in relation to theſe points, on which you are here
" aſſembled to deliberate; and I alſo with you; and about which, if
" I am able to give you a greater light, I am bound to do it, — attend
" to what I am going to declare. Our principal view in the expe-
" dition to Sicily was, if poſſible, to reduce the Sicilians to our yoke.
" After

" After them we intended to do the ſame by the Italians. We " ſhould next have attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians; " nay, Carthage itſelf. Had theſe our views been ſucceſsful, either " in the whole or the greater part, we ſhould ſoon have given the " attack to Peloponneſus; aſſembling for that purpoſe the whole " Grecian force, which the countries thus ſubdued muſt have added " to our own; taking alſo into our pay large bodies of Barbarians " and Iberians, and other ſoldiers of thoſe nations, which by gene- " ral conſent are famed for the moſt warlike of all Barbarians. We " ſhould have built alſo great number of triremes for the enlarge- " ment of our navy, as Italy would plentifully have ſupplied us " with timber; with which blocking up Peloponneſus on all ſides, " and with our land-forces at the ſame time invading it by land; " after carrying your cities, ſome by ſtorm and ſome by the regular " ſiege, we hoped without obſtruction to have warred you down, " and in purſuance of that to have ſeized the empire of univerſal " Greece. With money and all needful ſtores, adequate to this ex- " tenſive plan, the cities to be conquered in thoſe remoter parts " would with all proper expedition have ſupplied us, without any " demands on our own domeſtic revenues. Such were to be the at- " chievements of that grand armament which is now abroad; ſuch, " you may reſt aſſured upon the evidence of a perſon who was privy " to every ſtep, was its original plan. And the generals, who are " left in the command, will yet if they are able carry it into execu- " tion. And I muſt further beg leave to tell you, that if with " timely ſuccours you do not interpoſe, nothing in thoſe parts will " be able to ſtand before them.

" The Sicilians are a people unexperienced in war; and yet, " would they unite and combine together in their mutual defence, " they might poſſibly even now be too hard for the Athenians. But " then the Syracuſans, abandoned as they are by the reſt, and who " already have ſeen their whole force defeated in battle, and who are

" blocked up in their own harbours by the enemy's fleet, will be
" unable long to reſiſt the great force of the Athenians which is al-
" ready there. If therefore Syracuſe be taken, all Sicily is van-
" quiſhed at a ſtroke, and Italy becometh inſtantly their prey. And
" then the ſtorm, which as I intimated before, was to be directed
" againſt you from that quarter, will in a ſhort time gather, and
" come pouring down upon you.

" Let no one therefore imagine, that the end of your preſent de-
" liberation is the fate of Sicily, when Peloponneſus itſelf will be
" indangered, unleſs ſome meaſures of prevention be executed with
" ſpeed; — unleſs you ſend out a naval force for the preſervation of
" Sicily, ſo dextrouſly appointed, that the hands, who man the ſhips
" and ply the oar, may on the inſtant of their landing become a
" body of heavy-armed; and what in my judgment is better than
" an army, a *citizen* of Sparta to take upon him the command, that
" thoſe who are ready he may diſcipline to ſervice, and force ſuch to
" join as on choice would refuſe their concurrence. For, by ſuch a
" ſtep, thoſe who are already your friends will be animated with
" higher degrees of reſolution; and thoſe, who fluctuate at preſent,
" will join you with a ſmaller ſenſe of fear.

" It behoves you alſo to make war upon the Athenians at home
" in a more declared and explicit manner, that the Syracuſans, con-
" vinced that you have their welfare at heart, may make a more ob-
" ſtinate reſiſtance, and the Athenians be rendered leſs able to ſend
" reinforcements to their troops in Sicily.

" It behoves you further to raiſe fortifications at Decelia in Attica;
" a ſtep, which the Athenians have ever moſt terribly apprehended,
" and think that in that point alone you have not put their reſolution
" to its utmoſt trial in the preſent war. And *that* aſſuredly muſt be
" pronounced the moſt effectual method of diſtreſſing an enemy, to
" diſcover what it is he dreads moſt, and then carry how to afflict
" him in his moſt tender part. For it is a reaſonable concluſion,

" that

" that they will tremble moſt at incidents which, ſhould they take
" place, they are inwardly convinced muſt moſt ſenſibly affect them.
" As to the benefits, which you yourſelves ſhall reap by fortifying De-
" celéa, and of what they ſhall be debarred, I ſhall paſs over many,
" and only conciſely point out the moſt important. — By this, all
" the natural commodities of the country will fall into your hands;
" ſome, by way of booty; the reſt, by voluntary contributions.
" They will inſtantly be deprived of the profits of the ſilver-mines
" at Laurium, as well as of the rents of their eſtates, and the fees
" of their courts. The tributes from their dependents will alſo be
" paid with leſs punctuality; ſince the latter ſhall no ſooner perceive
" that you are earneſtly bent on war, than they will ſhew an open
" diſregard for Athens.

" That theſe or any of theſe points be executed with diſpatch and
" with vigour, dependeth, ye Lacedæmonians, upon yourſelves
" alone. I can only confidently aver, that all are feaſible; and I
" think I ſhall not prove miſtaken in my ſentiments. I ought not to
" ſuffer in the opinion of any Lacedæmonian, tho', once accounted
" the warmeſt of her patriots, I now ſtrenuouſly join the moſt inve-
" terate foes of my country; nor ought my ſincerity to be ſuſpected
" by any, as if I ſuited my words to the ſharp reſentments of an
" exile. I am driven from my country, through the malice of men
" who have prevailed againſt me; but not from your ſervice, if you
" hearken to my counſels. Your enmity is ſooner to be forgiven,
" who have hurt your enemies alone, than theirs who by cruel
" treatment compel friends to be foes. My patriotiſm is far from
" thriving under the injuſtice I have ſuffered: it was merely an ef-
" fect of gratitude for that protection I once enjoyed from my
" country. Nor have I reaſon at preſent to imagine, that againſt
" my country I am now going to march, ſo much as to recover
" ſome country to myſelf, when at preſent I have none at all. And
" I judge the perſon to be a true lover of his country; — not him,

" who exiled from it abandons himſelf without a ſtruggle to his own
" iniquitous fate, but — who, from a fondneſs for it, leaves no pro-
" ject unattempted to recover it again.

" As theſe are my ſentiments, I may fairly, ye Lacedæmonians,
" inſiſt upon your acceptance of my ſervice without diffidence or
" fear, whatever dangers or whatever miſeries may hereafter reſult.
" You well know the maxim, which univerſal conſent will evince
" to be good; that, if when an enemy I hurt you much, when I
" am now become your friend I can help you more. Nay, for the
" latter I am better qualified on this very account, that I am per-
" fectly acquainted with the ſtate of Athens; whereas, I was only
" able to conjecture at yours. And, as you are now met together to
" form reſolutions on points of the higheſt importance, I conjure
" you without heſitation to carry your arms at once into Sicily and
" Attica; to the end, that in the former, by the preſence of a ſmall
" part of your forces you may work out ſignal preſervations, and at
" home pull down the preſent, and even the future growth of the
" Athenians; that for ages to come yourſelves may reap ſecurity
" and peace, and preſide at the helm of united Greece, which will
" chearfully acquieſce under your guidance, and pay you a free un-
" compelled obedience."

Reſolved to ſuccour the Syracuſans.

To this purpoſe Alcibiades ſpoke. And the Lacedæmonians, who had before ſome ſort of intention to take the field againſt Athens, tho' hitherto they had protracted its execution, were now more than ever animated to it, when Alcibiades had given them ſuch a detail of affairs whom they judged to have the cleareſt inſight in them. Thereupon they turned their attention immediately on fortifying Decelèa, and ſending out a body of ſuccour for the preſent ſervice of Sicily. They alſo appointed Gylippus the ſon of Cleandridas to go and take upon him the command at Syracuſe, with orders, by concerting meaſures with the Syracuſans and Corinthians, to draw up a

Gylippus named for the command.

plan

plan for the moſt effectual and moſt ready conveyance of ſuccours thither.

Gylippus accordingly iſſued out his orders to the Corinthians to attend him without loſs of time at Aſine with two ſhips, and alſo to expedite the equipment of the fleet which they deſigned for this ſervice, and to keep them in readineſs to ſail when opportunity ſhould require. Having ſo far concerted meaſures, the embaſſadors departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenian trireme alſo, diſpatched from Sicily by the generals on that poſt to demand ſupplies of money and a body of horſe, was by this time arrived at Athens. And the Athenians, on hearing their demands, drew up a decree, to ſend away ſupplies to that armament and a body of horſemen.

And here the winter ended; and the ſeventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory, came alſo to an end.

YEAR XVIII.

ON the earlieſt approach of the ſpring which led on the following ſummer, the Athenians in Sicily, hoiſting from Catana, ſhewed themſelves on the coaſt of Megara in Sicily, of which the Syracuſans, having diſpoſſeſſed the inhabitants in the time of Gelon the tyrant (as I have already related), continued maſters of the ſoil. Having landed here, they ravaged the country; till approaching a fortreſs belonging to the Syracuſans, and attempting it without ſucceſs, they retired, ſome by land and the reſt on board the fleet, into the river Tereas; from whence going again on ſhore, they ravaged the plains and ſet fire to the growing corn. They alſo fell in with a ſmall party of Syracuſans, ſome of whom they ſlew; and then erecting a trophy, went again on board. They next returned to Catana; and after victualling there, proceeded from thence with their whole force to the attack of Centoripa, a ſtrong fort belonging to the Siculi; and having

414.

Progreſs of the Athenians in Sicily.

having made themſelves maſters of it by a capitulation, they ſtood away, burning down in their paſſage the corn of the Ineſſéans and Hybléans. Upon returning to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horſemen arrived frm Athens, tho' without horſes yet with all the proper furniture, as if they could be better ſupplied with the former in Sicily, — as alſo thirty archers mounted, and * three hundred talents of ſilver.

* 581 l. 5 s.

Motions in Greece.

In the ſame ſpring, the Lacedæmonians alſo took the field againſt Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonæ; but the ſhock of an earthquake being felt there, they again retired. — And after this, the Argives, making an irruption into the Thyreatis which borders upon themſelves, took a vaſt booty from the Lacedæmonians, which was ſold for no leſs than * twenty-five talents.

* 4843 l. 15 s.

And not long after in the ſame ſpring, the popular party at Theſpiæ aſſaulted thoſe in power, but without ſucceſs. And, tho' the Athenians marched away to their ſuccour, ſome of them were apprehended, and others were obliged to take refuge at Athens.

Defenſive meaſures at Syracuſe.

In the ſame ſummer, the Syracuſans had no ſooner received intelligence of the arrival of a body of horſemen amongſt the Athenians, and the deſign of advancing immediately to aſſault them, than it occurred to their reflexions, that " in caſe the Athenians could not " poſſeſs themſelves of Epipolæ (a ſpot of ground which is only one " continued crag, and lies directly above the city of Syracuſe) it " would be difficult to incloſe them compleatly round with works of " circumvallation, even tho' they ſhould be defeated in open battle." They applied themſelves therefore to the guard of all the approaches to Epipolæ, that the enemy might not on a ſudden gain the eminence; for by other methods it was impoſſible for them to carry that poſt. Excepting thoſe approaches, the reſt of the tract is an impracticable ſteep, inclining gradually quite down to the city, and commanding the view of every thing within it. Hence therefore, becauſe it riſeth with a continual aſcent, it was called by the Syracuſans *Epipolæ*.

As

As Hermocrates and his collegues had now formally taken upon them the command, the whole force of Syracuſe marched out by break of day into a meadow on the banks of the Anapus to paſs under review; where the firſt thing they did was to ſelect ſeven hundred of the choiceſt men amongſt the heavy-armed, to be commanded by Diomilus an exile from Andrus. Theſe were appointed for the guard of Epipolæ, and to be ready for ſervice, as they were always to keep in a body, on any ſudden emergence. But the Athenians, who had muſtered their forces on the preceding day, had ſtood away from Catana, and were come in the night undiſcovered to the ſpot called Leon, which is diſtant * ſix or ſeven ſtadia from Epipolæ, where they disbarked their land-forces, and then ſent their ſhips to lie in the ſtation of Thapſus. Thapſus is a peninſula, joined to the main-land by a narrow iſthmus and jutting out into the ſea, at no great diſtance from the city of Syracuſe, either by land or water. The naval force of the Athenians, having ſecured their ſtation by raiſing a paliſado acroſs the iſthmus, lay quiet in their poſts. But the land-army, without loſs of time, made a running march towards Epipolæ; and mounted by the paſs of Euryalus, before the Syracuſans, who were yet in the meadow buſied in their review, diſcovered or were able to advance to prevent them. And now their whole force was in motion to diſlodge them; each man with all poſſible alacrity, and more particularly the ſeven hundred commanded by Diomilus. But from the meadow to the neareſt ſpot where they could come up with the enemy was a march of no leſs than * twenty-five ſtadia. To this it was owing, that the Syracuſans came to the charge in a diſorderly manner; and, being plainly repulſed in battle at Epipolæ, were forced to retire within the city. Diomilus alſo and about three hundred more loſe their lives in this engagement.

The Athenians land at Leon. Surprize Epipolæ. A battle.

* *Above two miles.*

In purſuance of this, the Athenians, having erected a trophy and given up the bodies of the [illegible] under truce to the Syracuſans, marched

* *Two miles and a half.*

The Athenians

marched down the next day in order of battle to the very gates of the city. But as the Syracuſans refrained from ſallying out againſt them, they again drew off; and raiſed a fort at Labdalum on the very ſteepeſt edge of Epipolæ looking towards Megara, which they intended as a repoſitory for their baggage and money, whilſt themſelves might be called off either to fight or to carry on the works of a ſiege.

Soon after this they were joined by a body of three hundred Egeſtéan horſe, and one hundred more conſiſting of Siculi and Naxians, and ſome others in their Alliance. The Athenian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty. They had procured ſome horſes from the Egeſtéans and Catanéans, and had purchaſed the reſt: ſo that now they had got together a body of horſe, amounting in all to ſix hundred and fifty.

The ſiege begins.

A garriſon was no ſooner ſettled in the fort of Labdalum than the Athenians approached to Tyche, where taking poſt they built a wall in *circle* with great expedition, and by the rapidity of their work ſtruck conſternation into the Syracuſans. Upon this they ſallied out, with a fixed deſign to hazard an engagement, as they ſaw the danger of dallying any longer. The armies on both ſides were now beginning to face each other; but the Syracuſan generals, obſerving that their own army was in diſarray, and could not eaſily be formed into proper order, made them all wheel off again into the city, except

A ſkirmiſh.

a party of their horſe. Theſe, keeping the field, prevented the Athenians from carrying ſtones and ſtraggling to any diſtance from their poſts. But at length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, ſupported by the whole body of their cavalry, attacked and put to flight theſe Syracuſan horſemen. They made ſome ſlaughter amongſt them, and erected a Trophy for this piece of ſucceſs againſt the enemy's cavalry.

The circumvallation begun.

On the day following, ſome of the Athenians began to raiſe a wall along the northern ſide of their *circle*; whilſt others were employed

ployed in carrying ſtones and timber, which they laid down in heaps all along the place called Trogilus, near to the line marked out for the circumvallation, which was to reach by the ſhorteſt compaſs from the great harbour on one ſide to the ſea on the other. But the Syracuſans, who were principally guided by the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts of ſallying out for the future with the whole ſtrength of the city to give battle to the Athenians. It was judged more adviſeable to run along a wall in length, which ſhould cut the line in which the Athenian works were deſigned to paſs, and which (could they effect it in time) muſt entirely exclude the enemy from perfecting their circumvallation. Nay further, in caſe the enemy ſhould come up in a body to interrupt the work, they might give them full employ with one diviſion of their force, whilſt another detachment might raiſe paliſades to ſecure the approaches: at leaſt, as the whole of the Athenian force muſt be drawn out to oppoſe them, they would be obliged to diſcontinue their own works. To raiſe therefore the projected work, they iſſued out of the city; and beginning at the foot of the city-wall from below the Athenian circle, they carried on from thence a tranſverſe wall; cutting down the olive-trees in the ſacred grove, of which they built wooden turrets to cover their work. The Athenian ſhipping was not yet come round from Thapſus into the great harbour, but the Syracuſans continued maſters of all the poſts upon the ſea; and conſequently the Athenians were obliged to fetch up all neceſſary ſtores from Thapſus acroſs the land.

The Syracuſans *raiſe a counter-work.*

When it appeared to the Syracuſans that all their paliſades and the tranſverſe wall were ſufficiently compleated, in which the Athenians had given them no manner of interruption, as they were under apprehenſions that ſhould they divide their force they might be expoſed to a defeat, and at the ſame time were ardently intent on perfecting their own circumvallation; — the Syracuſans drew off

again into the city, leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the guard of their counter-wall.

The Athenians *demolish it.*

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the pipes, which by ſubterraneous ducts conveyed the drinking-water into the city. And having further obſerved, that the Syracuſans kept within their tents during the heat of the day, but that ſome had ſtraggled into the town, whilſt thoſe poſted at the paliſades kept but a negligent guard; they picked out three hundred of their heavy-armed, and ſtrengthening them with a choice party of their light-armed ſoldiers, ordered them to march with all poſſible ſpeed and attack the counter-work. The reſt of their force was to march another way, ſince headed by one of the generals it advanced towards the city, to employ the Syracuſans in caſe they ſallied; whilſt the other detachment, headed by the other general, attacked the paliſade, which covered the ſally-port. Accordingly the three-hundred aſſault and carry the paliſade, which thoſe who were poſted for its guard abandoned, and fled for ſhelter behind the works which incloſed Temenites. The purſuers however entered with them; but were no ſooner got in, than they were again forcibly driven out by the Syracuſans. And here ſome of the Argives, and a ſmall number of Athenians were ſlain.

But now the whole army wheeling about demoliſhed the counter-work, and pulled up the paliſade. The piles of which it was compoſed, they carried off in triumph, and erected a trophy.

And go on with the circumvallation.

The next morning the Athenians reſumed their work of circumvallation, and continued it acroſs the crag which is above the marſh and lies on the quarter of Epipolæ that looks towards the great harbour. This was the ſhorteſt cut for their circumvallation downwards, acroſs the plain and the marſh, 'till it reached the harbour. Upon this, the Syracuſans, iſſuing again, raiſed another paliſade, beginning from the city, and ſtretching quite acroſs the marſh. They alſo threw up an intrenchment along the paliſade, intirely to prevent the

Athenians

Athenians from continuing their works quite down to the ſea. The latter, when they had perfected their work along the crag, are bent on demoliſhing the new paliſade and intrenchment of the Syracuſans. For this purpoſe, they had ordered their ſhipping to come about from Thapſus into the great harbour of Syracuſe. They themſelves at the morning's dawn marched down from Epipolæ into the plain; and then croſſing the marſh, where the mud was hardeſt and beſt able to bear, by the help of boards and planks which they laid upon the ſurface, they carry almoſt the whole length of the paliſade and intrenchment early in the morning, and were ſoon after maſters of the whole. This was not effected without a battle, in which the *Another battle.* Athenians were again victorious. The routed Syracuſans fled different ways; thoſe, who had compoſed their right, towards the city; and thoſe, who had compoſed their left, towards the river. But, with a view of intercepting the paſſage of the latter, the three hundred choſen Athenians marched with all ſpeed to ſeize the bridge. The Syracuſans, alarmed at this ſtep, as this body conſiſted of the bulk of their horſe, face about on *the three hundred*, and put them to flight, and then break in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By ſo unexpected a ſhock the firſt band in that wing was thrown into diſorder. Lamachus, obſerving it, advanced to their ſupport from the left, with a ſmall party of archers that happened to be near him, and the whole body of the Argives. Having croſſed a ditch which lay between, ſeconded only by a few, whilſt the bulk of his party made a full ſtop, he is inſtantly ſlain [1], as were alſo five or ſix *Lamachus killed.* of thoſe by whom he was accompanied. The Syracuſans caught up

1 *Plutarch*, in the life of *Nicias*, circumſtantiates the manner in which this old general loſt his life in character. Callicrates, a good ſoldier, but of great impetuoſity, rode at the head of the Syracuſan horſe. Being challenged out by Callicrates, Lamachus alone engaged perſonally with him. Lamachus received the firſt wound; he then returned the blow, and dropped. His antagoniſt fell at the ſame time, and they both expired together.

their bodies with all poſſible expedition, and bore them off to a place of ſecurity on the other ſide of the river. They were in great meaſure obliged to make a precipitate retreat, ſince the reſt of the Athenian army was now coming up to attack them.

But now, ſuch of the Syracuſans as had fled at firſt towards the city, having gained leiſure to obſerve ſuch turns in their favour, caught freſh courage from the fight; and forming again into order, ſtood their ground againſt that body of Athenians which faced them. They alſo ſend a detachment to attempt the *circle* on Epipolæ, concluding it to be unmanned for the preſent, and might at once be taken. This detachment in fact made itſelf maſter of the out-work, and demoliſhed it for about ten *plethres* in length; but the *circle* itſelf was defended by Nicias from all their attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, had been left to repoſe himſelf within the *circle*. He therefore iſſued orders to his ſervants to ſet fire to all the machines and the timber which were lying before the wall: for he was convinced, that thus alone, in ſuch a total want of hands for their defence any ſafety could be earned. The event anſwered his expectation; for, when the flames begun to mount, the Syracuſans durſt not any longer come near, but thought proper to deſiſt and march away.

For now the Athenians, who by this time had chaced the enemy from off the plain, were remounting the aſcent to defend their *circle*; and, at the ſame inſtant of time, their fleet, conformable to the orders they had received, was ſtanding into the great harbour. The Syracuſans upon the high ground beheld the fight, which occaſioned them and the whole Syracuſan army to retire precipitately into the city; concluding themſelves no longer able, without an augmentation of their preſent ſtrength, to hinder the completion of the Athenian works quite down to the ſea.

After

After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, and in purſuance of a truce delivered up their ſlain to the Syracuſans, and received in exchange the body of Lamachus, and of thoſe who fell with him.

The Athenians carry on their works.

The junction of their whole armament, both of their land and naval force, being now compleated, they began again, from Epipolæ and the crag, to inveſt the Syracuſans with a double wall, which they were to continue quite down to the ſea. The neceſſary proviſions to ſupply their army, were brought in from all the coaſts of Italy. Many alſo of the Siculi, who hitherto had ſtood aloof, declared now for the Athenians, and came into their alliance, who were further joined by three veſſels of fifty oars from Hetruria.

The Syracuſans are leſs diſtreſſed.

All other points equally contributed to elevate their hopes. For the Syracuſans had begun to deſpair of being able to ſuſtain the ſiege, as they had no glimpſe of any approaching ſuccour from Peloponneſus. They were toſſing to and fro amongſt themſelves ſome propoſals for an accommodation, and had even ſounded Nicias upon that head, who by the death of Lamachus was left inveſted with the ſole command. Nothing definitive was however concluded, tho' (as might with reaſon be expected from men in high perplexity and beſieged more ſtraitly than ever) many propoſals were made to him, and many more were agitated within the city. The diſtreſſes alſo, which environed them at preſent, ſtruck into them mutual ſuſpicions of one another. Nay, they even diveſted of their charge the generals who were in authority when theſe diſtreſſes came upon them, as if all was owing to their miſconduct or treachery, and choſe in their ſtead Heraclides and Eucles and Tellias.

Gylippus ſails for Sicily.

In the mean time, Gylippus the Lacedæmonian and the ſhips from Corinth were come up to Leucas, deſigning with the utmoſt expedition to paſs over from thence to Sicily. But terrible accounts came thick upon them here; and all agreed in broaching the ſame untruth that "Syracuſe was compleatly inveſted on all ſides." Gylippus upon this gave up all hopes of ſaving Sicily; but, having the

the preſervation of Italy ſtill at heart, he and Pythen the Corinthian, with the ſmall ſquadron at hand conſiſting only of two Laconic and two Corinthian veſſels, croſſed over the Ionian gulf with all poſſible diſpatch to Tarentum. The Corinthians, beſides their own ten now fitting out, were to man two belonging to the Leucadians, and three more belonging to the Ambraciots, and follow them as ſoon as poſſible.

He arrives at Tarentum.

The firſt ſtep of Gylippus now arrived at Tarentum, was, to go in quality of embaſſador to Thuria, claiming privilege for it as his father had been a denizon of that *State*; but finding himſelf unable to gain their concurrence, he weighed from thence, and ſtood along the coaſt of Italy. But in the Terinéan gulf he met with a hard gale of wind, which in this gulf when in a northerly point blows generally with great and laſting violence, and now drove him from his courſe, and blew him out into the open ſea; where he ſtood again the rebuff of another violent ſtorm, but at length reached Tarentum. He there laid his veſſels on ground which had been damaged in the foul weather, and refitted them for ſervice.

Nicias *ſlights him.*

When Nicias found that he was in his paſſage, he betrayed an open contempt of ſo trifling a ſquadron, as the Thurians had already done before him. It appeared to him, that ſo petty a ſquadron could only be fitted out for piratical cruizes; and therefore he ſent out no detachments to hinder his approach.

Motions in Greece.

About the ſame time of this ſummer, the Lacedæmonians, with their own domeſtic forces augmented by the junction of their allies, made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part of that territory. The Athenians put out to ſea with thirty ſail to ſuccour the Argives, which procedure was beyond all denial the cleareſt violation of the treaties between them and the Lacedæmonians. Hitherto, they had only exerciſed robberies upon them from Pylus; and making deſcents rather on any other coaſt of Peloponneſus than Laconia itſelf, had left it to the Argives and Mantinéans to make war againſt them.

Nay,

Nay, tho' the Argives had frequently preſſed them, that with an armed force they would barely land on the Laconic coaſt, and after committing never ſo ſmall ravage in their company, immediately to retire, they had poſitively refuſed. But now, under the command of Pythodorus and Læſpodias and Demaratus, they made a deſcent at Epidaurus-Limera, and Praſia, committed large devaſtation on the adjacent country, and afforded the Lacedæmonians a moſt ſpecious and juſtifiable pretext to act offenſively againſt Athens.

When the Athenian fleet was ſailed homewards from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians alſo were withdrawn, the Argives broke into Phliaſia, where they laid waſte part of the Lacedæmonian territory, and made ſome ſlaughter of the people, and then returned to Argos.

THE

THE HISTORY OF The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE SEVENTH.

CONTENTS.

THE siege of Syracuse is carried on so vigorously by Nicias, that the Syracusans think of a surrender. At this crisis arrive the Peloponnesian succours and Gylippus the Spartan, which giveth a new turn to the siege. A counterwork is raised to stop the Athenian circumvallation: Engagements ensue. Nicias is now in a bad situation. He sendeth home a succinct detail of affairs by letter: A reinforcement is ordered him from Athens under the command of Demosthenes. The Lacedæmonians resolve to renew the war at home.

Year XIX. *Attica invaded, and Decelea fortified.—A naval engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenians are superior. In the mean time Athens is sadly distressed by the enemy.—A massacre at Mycalessus.—A sea-fight on the coast of Achaia.—A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, to the advantage of the Syracusans. The reinforcement arriveth from Athens. Demosthenes attempts Epipolæ, without success. Debates about raising the siege, which at length is resolved. The instant they are embarking the moon is eclipsed; upon which superstition detaineth them. The Syracusans attack them both by land and by water. The Athenians are worsted in every engagement; at length lose all their shipping. They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly distressed, and totally subdued. Nicias and Demosthenes are taken prisoners and put to death.*



THE

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VII.

GYLIPPUS and Pythen, when they had refitted their ſhips, ſtood along the coaſt from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrii. Here they received more certain information, that Syracuſe was not yet compleatly inveſted, and that a ſuccour of force might be thrown into the town by the way of Epipolæ. They went next to conſultation — whether "keeping Sicily on the right they ſhould "endeavour at all hazards to enter Syracuſe by ſea; — or, with Si- "cily on their left ſhould ſteer firſt to Himera; from whence, at- "tended by the forces of that *State* and whatever additional ſtrength "they could perſuade to join them, ſhould march thither over-land." It was determined, to go firſt to Himera, eſpecially as the four Athenian veſſels were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias at laſt, upon the certain intelligence that they were now at Locri, had

Gylippus *ſails for* Syracuſe.

detached to obſerve them. To be beforehand therefore with this detachment, they paſs through the ſtraits, and having touched only at Rhegium and Meſſene, arrive at Himera. Whilſt in the latter place, they prevailed upon the Himeréans to concur with them in the war, and not only to intruſt their troops under their command, but even to ſupply with arms ſuch of the mariners as had navigated the veſſels, and were therefore unprovided: For, their ſhipping they had drawn aſhore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinuntians alſo, by a meſſenger diſpatched on purpoſe, they had ſummoned to meet them with all their united ſtrength at a determined place upon their route. The Geloans alſo and ſome of the Siculi promiſed to attend with a party, tho' by no means conſiderable. The latter of theſe were diſpoſed better than ever to the ſervice, ſince Archonides was lately dead (who reigning over ſome of the Siculi ſeated in theſe parts, and having a great influence over them, had declared for the Athenians;) and ſince Gylippus appeared to them to be ſent from Lacedæmon with a full purpoſe to do them ſervice.

Lands in Sicily.

And now Gylippus, — having aſſembled an army, which conſiſted of about ſeven hundred of thoſe who navigated or came on board his veſſels, and for whom he had provided arms; of heavy-armed and light-armed Himeréans amounting together to a thouſand men, and one hundred horſemen; of ſome light-armed Selinuntians; a ſmall party of Geloan horſe; and a body of Siculi, in all a thouſand, — began his march for Syracuſe.

The Corinthians, in the mean time, were ſending out the other ſhips, as faſt as they could equip them for the ſervice, to follow with all poſſible expedition from Leucas: And Gongyplus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who with a ſingle ſhip ſet out laſt from Leucas, is the firſt who arrives at Syracuſe; and that, but a ſmall ſpace of time before the approach of Gylippus. Finding therefore upon his arrival, that the Syracuſans were going forthwith to hold a public aſſembly, in which the terms of putting an end to the war were deſigned

ſigned to be adjuſted; he diſſuaded them from ſo precipitate a ſtep, and reanimated their drooping reſolutions by ſtrong aſſurances, that "other ſhips would inſtantly arrive;" and, that "Gylippus the "ſon of Cleandridas was ſent thither by the Lacedæmonians to take "upon him the command." The Syracuſans accordingly reſumed their ſpirits, and immediately marched out of the town with the whole of their ſtrength, in order to meet Gylippus: For by this time they had received intelligence, that he was actually approaching.

Gylippus, upon his route, had made himſelf maſter of Iëgas, a fortreſs belonging to the Siculi; and now, at the head of his army drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to Epipolæ. Having mounted by the paſs of Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their firſt approach, he marched in conjunction with the Syracuſans toward the Athenian circumvallation. He happened to arrive in that critical juncture, when the Athenians had compleatly finiſhed * ſeven or eight ſtadia of the double wall extending to the great harbour, when in conſequence but a very ſmall part remained incomplete, and on which they were labouring with their higheſt application. On the other ſide of their *circle* towards Trogilus, the ſtones for compleating their work had been laid ready in heaps almoſt down to the beach, and ſome parts of their work on that ſide ſtood but half compleated; tho' others had received the finiſhing hand. To ſuch extremity of danger were the Syracuſans now reduced.

Arrives at Syracuſe.

* *About* $\frac{3}{4}$ *of a mile.*

Gylippus and the Syracuſans coming thus ſuddenly upon them, the Athenians at firſt were ſtruck with conſternation, but formed however in order of battle to give them a reception. But Gylippus, having ordered his forces to halt, diſpatcheth a herald to the Athenians, proclaiming that "in caſe they would evacuate Sicily "within the ſpace of five days with their arms and baggage, he "would readily grant them a truce." Such offers they received in a contemptuous

contemptuous manner [1]; and, diſdaining to return an anſwer, ordered the herald to move off. And now both ſides were buſy in marſhalling and diſpoſing their men for battle.

But Gylippus, who had made an obſervation that the Syracuſans were in great confuſion, and could not eaſily be formed into proper order, made his army fall back into more open ground. Nicias gave them no diſturbance whilſt they were making this motion, but, without advancing, ſtood cloſe under his works. And when Gylippus found, that the enemy would not move forwards to attack him, he made his forces wheel off to the high ground called Temenites, where they repoſed themſelves for the night.

The next morning he drew up the greateſt part of his army before the works of the Athenians, to prevent their ſending out ſuccours to more diſtant poſts. For he had detached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, which he carried by ſtorm, and put all the garriſon found within it to the ſword. Labdalum was ſo ſituated in regard to the Athenian poſts, that *they* could have no view of what was tranſacting there. The ſame day alſo an Athenian trireme, as it was entering the harbour, is taken by the Syracuſans.

Counterwork of the Syracuſans.

After ſo much ſucceſs, the Syracuſans and allies ſet about raiſing a counterwork along Epipolæ. Beginning at the city, they carried it upwards towards the ſingle wall which had an oblique inclination; and intended, that in caſe the Athenians could not ſtop its completion, it ſhould intirely exclude them from perfecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, having perfected their works to the ſea, had

[1] Nicias (ſays *Plutarch*) diſdained to return an anſwer. But ſome of his ſoldiers laughed outright, and asked, "If at the "arrival of a mantle and ſtaff from Sparta "the Syracuſans were become ſo full of "ſpirits, as to deſpiſe the Athenians, who "had lately given up to the Lacedæmo"nians three hundred of their countrymen "who had been their priſoners, all of "them better ſoldiers, and who combed "their hair too much better than Gy"lippus."

now

now remounted the eminence. And, as ſome parts of their work were but weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night, and was marching to demoliſh *thoſe*. But the Athenians, who paſſed the night without their works, were no ſooner aware of it, than they alſo marched away to defend them. Upon which, Gylippus finding them alarmed deſiſted, and made his army retreat to their former poſts. This however occaſioned the Athenians to raiſe thoſe parts of their wall to a greater height, and to take the guard of it upon themſelves, as amongſt the body of their confederates they had divided the guard of the reſt of their works, allotting a proper charge to each.

Nicias alſo judged it expedient to fortify the ſpot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium is a point of land over-againſt Syracuſe, which jutting out before the great harbour, renders the mouth of it very narrow. "If this were fortified," he thought "the importation of neceſſaries "for the army would be better ſecured: Becauſe then, from a "ſmaller diſtance, they could at any time command the harbour "where the Syracuſan ſhipping lay; and, ſhould it be their ill-for-"tune to be ſtraitned by ſea, might eaſier fetch in ſupplies, than in "the preſent ſtation of their fleet at the bottom of the great har-"bour." Now alſo he began, with greater attention than before, to ſtudy how to diſtreſs them by ſea; convinced, ſince the arrival of Gylippus, how little room he had to hope for ſucceſs by land. To this ſpot therefore he ordered his fleet, and drew his land-forces down, and immediately erected three forts. In theſe the greateſt part of the baggage was laid up; and the tranſports and tight ſhips were immediately ſtationed there. To this project however, the havoc that afterwards enſued amongſt the ſeamen is principally to be aſcribed. For as they ſuffered in this ſtation under ſcarcity of water, and the mariners were frequently obliged to fetch both water and wood from a diſtance, ſince near at hand they were not to be had; the Syracuſan horſe, who were maſters of the country, ſlaughtered them

Nicias fortifies Plemmyrium.

them in abundance. The Syracuſans had poſted a third part of their cavalry at their fortreſs of Olympiæum, to bridle the marauding excurſions of the enemy at Plemmyrium.

Now alſo Nicias received intelligence that the other Corinthian ſhips were in their paſſage. To watch their approach he therefore detacheth twenty ſail, who were appointed to cruize about Locri, and Rhegium, and the capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them.

The active proceedings of Gylippus.

Gylippus, in the mean time, was employed in building the counterwall along Epipolæ, making uſe of the ſtones which the Athenians had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of their own work. It was alſo his daily cuſtom, to draw up the Syracuſans and allies in order of battle, and lead them out beyond the point of the counterwall, which obliged the Athenians to draw up likewiſe to obſerve their motions. And when Gylippus judged he could attack them with advantage, he inſtantly advanced; and the charge being given and received, a battle enſued in the ſpace between their reſpective works; but ſo narrow, that no uſe could be made of the Syracuſan and confederate horſe. The Syracuſans and allies were accordingly defeated. They fetched off their ſlain by truce; and the Athenians erected a trophy. But Gylippus, having aſſembled the army round him, thought proper to make this declaration in the preſence of them all;—that, "the defeat was not to be charged on their want of "bravery, but on his own indiſcretion: He had deprived them of "the ſervice of their own cavalry and darters, by ranging his battle "in too confined a ſpot between the works: that he would now "again lead them out in a more judicious manner." He exhorted them therefore "to imprint it ſtrong on their remembrance, that as "in real ſtrength they were not inferior, it would be intolerably diſ-"graceful, if they, who to a man were Peloponneſians and Dorians, "ſhould not manifeſt themſelves ſo reſolutely brave, as to conquer "and drive out of their country a parcel of Ionians, and iſlanders,

and

" and a promiſcuous rabble of hungry adventurers." Having addreſſed them thus, he lay on the watch to ſeize a proper opportunity; and, as ſoon as he had gained it, led them on again to the charge.

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in general of all the Athenians, that " tho' it was not their own intereſt to bring on an engagement, " yet it highly concerned them to put a ſtop to the counterwork, " which the enemy was raiſing to hinder their progreſs:" For by this time the wall of the Syracuſans had only not over-reached the extreme point, to which the Athenians had brought their circumvallation: " And ſhould it be extended further, it would give the " enemy this double advantage;—a certainty of conqueſt, whenever they thought proper to fight; and a diſcretionary power, not " to fight at all." Determined by theſe conſiderations, they drew out in order to give the Syracuſans battle.

Gylippus ſoon began the engagement. He had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the works, and at a greater diſtance from them than before. He had poſted the cavalry and the darters on a wide and open ſpot, yet unoccupied by the works on either ſide, and poſted them ſo that they flanked the Athenians. In the ardor of the engagement, the cavalry broke in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which was ranged againſt them, and intirely routed them. In conſequence of which the remainder of the army was ſoon defeated by the Syracuſans, and in the greateſt diſorder retired for ſhelter behind their works. And night no ſooner came on, than the Syracuſans without loſs of time began to carry forwards their own work, which they ſoon extended beyond the Athenian circumvallation; by which they gained this great point, that they could no longer be inveſted on all ſides by the Athenians: and the latter, tho' maſters in the field, were henceforwards effectually ſtopped from perfecting their circumvallation. *An engagement.*

More ſuccours arrive at Syracuſe.

After this, twelve ſhips of the Corinthians, and Ambraciots, and Leucadians, the remainder of the ſquadron deſigned for this ſervice, having given the Athenian guard-ſhips the ſlip, came into the harbour of Syracuſe: They were commanded by Heraſinides a Corinthian. By theſe the Syracuſans were now aſſiſted in carrying on their work, 'till it was compleatly joined to the tranſverſe-wall.

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily, in order to promote the common cauſe; and to procure additional forces for the ſervices both of land and ſea; and to ſolicit the concurrence of ſuch *States*, as hitherto had manifeſted either no great inclination or an open repugnance to join in the preſent war. Other embaſſadors alſo were diſpatched by the Syracuſans and Corinthians to Lacedæmon and Corinth; inſtructed, to ſolicit a ſpeedy reinforcement, to be tranſported into Sicily either in trading-veſſels, or in boats, or by any other expeditious methods, ſince the Athenians had alſo ſent for reinforcements from Athens. The Syracuſans alſo aſſigned complements of men to their ſhipping, and ſedulouſly trained them to the ſervice of the ſea, as deſigning on this element alſo to try their fortune; nay, they laboured with alacrity and application, to increaſe their ſtrength in all reſpects.

Nicias *ſends his report to* Athens.

Nicias being ſenſible of this and conſcious that the ſtrength of the enemy and his own inability became daily greater, diſpatched his meſſengers alſo to Athens, a cuſtom he had ever obſerved and upon all occaſions, to report the particulars of his proceedings. But, in his preſent ſituation, it was more requiſite than ever; ſince now he was convinced, that he was environed with dangers; and, unleſs with the utmoſt expedition they either recalled their troops, or ſent them another and that a ſtrong reinforcement, no hopes of preſervation remained. Apprehenſive further, that the perſons he ſhould ſend, either through want of proper addreſs, or through defect of courage, or a paſſion to ſooth the populace, might ſuppreſs the truth; he ſent a true account of things in a letter wrote with his own hand.

By

By this method he concluded, that his own ſentiments of things could not be concealed or invalidated by meſſengers; that the Athenians would be informed of the truth, and might accordingly adjuſt their reſolutions. Theſe meſſengers therefore departed; inſtructed, to deliver the letter which he intruſted to their care, and what further they were to add by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious to guard his ſhattered forces from annoyance, than to plunge into freſh and ſpontaneous dangers.

In the cloſe of this ſummer, Euetion an Athenian general marched, in conjunction with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians, againſt Amphipolis; yet could not render himſelf maſter of that city. But then, ſetting out from Imeréum, he brought his triremes about into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the ſide of the river. And here this ſummer ended. Amphipolis.

In the beginning of winter, the meſſengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, where they gave ſuch accounts of things as he had charged them to give, and reſolved ſuch queſtions as were asked them. They alſo delivered his letter, which the clerk of the *State* ſtood up and read aloud to the Athenians. The contents were theſe:

"ATHENIANS,

"THE many letters from time to time received from me have "given you all proper information, ſo far as relates to paſt tranſac- "tions. And it is now high time you ſhould be made acquainted "with our preſent ſituation, that your councils may be adjuſted in a "proper manner. *Letter of* Nicias.

"After therefore we had defeated in ſeveral engagements the Sy- "racuſans, againſt whom you ſent us out; and, when we had "thrown up thoſe works before their city, within which we are this "moment lying; Gylippus the Lacedæmonian came upon us at the "head of an army brought from Peloponneſus, and augmented by

" the troops of ſome Sicilian *States*. In the firſt battle he is routed
" by us; but in the laſt, preſſed hard by their numerous cavalry and
" darters, we have been forced to retire within our intrenchments.
" Being therefore obliged by the ſuperior numbers of the enemy to
" diſcontinue our circumvallation, we are this moment lying upon
" the defenſive. Nor indeed are we able to draw out our whole force
" for action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are remotely em-
" ployed in the guard of our works. They have further run up a
" ſingle wall to cut our lines; ſo that there remains no longer a poſ-
" ſibility for us to compleat the circumvallation, unleſs, reinforced
" by a numerous body of troops, we are enabled to aſſault and de-
" moliſh the counterwork. And in conſequence of this, we, who
" deſigned to beſiege others, may with much more propriety be ſaid
" to ſuffer a ſiege ourſelves, at leaſt by land. For we dare not make
" any diſtant excurſions into the adjacent country for fear of the
" horſe.

" What is more; they have ſent embaſſadors to Peloponneſus, to
" ſolicit reinforcements. Gylippus alſo is making the tour of the
" Sicilian *States*, with a view to obtain the concurrence of ſuch as
" are at preſent neutral, and to prevail with the reſt to intruſt their
" additional levies for the ſervice both of land and ſea under his com-
" mand. And, according to my preſent intelligence, they are fully
" bent to attack at one and the ſame time our intrenchments with
" their land-forces by land, and with their ſhips by ſea. And, tho'
" I ſay *by* SEA, let not the ſound be too terrible in your ears. For
" they know very well the preſent ſtate of our navy; which, tho' at
" firſt a moſt compleat equipment for the cleanneſs of the ſhips and
" the health and vigor of the ſeamen, yet, at preſent hath ſcarce a
" ſhip which is not leaky; ſo long have they been neceſſitated to
" keep the ſea, whilſt their hands have daily been mouldering away.
" For, in fact, we have no opportunity to lay them dry and careen
" them; as we are under continual apprehenſions of being attacked
" by

" by the ſhips of the enemy, equal nay ſuperior in number to our
" own. That they will attempt it, we have moſt certain grounds
" to believe; but, the ſeaſons of doing it are intirely in their own
" option; which alſo enables them to preſerve their veſſels ever fit
" for ſervice, as they are not neceſſitated to be continually in action
" to ſtrike an awe into others. Nay, we ſhould hardly be able to do
" the like; tho' the number of our ſhipping was much larger than
" it is; or, tho' we were exempted from the neceſſity we now
" lie under of keeping guard with them all. For, in caſe we make
" the leaſt abatement of our vigilance, we ſhould be diſtreſſed for
" want of neceſſaries; which even now we fetch in with difficulty
" in the very teeth of the enemy. To this muſt be aſcribed the
" great waſte of our ſeamen, which hath already been made; and,
" whoſe number leſſens from day to day; ſince, obliged to fetch in
" wood and water and forage from remote places, they are inter-
" cepted by the enemy's horſe. Even our ſervants, who have no-
" thing to dread from our ruinated condition, deſert us daily. And
" ſuch foreigners, as were forced on board our fleet, depart with im-
" punity to their own cities; whilſt others, who were allured to the
" ſervice by the greatneſs of our pay, and imagined they were ra-
" ther come to plunder than to fight; when, contrary to their hopes,
" they behold the enemy poſſeſſed of a numerous fleet, and making
" a brave reſiſtance in every quarter; ſome catch at the leaſt pretext
" to go over to the enemy, and others make ſhift to ſculk away —
" never again to be retrieved in ſo wide a country as Sicily. Nay,
" ſome of thoſe, who having attended us hither from Athens, and
" ſince prevailed with the captains of triremes to accept of the ſer-
" vice of Hyrcanian ſlaves in redemption of their own, have by this
" means ſubverted our naval diſcipline.

" I am writing to men well-inlightened in naval affairs and per-
" fectly convinced, that the flower of an equipment is but of ſhort
" duration; and, how few of thoſe on board are skilled at ſteering

" the

" the veſſel, or managing the oar. But what gives me moſt acute
" vexation is this — that, tho' commander in chief, I am utterly
" unable to put a ſtop to theſe diſorders; ſince your tempers, Athe-
" nians, are hard to be managed; and am quite at a loſs, from
" whence to repair the waſte that hath been made of our ſeamen.
" The enemy have abundant reſources every where at hand, whereas
" neceſſity points out only *one* to us — that place, from whence we
" had who now remain, and who are for ever loſt. For Naxus and
" Catana, the cities which ſtill perſevere in our alliance, are unable
" to recruit us. And ſhould the enemy get one circumſtance more
" to take a turn in their favour, that the towns of Italy, which at
" preſent ſupply us with food, deterred by the diſcovery of our low
" condition and the non-appearance of a reinforcement from Athens,
" go over to the Syracuſans; the war will be finiſhed to their hands
" without coſting them a blow, and we ſhall be left to the mercy
" of the enemy.

" I could have ſent you much more pleaſing accounts of things;
" but none, ſo proper to give you a clear idea of the poſture of your
" affairs here; and ſuch, as you ought to have, before you proceed
" to deliberate upon them. And at the ſame time, as I am by no
" means a ſtranger to Athenian tempers, ſince I know you to be fond
" of hearing what will give you pleaſure, but are afterwards inflamed
" with anger if any article in event drops ſhort of your expectation;
" I thought it highly concerned my own ſafety, to tell you nothing
" but the truth. And let me here conjure you, to entertain no re-
" ſentment againſt either the private ſoldiers or commanders; ſince,
" in labouring thoſe points, which were the principal ends of the ex-
" pedition, they have fully done their duty.

" But, ſince all Sicily is in arms againſt us; and, ſince our ene-
" mies expect a reinforcement from Peloponneſus; reſolve without
" loſs of time, that, as your forces are not ſufficient to keep the
" enemy in play, they muſt either be recalled, or be reinforced
" with

" with a body not inferior to the firſt equipment, with both a land
" and a naval force, and a large pecuniary ſupply. For myſelf, I
" muſt inſiſt, that a ſucceſſor be ſent me; ſince I am quite diſabled
" by a nephritic diſorder from continuing in the command. And I
" think I have juſt title to expect my diſmiſſion from you; ſince, in
" the vigor of my life, I have been intruſted by you with ſeveral
" commands, in which I did you ſome ſignal ſervices.

" Whatever you determine, put it in execution on the firſt ap-
" proach of ſpring; and, above all things, keep clear of delays.
" For the ready ſupplies, given the enemy in Sicily, will ſoon enable
" them to act; and thoſe expected from Peloponneſus, tho' they muſt
" be longer in coming up, yet depend upon it, that unleſs you exert
" your utmoſt vigilance, ſome of them will ſteal hither as be-
" fore through all your guards, and ſome will infallibly be here be-
" fore you."

Such were the advices brought them by the letter of Nicias. The Athenians however, when they had heard it read, would not ſo far comply with the requeſt of Nicias as to give him his diſmiſſion; but, that afflicted as he was in body the whole burden of affairs might not lie too heavily upon him, they appointed two perſons already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, to aſſiſt him in the command, 'till thoſe, who by the public vote ſhould be joined with him in the commiſſion, can arrive. They alſo decreed him a reinforcement, conſiſting both of a land and naval force, to be levied amongſt the Athenians upon the *roll* and their dependents; and for collegues to ſhare in the command, Demoſthenes the ſon of Alciſthenes and Eurymedon the ſon of Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began his paſſage for Sicily about the winter-ſolſtice, at the head of ten ſail of ſhips and with a ſupply of * twenty talents of ſilver; impowered further, to aſſure them, that " a large reinforcement will ſoon come up, as the *State* had ſeriouſly intereſted itſelf in their " welfare."

A reinforcement ordered him.

* 3875 *l. Sterling.*

" welfare." Demoſthenes ſtayed behind to forward the equipment; and was intended to ſet out on the firſt approach of ſpring. He was buſied, in aſſembling together their contingents from the dependent *States*, and in levying amongſt them both money, and ſhipping, and ſoldiers.

The Athenians further ſend out twenty ſail to cruize on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, and to take care that no one paſſed over from Corinth and Peloponneſus into Sicily. For the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the embaſſadors, and the advice they brought, that " the " face of affairs was much altered for the better;" priding themſelves in the reflexion, that their former equipment had arrived in time to contribute to this turn, became now more alert than ever; and got tranſports in readineſs to carry over a body of their own heavy-armed into Sicily, whilſt the Lacedæmonians were intent on doing the ſame from other parts of Peloponneſus. The Corinthians, further, manned out five and twenty ſail; deſigning to hazard an engagement with the guard-ſhips ſtationed at Naupactus, or to diſable the Athenians who lay there from giving their tranſports the leaſt moleſtation, by keeping their own triremes ready ranged in order of battle, in the very face of that ſquadron.

The Lacedæmonians *reſolve to proſecute the war in* Greece.

The Lacedæmonians alſo were preparing for an invaſion of Attica, in purſuance of a former reſolution, and in compliance further with the preſſing inſtances of both Syracuſans and Corinthians. They had no ſooner heard of the reinforcement intended to be ſent by the Athenians to Sicily, than by making a diverſion they deſigned to ſtop its execution. Alcibiades alſo continued warmly importuning them to execute his plan of fortifying Deceléa, and to proceed briskly with the war. But the motives, which at this preſent juncture animated the Lacedæmonians moſt, were, that the Athenians, if engaged in a double war both againſt themſelves and againſt the Sicilians, muſt become a much more expeditious conqueſt; and further, the Athenians were the firſt aggreſſors in violating treaties. In the former war,

war, they were well convinced, the firſt offence was chargeable on their own heads; becauſe the Thebans had ſurpriſed Platæa, whilſt treaties were in fact ſubſiſting. Nay, contrary to an expreſs ſtipulation in a preceeding treaty, that "arms ſhould never be taken up "againſt the party which was willing to abide by a judicial deter- "mination," they themſelves had refuſed to ſubmit to a trial, tho' claimed by the Athenians. To a conduct ſo ungenerous they concluded that their ill ſucceſs in the war ought fairly to be imputed; and reflected with ſelf-accuſations, not only on the calamity they had ſuffered at Pylus, but on all their other loſſes in every quarter of the war. But now, ſince the Athenians with an equipment of thirty ſail had committed devaſtations at Epidaurus, at Praſiæ, and at other places; and continued to infeſt their dominions by robberies from Pylus; nay, as often as diſputes had intervened about the intent of articles in the laſt treaty, in which the Lacedæmonians appealed to a judicial determination, the others had haughtily refuſed it; — concluding hence, that the Athenians were become as guilty aggreſſors now as themſelves had been on the former occaſion; with chearful preſages of ſucceſs, they determined for war. In order to it, they demanded this winter from their allies their contingents of iron, and got all the needful materials in readineſs to execute their plan of fortification. Reſolved at the ſame time to tranſport an aid to Sicily in veſſels of burden, they began to levy it at home, and exacted the quotas of augmentation from their confederates. And thus the winter ended; and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory, came alſo to an end.

YEAR XIX.

The following ſpring no ſooner approached, than at an earlier date than on any former occaſion the Lacedæmonians and allies invaded Attica; and Agis, the ſon of Archidamus, king of the Lacdæ- *Before Chriſt* 413. *Attica invaded.*

monians, had the command of the army. At firſt they ravaged the country, particularly the plains; and this being done, having allotted out the work in portions to the ſeveral States, they ſet out about fortifying Deceléa. Now Deceléa is diſtant at moſt but * one hundred and twenty ſtadia from the city of Athens, and lies at the ſame diſtance or very little more from Bœotia. But in the plain, and on the fineſt ſpot of ground, from whence effectually to annoy them, was their fortreſs raiſed; and might be ſeen from the very walls of Athens.

Fortifications at Deceléa.

* *About twelve miles.*

In this manner the Peloponneſians and allies erected a fortreſs within Attica itſelf; whilſt, in the ſame portion of time, their friends in Peloponneſus embarked a body of heavy-armed on board their tranſports, and ſent them off for Sicily. For this ſervice the Lacedæmonians picked out from the very beſt of the Helots and of thoſe citizens of Sparta who were newly enfranchiſed, from both together ſix hundred heavy-armed; and appointed Heccritus, a *Spartan*, to command them. And the Bœotians ſent three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xeno and Nicon of Thebes, and Hegeſander of Theſpiæ. Theſe were *firſt* embarked at Tænarus in Laconia, and thence put out to ſea.

More forces ſent to Sicily.

Soon after theſe, the Corinthians ſent away five hundred heavy-armed; ſome, from Corinth itſelf; others, hired from the Arcadians; and appointed Alexarchus a Corinthian to command them. The Sicyonians alſo ſent two hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthians, and at their head Sargeus a Sicyonian.

But the five and twenty ſail of Corinthians, which lanched out to ſea in the depth of winter, lay ranged in an oppoſite ſtation to the twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leiſure for the embarkation of the heavy-armed on board the tranſports from Peloponneſus. On this account, principally, they were manned and fitted out to ſea; that they might divert the attention of the Athenians from the tranſport-fleet that was now putting out, and faſten it wholly upon the hoſtile appearance of theſe triremes.

In

In the mean time the Athenians, even during the fortifications in hand at Decelea and at the earlieſt approach of ſpring, ſent out thirty ſail to cruize on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, under the command of Charicles the ſon of Apollodorus. His inſtructions were further, to touch at Argos, and to ſummon them, in conformity to the treaty of Alliance, to embark a body of heavy-armed on board the fleet. Athenian *proceedings.*

Demoſthenes alſo, according to promiſe, they ſent away for Sicily, with a numerous fleet, conſiſting of ſixty ſhips of Athens and five of Chios, on board of which were twelve hundred *enrolled* Athenians, and as large a number of iſlanders as with the utmoſt induſtry they had been able to draw together. They had alſo amaſſed, from their other confederates ſubject to Athens, all manner of ſupplies they were able to furniſh for carrying on the war with vigour. But Demoſthenes was further inſtructed, to ſail at firſt in company with Charicles, and aſſiſt him in the cruize on the coaſts of Laconia. Demoſthenes therefore, having ſtood over to Ægina, continued there; till the remainder of his force, which was yet behind, had compleatly joined him, and Charicles had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries. Demoſthenes *ſails with the reinforcement.*

About the ſame time in this ſpring, Gylippus alſo returned to Syracuſe, at the head of as large a force as he had been able to collect from the ſeveral *States*, with whom his perſuaſions had been effectual; and, having convened the Syracuſans, he told them that — "they "ought to man out as large a number of ſhipping as they poſſibly "could, and try their fortune in a naval engagement: ſuch a ſtep, "he had reaſon to hope, might be attended with conſequences "which would amply compenſate the danger, and invigorate the "war." Gylippus.

Theſe inſtances of Gylippus were well ſeconded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon pains to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians by ſea. — "The latter he told them, were far from "enjoying their naval skill as an hereditary right, or a privilege from "time immemorial excluſively their own: In fact they were by

" nature landmen much more than the Syracuſans; and neceſſity
" alone, in the Mediſh invaſion, had forced them to try their fortune
" at ſea: By enterpriſing men, as the Athenians were, ſuch as were
" moſt daring in oppoſing them, muſt needs be regarded as the moſt
" formidable enemies. True — *they* had been uſed to intimidate
" their neighbours, not by a real ſuperiority of ſtrength but by their
" daring enterpriſing genius; and now, by the ſame methods, *them-*
" *ſelves* might become formidable even to Athenians." He aſſured them, " for his own part he was perfectly convinced, that the Syra-
" cuſans, if by an effort of bold reſolution they would on a ſudden
" attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more benefit from the terror
" which ſuch a ſtep would ſtrike upon the foe, than could accrue to
" the Athenians from their ſuperior ſkill when compared with Syra-
" cuſan inexperience." He preſſed them therefore " to try their
" fortune by ſea, and to bid adieu to fear."

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Hermocrates, and by others, the Syracuſans were eagerly bent on action by ſea, and manned out their fleet. And when the whole was ready for ſervice, Gylippus, by favour of the night, at the head of his land-army marched down to the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to aſſault them on the land-ſide. The triremes of the Syracuſans at the ſame inſtant of time, as had been concerted beforehand, to the number of thirty-five, are ſailing up out of the great harbour; whilſt forty-five were going about out of the leſſer harbour where their dock lay. The latter went round, deſigning to compleat their junction with the other ſquadron; and then in a body to ſtand againſt Plemmyrium, that the Athenians on both ſides might be thrown into confuſion. The Athenians loſt no time, but inſtantly manned out ſixty veſſels. With twenty-five of the number they engaged the thirty-five Syracuſan in the great harbour; with the reſt they went to meet the other ſqua-dron, that was coming about from the dock. A ſmart engagement immediately enſued in the mouth of the great harbour. The

diſpute

diſpute was a long time obſtinately maintained; one ſide exerting themſelves to clear the paſſage, but the other to obſtruct it.

A naval action, and Plemmyrium *recovered.*

In the mean time Gylippus — as the Athenians poſted at Plemmyrium had flocked down to the ſea-ſide, and with their utmoſt attention were looking at the battle on the water — Gylippus ſeizeth the opportunity; and, no ſooner had the morning dawned, than to the great ſurpriſe of the enemy he attacks the forts. He firſt makes himſelf maſter of the largeſt of the three, and afterwards carries the two leſſer, the defendants of which, ſeeing the largeſt ſo eaſily taken, had abandoned their poſts. Nay, on the ſurpriſal of the firſt, thoſe who had manned it, throwing themſelves on board the boats and a tranſport that lay at hand, found no ſmall difficulty in getting away to the camp. For, as the Syracuſans had now the better of the engagement with their ſquadron in the great harbour, they detached one of their nimbleſt triremes to purſue the fliers. But at the time the other two forts were carried, the Syracuſans were plainly vanquiſhed, which gave them who abandoned the laſt an opportunity to ſail away without obſtruction. For that Syracuſan ſquadron, that was engaged before the harbour's mouth, having forced their way through the Athenian fleet, by ſailing forwards in a diſorderly manner and continually running foul one upon another gave the Athenians an opportunity to regain the day. For this ſquadron they ſoon routed, and afterwards *that* within the harbour by which they had been vanquiſhed. They alſo ſunk eleven ſhips of the enemy, and made a ſlaughter of all their crews, thoſe of three ſhips excepted, to whom they granted quarter; and all this, with the loſs only of three ſhips on their own ſide. Having afterwards drawn aſhore the ſhatters of the Syracuſan fleet, and piled them into a trophy on the little iſle before Plemmyrium, they retired to their main incampment.

Thus unſucceſsful were the Syracuſans in their naval engagement. They had carried however the forts at Plemmyrium; and, to ſignalize each of their acquiſitions, they erected three ſeveral trophies.

One

One alſo of the two forts that were taken laſt they levelled with the ground; but the other two they repaired, and garriſoned.

In this ſurpriſal of the forts many were ſlain, and many were made priſoners, and a great ſtock of wealth repoſited there became the prize of the enemy. For as the Athenians had made uſe of theſe forts by way of magazine, much wealth belonging to merchants and corn in abundance were found within, much alſo of the ſtores belonging to the captains of the ſhips of war; inaſmuch as forty maſts for triremes and other materials of refitment had been laid up there, and three triremes were hauled aſhore to be careened. Nay, this ſurpriſal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief, if not the greateſt ſource of all the diſtreſs which the Athenian army ſuffered in the ſequel. For no longer was the ſea open to them for the ſecure importation of neceſſary ſupplies. From this time the Syracuſans ruſhed upon them from thence, and awed all their motions. The convoys could no more get in without fighting their way: Beſides that, in all other reſpects, it ſtruck a great conſternation, and even a dejection of mind amongſt the troops.

A Syracuſan ſquadron at ſea.

The next ſtep taken by the Syracuſans was, to ſend out to ſea a ſquadron of twelve ſhips, under the command of Agatharchus a Syracuſan. One of theſe ſhips was to proceed to Peloponneſus and land an embaſſy there, which had inſtructions "to notify the preſent "hopeful poſture of affairs, and to preſs a proſecution of the war in "Greece with all poſſible vigour." The other eleven ſtood over to the Italian coaſt, having received intelligence that a number of ſmall veſſels laden with ſtores for the Athenians were coming up. They intercepted and intirely deſtroyed moſt of theſe; and the timber on board them, which was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame together into ſhips, they burnt to aſhes on the ſhore of Caulonia. This done, they ſtood away for Locri; and whilſt they lay in that road, one of the tranſports from Peloponneſus, having on board the heavy-armed from Theſpiæ, came in. The Syracuſans removed

removed theſe heavy-armed into their own ſhips, and returned with them to Syracuſe.

The Athenians with twenty ſail were ſtationed at Megara, in order to intercept their return; where one ſhip alone with all the crew fell into their hands. They were not able to come up with the reſt; ſince, eluding all purſuit, they recover with ſecurity their own harbours.

Cutting up of the piles.

There happened alſo a skirmiſh in the harbour of Syracuſe about the piles, which the Syracuſans had drove down in the ſea before their old docks that their veſſels might ride in ſafety behind them, the Athenians be unable to ſtand in amongſt them, and do any damage to their ſhipping. Cloſe up to thoſe piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodigious ſize, on which turrets and parapets to cover the defendants were erected, whilſt others in long boats were faſtening cables round the piles, and by the help of a machine convenient for the purpoſe craning them up; and ſuch as they broke a ſet of divers ſawed off cloſe at the bottom. The Syracuſans in the mean time were pouring their miſſive weapons upon them from the docks, which were plentifully returned by thoſe poſted on the raft. In ſhort, the Athenians plucked up moſt of the piles. But one part of the ſtaccade was exceeding difficult to be demoliſhed, as it lay out of ſight. For they had driven down ſome of the piles in ſuch a manner, that their heads emerged not above the ſurface of the water. This render'd all acceſs exceeding dangerous, ſince ignorant where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge his veſſel as it were upon a ſhelve. But even theſe the divers for a pecuniary reward ſearched out and ſawed away. And yet, as faſt as this was done, the Syracuſans drove down a freſh ſet of piles. The contrivances both of annoyance and prevention were ſtrenuouſly exerted on both ſides, as might juſtly be expected from two hoſtile bodies poſted ſo near one another; the ſkirmiſhings were often renewed; and every artifice of war was ſucceſſively practiſed.

The

Embaſſies. The Syracuſans further had diſpatched embaſſies, compoſed of Corinthians and Lacedæmonians and Ambraciots, to the cities of Sicily, " to notify the ſurpriſal of Plemmyrium, and to give a juſt " repreſentation of the naval engagement in which they had been " defeated not ſo much by the ſtrength of the enemy as by their " own confuſion — in other reſpects, to aſſure them that their hopes " of ſucceſs were high; and that they firmly depended on receiving " ſoon an aid from them compoſed both of a land and naval force; " ſince the Athenians were alſo in expectation of a reinforcement " from Athens, the approach of which would their friends antici- " pate, the Athenians at preſent there muſt be totally deſtroyed, and " the war brought at once to an end." Such ſchemes were now in agitation in Sicily.

Demoſthenes. But Demoſthenes, when he had aſſembled the whole of the armament, with which he was to paſs over to the relief of thoſe in Sicily; weighing from Ægina, and ſtanding over to Peloponneſus, he compleats his junction with Charicles and the ſquadron of thirty ſail of Athenians under his command. And, as a body of heavy-armed had been taken on board the latter from Argos, they ſteered together for the coaſt of Laconia. And here firſt they ravaged in part Epidaurus-Limera; and, proceeding from thence to that part of Laconia, which lies over-againſt Cythera, and where ſtands the temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the adjacent country, they incloſed and fortified a neck of land, which might ſerve as a receptacle to ſuch of the Helots as deſerted the Lacedæmonians; from thence, banditti-like, as was done from Pylus, to infeſt the country. This convenient ſpot was no ſooner taken in, than Demoſthenes ſtood away for Corcyra; that he might take on board the auxiliaries there, and make the beſt of his way to Sicily. But Charicles ſtayed till he had put the place into a ſtate of ſecure defence and fixed a garriſon in it. This being done, he carried back his ſquadron of thirty ſail to Athens; and the Argives at the ſame time received their diſmiſſion.

This

This ſummer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers, of thoſe called *Machærophori*, and who are originally Dians. This body was intended to have been ſent with Demoſthenes into Sicily; but, as they arrived not 'till after his departure, the Athenians had reſolved to ſend them back again to their own homes in Thrace. To retain them merely for the ſake of the war waged againſt them from Deceléa, they thought, would plunge them in too large an expence, ſince the pay of every ſoldier was a * drachma a day. For now, ſince Deceléa, which had been fortified this ſpring by the joint-labours of the whole united army, continued to be garriſoned by detachments from the ſeveral *States*, which at certain intervals of time relieved one another in a regular ſucceſſion; it gave terrible annoyance to tht Athenians, and cauſed amongſt them ſuch havoc of their effects, and ſuch a deſtruction of their men, as threw them into great diſtreſs. All preceding incurſions of the enemy, having been only tranſient, had left them in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands for the reſt of the year; but now, as they awed the country by one continued blockade, and as by intervals they received conſiderable augmentations to enable them to give greater annoyance; as even the regular garriſon was periodically obliged to ſcour the country, and plunder for their own ſubſiſtence; and, as Agis king of the Lacedæmonians, who with the utmoſt diligence proſecuted the war, in perſon directed all the operations — the Athenians were ſorely preſſed. For, they were debarred the whole produce of their own lands; more than twenty thouſand of their ſlaves had deſerted to the enemy, and a large part of theſe were mechanics of the city. Their whole ſtock of ſheep and labouring cattle was loſt beyond retrieve. Their horſes — as the horſemen were obliged every day to mount; either to ride towards Deceléa, to awe the excurſions of that garriſon; or, to guard ſome important poſts in the country; — their horſes were either lamed, by running inceſſantly over hard or rugged ground; or, by wounds were diſabled for ſervice. The conſtant

State of things at Athens.

* 7*d*. ½.

ſupplies of proviſions for the city, which uſed to be fetched from Eubœa to Oropus and to be brought in from thence through Deceléa as the ſhorteſt paſſage, were now forced to go round the cape of Sunium by ſea, which conſiderably enhanced their price. For want alſo of all foreign commodities the city was equally diſtreſſed; and Athens was now reduced to be merely a place of arms. To keep guard on the battlements by day, the citizens were obliged ſucceſſively to relieve one another; but the whole body of the city, except the *horſemen*, mounted guard by night. The latter, ever under arms *without*, the reſt on the conſtant guard of the city-walls; and this, for a ſummer and winter without any intermiſſion; were reduced to a very low condition. But the point which preſſed hardeſt upon them was having two wars at once upon their hands. And yet, their obſtinacy had roſe to ſo high a pitch, as had it not been viſible to all the world, the bare mention of its poſſibility would have been quite incredible. For who would have believed, that this people, ſo cloſely blocked up at home by the Peloponneſians, ſhould ſcorn to give up Sicily? nay, ſhould perſevere with unabating zeal to carry on the ſiege of Syracuſe, a city in no reſpect inferior even to Athens itſelf? — that they ſhould exhibit ſuch an aſtoniſhing proof of their ſtrength and their courage to the eyes of Greece, where upon the firſt breaking out of the war ſome people had imagined, that in caſe the Peloponneſians invaded Attica, they could not hold out above one year intire, tho' others had allowed them two, and others three, but no body a longer ſpace? — and, that in the ſeventeenth year after the firſt invaſion of this kind, they ſhould attempt the conqueſt of Sicily; and, when deeply gaſhed in every part by one war already upon their hands, ſhould wilfully plunge into another as formidable in all reſpects as that waged againſt them from Peloponneſus? But now, when beſides what they had ſuffered already, they were terribly annoyed from Deceléa, and other incidents had exacted from them very large diſburſements, their finances were reduced to a very low ebb. At this

this period therefore, inſtead of the tribute paid them by their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of the value of all commodities imported and exported, which they thought would repleniſh their coffers faſter than the former method. For their diſburſements were not as they had been in preceding times, but had been inflamed in the ſame proportion as the ſcenes of war had been inlarged, whilſt their annual revenue was conſtantly decreaſing.

Tragical event at Mycaleſſus.

Unwilling therefore, in the preſent ebb of their treaſures, to defray the charge of this body of Thracians, who came too late for Demoſthenes, they ſent them back to their own country with all poſſible haſte. Diïtrephes was the perſon pitched upon to conduct them home, and was inſtructed, that "in the paſſage (for they were to "go through the Euripus) he ſhould employ them, if opportunity "offered, againſt the enemy." He landed therefore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner carried off a booty from thence. About the ſhut of evening he alſo croſſed the Euripus from Chalcis of Eubœa, and having landed his Thracians in Bœotia, led them againſt Mycaleſſus. His deſign was not diſcovered that night, tho' he halted at the temple of Mercury, which is diſtant from Mycaleſſus but * ſixteen ſtadia at moſt. But early the next morning he aſſaulted this city, which is of large extent. He carries it on the firſt attack, as there was no guard to reſiſt him, and the inhabitants could never have imagined, that a maritime body would have marched ſo far into the country to make attempts upon them. The wall beſides was weak; in ſome places it was fallen, and the remaining part of it was low; and the gates from too great a confidence of ſecurity, had been left open. No ſooner were the Thracians broke into Mycaleſſus than they gutted both houſes and temples. They maſſacred the inhabitants, ſhewing no regard to either old-age or youth, but venting their fury on all that came in their way. They butchered even the women and the children; nay, all the labouring cattle, and every creature that had life which came before their eyes. For the Thracians,

* *More than a mile and a half.*

when once their fury is inflamed, are as inſatiable of blood, as any other the greateſt ſavages in the Barbarian world. On this occaſion, the confuſion was terrible, and every ghaſtly method of deſtruction was exemplified in act. They even fell upon the publick ſchool, which was a very large one, when the youth of the town were but juſt got in, and hacked all the children to pieces. And thus, this whole city was involved in a calamity, a greater than which no city had ever felt; nay, a calamity unexpected, and dreadful indeed!

The Thebans had no ſooner intelligence of it, than they marched to their aſſiſtance; but came not up with the Thracians, 'till they were retired to ſome diſtance from the town, where they recovered from them their booty; and, having put them to flight, continue the chace down to the Euripus and the ſea, where the veſſels which had brought them lay at anchor. Here they make a ſlaughter of moſt of thoſe who endeavoured to get on board but could not ſwim, ſince the perſons left in the veſſels, when they ſaw what paſſed on the ſhore, put them off beyond their reach. But in the other parts of the retreat, the Thracians behaved with ſome gallantry againſt the Theban horſe, which attacked them firſt; ſince, ſallying frequently out on the purſuers, and rallying again after the diſcipline of their country, they made good their retreat; and thus, few of this body were deſtroyed. A number further, who ſtayed behind in the city to plunder, were found there and put to the ſword. The whole number of the ſlain, amongſt this body of thirteen hundred Thracians, amounted to two hundred and fifty men: Tho', in return, they killed of Thebans and others, who accompanied by way of aid, of horſe and heavy-armed together, about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes one of the *Rulers* of Bœotia: The lives of ſome more Mycaleſſians were alſo loſt in their company. Such was the calamity which fell to the unhappy lot of Mycaleſſus; and which, for exceſs of horror, is more to be deplored than any other of the tragical events of this war.

Demoſthenes,

Demoſthenes, who after marking out the fortification had ſtood away from Laconia to Corcyra, ſurpriſing a tranſport-veſſel which rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Eléans, on board of which a number of heavy-armed Corinthians were to paſs over into Sicily, ſinks that veſſel. But the mariners, having ſaved themſelves by flight, found afterwards another veſſel, and proceeded in the voyage. Demoſthenes.

From hence Demoſthenes came up to Zacynthus and Cephallene, where he took their heavy-armed on board, and ſent for thoſe of the Meſſenians from Naupactus. He alſo croſſed over to the oppoſite continent of Acarnania, to Alyzia and Anactorium, both belonging to the Athenians. Thus employed as he was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, returning from Sicily whither he had been ſent in the winter to carry a ſupply of money for the army, meets him; and amongſt other intelligence relates, that "he had heard ſince he was upon "his return, that Plemmyrium had been taken by the Syracuſans." Conon alſo, who commanded at Naupactus, came to them, with advice, that "the five and twenty ſail of Corinthians which lay over-"againſt their ſquadron had not quitted that ſtation, and even "threatened them with an engagement." He exhorted therefore theſe commanders to detach ſome veſſels thither, ſince their ſquadron at Naupactus, conſiſting only of eighteen ſhips, was not a match for the enemy whoſe ſquadron amounted to twenty-five. Upon this, Demoſthenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the prime ſailors amongſt thoſe under their own command, to follow Conon for the reinforcement of the ſquadron at Naupactus.

The two former continued to aſſemble forces for the grand expedition. Eurymedon for this purpoſe ſailed to Corcyra, commanded them to man out fifteen ſhips, and ſelected himſelf the heavy-armed for the ſervice; for, as he was returned from carrying the ſtores, he joined himſelf with Demoſthenes in the command, in purſuance of the prior nomination. Demoſthenes was collecting a body of ſlingers and darters from the towns of Acarnania.

The

Sicily. The embaſſadors from Syracuſe, who were ſent round to the Sicilian cities after the ſurpriſal of Plemmyrium, had ſucceeded in their negotiations; and, having aſſembled a large body of ſuccours, were intent on bringing them up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelligence of their motion, ſends to ſuch of the Siculi as lay upon their route and were in his alliance, namely the Centoripes and Halycyæans and others, "by no means to yield a free paſſage to the enemy, but "to aſſemble in a body and obſtruct their march." It was impoſſible for them to reach Syracuſe by any other route: for the Agrigentines had refuſed them a paſſage through their territories. Now therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, the Siculi, in compliance with the requeſt of the Athenians, had placed three different ambuſcades in their way. From theſe ruſhing ſuddenly upon them, as they were advancing in a careleſs manner, they deſtroyed about eight hundred men, and all the embaſſadors, excepting one Corinthian. And this Corinthian brought up afterwards to Syracuſe all thoſe who eſcaped by flight, the number of whom amounted to fifteen hundred.

About the ſame time, the Camarinéans alſo ſend up a body of ſuccours, conſiſting of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters and three hundred archers. The Geloans alſo ſent them a ſquadron of about five ſail, beſide four hundred darters and two hundred horſemen.

Now almoſt all Sicily except the Agrigentines, for theſe ſtill adhered to their neutrality; all the reſt of the iſland, I ſay, who hitherto had ſtood aloof to obſerve events, united themſelves againſt the Athenians, in behalf of Syracuſe. Tho' the Syracuſans, after the blow they had juſt received from the Siculi, thought it not proper to attack the Athenians again upon a ſudden.

Demoſthenes. But Demoſthenes and Eurymedon, having now compleated their embarkations at Corcyra and on the continent, at the head of this united and powerful armament, croſſed over the Ionian to cape Iäpygia;

Iäpygia; and, ſtanding away from thence, reach the Chærades, iſlands of Iäpygia. Here they take on board their fleet a party of Iäpygian darters to the number of fifty, and one hundred more of the Meſſapian nation. And after they had renewed a friendſhip of ancient date with Artas, who being lord of theſe iſlands ſupplied them with the darters, they proceed to Metapontium in Italy. Upon the plea of an alliance ſubſiſting between them, they prevail upon the Metapontians to furniſh them out three hundred more and two triremes, with which augmentation they ſtood along the coaſt to Thuria; where on their arrival they find, that the party, who had acted againſt the Athenian intereſt, had in a late ſedition been driven out of the city. Deſirous here to take a view of the whole armament, and to know whether any part had ſtraggled and was left behind; hoping further, to prevail upon the Thurians to join them with their forces in the moſt cordial manner, and, ſince their welfare was connected with that of Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the Athenians to be equally their own; they ſtay'd ſome time at Thuria, and compleated their deſigns.

An engagement on the coaſt of Achaia.

To return to the Peloponneſians. About the ſame portion of time their ſquadron of five and twenty ſail, which to favour the paſſage of the tranſports to Sicily lay ranged in oppoſition to the fleet at Naupactus, having now made all things ready for an engagement, and equipped out ſome additional veſſels, which had almoſt equalized their number to that of the Athenian ſhips, take their ſtation in Rhypica near Erineus of Achaia. As the place in which they rode was bent in the form of a creſcent, the land-force of the Corinthians and adjacent confederates, who marched to their aſſiſtance, was poſted upon each wing of the ſquadron, on the jutting necks of land; whilſt the ſhips drawn up cloſe together compoſed the centre of their arrangement; and Polyanthes the Corinthian commanded the fleet.

The Athenians, with three and thirty ſail under the command of Diphilus, weighed from Naupactus, and ſtood in againſt them. At firſt, the Corinthians lay ſtill without motion; but, ſo ſoon as it was judged neceſſary for them to act, and the ſignal-flag was accordingly hoiſted, they advanced to charge the Athenians; and an engagement enſued. The contention was maintained a long time on both ſides. Three of the Corinthian veſſels are deſtroyed, whilſt not a ſingle ſhip on the Athenian ſide was ſunk, tho' ſeven were diſabled for ſervice by blows they had received from the enemies beaks, by which their fore-caſtles had been ſhattered by the Corinthian ſhips, made firm and compact for this very purpoſe by ſtays on each ſide of the beak. The event of the engagement remaining doubtful, from whence both ſides took occaſion to claim the victory, the Athenians however being maſters of all the ſhatters of the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove right into the ſea, and which the Corinthians made no efforts to recover, they dropped away from each other. Yet no kind of purſuit was attempted, and no priſoners were taken by either. For the Corinthians and Peloponneſians, who fought cloſe under the ſhore, were by that enabled to make an eaſy eſcape; but on the Athenian ſide, not even a ſingle ſhip was ſunk. And yet, when the Athenians were ſailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately ſet up a trophy, as if the victory was their own; becauſe they had diſabled a larger number of the enemy. They further looked upon themſelves as not defeated, becauſe their enemies were not clearly victorious. For it is the way with the Corinthians, to pronounce themſelves victors, if they are not ſadly beaten; whereas the Athenians eſteem themſelves defeated, if they have not made a ſignal conqueſt. But further, when the Peloponneſians were retired from their ſtation, and the land-army was diſmiſſed, the Athenians erected a trophy. The ſpot they choſe, whereon to place this token of their victory, was diſtant about * twenty ſtadia from Erineus, the ſtation in which the Corinthians rode. Such was the event of this naval engagement.

* *About 2 miles.*

Demoſthenes

Demoſthenes and Eurymedon, ſo ſoon as the Thurians had got in readineſs ſeven hundred heavy-armed with three hundred darters to attend them in the expedition, ordered the fleet to coaſt along the ſhore towards the Crotoniatis; whilſt themſelves, after having taken a review of all their land-army upon the banks of the Sybaris, marched them over land through the Thuriatis. But when they were advanced to the river Hylias, they were met by a meſſage from the Crotoniatæ, intimating to them, that "their conſent ſhould never "be given for the paſſage of this army through their dominions;" Upon which they wheel'd off downwards towards the ſea and the mouth of the Hylias, where they halted a night, and were joined by the whole body of the fleet. Demoſthenes.

The next morning they re-embarked and proceeded along the coaſt, touching at every city except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the diſtrict of Rhegium.

But during this interval, the Syracuſans, who had received advice of the approach of the reinforcement, determined to make another attempt with their fleet and the whole augmented body of their land-army, which they had aſſembled together for this very deſign of attacking the Athenians again before the reinforcement arrived. But like men, who in the former action had clearly perceived what would give them advantages over the enemy, they had made ſome alteration in the ſtructure of their veſſels. Having ſhortned the heads of their ſhips they made them more firm and compact, and faſtened very ſubſtantial ſtays to each ſide of the beak. They ſtrengthened theſe again by rafters of ſix cubits in length which were laid along the ribs both within and without; in the ſame manner, as the Corinthians had ſtrengthened the whole prow of their ſhips, for the laſt naval engagement againſt the ſquadron at Naupactus. By this means, the Syracuſans concluded, they ſhould gain an advantage over the ſhips of the Athenians, which were of a different ſtructure, as in the prow they were but weak, becauſe of their uſual practice in an engagment, *Battle at* Syracuſe.

not to charge a-head, but by tacking about to ſtrike upon the ſides;— that further, ſhould the battle be fought in the great harbour, where ſea-room would be ſmall and the ſhips be crowded, this muſt be alſo an advantage in their favour; ſince, darting themſelves a-head, they muſt needs ſhatter the prows of the enemy, when with compact and ſolid beaks they ſtruck againſt ſuch as were hollow and weak;— that again, for want of ſea-room the Athenians would be too much ſtraitened to make their tacks, or to run through their lines, which were points of art on which they chiefly relied; they were determined to the utmoſt of their power to check all attempts of the latter ſort, and the narrow ſpace in which they muſt engage would of itſelf prevent the former; and now, they intended with dexterity to turn to their own advantage the method of ſtriking a-head, which on the former occaſion appeared to be an error in the maſters; that, hence infallibly the day muſt be their own; for the Athenians, if once repulſed, would not have room to go round and return to the charge, ſince thus they muſt directly be forced on the ſhore, which lay but a ſmall diſtance from their camp and would ſadly cramp them up; that, they themſelves muſt be maſters of the reſt of the harbour, whilſt the enemy crowded together, in caſe they ſhould be forced to give way, muſt be driven into narrow compaſs, and even falling foul on one another, a total confuſion and diſorder muſt certainly follow;— For what hurt the Athenians moſt, in all their naval engagements, was their inability to make uſe of the whole harbour for tacking about or returning to the charge, in the ſame manner as the Syracuſans;— that finally, the Athenians could not poſſibly get out into wider ſea, as the entrance of the harbour and the ſpace behind the lines of battle were in their own command; nay, other obſtacles would co-operate, ſuch as Plemmyrium, which would now oppoſe any attempt of this kind, and the very nature of the harbour's mouth, which was exceeding narrow.

By

By ſuch a project the Syracuſans had given an increaſe to their former ſkill and ſtrength; and, animated more than ever by the thought of having improved from their errors in the former engagement, they ſally'd out to encounter the enemy, both with their land and naval force. Gylippus ſhewed himſelf, a ſmall portion of time before the reſt, at the head of the infantry; whom, ſallying out of the city, he drew up near the Athenian intrenchment, in that quarter where it faced the city. Then, the garriſon of Olympiæum to a man, as well heavy-armed as horſemen, with all the light-armed parties of the Syracuſans, came and drew up on the other quarters. And immediately after, the ſhips of the Syracuſans and their allies came ſailing forwards.

The Athenians at firſt imagined, that at preſent they were threatned only with an aſſault by land; but when, on a ſudden, they ſaw the fleet bearing down againſt them, they were ſtruck with confuſion. Some of them were taking poſt *upon* and *without* the intrenchments to make head againſt the aſſailants; others were ſally'd forth to encounter the troops from Olympiæum, and thoſe from remoter parts coming on with full ſpeed, a numerous body of horſemen and darters. The reſt were hurrying on board to man the ſhips, or to give what aſſiſtance they could upon the beach. And no ſooner were the proper complements on board than ſeventy-five ſhips ſtood out to meet the enemy; but then, the number of the enemy's veſſels was about eighty.

Great part of this day was ſpent in advancing towards and retiring from one another, and in reciprocal endeavours to ſeize advantages; but neither ſide was able to execute any remarkable piece of ſervice, excepting that the Syracuſans ſunk one or two of the Athenian ſhips; upon which they parted, and at the ſame time the land-army drew off from the intrenchments.

The day following the Syracuſans lay quiet, affording the enemy no room to gueſs at their future deſigns.

But Nicias, conſcious to himſelf that hitherto no advantages had been gained by ſea, and fully expecting that the enemy would repeat their attempt, obliged the captains of the triremes to repair their ſhips if any wiſe damaged, and ſtationed the tranſports before the piles, which they had drove down in the ſea to ſecure the ſhips, and lock up as it were that ſpace in which they lay. The tranſports he ranged in a line at the diſtance of the breadth of two [2] *plethra* from one another; that, in caſe a ſhip was repulſed, it might run in hither as a place of ſecurity, and might again ſtand out without any moleſtation. In perfecting theſe diſpoſitions the Athenians were all this day employed from morning to night.

The next day, the Syracuſans, earlier in the morning than before and with the ſame parade of their land and naval force, came out to attack the Athenians. Now again, facing each other in the lines of engagement, they ſpent great part of the day in the ſame endeavours as before to over-reach and ſurprize one another; till at length, Ariſto the ſon of Pyrrichus, a Corinthian, and the moſt expert ſeaman in the fleet of Syracuſe, perſuades the commanders of that fleet to diſpatch their orders to the magiſtrates within the city—"with all expedition to bring the proviſions which were for ſale down to the beach of the ſea, and hold the market there; nay further, to compel all thoſe who had any meat to ſell, to offer it inſtantly on the beach, that the mariners might come aſhore and dine under the ſides of their veſſels; ſo that, after a ſhort repaſt, they might this ſame day unexpectedly fall upon the Athenians." This counſel being approved, the neceſſary orders were diſpatched away, and the market was furniſhed out. Then ſuddenly the Syracuſan fleet fell back, and ſtood away towards the city; where, diſembarking with all poſſible haſte, they took their repaſt.

2 A *plethron* is ſaid by ſome to contain 1444, by others, 1000 ſquare feet.

But

But the Athenians, who aſcribed this dropping off of the enemy to a conſciouſneſs of their own inferority, quitting their own ſhips as if there was nothing further to be done, diverted their attention to their own affairs, and eſpecially to prepare a refreſhing meal for themſelves; confident, there would be no engagement on this day. But on a ſudden, the Syracuſans, repairing on board, ſtood out a ſecond time to give them battle. Then the Athenians, in much hurry and confuſion, and moſt of them ſtill faſting, re-embarking without any regularity or order, with great difficulty, after a conſiderable interval, ſtood out to receive them. For a certain ſpace, each ſide ſtood upon their guard, and declined the charge. At length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was imprudent to dally ſo long and exhauſt their ſpirits by the mere labour of the oar, which ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious attack. Upon which, animating one another with a ſhout, they darted upon the enemy, and the engagement began.

The Syracuſans received the ſhock without giving way, and keeping the heads of their veſſels right againſt the enemy, executed their project, and with their ſtrengthened beaks ſhattered the forecaſtles of the Athenian ſhips; whilſt their darters, who were ranged along the decks, galled the Athenians ſorely with their miſſive weapons: tho' not near ſo much, as did the crews of ſome light Syracuſan boats, which ſcoured about the enemy's fleet; ſometimes getting under their wards and gliding along the ſides of their veſſels; and, from theſe cloſe poſitions, aiming their darts at the mariners. In fine, the Syracuſans, perſevering in this manner to gall their foes, were maſters of the day; whilſt the Athenians, being put to flight, were obliged to retire, through the intervals of the line of tranſports, into their own ſtation. The Syracuſan ſhips purſued as far as to this line of tranſports; but were obliged to ſtop there, for fear

of

of the [3] machines which hung upon the yards of the tranſports to bar all approach. Two ſhips indeed of the Syracuſans, elevated with ſucceſs, approached too near, and were ſunk; and another, with all her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now the Syracuſans, who in the action had ſunk ſeven ſhips of the enemy, had damaged many, had taken many priſoners, and made great ſlaughter, judged it proper to retire. They then erected trophies as victorious in two engagements, and plumed themſelves in the aſſurance, that by ſea they had the ſuperiority over the enemy; preſuming, at the ſame time, that they muſt ſoon be victorious alſo by land. Upon which they got every thing in readineſs to attack them once more on both elements.

Demoſthenes *arrives.*

But at this criſis, Demoſthenes and Eurymedon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement from Athens; which conſiſted, of ſeventy-three ſail of ſhips including foreigners, of about five thouſand heavy-armed of their own and their confederate troops; beſide a conſiderable number of darters as well Barbarian as Grecian, and ſlingers, and archers, and a compleat ſupply of all military ſtores. The firſt appearance of this grand reinforcement ſtruck the Syracuſans and their allies with no ſmall conſternation. It looked as if the war muſt be endleſs, and themſelves expoſed to dangers that knew no bounds. They ſaw that, in ſpite of the annoyance which Deceléa now fortified gave them, the Athenians were arrived before Syracuſe with another armament as great and as formidable as the former; and that, in every view, the ſtrength of Athens muſt be quite unſurmountable. And now alſo the Athenians, who remained of the former armament, reſpired from that dejection of ſpirit, into which a ſeries of misfortunes had plunged them.

[3] Called *Dolphins* from their form. They were maſſy, made of lead, and hung upon the ſail-yards by cords and pullies; and, when thrown into the enemy's ſhips, either burſt or ſunk them.

Demoſthenes,

Demoſthenes, after taking a view of the preſent poſture of affairs, thought it abſolutely neceſſary to avoid delays and keep clear of thoſe errors which had done ſo much prejudice to Nicias. For Nicias, at his firſt appearance ſtruck an univerſal conſternation; and yet, by declining the immediate attack of Syracuſe, and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, he became an object of contempt; and Gylippus had time to land a ſuccour from Peloponneſus, which diſconcerted all his meaſures. That ſuccour, however, the Syracuſans could never have ſent for, had Nicias aſſaulted them on his firſt approach. For deluding themſelves with the thought, that they were a match for their foes; they would have found by ſad experience, that they had indulged a cruel miſtake, and muſt the ſame moment have been inveſted on all ſides. And in ſuch a ſtate, tho' they had invited thoſe ſuccours, yet no effectual relief could have been obtained from them.

And determines on action.

Demoſthenes therefore, reflecting on theſe paſt miſtakes, and ſenſible that he himſelf this very moment, on the firſt day of his arrival, appeared moſt terrible in the eyes of the enemy, reſolved without loſs of time to improve the preſent conſternation, which his reinforcement had ſtruck amongſt them. He further took notice, that the counterwork of the Syracuſans, by which the Athenians had been excluded from perfecting their circumvallation, conſiſted only of a ſingle wall; and in caſe the heights of Epipolæ could again be regained, with the camp which at firſt had been occupied there, *that* work might eaſily be carried, ſince the defendants could not now be able to withſtand the Athenian ſtrength;— he determined therefore to put this project in execution; judging, that in caſe it ſucceeded it would be a means of bringing the war to a ſpeedy concluſion. For, if the ſcheme took place, the ſurrender of Syracuſe muſt ſoon follow; at worſt, he would draw off the army, and not waſte the lives of thoſe Athenians who were employed in this ſervice,

ſervice, and the ſtrength of the whole *State*, to no manner of purpoſe.

Now therefore, the Athenians began to act offenſively; and, in the firſt place, ſallying out from their camp, they ravaged the country along the banks of the Anapus; and were now again, as on the the firſt approach, maſters without control both by land and ſea. For in neither element durſt the Syracuſans any longer come out to check their motions, abating what ſmall reſiſtance was made by the cavalry and darters from Olympiæum.

His attempt to regain Epipolæ.

In the next place, Demoſthenes thought proper to try what could be done againſt the works of the enemy, by the help of machines. But when upon applying them, thoſe machines were fired by the Syracuſans, who from the top of their works made a gallant defence; and, tho' the army attacked in ſeveral quarters at once, they were every where repulſed; he determined, to waſte no longer time upon the trial. But, having prevailed with Nicias and his other collegues in command, to aſſent to the ſcheme he had formed to recover Epipolæ, he proceeded to put it in execution. Yet, by day-light, it was judged impoſſible for them either to march, or to mount the aſcent, without being diſcovered. Upon this, having iſſued out his orders, that every man ſhould take with him ſubſiſtence for five days, and that all the maſons and carpenters ſhould attend the march, with proper ſtore of miſſive weapons, and all needful materials for raiſing new works in caſe the attempt was ſucceſsful; he put himſelf, about the firſt ſleep, at the head of the whole army; and, aſſiſted by Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards Epipolæ. But Nicias was left behind in the intrenchments.

When now they were advanced to the paſs of Euryalus, by which the firſt army gained formerly the aſcent, they are yet undiſcovered by the Syracuſan guards; and, mounting the heights, ſurpriſe the fort which was there mann'd by the Syracuſans, and ſlaughter ſome

ſome of the defendants. But the majority, flying amain towards the camps, of which there were three among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolæ, (one of Syracuſans, a ſecond of other Sicilians, and a third of the confederates,) they ſpread the alarm; and alſo notified the enemy's approach to the ſix hundred Syracuſans, who at firſt were ſelected for the guard of this quarter of Epipolæ. Theſe ſallied out inſtantly to ſtop their progreſs; and Demoſthenes with his Athenians, falling in with them, put them to flight, after they had made a gallant ſtand. Upon this ſucceſs, they immediately puſhed forwards, that they might improve the preſent ardor of the ſoldiers to the immediate completion of thoſe points, for which they had made this bold attempt. Another party, which had been advancing all along without a check, ſurpriſed the counterwork of the Syracuſans; of which, ſince abandoned by its defendants, they were throwing down the battlements.

Battle in the night.

But now the Syracuſans, and their confederates, and Gylippus with the body under his command, marched out of their intrenchments. Yet, having been attacked in ſo daring a manner amidſt the darkneſs of the night, they had not recovered their ſurpriſe when they fell in with the Athenians; and thus, not able to ſtand the firſt ſhock, they were obliged to give way for a time. But, as the Athenians puſhed forwards with great irregularity, as if the victory was quite their own; eager further, to make themſelves maſters of all the tract not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear, leſt ſhould they ſlacken in their ardor, the enemy might have time to rally into a body — the Bœotians firſt put a ſtop to their career; and, ruſhing boldly upon them, routed and put them to flight. By this turn the Athenians were thrown into ſo much diſorder and confuſion, that the particulars which followed cannot eaſily be gathered neither from themſelves nor their antagoniſts. For, even in day-light, when objects are cleareſt to the ſight, men preſent in a battle are not able to ſee all that paſſeth; each ſingle combatant can barely relate what happened about his

his own perſon. When therefore armies engage amidſt the darkneſs of the night (tho' this is the only inſtance of it between powerful armies in the preſent war,) how is it poſſible to come at the knowledge of the ſeveral incidents? The moon indeed ſhone at this time; but then, they only ſaw one another as objects appear by moon-light, ſo as to diſcern the appearance of human bodies, but not to diſtinguiſh between friends and enemies. The heavy-armed further, numerous on both ſides, were too much crowded for want of room. One party of the Athenians was already clearly defeated; another, unbroke by the firſt attack upon them, was puſhing forwards. Of the remainder of their army, a great part had already mounted the aſcent; yet ſome were ſtill buſied in mounting up; but none of theſe, when they were got upon the eminence, knew which way to advance. For before them (as the rout was begun) there was one grand medley of confuſion, and the tumult was ſo loud that no ſounds could be diſtinctly heard. The Syracuſans and their confederates were animating one another with loud exultations (for the ſeaſon of the night made all ſignals uſeleſs) to compleat the blow, and were clearing before them all that came in their way: But the Athenians were prying about for one another, and regarded every thing they met, even tho' they fell in with their own friends, as the flight was now begun, for an aſſured enemy. Obliged further by frequent iterations to demand the *word*, as the only method to diſtinguiſh one another; all calling out aloud for it at the ſame inſtant of time; they heightened the general diſtraction, and clearly diſcovered their own *word* to the enemy. But then they had not equal opportunities to diſcover that of the enemy; becauſe, as the latter were now the victors and kept more in bodies, it was leſs liable to detection. Hence it came to paſs, that tho' a ſtronger party of the Athenians fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet they judged it beſt to fly; becauſe they were ſenſible that their own *word* was divulged; and, as they could not return the *word* of the Syracuſans, they

they muſt unavoidably be cut to pieces. But what had the greateſt effect, and did moſt hurt to the Athenians, was the ſinging the *pæan*; ſince *that* uſed on both ſides, being nearly the ſame, raiſed the utmoſt confuſion. And, when the Argives, and Corcyréans, and all others of Doric deſcent, who were with the Athenians, began from time to time their *pæan*, it ſtruck the ſame alarm into the Athenians as when the enemy themſelves ſung it. So that, in ſhort, falling in amongſt one another in different quarters of the army, when once the confuſion was roſe to a height; friends againſt friends, and citizens againſt fellow-citizens; they not only impreſs a reciprocal terror, but proceed to blows with ſo much fury that they could not eaſily be parted. The purſuit was briſkly followed, in which many of them plunging headlong down the precipices were daſhed in pieces, becauſe the paſs downwards from Epipolæ was too narrow for their numbers. But of thoſe, who from the heights got down into the plain, many, and all in general who came in the firſt armament, ſince better experienced in the country, eſcaped in ſafety to the camp. Whereas of the laſt comers, ſome, ſtraggling into bye-ways, were bewildered in a country to which they were utter ſtrangers; and, at break of day, were cut to pieces by the Syracuſan horſe, who ſcoured the plains.

On the day following, the Syracuſans erected two trophies on Epipolæ; one, on the ſummit of the paſs; and the other, where the Bœotians firſt ſtopped the enemy's progreſs. The Athenians alſo obtained a truce to fetch off their dead; the number of which was large [4], both in their own troops, and thoſe of their allies: And yet, more arms were taken by the enemy than bore proportion to the ſlain. For, of the number of light-armed, who were puſhed to the brink of the precipices, and throwing away their ſhields were *The Syracuſans erect two trophies.*

4 *Plutarch* puts it at two thouſand: But *Diodorus Siculus* ſays, it was two thouſand five hundred.

obliged to leap down, tho' ſome periſhed by the fall, yet others eſcaped with life.

But after this, the Syracuſans, highly animated again with this freſh unexpected turn in their favour, ſent out Sicanus at the head of fifteen ſail to Agrigentum now embroiled in a ſedition, with orders to exert the utmoſt of his power to reduce it to their obedience. Gylippus alſo made once more the tour of Sicily, to levy another army; confident, that with ſuch a reinforcement he could carry the very intrenchments of the enemy by ſtorm, ſince affairs had taken ſuch a favourable turn on Epipolæ.

A council of war.

In the mean time, the Athenian generals were employed in the needful conſultations ſince the laſt misfortune, and the preſent univerſal dejection of their troops. They ſaw, that all their attempts were blaſted by ill ſucceſs, and that the ſoldiers were chagrined at the continuance of ſo fruitleſs a ſervice. For a ſickneſs ſpread amongſt their people from a double cauſe; from the preſent ſeaſon of the year, in which the human body is moſt ſubject to diſorders; and the marſhy unwholſom ground on which they were incamped; beſides that, in every reſpect, their ſituation appeared deſperate, and quite beyond the power of redreſs.

Opinion of Demoſthenes.

The opinion of Demoſthenes was therefore totally repugnant to a longer continuance before Syracuſe. He urged "the immediate "execution of the ſcheme he had formed, before he made the late "dangerous attempt upon Epipolæ; which ſince it had miſcarried, "they ſhould no longer protract their departure, whilſt yet the ſea-"ſon of the year was proper for their voyage homewards, and they "had ſtrength enough in the laſt reinforcement to force their paſſage "in ſpite of the enemy." He affirmed, "it would be more con-"ducive to the public welfare, to turn their arms againſt thoſe who "were erecting fortifications within Attica itſelf than againſt the Sy-"racuſans, whoſe reduction now was almoſt become impracti-"cable;—and, that it was madneſs to perſiſt any longer in a ſiege, "which

" which diſſipated the wealth of the *State* in fuitleſs vain expences."
In this manner Demoſthenes declared his ſentiments.

As for Nicias; tho' convinced within himſelf that their affairs were in a bad ſituation, yet he was unwilling with his own mouth to confeſs their low condition; or, that a departure ſhould be fixed by the general votes of a public council, where all that paſſed muſt be reported to the enemy: becauſe ſhould the determination be formed in this manner, the execution could not go forwards without the enemy's privity. Beſides, as he knew the ſtate of the enemy ſomewhat more perfectly than others; he imagined, there were grounds to hope that the ſtate of the latter would ſoon become worſe than their own, would they only continue to preſs the ſiege. A want of ſupplies muſt ſoon reduce them to great ſtraits; and this the ſooner, as by the acceſſion of the laſt ſquadron themſelves were now again maſters of the ſea. And what is more, in Syracuſe itſelf there was a party, which wiſhed to ſee the city fall into their hands. Theſe had diſpatched their agents to Nicias, and inſiſted he ſhould not quit the ſiege. Yet, thus enlightned as he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as his mind was balanced between two meaſures, which equally required mature deliberation. But for the preſent, he openly declared himſelf in council againſt drawing off the army. He told them, " he was perfectly well aſſured, that the Athenians would " never forgive him, ſhould he carry their troops from Sicily with- " out peremptory orders: That the affair would not then lie under " the cognizance of ſuch as here adviſed it, and with their own eyes " were convinced of the neceſſity of ſuch a ſtep; but of men, who " would form their judgments upon the ſpiteful calumniations of " others, and the influence ſome malicious demagogues would have " over their underſtandings, by which their fate would be deter- " mined." He further repreſented that " many, nay the greater " part of the ſoldiers, who now formed the troops and make ſuch " tragical outcries about the perils that environ them at preſent, " would

Of Nicias.

" would change their notes, ſo ſoon as they were landed again
" at Athens, and aſcribe their return to the treachery and corruption
" of their commanders." For ſuch reaſons, he declared, " as he
" was well acquainted with Athenian tempers, he would chooſe, ra-
" ther than be undone at Athens by baſe criminations and an unjuſt
" ſentence, to hazard the laſt extremity, and periſh, if ſo it muſt
" be! under the violence of the enemy." He maintained however that " the ſtate of the Syracuſans was worſe than their own. The
" demand upon them for the pay of foreigners was large; their ex-
" pences in ſecuring the outworks of Syracuſe were high; they had
" now ſupported a large navy for the ſpace of an intire year; want
" therefore muſt ſoon come upon them, and they muſt ſhortly be to-
" tally diſtreſſed: becauſe the ſum of * two thouſand talents they
" had already expended of their own ſtock, and had even contracted
" a large debt beſide. And, in caſe they abate of their preſent
" punctuality or making good the appointments of the forces they
" have on foot, their ſtrength muſt moulder away; ſince it con-
" ſiſted, not like the Athenians, of troops which muſt ſerve, but of
" ſuch as were only diſcretionary aids." He concluded with " the
" neceſſity they lay under from the ties of duty to continue the ſiege
" with vigour, and by no means expoſe a ſuperior ſtrength to
" ruin, through a falſe preſumption, that they were inferior in point
" of ſupplies."

Nicias expreſſed himſelf on this occaſion with an air of neat confidence, as a perſon perfectly well acquainted with the ſtate of Syracuſe, and the failure of money there, and becauſe there was a party within the city, which acted in favour of the Athenians, and had adviſed him by their agents " by no means to raiſe the ſiege." And what is more, he placed a ſtronger dependence now upon the fleet than ever he had done before the late unſucceſsful engagement.

As to the propoſal of continuing the ſiege, Demoſthenes would not yield the leaſt degree of attention to it; — " If the army muſt not
" evacuate

" evacuate Sicily without a peremptory order from Athens, but muſt
" perſiſt in this deſtructive ſervice; he judged, it would be better to
" draw them off to Thapſus or to Catana; where they might find
" opportunity enough to make incurſions with the land-army upon
" the territories of the enemy, and by committing devaſtations
" might highly diſtreſs them. Their fleet might then engage in the
" open ſea; not in a ſpace confined and ſtraitned, which was the
" greateſt advantage to the enemy; but in ſufficient ſea-room, where
" all their ſuperior ſkill might fairly be exerted, where they would
" be able to make their tacks, and bear down again upon the foe
" with greater agility and more violent ſhocks, than could be done
" in the limitary ſpace of a cloſe pent up harbour. Upon the
" whole, (he affirmed,) that his conſent never ſhould be given to a
" longer continuance in their preſent poſts; but, he was for moving
" off with all poſſible expedition; and they had not a moment to
" laviſh upon delay."

Eurymedon then declared, that his ſenſe of things coincided with that of Demoſthenes. And, Nicias perſiſting in the contrary opinion, a fit of languor and ſuſpence enſued; attended with the ſecret imagination, that the poſitiveneſs of Nicias reſulted from ſome ſtronger hopes of ſucceſs he had conceived above his collegues. And in this manner the Athenians fell into dilatory meaſures, and continued in their camp before Syracuſe. Of Eurymedon.

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuſe; — Sicanus truly, diſappointed of Agrigentum; for he was advanced no farther than Gela, when the ſedition in favour of the Syracuſans was brought to an amicable period; — but then Gylippus was returned at the head of a numerous body, conſiſting of levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed troops from Peloponneſus, who in the ſpring had put to ſea on board the tranſport, but came over laſt from Africa to Selinus. For into Africa they had been driven by contrary winds; and, having there been furniſhed by the Cyrenéans with two triremes Gylippus.

and

and a ſet of pilots, as they coaſted along the African ſhore, they relieved the Eveſperitæ then blocked up by the Libyans. The latter they defeated in a ſet battle; and proceeding from thence along the ſhore they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, from whence lies the ſhorteſt cut to Sicily, being only a paſſage of two days and a night. Hence therefore they ſtood acroſs, and landed at Selinus.

The Athenians reſolve to raiſe the ſiege.

With this acceſſion of ſtrength, the Syracuſans inſtantly prepared to attack the Athenians again both by land and ſea. But the Athenian generals — finding they had received ſo large an augmentation; and that the poſture of their own affairs was ſo far from being changed for the better, that day after day it grew worſe in every reſpect; and, what was worſt of all, that their troops were quite exhauſted with fatigue and ſickneſs; — they repented now in earneſt, that they had not drawn off in time. And, as Nicias now no longer oppoſed that ſtep with the ſame vehemence as he had done before, but merely endeavoured that it ſhould not be determined in public council, they iſſued out orders with the utmoſt ſecrecy, that the whole armament ſhould hold themſelves in readineſs to put to ſea upon a ſignal given. But, all things now ready, the very moment they are going to embark, the moon is eclipſed: for it was now the time of the *full.* The bulk of the army, ſtruck with the aweful appearance, called out upon the generals to halt. And Nicias, always addicted too much to ſuperſtition and ſuch vulgar ſcruples, poſitively declared, that "it ſhould no more be debated whether they ſhould "remove or not, 'till the three times nine days were paſt which the "ſoothſayers preſcribe on ſuch occaſions." So, for this reaſon, a longer ſtay was forced upon the Athenians, who had been too dilatory already [5].

Stopped by an eclipſe.

The

5 That the bulk of an army or a fleet ſhould be frightned at ſuch appearances, is no wonder at all. They are ever ignorant, and the moſt daring of them in other reſpects

The Syracuſans, who had ſoon an intelligence of their deſigns, were now more animated than ever to preſs briſkly on the Athenians, as on men who had given proofs of their own inward conviction, *A battle.*

reſpects have been much addicted to ſuperſtition. But one cannot help being ſurpriſed at the ignorance and ſuperſtition of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and deploring the foible of a man who had ſo good a heart. *Plutarch* expatiates largely on this occaſion. "Even the vulgar, (ſays he,) at this time "were well appriſed, that an eclipſe of the "ſun was often occaſioned, about the time "of the change, by an interpoſition of the "moon. But, as to the moon, by the "interpoſition of what body, and how on "a ſudden at the *full* its light fades away "or emits variety of colour, was not eaſy "for them to conceive. They thought it "a ſtrange occurrence, and ſent from God "as a prognoſtic of great calamities. The "firſt perſon, who wrote a clear and bold "ſolution of the enlightning and obſcura-"tion of the moon, was Anaxagoras, who "now had not been long dead: Nor was "his account in every body's hands; but "concealed, imparted only to a few, and "that with caution and aſſurances of ſe-"crecy. The world could not bear, that "Naturaliſts and Meteor-mongers, as they "were then ſtiled, ſhould ſeem to reſtrain "the divine power by quaint argumentati-"ons, inviſible operations, and neceſſary "conſequences. For ſuch attempts Pro-"tagoras was baniſhed; and Pericles "with much ado procured the releaſe "of Anaxagoras, when thrown into pri-"ſon. Nay Socrates, who never meddled "with any of theſe points, was however "put to death upon the charge of *philoſo-"phizing*. It was not 'till late, that the "glory of Plato ſhone abroad; who, by "his irreproachable life, and ſubjecting na-"tural neceſſities to a divine and ſovereign "power, cleared away all bad imputations "from ſtudies of this kind, and by a mathe-"matical beginning opened a field to other "ſciences. *And thus, his friend Dion*, at "what time he was ſetting ſail from Za-"cynthus againſt Dionyſius, was not at all "diſheartned by an eclipſe of the moon, "but landed ſafe at Syracuſe, and ejected "the tyrant. It was the misfortune of "Nicias at this juncture, not to have even "a skilful ſoothſayer with him; for his in-"timate Stilbides, who had cured much of "his ſuperſtition, had died a little before: "Since this portent (as Philochorus ſays) "was not a bad one, but an excellent "good one for a flying army; ſince acts "which are accompanied with fear, ſtand "in need of concealment, and light is ever "an adverſary to them. Beſides, after "eclipſes of the ſun or moon, it was the "uſual cuſtom (as Autoclides hath in-"formed us) to hold only a three days "ceſſation from buſineſs. But Nicias "perſuaded himſelf, that a compleat revo-"lution of the moon ought to be waited "for; as if with his own eyes he had not "ſeen her ſhine bright again, when ſhe "had paſſed the ſhadow and the earth's "interpoſition. Yet throwing up all at-"tention to other points, he minded no-"thing but ſacrificing, 'till his enemies "attacked him." Life of *Nicias*.

that they were no longer a match for their foes either by ſea or on land; ſince with other thoughts they never could have projected a re-embarkation. Apprehenſive at the ſame time, that ſhould they remove to any other quarter of Sicily they would become more difficult of reduction; they ſaw the neceſſity of engaging them by ſea without a moment's loſs, whilſt yet they had an advantage in compelling them to fight. Upon this they ordered the complements of men on board their ſhips, and exerciſed their crews as many days as was judged ſufficient. But, when opportunity offered of acting with advantage, on the firſt day they aſſaulted the Athenian intrenchments; and a party of heavy-armed and horſemen, tho' not numerous, ſallying out at ſome of the ports to beat them off, they cut off ſome of the heavy-armed from the reſt of that party, and having put them to flight follow the purſuit. As the ſpot further on which the aſſault is made was narrow, the Athenians loſe ſeventy horſes and a ſmall number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more happened on this day, as the army of the Syracuſans now made their retreat.

But on the day following, they ſtand out with their [6] fleet, to the number of ſeventy-ſix ſhips; and, at the ſame time, the land-army marched up to the intrenchments. The Athenians lanched out with fourſcore and ſix to give them a reception; and thus charging one another, an engagement enſued. Eurymedon commanded the right wing of the Athenian fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and ſurround the ſhips of the enemy. For this purpoſe he opened his

6 *Plutarch* adds, That "on this occaſion the very lads came out in fiſhing-boats and skiffs, taunting and inſulting the Athenians. One of theſe lads, Heraclides, of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian veſſel. But Pollichus, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his ſafety, charged inſtantly with the ten triremes he had under his command. The reſt of the Syracuſan fleet, now alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a general engagement." Life of *Nicias*.

line

line and ſtood along too cloſe to the land; which gave the Syracuſans and their allies, who had now defeated the centre of the Athenians, an opportunity to intercept him in the bottom and receſs of the harbour, where they ſlay Eurymedon himſelf, and deſtroy the ſhips which had ſeparated in his company. And this done, they gave chace to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them aſhore. Eurymedon *killed.*

Gylippus now, perceiving that the ſhips of the enemy were defeated and drove aground quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed inſtantly a deſign to make ſlaughter of the men as they were leaping on ſhore, and of giving the Syracuſans an opportunity eaſily to draw off all the ſhips from land of which they were intire maſters. At the head therefore of one diviſion of the land-force, he marched down to the pier to ſecond the fleet. The Tyrrhenes happened to have been poſted neareſt by the Athenians; who, ſeeing a body of the enemy running down thither in a diſorderly manner, advanced eagerly to meet them; and, charging briſkly on the van, put them to flight and drive them into the lake of Lyſimelia. But ſoon after, a reinforcement of Syracuſans and their allies coming up, the Athenians alſo advanced with ſpeed to ſuccour their friends, and trembling for their ſhips ſoon came to an engagement with them, and after routing purſued them amain. They ſlaughtered now a great number of the heavy-armed; and, what was more, preſerved the far greater part of their fleet; and towed again to their former moorings all their ſhips, except eighteen, which the Syracuſans and their allies made prizes, and put all the men on board them to the ſword. With a view further to deſtroy the reſt by ſetting them on fire, they filled an old tranſport-ſhip with faſcines and combuſtible matter; and, as the wind blew right upon the Athenians, ſet her on fire, and let her drive in amongſt them. The Athenians, trembling for the ſhips, put all their engines inſtantly at work to extinguiſh the flames; which, having at length effectuated, and kept this fireſhip

clear of their own veſſels, they were delivered from this imminent danger.

The Syracuſans *victorious.*

After this, the Syracuſans erected a trophy for their victorious engagement on the water, and for the interception of the party of the heavy-armed before the intrenchments where they had taken ſo many horſes. The Athenians alſo did the ſame for the repulſe given by the Tyrrhenes to the land-forces of the enemy, and their being chaced into the lake, and the larger ſucceſs they afterwards obtained with the reſt of their army.

But now, when beyond the reach of doubt the Syracuſans, tho' at firſt alarmed at the large reinforcement of ſhipping brought againſt them by Demoſthenes, had gained a ſignal victory by ſea, the Athenians were plunged into a total dejection of ſpirit; they were thunderſtruck by the reverſe of misfortunes ſo little expected; and begun to repent, with much more bitterneſs of thought, that they had ever engaged in ſo fatal an expedition. They had invaded *States*, whoſe polity was already of a piece with their own, whoſe form of government was *popular* like that of Athens, and which flouriſhed in ſhipping, in horſes, and each article of power. And yet finding themſelves unable to give any meaſure of ſucceſs to their projects by introducing diſſenſions amongſt them, through political embroilments; nor even by a powerful force, ſuperior to that of their foes, able to ward off the many blows they had received; they had fallen beforehand into great anxieties, and now ſadly beaten as they were at ſea, one thought of which they never could hitherto have conceived, their deſpondency became more violent than ever.

The Syracuſans *in high ſpirits.*

From this time the Syracuſans ſcoured the whole harbour without having any thing to fear. They had alſo formed a ſcheme of barring up its mouth, that the Athenians, tho' never ſo intent upon it, might for the future not have it in their power to ſteal away. Their care and diligence were no longer employed on the view alone

of

of their own preſervation, but on the larger view of ruining the Athenians. They concluded, and juſtly too, that the latter turns in their favour had given them the aſcendent over theſe invaders; and, could they but compaſs the total overthrow of this body of Athenians and their allies, the grand atchievement would ſtrike all Greece with admiration. Nay more, all other Grecians muſt reap the fruits of ſuch ſucceſs; of whom, ſome would in an inſtant recover freedom, and others be delivered from the fear of loſing it: For the remaining ſtrength of Athens would never be able to ſtand againſt that weight of war, with which ſhe muſt be ſoon incompaſſed about. And thus, could they (Syracuſans) be the glorious authors of ſuch deſirable events, they muſt infallibly become objects of wonder not only to all the preſent age but to lateſt poſterity. And of a truth, conſidered in ſuch a light, it was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the conqueſt not only of the Athenians, but alſo of their whole extenſive and combined alliance. And this, not merely to earn laurels for themſelves, but for the auxiliaries alſo who had engaged in their cauſe; ſince, expoſed in the front of the war with the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, they had objected their own *State* to the fury of a ſtorm which threatned them all, and by their own perſonal valour in naval engagements had contributed moſt to ſuch a height of ſucceſs.

Catalogue.

The various people now got together at this one city of Syracuſe were ſo very numerous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehenſive roll of thoſe, who in the ſeries of the preſent war ſided either with the *States* of Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is ſubjoined of thoſe, who muſtered in the offenſive and defenſive armies at Syracuſe; who fought againſt, or in behalf of Sicily; who joined for the reduction or preſervation of this iſland, not ſo much from juſt and lawful motives, or a concurrence reſulting from the ties of blood, as from policy, or intereſt, or direct compulſion.

The

The Athenians truly, in quality of Ionians, had voluntarily come hither againſt the Syracuſans, who were Dorians; attended by thoſe, who ſpoke the ſame dialect, and uſed the ſame inſtitutions with themſelves, the Lemnians, and Imbrians, and thoſe Æginetæ who were the preſent poſſeſſors of Ægina. The Heſtiæans further, now inhabiting Heſtiæa in Eubœa, as an Athenian colony, had joined in the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, ſome came along with them becauſe they were dependents; ſome, tho' independent, becauſe they were confederates; and ſome there were, who attended merely for their pay. The dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, and Chalcidéans, and Styrenſians, and Caryſtians, from Eubœa; from the iſlands, the Céans, and Andrians, and Teïans; from Ionia, the Mileſians, and Samians, and Chians. Of theſe, the Chians, being not ſubjected to a tribute but only to furniſh a quota of ſhipping, tho' independent at home yet followed their arms. And all theſe hitherto recited were Ionians, and Athenian colonies, excepting the Caryſtians; for theſe laſt are Dryopes. But as ſubjected to Athens, not ſo much from choice as Ionians as by mere compulſion, they now followed their maſters againſt Dorians. To theſe were added Æolians; the Methymnéans for inſtance, who were to furniſh ſhipping but were exempted from tribute; the Tenedians further, and Ænians, who were tributaries. But theſe, being Æolians, were now compelled to fight againſt other Æolians; namely, their own founders the Bœotians, who adhered to the Syracuſans. The Platæans did the ſame, and were the only Bœotians that acted againſt Bœotians upon the juſtifiable pretext of laſting enmity. The Rhodians further and Cytherians attended, tho' both of Doric deſcent: The Cytherians truly, who are a Lacedæmonian colony, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian ſide againſt the Lacedæmonians under the command of Gylippus: And the Rhodians, Argives by deſcent, were obliged to turn their arms againſt the Doric Syracuſans; nay, againſt the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting

acting in concert with the Syracuſans. Of the people of the iſles on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, came the Cephallenians and Zacynthians; independent in fact, but through their ſituation controled in ſome meaſure by the Athenians, who are maſters of the ſea. The Corcyréans further, who were not only of Doric but what is more were even of Corinthian original, as being a colony of the latter and by blood allied to the former, from compulſion, as they gave out for a colour, tho' in truth from deliberate malice, ſince oppoſing the Corinthians whom they hated, followed the Athenians with an ardor inferior to none. The Meſſenians alſo, now ſtiled Meſſenians of Naupactus, and thoſe from Pylus, which was ſtill held by the Athenians, were brought along to the war. To whom muſt be added a ſmall party of Megaréan exiles, who by a ſad reverſe of fortune now took part againſt the Selinuntians, who were alſo Megaréan. The reſidue of the confederates were engaged rather upon free and ſpontaneous choice. The Argives, for inſtance, not more from obligations of ſubſiſting treaties than the rancour they bore the Lacedæmonians and the gratification of private ſpleen, tho' Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians againſt their Doric kindred. But the Mantinéans, and the reſt of the Arcadians, who are mercenaries, and eternally habituated to act againſt any foe pointed out to them, were now ſo far influenced by gain as to regard thoſe Arcadians as their enemies, who came over on this occaſion in company with the Corinthians. The Cretans alſo and Ætolians were there, allured by an advantageous pay. And thus it happened, that the Cretans, who in concert with the Rhodians had founded Gela, readily took part for the ſake of gain, not *with* but *againſt* a colony which themſelves had planted. There was alſo a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly induced to join by the pay they received; but principally, by their perſonal regard for Demoſthenes, and their attachment to the Athenians. And thus have we run them over to the utmoſt boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italic nations, the Thurians and thoſe Metapontians,

whom

whom inteſtine feuds had reduced to the neceſſity of fighting for ſubſiſtence, joined their arms; and of the Sicilian, the Naxians and Catanéans; of Barbarian, the Egeſtéans, who were the firſt movers of this grand contention, and the major part of the Siculi; and out of Sicily, ſome of the Tyrrhenes, from enmity to the Syracuſans; and the mercenary Iäpygians. So many nations were aſſembled together at preſent under command of the Athenians.

The auxiliaries, on the ſide of the Syracuſans, were the Camarinéans who border cloſe upon them; and the Geloans, who are ſituated next the Camarinéans. To proceed regularly; as the Agrigentines were neutral, the Selinuntians next occur, who are ſeated beyond the Agrigentines; ſince they inhabit that tract of the iſland, which faceth Afric. Then the Himeréans, the only Grecian people, who inhabit that part of the iſland which lies off the Tyrrhene ſea, and were the only body which came from thence to the aid of Syracuſe. The ſeveral nations of Greek deſcent ſettled in Sicily, being all Doric and independent, acted together in concert. Of the Barbarous people; they had thoſe Siculi alone, who did not openly revolt to the Athenians. But out of Sicily; the Lacedæmonians ſent them a *citizen* of Sparta to command and a body of *Neodamodes* and *Helots*: by a *Neodamas* is meant a citizen newly enfranchiſed. The Corinthians alone aided them both with ſhipping and a land-force, in conjunction with the Leucadians, and Ambraciots by blood allied to Syracuſe. From Arcadia alſo came a body of mercenaries, ſent by the Corinthians; and the Sicyonians, who acted on compulſion. And of thoſe, who dwell without the Peloponneſus, were the Bœotians. But beſide theſe foreign aids, the Sicilians, as poſſeſſed of great and powerful cities, furniſhed out in all reſpects a much greater and well-appointed force. For by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, of ſhips, and horſes, and other kinds of military force, in an amazing abundance, were raiſed and brought to Syracuſe. And yet it muſt be ſaid, that the domeſtic force of the Syracuſans was

more

more to be conſidered than all the reſt, from the greatneſs of their *State* and the immediate urgency of thoſe perils with which they were environed.

Theſe were the aids, the numerous aids, aſſembled together by the contending parties. And, at this juncture, all theſe were preſent on each ſide of the conteſt; and from this criſis neither party received any acceſſion.

Grand ſcheme of the Syracuſans.

The Syracuſans therefore and their confederates thought, ſince the ſignal victory they had gained upon the water, it would be a brave exploit and highly for their glory, to make the whole extenſive camp of the Athenians their prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, both by land and ſea. With this project, they immediately barred up the great harbour, the mouth of which is about * eight ſtadia over, with a line of triremes placed ſide by ſide, and other veſſels and boats moored faſt together by anchors; and got every thing beſides in readineſs, in caſe the Athenians ſhould venture on another engagement. Their every view was now become large and aſpiring.

* *Near a mile.*

When the Athenians ſaw the harbour thus barred up, and perceived further the whole of the enemy's deſigns, it was judged high time to go to conſultation. The commanders of the different bodies were called to council with the generals; in which, upon repreſentations made "of the great diſtreſs to which they were reduced; and, "that they had not a ſtock of proviſions ample enough for their im- "mediate ſubſiſtence (for, bent on ſailing away, they had ſent al- "ready to Catana to countermand any freſh convoys;) and, unleſs "they could recover their maſtery at ſea, it would be impracticable "for the future to obtain a ſupply;" they came to a final reſolution — "To quit their intrenchments on the higher ground, and be- "fore the ſtation of their ſhipping to raiſe a circular work, of as "little compaſs as poſſible, but ſufficient to ſerve for a magazine and "hoſpital, and to this only to aſſign a guard; as for the reſt of

" the land-army they were to oblige every ſoldier to go on board;
" that all the ſhips, which yet were undamaged or had been laid up
" for want of hands, might be compleatly manned; and thus, they
" muſt fight their paſſage out of the harbour; and, if it ſucceeded,
" make directly for Catana; but, if repulſed, they would burn their
" ſhipping, and moving off in one body by land would endeavour,
" by the moſt expeditious marches, to reach the neareſt place that
" would receive them, whether Barbarian or Grecian."

Athenian meaſures.

Such was the plan reſolved on, and which they began immediately to execute. For now, abandoning their upper intrenchments, they drew down to the beach, and manned the whole of their ſhipping, on board of which they forced without exception all ſuch as had youth and vigour enough to be of ſervice there. The whole number of ſhips they were by this means enabled to man amounted to a hundred and ten. They alſo placed on board the fleet a large number of archers, the darters of the Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries; and provided, in all other reſpects, for action, as well as their condition would permit, or the nature of the project required.

When things were thus in great forwardneſs, Nicias taking notice, that the ſoldiery was much dejected by the great defeats, which, contrary to their wonted cuſtom, they had received by ſea; and yet deſirous to hazard another engagement as ſoon as poſſible, becauſe pinched for want of neceſſary ſubſiſtence; he gathered them all round about himſelf, and endeavoured to raiſe their drooping ſpirits by the following exhortation, the firſt of the kind he had ever made.

Speech of Nicias.

" MY fellow-ſoldiers whether of the Athenian or the confe-
" derate troops! the bold attempt we are now going to make is of
" equal concern to each individual amongſt us; ſince, not more for
" victory over our foes than for the preſervation of ourſelves and our
" country,

" country, we are now to fight; and, if our naval efforts be crowned
" with victory, each of us may again be bleſt with the ſight of his
" own native city. Away therefore with theſe faces of deſpair, this
" painful dejection, fit only for a raw unexperienced multitude, who
" unſucceſsful in their firſt attempts for ever after bid adieu to hope,
" and by unmanly fears anticipate misfortunes!

" As for you, Athenians, who form ſo conſiderable a part of this
" aſſembly, experienced as you are in ſuch variety of warfare!—
" And you alſo our allies, who have ever fought under our banners!—
" recal to your reflexion the unexpected turns of war; encourage
" the hope, that fortune may at length declare for us; and deter-
" mine once more to engage the foe with a ſpirit worthy of that
" numerous ſtrength, of which by ocular demonſtration you ſee
" yourſelves this moment poſſeſſed. Thoſe points, of which we
" perceive we may avail ourſelves againſt the narrowneſs of the har-
" bour's mouth, againſt ſuch a multitude of veſſels as will be crouded
" together, and againſt that particular diſpoſition of ſoldiers on their
" decks, from which on the former occaſion we ſuffered ſo much,—
" all theſe, I muſt tell you, are as well adjuſted, as our preſent con-
" dition will permit, by the united care of us your generals and
" your own maſters. For many archers and darters ſhall now line
" your decks, and that croud of ſoldiers, which when we engage
" in the open ſea we never can uſe, becauſe the veſſels would be
" too heavily laden to allow the proper exertion of our ſkill; that
" croud, I ſay, in this pent up contracted ſpace ſhall give to our
" naval battle the ſtrength and ſtability of a land-engagement. We
" have alſo deviſed the proper means to compenſate the inferior
" ſtructure of our ſhips; and, in return for the conſolidated beaks
" of our enemy, have provided the ſhips with grappling-irons, which
" will hold faſt a veſſel that hath run againſt you from getting clear,
" provided thoſe on board will perform their duty. Becauſe, as ne-
" ceſſity inforceth us now to fight a mere land-battle from our decks,

" it highly concerns us, neither to be beat off ourſelves, nor to ſuf-
" fer them to get clear from our grapple; eſpecially, when all the
" ambient ſhore, excepting the ſmall tract now occupied by our own
" army, is hoſtile in regard to us. Mindful of theſe things, it be-
" hoves you to fight it out ſo long as ſtrength and vigour ſhall enable
" you, and never ſuffer yourſelves to be driven on *ſuch* a ſhore; but,
" when once your ſhip hath grappled with a foe, never once to think
" of loſing your hold, till you have cleared the enemy's decks of all
" the defendents. But theſe points I give in charge to the heavy-
" armed, not leſs than to the ſeamen; ſince this method of engage-
" ment is more particularly your province; and, ſince it ſtill remains
" within your power to earn a glorious victory, by putting your land-
" method into practice. But the ſeamen I exhort, and with my ex-
" hortations mingle my intreaties, not to ſhrink too much under the
" ſenſibility of paſt defeats, as your decks are now better armed in
" all reſpects than they were before, and as the number of the ſhip-
" ping is enlarged. Recal the idea of that heart-delighting privi-
" lege, of which you are now to ſecure the continuance; — To you
" I ſpeak who, tho' not of Athenian extraction, have hitherto been
" regarded and honoured as Athenians; and, for ſpeaking well our
" language, and appropriating our manners, have been admired
" through the whole extent of Greece, have participated the bene-
" fits of our large-extended empire, not leſs than ourſelves in point
" of profit, and much more than ourſelves in ſtriking awe into
" your vaſſals, and being exempted from the attacks of injuſtice.
" Since therefore you alone have freely ſhared our empire with us,
" you are bound by all the ties of honour, by no means to deſert its
" preſent vindication. Then in open deſpight of thoſe Corinthians,
" whom you have ſo often conquered; and of thoſe Sicilians, not
" one of whom durſt look us in the face ſo long as the vigour of our
" fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before you, and ſtrike into
" them the plain conviction — that your military ſkill, tho' ſtrug-
" gling

" gling with weakneſs and misfortunes, is yet far ſuperior to all their
" ſtrength and luck united.

" But to the native citizens of Athens amongſt you I muſt once
" more ſuggeſt, that you have now no longer in your docks ſuch
" another fleet as *this*, nor have left behind you ſuch another body
" of heavy-armed. If therefore your immediate fate be any thing
" leſs than victory, your enemies will ſail and be directly at Athens;
" and the remainder of our forces there will no longer be able to re-
" pulſe the united aſſaults of their domeſtic foes and ſuch foreign in-
" vaders. Nay, the infallible reſult muſt be, that you at once put
" on the chains of Syracuſans, againſt whom you are conſcious with
" what intentions you at firſt came here; whilſt your country muſt
" be forced to ſubmit to a Lacedæmonian bondage. Now therefore
" ſummon all your courage, to earn the day, in which your own
" liberty and that of Athens is to be the victor's prize. And, let
" each individual amongſt you invigorate himſelf with the thought;
" nay, let it throw ſpirit and life into the whole army — that, *thoſe*
" who are now to engage on board this preſent fleet are the whole
" of the land and naval force of your country, are the ſurviving ſup-
" ports of the *State* and the great NAME of Athens. In ſo mo-
" mentous a conflict, whoever amongſt you excels in military ſkill
" or inward bravery, that perſon had never ſo fine an opportunity to
" give demonſtration of his ſuperior worth, or to perform a great
" ſervice for himſelf, or for the welfare of his country."

Nicias, after he had finiſhed this earneſt exhortation, ordered them to repair directly to their poſts on board the fleet.

As all this hurry of preparation lay within their view, Gylippus and the Syracuſans could not eſcape the conviction, that the Athenians were bent on another engagement. They had, moreover, received intelligence of the new project of the grappling-irons. As therefore they had provided againſt every thing beſides, they alſo

made proviſion to counterwork that project. For this purpoſe, they had covered the prows and almoſt the whole gunnel of their ſhips with hides; that, when the grappling-iron was thrown, it might ſlip off and catch no hold. And, no ſooner were all their preparations compleated, than the Syracuſan generals in concert with Gylippus animated their men to engage with reſolution, by the following harangue:

Speech of the Syracuſan *commanders.*

" THAT your paſt atchievements have been glorious indeed, " and for the acquiſition of greater honour and glory that you are " now on the brink of engaging, — the generality of you, ye Syra- " cuſans and confederates! are well convinced, and need not at pre- " ſent to be informed: For otherwiſe you could never have per- " ſiſted ſo far in this warm career of bravery and ſucceſs. But if " there be a man amongſt you, whoſe ſenſe of things drops ſhort " of their real poſition, we ſhall now throw upon it the needful " illuſtration.

" This land, our property, the Athenians have invaded; aiming, " in the firſt place, at inſlaving Sicily; and had this deſign ſucceeded, " at inflicting an equal fate on Peloponneſus, and the reſt of Greece. " And yet theſe very Athenians, who enjoy already the largeſt tract of " empire that any ancient or modern *State* of Greece hath at any time " enjoyed, you are the firſt who have bravely reſiſted, and of that " navy, on which they erected their incroaching pile of power, are " plainly the victors in ſeveral engagements; as again, in that which " now approacheth you will aſſuredly beat them. For men, who " have received ſuch ſevere checks in a point for which they ſo " highly plumed themſelves, will for the future have a much worſe " opinion of their own merit, than if they had never conceived ſo " high a value of it; and, when all their towering pretenſions are ſo " unexpectedly blaſted, their ſubſequent efforts muſt of courſe drop " ſhort of their real ſtrength: And this, you may reſt aſſured, is the

" preſent

" preſent ſtate of *yonder* Athenians. And by parity, in regard to
" ourſelves, that proportion of ſtrength we enjoyed at firſt, with
" which, tho' far inferior in ſkill, we boldly and ſucceſsfully pre-
" ſumed to withſtand them, muſt now be ſuitably enlarged; and,
" with the further acceſſion of this inward aſſurance, that we are
" really the beſt ſince we have beat the beſt ſeamen in the world,
" our hopes of ſucceſs are in every light redoubled. And then hu-
" man experience teacheth us, that in every competition the warmeſt
" hope is ever accompany'd with the greateſt reſolution.

" But further, thoſe late alterations, which they have introduced
" among their ſhipping, in order to equalize and balance ours, have
" been a long time familiar to our own practice. And each of their
" new preparations we ſhall dextrouſly improve to our own advan-
" tage. For when, contrary to the long and inveterate diſcipline of
" their fleet, there are crouded together upon their decks, a nume-
" rous body of heavy-armed, as well as another numerous body of
" mere *terra firma* darters, as they may properly be ſtiled; when
" thus Acarnanians and other land-men are forced on board, who
" even ſitting would be unable to poiſe and direct their weapons; —
" how can they avoid indangering their veſſels? or, jumbled con-
" fuſedly together and tottering under motions to which they are not
" inured, how can they eſcape a total diſorder?

" What ſtill makes more againſt them, the multitude of their
" ſhipping will only ſerve the more to embarraſs them; — and let
" this diſpel the fears of thoſe who may be afraid of engaging
" againſt their ſuperior numbers. For a multitude of ſhips in a con-
" tracted ſpace will be more ſlow in executing orders, and are at the
" ſame time moſt eaſily expoſed to the annoyance, which our pre-
" parations are contrived to give them. And now, attend to the
" true and real ſituation of the foe, as from good intelligence we are
" enabled clearly to declare it to you.

" Environed

" Environed on all ſides with misfortunes, and diſtreſſed in a pre-
" ſent want of the neceſſaries of life, they are become quite de-
" ſperate. And hence, tho' they have reſigned all confidence in their
" real ſtrength, yet in the fury of deſpair they are throwing them-
" ſelves upon the deciſion of fortune; that either, if the paſſage can
" be forced, they may lanch out to ſea; or, that project failing,
" may attempt a retreat by land; — as if, to a worſe condition than
" their preſent, it were not in the power of fortune to reduce them.
" Warmed therefore with brave reſentment, let us alſo try the en-
" counter againſt ſuch wild confuſion, and againſt the fortune of
" our inveterate foes now treacherouſly bent to finiſh their deſtruc-
" tion. Let us charge with the full conviction, that on an enemy,
" who would juſtify their invaſion on the principle of redreſſing
" wrongs, it is moſt fair and equitable to ſatiate all the fury of re-
" venge; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is an appetite of our
" nature, and commonly ſaid to be the ſweeteſt of all human enjoy-
" ments. But — that thoſe men *yonder* are our foes, our moſt bitter
" unrelenting foes, you need no further proofs; ſince bent on inſlaving
" this our country, they firſt made the voyage. And, had this their
" odious project been ſucceſsful, on our citizens they had inflicted
" the moſt cruel torments, on our wives and children the moſt inde-
" cent enormities, and on Syracuſe the moſt ignominious appellation.
" In a work of ſo juſt retaliation, to indulge a tenderneſs of mind,
" or to think it gain to let them depart without additional revenge,
" will be a matter of juſt reproach. For the latter is all they will
" be able to effect, even tho' at length they may be victors. But to
" us, could we execute the fair and equitable wiſhes of our hearts,
" by inflicting upon *them* the puniſhment they well deſerve, and in
" ſetting the liberty of all Sicily, as it hath been ever enjoyed by us,
" beyond the reach of any future inſults; how glorious muſt ſuch
" atchievements be! For ſuch critical moments of adventure are
" moſt rarely to be met with; which, if unſucceſsful, can do the
" leaſt

" leaſt diſſervice; but, if ſucceſsful, draw after them the moſt va-
" luable acquiſitions."

When the Syracuſan generals, ſeconded by Gylippus, had finiſhed this their exhortation to their own ſoldiers: they alſo, in their turn, repaired immediately on board their fleet, as they found was already done by the Athenians.

Earneſt for action.

But Nicias, whoſe mind was ſurcharged with preſent cares, ſenſible — how extreme the danger! and how nearly approaching! ſince this very moment they were only not in motion; — and once more reflecting, that, as generally happens in affairs of ſuch prodigious moment, ſome points might yet be left imperfect, ſomething of energy and weight and influence be yet left unſaid; he called out again upon every ſingle captain in the fleet, addreſſing himſelf ſeparately to them, with the honourable mention of their *fathers*, *themſelves*, and *their tribe*; and conjuring each, by his own diſtinguiſhing ſplendor whatever it was, " not now to betray it, nor tarniſh thoſe " hereditary virtues on which their anceſtors had founded their " glory;" reminding them earneſtly " of the uninterrupted freedom " of their country, and the privilege they had ever enjoyed of living " in it quite free and uncontroled;" inſerting other arguments, ſuch as, with men who had their *all* ſo much at ſtake, might have influence and weight; no matter now how trite or hackneyed by frequent repetitions, or how equally applicable to every caſe, as fetched from the endearments of their wives, and their offspring, and their paternal Gods; ſuch as, from every topic in a plunge of horror and diſtreſs are rung in the ears of men, as likely to animate and perſuade. And thus at laſt, tho' fearful that not even yet he had ſaid enough but all that the time would permit — he parted from them; and, placing himſelf at the head of the land-army, marched down to the beach; where, he drew them up in as large a line as they

could poſſibly form, that their appearance might have the greater effect in emboldening thoſe on board the fleet.

And now Demoſthenes, and Menander, and Euthydemus, (for theſe went on board to command the fleet) getting clear from their moorings, ſtood away directly towards the barricade of the harbour, and that interval of its mouth not yet compleatly barr'd in order to clear the paſſage. The Syracuſans alſo and their allies had now lanched forth againſt them with their uſual number of ſhips. A detachment of theſe were ſo ſtationed as to guard the paſſage; the reſt were ſpread circularly quite round the harbour; that, on all ſides at once, they might attack the Athenians; and their land-army on the beach might ſecond them on approaches to the ſhore. The Syracuſan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who were reſpectively ſtationed in each of the wings; whilſt Pythen and the Corinthians compoſed the centre.

The battle. When the Athenians were come up to the barricade, they run boldly at it; and by the violence of the firſt ſhock they beat off the veſſels ranged about it, and were intent on clearing away the whole barricade. But here, the Syracuſans and allies falling in amongſt them from every quarter, a general engagement enſued, not only at the barricade but in every part of the harbour. Obſtinate it really proved; and ſuch a battle, as they had never fought before. Great in truth was the ardor of the ſeamen on both ſides in running upon the enemy, whenever the word was given; and great was the art exerted by the officers in attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention. The ſoldiers on board exerted all their efforts, that, when ſhip came to cloſe with ſhip, no ſtretch of military ſkill ſhould be omitted on the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly in his poſt, ſtrained all his diligence to ſignalize his own behaviour. But, as numerous ſhips were falling in together amongſt one another in little ſea-room, — and ſo large a number never fought before in ſo ſmall a ſpace,

ſpace, ſince the amount of both fleets fell little ſhort of two hundred; — the direct incurſions with the beak were few, becauſe room was wanting for tacks and paſſages; but boardings were frequent, as the veſſels were continually running foul on one another, or in ſheering off met with others which were coming on. And, ſo long as a veſſel was in her approach, thoſe on the hatches poured plentifully againſt her whole ſhowers of javelins, and arrows, and ſtones; but when they were once come to grappling, the ſoldiers cloſing in firm battalion endeavoured by force to board one another. Nay, it moſt frequently happened, through the ſtraitneſs of ſea-room, that the very moment one party boarded the enemy, the very ſame moment they were alſo boarded themſelves, as two veſſels lay often along-ſide of an enemy; nay ſometimes more, by neceſſity mingled and ſqueezed faſt together. In the mean time, the care of the officers was not confined to one ſingle point, but diſtracted on all ſides by a whole round of perils; they were here intent on their own defence, and there on the annoyance of the enemy. And further, the prodigious craſh that was made by ſuch a number of ſhips running at the ſame inſtant upon one another, ſtruck ſuch diſmay and loſs of hearing, that the voices of thoſe who iſſued out orders could no longer be diſtinguiſhed. Loud beſides were the exhortations and ſhouts of the officers on both ſides; partly in conformity to rule, tho' ſwelled at preſent by the ardor of contention. Amongſt the Athenians it was ſhouted amain — "To force the paſſage, and now or never to exert "their utmoſt ſtretch of bravery to earn a ſafe return to their native "country;" — amongſt the Syracuſans and their allies ---- "How "glorious it would be to hinder their eſcape, and by preſent victory "for every one amongſt them to increaſe the growing honours of "his country!" The commanders alſo on both ſides, if they ſaw a veſſel dropping off before it was overpowered by the enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, demanding ---- on the Athenian ſide ---- "Did they retire on the wild preſumption that yonder moſt

" hoſtile ſhore would prove more friendly to them than the open ſea,
" which by long preſcription they had claimed as their own province."--
But, on the Syracuſan --- " Would they, who were perfectly aſſured
" that the Athenians wanted nothing ſo much as to eſcape --- would
" they fly firſt from thoſe who were flying?" The land-army, further, of each party upon the beach, whilſt yet the battle was alternately fluctuating on the water, felt the utmoſt anxiety and the moſt painful conflict of mind --- earneſtly bent, as the one *domeſtic* party was, " on gaining accumulated honours;" but fearful, as the other *invading* party was become, that " their condition might ſoon be-
" come worſe than it was already." For, the whole hope of the Athenians centring at preſent in that *fleet*, their anguiſh for the event was more acute than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by their own poſition on the beach, which gave them a clear uninterrupted proſpect of all that paſſed in the battle upon the water. The ſcene was but at a trifling diſtance from their eyes; and, as the looks of all of them were not at the ſame inſtant faſtned upon the ſame ſpectacle ---- if any ſaw their own party prevailing, they grew at once exalted; and immediately began an invocation to the Gods, that the efforts of their friends might be crowned with ſucceſs;--- whilſt another party, beholding thoſe who were vanquiſhed, uttered a loud ſhriek which ended in a groan; and, by the ſight of ſuch affecting turns were more ſubdued in ſpirit, than thoſe who were actually engaged in this medley of horror. Others further, who were intent upon a quarter of the engagement, where the event was yet in ſuſpence, and no judgment amidſt ſuch confuſion could be formed, adjuſted the contortions of their bodies to their own inward fears, and paſſed that interval in extremity of anguiſh. For each ſingle moment, they were within a little of eſcaping or being ſunk. And thus, in one and the ſame army of Athenians, ſo long as the event was under deciſion, a whole medley of noiſes was heard toge-
ther --- *ſhrieking* --- *ſhouting* --- *victory!* --- *undone*, *undone*, and all other

other ſounds of various import, which in ſuch extremity of danger a numerous body of men may be forced to utter.

Thoſe further on board were equally ſenſible of all the quick alternatives of paſſion; 'till at laſt, after the battle had for a long time been obſtinately maintained, the Syracuſans and allies put the Athenians to open flight; and plying briſkly in the chace, with obſtreperous clamour and loud exultations drove them upon the beach. And here, the land-ſoldiers which had ſerved on board, excepting ſuch as had been taken in the deeper water, leaping in all parts as they ſeverally could on ſhore, run in great confuſion for ſhelter to the camp. The army on the beach, with paſſions no longer diverſified, but with one and the ſame uniform vehemence, having expreſſed their reſentment of the horrible concluſion by a loud ſhriek and a hearty groan, — ſome hurried along the beach to ſuccour the ſhipping; others, to defend what yet remained of their intrenchments; whilſt a third party, and the bulk of the army, confined their whole care to themſelves, and were ſolely intent on their own perſonal preſervation. The horrid conſternation, in which this moment they were univerſally plunged, was greater than Athenians had ever felt before. They ſuffered now, what on a former occaſion they had made others ſuffer at Pylus. *There* the Lacedæmonians having firſt loſt their fleet, had the further mortification to ſee all their gallant Spartans in the iſland undone. And now, the deſperate condition of the Athenians offered no glimmering of ſafety on the land, unleſs ſome miraculous contingency ſhould take place in their favour.

After an engagement ſo hardy and well diſputed, after the ſinking of a large number of ſhips, and the death of numbers on both ſides, the Syracuſans and their allies, who were maſters of the day, took up the ſhatters and the dead. This being done, they ſailed in triumph to the city, and erected a trophy. *Syracuſans victorious.*

But the Athenians, quite ſunk with the weight of their preſent misfortunes, never ſo much as once entertained the thought of recovering *The Athenians quite diſpirited.*

covering their ſhattered veſſels or their dead; but were contriving how to decamp by favour of the approaching night. Demoſthenes, upon this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own opinion, that "manning at once the whole number of their veſſels they ſhould "exert their utmoſt efforts to force their paſſage out of the harbour "early the next dawn;" affirming that "they had ſtill a larger "number of ſhipping fit for ſervice than the enemy:" For the Athenians had yet about ſixty left, whereas thoſe of the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came into the propoſal; but, when both joined in iſſuing proper orders for the execution, the ſeamen flatly refuſed to go on board. Diſpirited as they were by the laſt great blow, they had reſigned all hope of ever beating theſe enemies again. No meaſure now remained but a retreat by land, on which the univerſal attention was henceforth employed.

Hermocrates. Hermocrates the Syracuſan had conceived a ſuſpicion, that ſuch a ſtep would be taken by them; and, foreſeeing what difficulties might ariſe, if ſo large an army ſhould march acroſs the country, and poſting themſelves afreſh on Sicilian ground ſhould again reſume their ſpirits, and renew the war againſt Syracuſe, — he waited upon thoſe in authority, and ſuggeſted to them, that "they ought not by any "rules of policy to let the enemy ſteal off by night (inſerting here "his own ſentiments of the affair,) but that all the Syracuſans and "their allies ſallying out in a body ſhould pre-occupy and ſecure "the roads, and in good time beſet and put ſtrong guards in all the "paſſes." The magiſtrates were ſenſible as much as he who gave this advice how reaſonable it was, and declared themſelves for its execution; — But then, "the men, who now indulging their joy for "the late victory were intent on recreations, and as beſides it was a "feſtival-time (for this very day they were performing the anni-"verſary ſacrifice to Hercules,) in all probability would refuſe to "march: Becauſe, tranſported as they were with ſucceſs, the gene-"rality no doubt were celebrating the feſtival with good cheer and "wine;

" wine; and any thing might ſooner be hoped from them, than obe-
" dience to an order for taking up their arms and ſallying forth at a
" minute's notice." As the magiſtrates were convinced that things would ſo turn out, the ſcheme was judged impracticable, and Hermocrates could in no wiſe prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play off againſt the foe. Afraid, leſt the Athenians diſlodging quietly by night might poſſeſs themſelves of the moſt difficult paſſes, before any oppoſition could reach them; he diſpatcheth ſome of his moſt truſty friends, under an eſcorte of horſe, to the Athenian camp ſo ſoon as it was dark; who, riding up ſo near to the intrenchments that their words might be diſtinctly heard, and calling out aloud on ſome perſons to come forth, ſince they were a party ſent from his friends in Syracuſe to bring Nicias ſome intelligence; charged them to carry word immediately to Nicias " by no means to draw off the
" army by night, becauſe the Syracuſans had beſet the roads; but
" to defer his march 'till day-light, when he had leiſure to make the
" proper diſpoſitions." And, after delivering this meſſage, they rode off; whilſt thoſe who received it went and reported it faithfully to the Athenian generals.

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, in which they were far from ſuſpecting any fraud, they continued all night in their poſts. And then, as they had not diſlodged at once in a hurry, they thought it adviſeable to ſtay where they were *but* one day longer, that the ſoldiers might pack up and carry away with them as large a part as was poſſible of their neceſſary ſtores. The reſt of the baggage, it was agreed, ſhould be abandoned to the enemy. They were only to carry off, each perſon for himſelf, what was abſolutely neceſſary for food and raiment.

The ſiege of Syracuſe is raiſed.

But in this interval, the Syracuſans and Gylippus by ſallying out with the land-forces had gained a march before them; had blocked up the roads along the country, by which it was judged the Athenians would march; and had poſted ſtrong guards upon all the fords

of

of brooks and rivers: nay, their detachments ſtood ready drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from the moſt convenient paſſes. Standing out further into the harbour with their fleet, they dragged from the ſhore the Athenian ſhipping. Some few of theſe they burnt, as the Athenians themſelves had deſigned to do; but the reſidue, at their leiſure, from the ſpot where each lay ſtranded, they took in tow, and carried away to the city. And this being done; when Nicias and Demoſthenes judged, that they had compleated ſuch preparations for their march as were abſolutely needful, the diſlodgment of the whole army was put in execution on the third day from the naval engagement.

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed in one particular light, as that they retreated becauſe they had loſt the whole of their fleet, and all their mighty hopes had terminated in ſuch perſonal dangers to themſelves, and ſuch as even boded the ruin of Athens; but the very abandoning of the camp preſented to their ſight the moſt cutting ſpectacles, and ſtruck each ſoul amongſt them with heart-piercing anguiſh. For, as the dead lay uninterred upon the ſurface of the earth, when the remains of an old acquaintance thus miſerably laid out arreſted the eyes of a ſoldier, he was inſtantly ſeized with regret and horror. But the living, who on account of wounds and ſickneſs were left behind, were cauſes of much greater affliction to the ſound than were even the dead, and in truth were much more to be deplored than thoſe who had no longer a being. For, burſting out into prayers and lamentations, they occaſioned a wild irreſolution of thought; earneſtly intreating, that they might not be left behind, and ſcreaming out aloud on each by name, as they ſaw a friend or an acquaintance or an old comrade moving off; throwing their arms about their necks, and ſo dragged along whilſt they could keep their hold. But when ſtrength and bodily vigour failed and left them deſtitue of reſource, they gave them the laſt adieu not without a ſhower of curſes and a hideous howl. By ſuch cutting incidents the whole army

army was filled with tears and a wild irreſolution; ſo that they could not depart, without the higheſt regret, tho' from a ſpot ſo hoſtile, where they had ſuffered more than tears could alleviate; and the dread of more which yet might be impending was inexpreſſible. Dejection of the head and ſelf-accuſation were general through all the troops. And they reſembled nothing leſs than a large ſubjugated city, whoſe numerous inhabitants were eſcaping from the fury of a ſack. For the amount of thoſe, who were now marching off together, was not leſs than forty thouſand men.

Of theſe, the generality carried off merely what neceſſary ſubſiſtence they had ſcraped together; but the heavy-armed and horſemen, contrary to cuſtom, were now obliged to carry their own ſuſtenance themſelves, beneath their armour; ſome, becauſe they had none; others, becauſe they durſt not truſt their ſervants. The deſertions had for a long time been large, but of late in greater numbers than ever. Neither were they thus provided with ſufficient ſtores; for there was no longer any corn to be found in the camp. Nay truly, the general calamity and equability of misfortunes, which in many caſes alleviate the pain as numbers are involved, were unable to render the preſent evils in any degree ſupportable; eſpecially, when the thought occurred —from *what* a height of ſplendor and preceding glory, to *what* a plunge and miſerable ſtate they were now reduced! For a moſt cruel turn of fortune this really proved to a Grecian army; who, coming hither to inſlave others, were departing now with the ſad alternative of fearing to be made ſlaves themſelves; and, inſtead of the prayers and pæans with which they firſt began the voyage, were now diſlodging with omens that portended nothing but miſery: Thoſe further, who came hither as lords of the ocean, were now ſtealing away by land; from henceforth to be ſaved, not by naval ſkill but the perſeverance of a land-army. However, all theſe reflexions put their patience nothing on the ſtretch, in compa-

riſon of that weight of miſery which this very inſtant was hovering over their heads.

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be overwhelmed in deſpair and ſunk in this plunge of diſtreſs, addreſſed himſelf ſeverally to the troops; exhorted, and comforted by every topic which occurred each ſingle party whom he viſited by turns, elevating his voice far beyond the ordinary pitch to ſuit the earneſtneſs of his heart, in hope that the louder he ſpoke, the more extenſive effect it might have upon the hearers.

Speech of Nicias.

" EVEN yet, and in the preſent low ebb of our fortune, my " dear countrymen and confederates, we ought to encourage hope. " Inſtances may be given of armies who have been reſcued from a " deeper plunge of dangers than that which is now our portion. " Nor ought you to torture yourſelves with too painful regret at " what you ſuffer, or at the unmerited miſeries which this moment " environ you about. Even I myſelf, who have much leſs room to " boaſt of a conſtitution ſuperior to hardſhips than the meaneſt ſoldier " in your ranks (for your own eyes can witneſs to how low a ſtate my " bodily infirmities have reduced me,) who however in the conti- " nued happineſs of my former courſe of life, or in any other re- " gard, am inferior to none amongſt you, — yet am buffeted now " by the ſtorms and outrages of fortune as cruelly as ever were the " vileſt and moſt abject of my fellow-creatures. It is true, I have " ever habitually worſhipped the Gods, with a conſcientious defer- " ence to eſtabliſhed laws; and have made juſtice and beneficence " to man the conſtant practice of my life. Upon the ſtrength of " this, when I look forwards to the future, my mind is enlivened " with invigorating hope; — tho' I own theſe misfortunes, ſo far " undeſerved, ſtrike no little terror on my thoughts; — but better " times perhaps may be approaching. For ſure our enemies have

" been

" been bleſſed with an ample meaſure of ſucceſs; and, tho' ſome
" Deity may have frowned at firſt on this our expedition, yet, by
" this time his wrath muſt be fully wreaked upon us. We are not
" the firſt inſtance of a people, who have wantonly invaded the poſ-
" ſeſſions of another. Many ſuch offences have taken their riſe
" from the impulſe of human paſſions, and have been puniſhed with
" ſuch a meaſure of vengeance, as human nature was able to en-
" dure. Good reaſon therefore have we now to hope for a milder
" fate from the offended Deity; who, depreſſed as we are, ſeem
" objects of compaſſion much more than of reſentment. Caſt
" therefore your eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and the
" goodly numbers, which even now compoſe your retreat; and let
" the fight revive and chear your drooping ſpirits. Conclude, that
" wherever you chuſe to halt, you are of yourſelves that inſtant a
" mighty community; ſuch, as no other Sicilian people can pre-
" ſume to ſtand before ſhould you attack, nor to diſpoſſeſs wherever
" you think proper to ſettle. But, that your march be orderly and
" ſafe — be that the care of each individual amongſt your ranks,
" made warm and earneſt by the thought, that on whatever ſpot
" you may be compelled to fight, on that, if crowned with victory,
" you regain a country and a bulwark of your own. But then, our
" march muſt be continued both day and night with unabating ſpeed,
" becauſe our ſtock of proviſion is but ſcanty. And can we but
" reach ſome friendly territory belonging to the Siculi, who from
" their exceſſive dread of the Syracuſans will ever preſerve their at-
" tachment to us, conclude yourſelves that moment to be beyond
" the reach of danger. Send therefore your meſſengers beforehand
" to them, with orders to meet us on our route, and bring us the
" needful ſupplies of food. On the whole, my fellow-ſoldiers, reſt
" aſſured that the laſt neceſſity injoins you to be reſolutely brave,
" ſince to cowardiſe now no place of ſhelter is any longer open; and
" only, if you ſtem the efforts of your foes — *can* you again be

" happy in the enjoyment of thoſe ſcenes your eyes ſo fondly regret;
" and *can* Athenians re-erect the extenſive power of the Athenian
" *State*, how low ſoever it may be fallen at preſent. For they
" are *men* who make a *State*, not walls nor ſhips by men
" abandoned."

The Athenian march.

With theſe words of encouragement Nicias ran regularly thro' all the ranks of the whole army; careful at the ſame time, if he ſaw any parties ſtraggling from the main body and quitting the order of the march, to fetch them up and replace them. Demoſthenes exerted himſelf as diligently in his own department, encouraging his troops with the ſame energy and ardor of addreſs. The body under Nicias, drawn up in a ſquare, led the van of the march; that under Demoſthenes brought up the rear; whilſt the baggage-men and the numerous croud that attended the camp marched within the centre of the heavy-armed.

Haraſſed by the enemy.

When they were advanced to the place of fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syracuſans and allies drawn up in battalia there, to oppoſe the paſſage. But, putting theſe to flight, they gained the paſſage of that river, and advanced into the country beyond; tho' their march was terribly haraſſed by the incurſions of the Syracuſan horſe, and by the miſſive weapons, which the light-armed of the enemy poured in from time to time amongſt them. And yet in this day's march the Athenians wrought about * forty ſtadia, and halted for the night upon an eminence.

* *about 4 miles.*

On the enſuing day by early dawn they were again in motion, and advanced about † twenty ſtadia, when deſcending into a certain plain they halted and formed an incampment. Their deſign in this was to fetch in ſome proviſions, for the adjacent country was inhabited; and to get a proper ſupply of water to carry along with them. For in the country beyond, through which their route was fixed, no ſprings were to be met with for the length of ſeveral ſtadia. But during

† *2 miles.*

during this halt, the Syracuſans advancing beyond them throw up a work acroſs their route, to ſtop their further progreſs. The ſpot choſe for this was a ſtrong eminence, flanked on both ſides by an inacceſſible crag, and known by the name of Acræum-Lepas.

On the day following the Athenians reſumed their march; but the horſe and numerous darters of the Syracuſans and allies ſtop'd their advance, the latter pouring in their weapons upon, and the former riding up and diſordering their ranks. For a long time, it is true, the Athenians maintained the ſkirmiſhes againſt them; but, at length, they retreated again to their laſt incampment. And now, all further ſupplies of proviſions were totally cut off; it being no longer poſſible to fetch in any for fear of the horſe.

But, decamping early in the morning, they continued their march, and forced their progreſs to the eminence which was fortified by the new work. Here they found the Syracuſan infantry drawn up before them in firm and deep battalia, poſted alſo on the ſtrong eminence they had occupied on purpoſe: for the paſs was very narrow. The Athenians marched up and aſſaulted the work; but being pelted by ſhowers of darts from the eminence, which was very ſteep, and ſo gave thoſe upon it a great advantage in throwing their weapons home; and finding themſelves unable to force it; they again drew off, and attempted it no further. It happened at the ſame time, that ſome claps of thunder were heard accompanied with rain, effects not unuſual in this ſeaſon, as the year was now in autumn. And yet, theſe accidents contributed ſtill more to diſpirit the Athenians; who concluded, that every thing now acted in combination for their deſtruction. During this interval of inaction, Gylippus and the Syracuſans ſend off a detachment of their forces to throw up a work in their rear, where the enemy had already paſſed. But the Athenians ſent alſo a detachment of their own body, which prevented its execution. And after this, wheeling off with their whole body more into the plains, they halted there for the night.

The

The next morning they began to move forwards again. And now, the Syracuſans beſetting them quite round in a circle poured vollies of darts and arrows amongſt them, and wounded numbers. If indeed the Athenians ſallied out againſt them, they retreated; but, when the Athenians drew back, they then preſſed upon their retreat; and falling in chiefly amongſt their rear, if at any time they put ſmall parties to flight, they ſtruck a conſternation into the whole army. But for a long time, in ſuch a train of ſkirmiſhings, the Athenians made good their ground; and, advancing afterwards the length of * five or ſix ſtadia, they halted in a plain. Here alſo the Syracuſans no longer moleſted them, but withdrew to their own camp.

* *Above* $\frac{1}{2}$ *a mile.*

March in two columns.

This night it was determined by Nicias and Demoſthenes that — ſince the army was reduced to ſo low a condition, and began already to be preſſed with a total failure of proviſions; ſince further large numbers had been wounded in the many incidental aſſaults of the enemy; — they ſhould firſt kindle a great number of fires, and then march the whole army off, no longer by the route which they had firſt projected, but by another towards the ſea, quite contrary to that which the Syracuſans had already pre-occupied and guarded. The reſidue of the march was no longer pointed towards Catana, but to the other coaſt of Sicily, towards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that quarter both Grecian and Barbarian. In purſuance of this, a large number of fires being kindled, they diſlodged in the dead of night.

This part of their retreat — as is the general fate of armies but eſpecially of the greateſt, ever ſubject to fears and panics, particularly when moving in the night and on hoſtile ground, and conſcious further that the enemy is cloſe at their heels — was made in a ſad and diſorderly manner. The column indeed under Nicias, which compoſed the van, kept firm together in a body, and quite out-marched the reſt of the army. But that under Demoſthenes, being one half at leaſt if not the major part of the whole force, was ſeparated from the

the van, and came on in great confuſion and diſorder. However, by the dawn of day they reach the coaſt; and gaining the great road which is called *the Helorine*, took their route along it; that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis, they might pierce upwards along the courſe of that river into the heart of the country. For thus, they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom they had ſummoned to be ready on their route. But when they had gained the ſight of that river, they found its banks already occupied by a Syracuſan guard, buſy in throwing up a rampart and paliſado to defend its paſſage. This party they ſoon diſperſed, and paſſed the river; and from thence advanced towards another river, the Erineus; for thus their guides had plan'd their route.

In the mean time the Syracuſans and allies, when the day was clearly broke, and they knew the Athenians were ſtole off, began in general to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus; as if the Athenians had made their eſcape through his connivance. Yet beginning the purſuit with all poſſible expedition, and it was eaſily diſcoverable what route they had taken, they come up with them about the hour of repaſte. And, as they fell in firſt with the column under the orders of Demoſthenes, which compoſed the rear, and had moved in a more ſlow and diſorderly manner than the van, becauſe the darkneſs of the night had ſo highly incommoded and confounded their march; they immediately charged them, and fought. The Syracuſan cavalry beſet them quite round, the more eaſily indeed as they were ſeparated from the van; and drove them into one crouded heap. But the column under Nicias was now * fifty ſtadia before them. For Nicias led them forwards with great celerity, concluding that their ſafety conſiſted, not in lingring voluntarily at ſo critical a period, or expoſing themſelves to an engagement; but, in puſhing forwards with their utmoſt ſpeed, and fighting only when by abſolute neceſſity they were compelled to fight. But then Demoſthenes was involved in a much more laborious and continued toil; becauſe, as he

* *Above 5 miles.*

he filed off laſt, the enemies were leſt upon his rear; and, ſoon convinced that they had began the purſuit, he was obliged, not ſo much to move forward as to draw up his troops in the order of battle, 'till by ſuch neceſſitated lingering he is environed by them; and himſelf, and the body of Athenians under him, are thrown into high tumult and confuſion. For now, hemm'd in as they were on a certain ſpot, ſurrounded quite round by walls; and whence the iſſues both on one ſide and the other were full of olive-trees; they were terribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracuſans wiſely choſe to give them, and to decline all cloſe engagement: becauſe, to hazard the latter againſt enemies now become quite deſperate, they judged would make more for the advantage of the Athenians than of themſelves. Tho' at the ſame time, a kind of frugality, inſpired by the great career of ſucceſs they had already obtained, taught them not to exhauſt their ſtrength on ſuperfluous encounters; and perſuaded them, that *thus* they might effectually ſubdue, and make this great army their priſoners. When therefore, for the whole remainder of the day, they had galled them on all ſides with miſſive weapons, and now perceived, that the Athenians and their allies were reduced to a miſerable plight by the wounds which they had received and the other calamities which lay hard upon them; Gylippus, in concert with the Syracuſans and allies, cauſeth a herald to proclaim, — Firſt, that "ſuch inhabitants of the "iſles as would come over to them ſhould reſt in the ſecure enjoy-"ment of their liberty." — Upon which, ſome cities, tho' not many, went over to them: And in the next place, after ſome time, a ſurrender is agreed on of the whole body of troops commanded by Demoſthenes, on the terms, that "they ſhould deliver up their "arms; and, no one ſhould ſuffer death, either by public execu-"tion, or the miſeries of a priſon, or the want of neceſſary ſub-"ſiſtence." Thus, this whole body, to the number of ſix thouſand men, ſurrender'd themſelves priſoners, and produced all the ſilver they

The column under Demoſthenes *ſurrenders.*

they had about them, which they were commanded to throw into the hollows of ſhields, four of which in this manner were filled full with ſpoil. And theſe priſoners the victors immediately led away to Syracuſe.

But Nicias, and the column under his command, arrived the ſame day on the banks of the Erineus; and, having paſſed that river, halted on an eminence. The day following, the Syracuſans coming up to his poſt, notified to Nicias, that "thoſe under Demoſthenes had "ſurrender'd;" and ſummoned him to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, he begs leave to ſend out a horſeman to diſcover the truth; who upon his return affirming that "they had actu-"ally ſurrender'd," Nicias ſends an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracuſans, that he was ready to ſtipulate in the name of the Athenians — that, "whatever ſums the Syracuſans had expended in this "war ſhould be fairly reimburſed, on condition the forces under his "command might have free departure; but, till the money could be "paid, he would leave with them a number of Athenians as hoſtages "for performance, a man for a talent." *Nicias would fain treat.*

Gylippus and the Syracuſans refuſed the offer; and, reſuming offenſive meaſures, ranged their parties quite round the eminence, and poured in their miſſive weapons upon them till the evening. This body of troops was alſo ſadly diſtreſſed for want of bread and neceſſary ſubſiſtence. Watching however for the dead and ſilent hours of the night, they were then determined to continue their march. They accordingly take up their arms; the Syracuſans perceive it, and ſung the pæan of alarm. The Athenians were *thus* convinced, that they could not diſlodge without being diſcovered, and ſo grounded their arms again; all, but one party of three hundred men. For theſe, having forced themſelves a paſſage through the guards, made off in the night as faſt as it was poſſible.

So ſoon as the day appeared, Nicias at the head of his troops led them forwards. But the Syracuſans and allies preſſed upon him on *He marches on.*

all ſides in the uſual manner, pouring in vollies of darts and javelins. The Athenians made the beſt of their way to reach the river Aſſinarus; — not only becauſe annoyed on all ſides by the irruption of the numerous cavalry and ſkirmiſhing parties, they concluded they ſhould be eaſed of theſe could they once paſs that river; but alſo, through bodily fatigue, and a vehement deſire to extinguiſh their thirſt. When therefore they are upon the bank, they ruſh into the river; no longer obſervant of order, but each ſingle ſoldier intent on paſſing the firſt of the army. And the enemy, who now preſſed hard upon them, had rendered the paſſage already a buſineſs of toil. For, obliged as they were to go down in confuſed heaps, they fell and trampled upon one another; ſome, embaraſſed by their ſpears and luggage, met with inſtant deſtruction; others, intangled in the croud, were carried away by the current. The hither bank of the river was now filled with Syracuſans; and, it being naturally ſteep, they poured down their darts upon the Athenians, numbers of whom were drinking greedily of the ſtream, confuſedly hampered together in the hollow of the channel. The Peloponneſians, plunging in after them, made a great ſlaughter of thoſe who were in the river. The water was immediately diſcoloured with blood. But the ſtream polluted with mud and gore deterred them not from drinking it greedily, nor many of them for fighting deſperately for a draught of it. But in ſhort, when the carcaſes of the dead began to lie heaped one upon another in the river, and the whole army was become a continued carnage [7]; of ſome in the river; of thoſe, who were making off from the banks, by the horſemen of the foe; Nicias ſurrenders himſelf priſoner to Gylippus, into whoſe power he choſe to fall ſooner than into that of the Syracuſans. He told him, that "he "himſelf and the Lacedæmonians might decide his fate as beſt "pleaſed themſelves; but intreated, that a ſtop might be put to the

He ſurrenders.

7 According to *Diodorus Siculus*, the number of the ſlain amounted to eighteen thouſand men.

ſlaughter

" ſlaughter of his ſoldiers." Upon this, Gylippus iſſued out orders to give quarter; and thus they carried off the remnants of this body as priſoners of war, ſuch excepted as were ſecreted by their captors, the number of which was large. Having further detached a party in purſuit of the three hundred, who in the night had broke through the guard; they alſo made them priſoners. The whole number now collected together as the public prize was not large; but very numerous were they, who were clandeſtinely ſecreted. Not a town in Sicily but was crouded with them, ſince theſe had not ſurrender'd upon terms like thoſe under Demoſthenes. A conſiderable number had alſo periſhed. For this was a terrible ſlaughter; nay, there was no one greater in the courſe of the Sicilian war. And in the preceding ſkirmiſhes, which had happened very frequently during the march, not a few had been ſlain. Yet notwithſtanding all this, many made their eſcape; ſome, from the ſcenes of action; and others, from their priſons, from whence they afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. Theſe repaired to Catana as a ſafe reſort.

Both put to death.

And now, the Syracuſans and allies in one grand collective body, having amaſſed together as large a number of priſoners as they poſſibly could and all the ſpoils, returned in triumph to Syracuſe. The bulk of priſoners, whether of the Athenians or their confederates, whom they had taken, they thruſt down into the quarries; concluding, that from ſuch a confinement they could not poſſibly make eſcapes; but Nicias and Demoſthenes, in ſpite of all the remonſtrances of Gylippus, they butchered. For Gylippus imagined, that the finiſhing of this war would inveſt himſelf with pre-eminent degrees of glory, if beſides the reſt of his atchievements he could carry home to the Lacedæmonians the Generals of the enemy. It had further ſo happened, that one of theſe, that is Demoſthenes, was regarded as their moſt inveterate enemy, becauſe of his exploits againſt them in the iſland Sphacteria and Pylus; and the other (Nicias) as their moſt ſincere well-

well-wiſher, from his behaviour on thoſe very incidents. For Nicias had ſtrenuouſly exerted himſelf in behalf of thoſe Lacedæmonians, who were made priſoners in the iſland. It was he, who prevailed with the Athenians to ſign the treaty, in purſuance of which they were releaſed. For ſuch ſervices done them, the Lacedæmonians had a kindneſs for him; and it had been chiefly owing to his aſſurance of this, that he ſurrender'd himſelf priſoner to Gylippus. But a party of the Syracuſans, as was generally reported, fearful, becauſe they had kept up a correſpondence with him, leſt, if put to the torture, he might now amidſt the general proſperity involve them in trouble; others alſo, and not leaſt of all the Corinthians, leſt as he was rich he might purchaſe the connivence of his keepers to get his liberty; and then again, might have influence enough to foment freſh ſtirs to their prejudice; obtained the concurrence of their allies, and put him to death. For theſe, or reaſons moſt nearly neighbouring to theſe, was Nicias doomed to deſtruction; tho' the man of all the Grecians in the preſent age, who leaſt deſerved ſo wretched a cataſtrophe, ſince his whole life was one uniform ſeries of piety towards the Deity *.

The Athenians *confined in the quarries.*

As for thoſe who were doomed to the quarries, the Syracuſans treated them at firſt with outrageous ſeverity. As great numbers were crouded together in this hollow dungeon, the beams of the ſun in the firſt place, and then the ſuffocating air annoyed them in a more terrible manner, becauſe the aperture was left uncovered; and each ſucceeding night, the reverſe of the preceding day, autumnal and nipping, through ſuch viciſſitudes threw them into ſtrange diſorders. Thus ſtraitned as they were for room, they did whatever they had to do on one and the ſame ſpot; and the carcaſes of thoſe who died lay heaped up promiſcuouſly together; as ſome expired of their wounds, and others periſhed through the viciſſitudes of air they ſuffered, or ſome other ſuch deadly cauſe. At length, the ſtench became into-

* Mr. Hobbes in his tranſlation hath omitted this laſt Comma.

lerably

lerably noiſome; and they were further oppreſſed with hunger and thirſt. For, during the ſpace of eight months, the allowance to each was only a * *cotyl* of water and two † *cotyls* of bread a day. Nay, whatever ſpecies of miſery numbers cooped up in ſo cloſe a confinement might be liable to ſuffer, not one of theſe but preſſed cruelly upon them. They were all thus thronged and dieted together for ſeventy days. But after this term, all but the Athenians, and ſuch of the Sicilians and Italians, as had joined with them in the invaſion, were ſold out for ſlaves [8].

* *Little more than half a pint.*

† *About 32 ſolid inches.*

The cloſe.

What the whole number of priſoners was, it is hard exactly to relate; but however they could not be fewer than ſeven thouſand. And this proved to be the greateſt Grecian exploit of all that happened in the courſe of this war; and, in my opinion, of all that occur in the whole hiſtory of Greece; ſince the event to the victors was moſt glorious, and to the vanquiſhed moſt calamitous. For in every reſpect they were totally overpowered, and their miſeries in no reſpect had any mitigation; in ſhort, root and branch, as is commonly ſaid,

8 "The decent and engaging behaviour "of the Athenians was of great ſervice to "them. For by it they either ſoon obtained "their liberty, or were highly eſteemed "and careſſed by their maſters. Some of "them were indebted for their freedom to "Euripides. The Sicilians, it ſeems, "were fonder of the muſe of Euripides, "than were even the people who lived in "Greece itſelf. If the ſtrangers, who "were often reſorting to Sicily, brought "them any ſpecimens or morſels of his "poetry, they learned them by heart, and "with high delight communicated them "to their friends. It is ſaid, that ſeveral, "who by this means earned their liberty, "went afterwards to wait upon Euripides "in token of their gratitude; aſſuring "him, ſome of them, that they had "been releaſed from ſlavery, for teaching "their maſters what pieces of his writing "they were able to repeat; and others, "that, when vagabonds after the defeat, "they had been ſupplied with meat and "drink for ſinging ſome of his lines. This "is not to be wondered at; ſince, even a "Caunian veſſel, which being hard chaced "by pirates, and endeavouring to get for "refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was how-"ever kept off by force; 'till at length "being asked, Whether they could repeat "any of Euripides his verſes? they an-"ſwered in the affirmative; upon which "they obtained immediate reception and "refuge." *Plutarch* in the Life of *Nicias*.

their

their land-armies and their ſhipping were now ruined; nay, nothing belonging to them was exempted from deſtruction. And few, out of all their numbers, had the good fortune to reviſit their native country.

Such were the tranſactions in Sicily[9].

9 Some Iambic verſes of an unknown author are found at the end of this book in the latter Greek editions; and I beg the reader to accept the following tranſlation of them.

The pride of glory, the exalted height,
The frequent trophies on the land and ſea,
The long career of well deſerv'd ſucceſs,
On which their great forefathers towr'd aloft,
Whilſt Perſia trembled at th' Athenian name,
Now droop'd at once! —— a chaos ſoon ſucceeds
Of anarchy, deſtruction, and diſtreſs:
Low ebb'd the *State*, as high it erſt had flow'd.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE EIGHTH.

CONTENTS.

THE news of the overthrow in Sicily cauſeth a great conſternation at Athens. All Greece is in combination againſt them: And their dependents are meditating revolts.

Year XX. *Revolt of the Chians. An alliance between Darius Nothus and the Lacedæmonians. The war transferred to Ionia. Battle of Miletus. A ſecond alliance between Darius and the Lacedæmonians. Proceedings at Chios. Revolt of Rhodes. The politic conduct of Alcibiades: His intrigues. A ſedition among the Athenians at Samos in favour of an oligarchy. Phrynichus counterplots Alcibiades. A third alliance between Darius and the Lacedæmonians.*

Year XXI. *Proceedings at Chios. The democracy overturned in ſeveral places of the Athenian juriſdiction; and at Athens, by the influence of Antipho, Phrynichus, and Theramenes. A council of four hundred take upon them the government. The army at Samos declares for the democracy, recals Alcibiades, and elects him* General. *Athens full of factions. Phrynichus ſtabbed. A tumult; in the midſt of which the fleet of the enemy appears in ſight. Battle of Eretria: And revolt of Eubœa. The Four-hundred are depoſed: And a new form of government ſettled at Athens. The baniſhment of Alcibiades repealed. Battle of Cynos-Sema.*



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VIII.

Conſternation at Athens.

WHEN the news was reported at Athens, no belief for a long time was given — even tho' the moſt creditable part of the ſoldiery, who had made their eſcape from this diſaſtrous buſineſs, proved it by a circumſtantial relation — that ſo total a deſtruction was become their lot. But no ſooner were they convinced of its [1] reality, than their reſentments burſt forth againſt thoſe

1 *Plutarch* from report tells an odd ſtory on this occaſion. —— "A ſtranger, who "(it ſeems) had come aſhore at the Pi- "ræus, and had ſat him down in a bar- "ber's ſhop, began to talk about the over- "throw in Sicily, as of a point well "known at Athens. The barber hearing "it, before any other perſon had the "news, ran with all ſpeed up into the "city; and, having firſt informed the "magiſtrates of it, ſpread the report in an "inſtant all over the forum. Conſterna- "tion and tumult at once enſued. The "magiſtrates convened an aſſembly of the people,

thoſe of the orators, who had adviſed and recommended the expedition, as if their own ſuffrages had never concurred to its execution. They further vented their gall againſt thoſe retailers of oracles and foretellers of future events, againſt all in general, who, pretending privity to the will of heaven, had elevated their hopes with the certain conqueſt of Sicily. On all ſides now, all manner of diſaſters environed them about; and never had Athens been thrown into ſo great a conſternation and dejection, as at the preſent juncture. For now, beſide what each private family ſuffered, as the *public* at the ſame time had loſt the bulk of its heavy-armed and horſemen, and that flower of its youth which they ſaw it impoſſible to replace, they were ſorely dejected. Conſcious, further, that they had not ſhipping ſufficient in their docks for a freſh equipment, nor money in the public treaſury, nor even hands to man what veſſels they had left, they gave up all hope of deliverance in the preſent plunge. Their enemies from Sicily, they imagined, would ſoon enter the Piræus with a powerful navy; eſpecially, as they were fluſhed with ſuch a career of ſucceſs; and their enemies nearer home would now, for a certainty, redouble their preparations, and with the utmoſt reſolution fall upon them at once both by ſea and land, and be farther ſtrengthened by the revolt of their own temporizing confederates. At laſt, however, they agreed it was their duty to do what might yet be done, — not baſely to abandon their own preſervation, but to fit out a navy by collecting from all poſſible reſources both timber and money, — and timely to ſecure their own dependent-*States*, above all Eubœa, — and to reduce the expences of the civil adminiſtration with all poſſible œconomy, — and to lodge the ſove-

" people, and produced the barber before " them. He was called upon to tell from " whom he had the news: And, when he " could not name the perſon, being looked " upon as an idle fellow and a diſturber of " the public peace, he was immediately " tied upon the wheel, and a long time " whirled round upon it, 'till ſeveral perſons arrived, who gave a minute and " circumſtantial account of the whole." *Life* of *Nicias*.

reignty

reignty in the hands of a ſelect body of old experienced ſtateſmen, whoſe maturer counſels might if poſſible yet extricate the *State* from its preſent misfortunes. Such an effect had the general conſternation now upon them, — an effect not unuſual with a *people*, — that they became heartily diſpoſed to order their government aright. And, as to ſuch reſolutions they came, they proceeded farther to put them in execution: And the ſummer ended.

The reſt of Greece in high ſpirits.

In the beginning of the enſuing winter, animated by the terrible blow the Athenians had received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece was alert againſt them. Even ſuch, as had hitherto obſerved a ſtrict neutrality, without ſo much as waiting for a formal invitation to accede, thought it incumbent upon themſelves no longer to be abſent from the war, but voluntarily to enter the liſts againſt the Athenians. Not a *State* but reaſoned thus — that "themſelves alſo theſe "Athenians, had they ſucceeded in Sicily, would undoubtedly have "attacked;" and then concluded — that "as the war for certainty "was very nearly finiſhed, it would be glorious for them to have a "hand in its completion." But, the old confederates of the Lacedæmonians, as their deſires were greater; ſo they exerted themſelves now with higher alacrity than ever to procure a ſpeedy relaxation of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a moſt remarkable manner, ſuch *States* as were dependent upon Athens manifeſted their readineſs to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution; ſince now, they formed their judgments in all the warmth of indignation, and could diſcern no probable method, by which the Athenians could retard their ruin for another ſummer.

Particularly the Lacedæmonians.

All theſe circumſtances coinciding, the Lacedæmonian *State* became prodigiouſly alert; and, above all, with the expectation, that their confederates of Sicily with a powerful reinforcement, as their navies muſt now of neceſſity act in concert, would be with them, in all probability, very early in the ſpring. In every view their hopes were gallant and elate. They determined to go on with the war

without any delay; concluding, that if once brought well to a concluſion, they ſhould ever for the future be releaſed from ſuch dangers as had lately threatned from Athens, in caſe Sicily had been reduced: And, ſhould they now demoliſh their competitors, muſt remain for the future ſupreme leaders of Greece, without fear of a reverſe.

Agis *in motion.* Inſtantly therefore Agis their king, though in the depth of winter, ſallying forth with a body of troops from Deceléa, marched round the confederacy, levying ſums of money for the ſervice of the marine. Turning his route to the Melian gulf, he took a large booty from the Ætæans, againſt whom their enmity had been of long duration, which he converted into money. He alſo compelled thoſe Achæans, who were ſeated in the Pthiotis, and other *States* in this quarter dependent on Theſſaly, ſpite of all the complaints and murmurs of the Theſſalians, to give him ſome hoſtages for their good behaviour, and to furniſh him with money. He diſpoſed of theſe hoſtages into ſafe cuſtody at Corinth, and ſpared no pains to get them over into the alliance.

Order for a large equipment. The Lacedæmonians, further, circulated an order among the *States*, for the building of one hundred ſail of ſhips. They taxed themſelves and the Bœotians to furniſh reſpectively twenty-five, the Phocians and Locrians fifteen, the Corinthians fifteen, the Arcadians and Pellenians and Sicyonians ten, the Megaréans and Trœzenians and Epidaurians and Hermionians ten. They went to work with all other needful preparations, that they might proſecute the war briſkly upon the firſt approach of ſpring.

Meaſures taken at Athens. The Athenians on the other hand, were not remiſs in preparing for their own defence; ſince, in purſuance of the plan they had formed, they were buſy during all the winter in building of ſhips, having collected proper quantities of timber; and in fortifying Sunium, that the navigation of their victuallers round that cape might be preſerved from moleſtation. They alſo evacuated the fortreſs in Laconia, which they had raiſed in the voyage to Sicily. And in all reſpects,

reſpects, where they judged themſelves involved in any leſs needful expence, they contracted their diſburſements with the utmoſt frugality. But their principal care was keeping a cloſe eye upon their dependents, that they might not revolt.

Schemes for revolts.

Amidſt theſe employments of both parties, which were nothing leſs than moſt earneſt preparations on all ſides, as if war was juſt in its commencement; the Eubœans took the lead, and ſent embaſſadors this winter to treat with Agis about a revolt from the Athenians. Agis accepted what terms they propoſed, and ſends for Alcamenes the ſon of Sthenelaïdas and Melanthus from Lacedæmon, to paſs over as commanders into Eubœa. Accordingly they arrived with a body of * citizens newly infranchiſed, to the number of about three hundred; and Agis was preparing for their tranſportation. But in this interval the Leſbians arrived, with declarations of their readineſs to revolt. And, as they were ſeconded by the recommendations of the Bœotians, Agis is perſuaded to put off for a time the affair of Eubœa, and began to expedite the revolt of the Leſbians, having aſſigned them Alcamenes for their governor, who was to have paſſed over to Eubœa. The Bœotians promiſed to ſend them ten ſhips, and Agis ten. Theſe points were tranſacted without the privity of the Lacedæmonian *State*. For Agis, ſo long as he continued at Decelëa, having under his command the army of the *State*, was inveſted with a power of ſending detachments whitherſoever he thought proper, and to levy men and money at his own diſcretion. And it may with truth be affirmed, that the confederates during this period paid a much greater deference to him than to the *State* of Lacedæmon. For having a powerful force under his own orders, he was formidable in his every motion. And thus he arbitrarily ſettled the negotiation of the Leſbians.

* Neodamodes.

But then, the Chians and the Erythræans, who alſo were deſirous to revolt, addreſſed themſelves not to Agis but at Lacedæmon. In their company alſo went thither an embaſſador from Tiſſaphernes, who

who was lieutenant for Darius the ſon of Artaxerxes in the maritime provinces of Aſia. Even Tiſſaphernes concerned himſelf now to inflame the Peloponneſian ardor, and promiſed them large ſupplies. For lately he had been ſummoned by *the king* to make returns of the revenue of his government, which not being able to exact from the Grecian cities becauſe of the Athenians, he was run into a large arrear. He concluded therefore, that, could he demoliſh the Athenians, he then with great eaſe might levy the tributes; what is more, might make the Lacedæmonians confederates to the *king*; and might at length convey to him, either alive or dead, Amorges the baſtard-ſon of Piſſuthnes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king had expreſly commanded. The Chians therefore and Tiſſaphernes were now negotiating this point in concert.

Calligitus the ſon of Laophon a Megaréan and Timagoras the ſon of Athenagoras a Cyzicene, both exiles from their native places and refuged with Pharnabazus the ſon of Pharnabacus, arrive at Lacedæmon about the ſame point of time, commiſſioned by Pharnabazus to procure an aid of ſhipping for the Helleſpont, by which he might be enabled (the very ſame thing as Tiſſaphernes deſired) to work the revolt of the cities within his diſtrict from the Athenian obedience, becauſe of the tributes, and expeditiouſly to gain for himſelf the credit of having procured for his maſter the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. As the agents of Pharnabazus and thoſe alſo of Tiſſaphernes were negotiating the ſame point, though apart from each other, a great debate aroſe among the ſtateſmen at Lacedæmon; one party inſiſting with vehemence, that an aid of ſhipping and a land-force ſhould be ſent to Ionia and Chios; another party, that they ſhould be ſent firſt to Helleſpont. The Lacedæmonians, however, complied by far the ſooneſt with the demands of the Chians and Tiſſaphernes. Alcibiades indeed eſpouſed the cauſe of the latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark hereditary friendſhip to Endius, who at this juncture preſided in the college of *Ephori*. On this account it

it was, that the family of Alcibiades, in compliment to this friendſhip, had taken a Lacedæmonian name: For this Endius was the ſon of an Alcibiades. Yet, previouſly, the Lacedæmonians diſpatched Phrynis, a perſon born and educated in thoſe parts, to Chios; to inſpect the ſtate of affairs there and report, whether they had ſo large a number of ſhipping as they pretended, and their ſituation in other reſpects equalized the fine account they had given of it. Accordingly, when Phrynis had reported, "that all the accounts they had "heard were true," the Chians and Erythræans were inſtantly admitted allies. They voted, farther, to ſend them forty ſail of ſhipping, as there were already aſſembled at Chios not fewer than ſixty from places which the Chians named. Ten of theſe they deſigned to diſpatch as ſoon as poſſible, under the command of Melanchridas who was appointed admiral. But afterwards, the ſhock of an earthquake being felt, inſtead of Melanchridas they ſent Chalcideus; and, inſtead of ten, equipped in Laconia only five ſhips for this ſervice.

Here the winter ended; and the nineteenth year of this war came alſo to an end, of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory.

YEAR XX.

SUMMER now coming on, as the Chians were moſt earneſtly ſoliciting the diſpatch of the ſhips, and were alſo afraid leſt the Athenians ſhould get notice of their tranſactions, — For the whole of the negotiation had been carried on without the knowledge of the latter — the Lacedæmonians ſend to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, to prevail with that *State* for the tranſportation of their ſhips with all poſſible expedition acroſs the Iſthmus, from the other ſea into that which lies towards Athens, that all in a body might ſtand away for Chios, as well thoſe which Agis had deſtined for the ſervice of Lesbos

Before Chriſt 412. *The Lacedæmonian mea-ſures.*

Leſbos as the reſt. The whole number of ſhipping belonging to the alliance, now aſſembled together there, amounted to thirty-nine.

But Calligitus truly and Timagoras refuſed, in the name of Pharnabazus, to have any participation in the expedition to Chios; nor would part with the money they had brought with them, which was * five and twenty talents, to diſburſe this equipment. They intended to get another fitted out, which ſhould ſail away under their own orders.

* 4843 *l.* 15 *s. Sterling.*

As for Agis — when now he perceived that the Lacedæmonians were determined to go *firſt* to Chios, he no longer ſuffered his own projects to claſh with thoſe of the *State:* But the confederates now aſſembling at Corinth proceeded to draw up a plan of operations. It was accordingly agreed, that they ſhould go firſt to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who fitted out the five ſhips in Laconia; from thence to Leſbos under the command of Alcamenes, whom Agis had deſtined for that ſervice; in the laſt place they ſhould proceed to Helleſpont, and in this ſervice it was agreed beforehand that Clearchus the ſon of Ramphias ſhould take upon him the command: But the firſt ſtep ſhould be the tranſportation of a moiety of their ſhipping acroſs the Iſthmus, which were immediately to ſtand out to ſea, that the attention of the Athenians might be leſs engaged upon ſuch, as were already in their courſe, than on thoſe which were to follow. — For now they determined to croſs the ſea in an open inſulting manner, as they contemned the preſent impotence of the Athenians, becauſe they had no conſiderable force any where at ſea.

When theſe reſolutions were formally compleated, they immediately tranſported one and twenty ſhips. Expeditious ſailing was earneſtly ſolicited; but the Corinthians declared a reluctancy to go the voyage, 'till they had celebrated the Iſthmian games which were at hand. To remove this obſtacle, Agis declared himſelf ready to have the whole procedure charged to his own account, that they might be

be cleared from a breach of the Iſthmian ceſſation. The Corinthians not complying with this propoſal, and delay neceſſarily reſulting from it, the Athenians gained by this an earlier diſcovery of the negotiation of the Chians; and, diſpatching Ariſtocrates one of their generals, charged them openly with the guilt of ſuch a procedure. The Chians as ſtrenuouſly denying the charge, they commanded them to ſend away their ſhipping forthwith to Athens by way of pledge for their ſafety.

The Chians accordingly ſent ſeven. But the detachment of theſe was owing intirely to the *popular* party of that iſland, who had been kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. The *few*, who were privy to it, had no mind to incur the popular reſentment before they were enabled to ſtem its fury; eſpecially as now they had reſigned all hope of the arrival of the Peloponneſians, whoſe motions were exceeding dilatory.

In the mean time the Iſthmian games were ſolemnized. And at theſe the Athenians, who had the regular invitation ſent them, aſſiſted in form. The practices of the Chians became here more apparent to them than ever. No ſooner therefore were they returned to Athens, than they put all the needful expedients in readineſs, to prevent the ſquadron which was to ſail from Cenchreæ from paſſing undiſcovered.

When the feſtival was over, the latter with one and twenty ſail, under the command of Alcamenes, ſtood out to ſea in order for Chios. And the Athenians advancing againſt them, at firſt with an equal number of ſhipping, ſtood off again into open ſea. But when the Peloponneſians would not follow them far, but ſtood in to the land, the Athenians diſappeared. For, having amongſt their number the ſeven ſhips of the Chians, they thought it not ſafe to truſt them. But having afterwards manned out others to the amount of thirty-ſeven, they drive the enemy along the coaſt into Piræus of the Corinthians: This is a deſert harbour, and the laſt upon the confines of Epidauria.

A ſquadron ſails for Chios.

Intercepted, and driven into Piræus.

One ſhip indeed, which the enemy came up with at ſea, the Peloponneſians loſt; but all the reſt they draw together to a ſtation within the harbour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on the water with their ſhips, and by land with a party ſent purpoſely on ſhore. The attack was attended with great confuſion, and carried on in a diſorderly manner. The party of the Athenians, which attacked from the land, diſable the bulk of the ſquadron, and kill the commander Alcamenes: Some alſo of their own people periſhed in the action. But when the diſpute was ended, they poſted a ſufficient number of their ſhips to lie facing thoſe of the enemy, and with the remainder anchor near a little iſle, on which as it lay at a ſmall diſtance they form an incampment, and ſend away to Athens for a reinforcement.

Blocked up there.

In favour of the Peloponneſians, came up, on the day following, not only the Corinthians; but, ſoon after, a number alſo of others from the adjacent country in aid of the ſquadron; who perceiving, that the preſervation of it would be a work of laborious toil on ſo deſart a coaſt, were ſadly perplexed. Some argued vehemently for ſetting the ſhips on fire; but at length it was concluded to draw them aſhore, and incamping with their land-forces round them to guard them from the enemy, till ſome convenient opportunity ſhould offer of getting them away. Agis alſo, when informed of their ſituation, ſent to them Thermo, a citizen of Sparta.

To the Lacedæmonians the firſt advice that had been ſent was this — that "the ſquadron had ſet ſail from the Iſthmus." For orders had been given Alcamenes by the *Ephori*, that when this point was executed he ſhould diſpatch an horſeman to them: And immediately then they had determined to diſpatch away the commander Chalcideus accompanied by Alcibiades, with the five ſhips of their own equipment. But at the inſtant they were ready to move off, the news arrived — that "the ſquadron had been drove into Piræus." Dejected by this unexpected event, becauſe they had ſtumbled in the

the very firſt entrance on an Ionian war, they no longer perſiſted in the deſign of ſending away their own ſhips, but even thought of recalling ſome of thoſe which were already at ſea. But as this was diſcovered by Alcibiades, he again perſuades Endius and the other *Ephori* by no means intirely to give up the expedition; aſſuring them, that "by a timely diſpatch they yet might make that iſland, "before any information of the diſaſter which had befallen the ſquadron could reach the Chians; and of himſelf, were he once in Ionia, "he could eaſily effectuate the revolt of the cities, by opening "their eyes in reſpect to the weakneſs of the Athenians, and the "hearty and vigorous interpoſition of the Lacedæmonians; ſince "on theſe topics he ſhould be heard with greater deference than "any other perſon whatever." He alſo privately encouraged Endius with the proſpect of "great glory to himſelf, if through him "Ionia could be brought to revolt and the *king* be made confederate "to Lacedæmon, whilſt Agis had no manner of participation in "theſe maſterly ſtrokes of policy:" For he happened now to be at [2] variance with Agis. By ſuch inſinuations Alcibiades prevailed upon the college of *Ephori* and Endius, and ſailed away with the five ſhips in company with Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian: And the voyage they performed with all poſſible expedition.

A ſecond ſquadron ſails.

2 No reaſons are here aſſigned for the variance between Alcibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones might occur from the different tempers and manners of the perſons. But we learn from *Plutarch*, that Alcibiades had been intriguing with Timæa the wife of Agis, and had had a ſon by her who was called Leotychides, diſowned afterwards by Agis, and incapacitated from ſucceeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always diſſolute; and yet, this (it ſeems) was merely to gratify his pride, ſince he declared his intention in this intrigue to have been, that his deſcendents might reign at Sparta. This fine gentleman from Athens was exceeding agreeable in the eyes of her Spartan majeſty; even tho' his deportment at Sparta was ſuch, as if he had been trained from his birth in the ſevere diſcipline of Lycurgus. He was a *thorough* Spartan, ſhaved cloſe, plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry bread, and feaſt on black broth: One would think, ſays *Plutarch*, he had never kept a cook in his life, never ſeen a perfumer, nor ever worn a Mileſian robe. *Life* of *Alcibiades*.

About the ſame time, the ſixteen ſhips which had been at the war of Sicily under the orders of Gylippus, regained in ſafety the Peloponneſian ports. They had been intercepted near Leucadia, and terribly haraſſed by twenty-ſeven ſail of Athenians commanded by Hippocles the ſon of Menippus, who was ſtationed there to watch the return of the fleet from Sicily. Yet only a ſingle ſhip was loſt. The reſt, eſcaping the Athenian chace, arrived ſafe in the harbour of Corinth.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were now upon their voyage, ſtopped and detained whatever they met, that their courſe might not be divulged. And touching firſt at Corycus on the main, and there ſetting at liberty ſuch as they had detained, and gaining a conference with ſome of the Chians who were privy to their deſigns, by whom being adviſed to make directly for the harbour of Chios, without any formal notification — they arrive there, intirely unexpected by the Chians. By this the *many* were thrown at once into aſtoniſhment and terror; but the *few* had ſo conducted matters, that the *council* was that moment ſitting; in which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admitted to ſpeech it — that "many other ſhips are coming "up," — but ſuppreſſing all mention of the ſquadron blocked up at Piræus, the Chians declare a revolt from the Athenians; and the Erythræans ſoon follow their example.

Revolt of Chios.

And Clazomenæ.

So far ſucceſsful, they paſſed on with three ſhips to Clazomenæ, and cauſe that city alſo to revolt. Inſtantly upon this, the Clazomenians croſſed over into the continent, and fortified Polichne, to be a place of ſafe reſort for themſelves, in caſe obliged to quit the little iſle they occupied at preſent. All the revolters, in ſhort, were warmly employed in fortifying their towns, and making preparations for war.

Meaſures taken at Athens.

At Athens ſoon the news arrives of the revolt of Chios. They were now convinced, that horrid and apparent dangers already enviroined them about, and that the reſt of their dependents would not long

long be quiet, when the moſt powerful *State* amongſt them had thrown off the yoke. Now therefore the * thouſand talents, which through all the courſe of the war they had religiouſly refrained from touching, the penalties being diſcharged which the law inflicted upon him who ſhould move or whoever ſhould vote it, amidſt their preſent conſternation, they decreed "ſhould be employed in the public ſer-" vice, and that a large number of ſhips ſhould by this means be " equipped; — that further, from the ſquadron which blocked up " Piræus eight ſhips ſhould immediately be detached;" which accordingly quitting the blockade, purſued the ſquadron under Chalcideus, but being unable to come up with them returned again. This detachment was commanded by Strombichides the ſon of Diotimus — that "ſoon after twelve others under the orders of Thraſycles ſhould " repair to Chios, theſe alſo to be detached from the ſame blockade." Having, moreover, fetched off the ſeven veſſels belonging to the Chians, which aſſiſted in forming the blockade at Piræus, they ſet at liberty the ſlaves who were on board them, and threw all the freemen into priſon. But, to replace the whole number detached from the blockade of the Peloponneſians, they loſt no time in fitting out other veſſels and ſending them to that poſt. They had alſo a ſcheme for the expeditious equipment of thirty more. Great indeed was their ardor, and nothing of ſmall importance was taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no leſs than the recovery of Chios.

* 19375*l.* *Sterling.*

In the mean time Strombichides with the eight ſail of ſhips arrived at Samos; and, taking with him one Samian veſſel, ſtood onwards to Teos, and required of them "to have no participation in " the preſent commotions." From Chios alſo, Chalcideus was now coming over to Teos with a fleet of three and twenty ſail; and the land-force of the Clazomenians and alſo of the Erythræans, attending his motions, was marching thither by land. But Strombichides, having timely notice of their approach, put out again before their arrival. Teos.

arrival. Standing out aloof into open ſea, he had a view of this numerous fleet in their courſe from Chios, upon which he fled amain to Samos. But the enemy followed in purſuit.

The Teïans, who at firſt refuſed admittance to the land-forces, when now the Athenians plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. Here, the bulk of them were inactive for a time, attending the return of Chalcideus from the purſuit. But when time wore on without his appearing, they demoliſhed of their own accord the wall which the Athenians had built on the ſide of Teos facing the continent. In this they were alſo aſſiſted by a ſmall party of Barbarians, who in this interval had joined them, and were commanded by Tages the deputy of Tiſſaphernes.

Revolt of Miletus.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chaced Strombichides into Samos, having furniſhed the mariners of the Peloponneſian veſſels with proper arms, leave them as a garriſon in Chios. Having manned their veſſels afreſh at Chios, with an addition of twenty others, they ſtood away for Miletus, as meditating its revolt. This was owing to Alcibiades, who, having an intereſt in perſons of the firſt rank among the Mileſians, made it a point to effectuate their acceſſion before the fleet ſhould come up from Peloponneſus, and to ſecure the whole honour to the Chians and himſelf and Chalcideus and Endius who had ſent him, in purſuance of his engagements to work the revolt of the cities with the ſole power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. Having therefore performed the greateſt part of their voyage thither without being diſcovered, and prevented by a ſmall portion of time Strombichides and alſo Thraſycles, who was lately come up from Athens with twelve ſhips and in junction with the former followed after them, they cauſe Miletus to revolt. The Athenians indeed with nineteen ſail arrived upon their heels; but, as the Mileſians denied them a reception, they took their ſtation at Lade an adjacent iſle.

The

The firſt alliance between *the king* and the Lacedæmonians was made immediately after the revolt of Miletus, by Tiſſaphernes and Chalcidæus, as followeth:

" ON theſe terms the Lacedæmonians and confederates have made " an alliance with *the king* and Tiſſaphernes ——

Alliance between the king and the Lacedæmonians.

" Whatever region or cities the *king* poſſeſſeth, and the anceſtors " of the *king* poſſeſſed, be thoſe the *king*'s.

" And out of thoſe cities whatever ſums of money or any other " ſupply went to the Athenians, let the *king* and the Lacedæmonians " and confederates jointly ſtop, that the Athenians may no longer " receive thoſe ſums of money, nor any other ſuch ſupply.

" And, the war againſt the Athenians let the *king* and the Lace- " dæmonians and confederates jointly carry on.

" And, be it unlawful to put an end to the war againſt the Athe- " nians, without the conſent of both the contracting parties, of the " *king* on one ſide, of the Lacedæmonians and confederates on the " other.

" If, further, any revolt from the *king*, be they declared enemies " to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

" And, if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and confederates, " be they declared enemies, in the ſame manner, to the *king*."

This alliance was now formally concluded.

Immediately after this, the Chians, who had manned out ten additional ſhips, ſtood away to Anæa, being deſirous to pick up ſome information of what was doing at Miletus, and at the ſame time to cauſe the revolt of the cities. Here, being reached by an order from Chalcideus to return back to Chios, with an intimation that Amorges with a land-army would ſoon be upon them, they ſailed away to the temple of Jupiter. From hence they deſcry ſixteen ſhips, which Dionedon was bringing up from Athens, from whence he had

More revolts.

ſailed

ſailed ſomewhat later than Thraſycles. Upon this diſcovery they fled amain — with a ſingle ſhip to Epheſus, but with the reſt of their fleet to Teos. Four indeed of the number, which their crews had abandoned, the Athenians take; yet all the hands eſcaped on ſhore; but the remainder reach in ſafety the city of the Teïans. After this, the Athenians ſtood away into Samos. But the Chians, putting again to ſea with the reſidue of their ſhips and attended by a land-force, cauſed Lebedos to revolt, and alſo Eræ. And theſe points carried, both the land-force and the ſquadron returned reſpectively to their own homes.

The blockade at Piræus *broke.*

About the ſame time, the twenty ſail of Peloponneſians, which had been chaced into Piræus and lay blocked up there by an equal number of Athenians, having made an unexpected ſally upon the enemy and got the better in a naval engagement, take four of the Athenian ſhips; and, ſailing away for Cenchreæ, were again fitting out for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Aſtyochus alſo came down thither from Lacedæmon as admiral, in whoſe hands the whole command at ſea was now lodged.

Teos.

When the land-army had quitted Teos, Tiſſaphernes in perſon came thither with a body; and, after compleatly demoliſhing thoſe parts of the wall before Teos which were yet left ſtanding, marched away.

Not long after his departure, Diomedon arriving there with ten ſail of Athenians, in order to gain a reception, made a truce with the Teïans. From thence he coaſted along to Eræ, and aſſaulted the place: But not being able to take it, he ſailed away.

Inſurrection at Samos.

Coinciding with this in point of time, an inſurrection was made at Samos by the *people* againſt the *nobility*. The Athenians, who with three ſhips were then lying at Samos, aſſiſted the former. On this occaſion, the Samian *people* maſſacred about two hundred perſons, all of the *nobility*. Four hundred others they condemned to exile; and, having divided amongſt themſelves their lands and houſes,

and

and obtained from the Athenians a decree of being governed by their own conſtitutions as men whoſe fidelity was no longer to be ſuſpected, they aſſumed the whole civil adminiſtration, leaving no ſhare of it in the hands of the *landed gentry*, and abſolutely prohibiting to the *people* all alliance for the future with them, ſo as neither to give their daughters to them, nor ever to marry theirs.

Revolt of Leſbos.

After theſe tranſactions, during the ſame ſummer, the Chians proceeding with unabated ardor, left nothing undone to compaſs the revolt of the cities. Even without Peloponneſian aid they made them viſits with their own ſingle force; and, deſirous at the ſame time to involve as large a number as poſſible in their own dangers, they undertake a voyage with thirteen ſail of ſhips to Leſbos. — This ſquared exactly with the Lacedæmonian plan, which was to make the ſecond attempt upon that iſland — and from thence to proceed to Helleſpont. The land-force at the ſame time of ſuch Peloponneſians as were at hand, and their adjacent allies, attended their motions by the route of Clazomenæ and Cyme. Theſe were commanded by Eualas a Spartan; but the fleet was under the orders of Deixiadas a native of thoſe parts. And thoſe ſhips, ſteering firſt towards and arriving at Methymne, cauſe its revolt [3]. * * * * * *

Reduced again by the Athenians.

But Aſtyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief, putting to ſea from Cenchreæ where he had taken upon him the command, with four ſail of ſhipping arrives at Chios. And the third day after his arrival there, twenty-five ſail of Athenians commanded by Leon and Diomedon reached the iſle of Leſbos: For Leon had been lately ſent from Athens with a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening of that day, Aſtyochus put out again to ſea with the addition of one Chian ſhip, and ſtood away for Leſbos to give them all the aſſiſtance

3 From what follows it looks as if ſome words were wanting here. The Latin tranſlators have endeavoured to ſupply it, thus. —— "And the Chians, leaving four ſhips here for the defence of the place, ſtood away with the reſt to Mitylene, and cauſed it to revolt."

in his power. Accordingly he toucheth firſt at Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day following to Ereſſus, where information meets him that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians at a ſhout. For the latter, as their arrival was intirely unexpected, ſtanding boldly into the harbour, ſeized at once all the Chian veſſels: And then landing, and gaining the victory over ſuch as made head againſt them, became maſters of the city. Aſtyochus, informed of this event by the Ereſſians and the Chian ſhips under command of Eubulus from Methymne — which, having been left in the harbour of that place, had fled at once when Mitylene was taken: Three of them came up ſafe to Aſtyochus, but one had fallen into the hands of the Athenians — Aſtyochus now deſiſted from proceeding to Mitylene. Having effectuated the revolt of Ereſſus and provided the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the ſoldiers from on board his own ſquadron to march by land under the orders of Eteonicus towards Antiſſa and Methymne; whilſt himſelf, with his own ſhips and the three Chian, advanced along the ſhore towards the ſame places. He hoped the Methymnéans upon the ſight of this ſuccour would reſume their ſpirits, and abide by their revolt. But when every thing in Leſbos ſeemed to act in concert againſt his ſcheme, he took his land-men again on board, and made the beſt of his way back again to Chios. The forces, further, that had attended the motions of his ſquadron, and which were to have proceeded with him to Helleſpont, were diſmiſſed to their reſpective cities. After this, they were joined at Chios by ſix ſhips, which were ſent thither from the confederate fleet of Peloponneſians aſſembled at Cenchreæ.

And Clazomenæ.

The Athenians, in the mean time, were employed in reſettling the ſtate of affairs in Leſbos. Standing acroſs from thence, and demoliſhing Polichne on the continent lately fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed all the latter back again to their city in the iſle, excepting ſuch as were authors of the revolt: For theſe had retired to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ once more became ſubject to the Athenians.

The

The ſame ſummer the Athenians, who with twenty ſhips had ſtationed themſelves at Lade, to awe Miletus, having made a deſcent at Panormus in the Mileſian territory, kill Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian, who with a handful of men endeavoured to repulſe them. The third day after this action they re-embarked, but firſt erected a trophy; which the Mileſians thought proper to demoliſh, as not fixed on a ſpot which was the property of the victors. *Chalcideus killed.*

Leon alſo and Diomedon, at the head of the Athenian fleet on the ſtation of Leſbos, aſſembling together what force they could from the Oinuſſæ-iſlands which lie before Chios, and from Siduſa and Pteleum fortreſſes of their own in Erythræa, ſtood away from Leſbos in a body, and carried on the war by ſea againſt the Chians. The land-ſoldiers on board them were ſome of the heavy-armed of the public *roll* of Athens, now preſſed into this ſervice. At Cardamyle they landed; and at Boliſſus having routed in battle a body of Chians that made head againſt them, and done great execution upon them, they reduced all the places in that quarter of the iſland. At Phanæ alſo, they fought a ſecond time with great ſucceſs; and a third time, at Leuconium. But, as after theſe repeated defeats, the Chians no longer ſhewed themſelves in the field to oppoſe them, the victors made cruel ravage on that rich and fertile country; and which, from the invaſion of the Medes to the preſent period of time, had been totally exempted from the miſeries of war. For next to the Lacedæmonians the Chians are the only people, who (as far as I have been able to obſerve) have enjoyed a ſeries of public proſperity with a ſteddy and uniform moderation; and in proportion as their *State* increaſed in wealth and power, made ſuitable acceſſions to its domeſtic ſplendor and ſecurity. Nay, even their late revolt, if this ſhould chance to be aſcribed to a want of judicious and cautionary meaſures, they never ventured to declare, till they had fortified the hazardous ſtep with numerous and gallant confederates, and ſaw plainly that the Athenians (as even the Athenians themſelves could not poſſibly deny) *War againſt the* Chians.

after the blow received in Sicily, were plunged into the loweſt depth of impotence and diſtreſs. If therefore they proved miſtaken, it was one of thoſe caſes inſeparable from the conſtant mutability of human affairs, where numbers were involved in the ſame miſtake with themſelves, who yet in their judgment were perfectly convinced, that the intire ruin of Athens was faſt approaching.

Now therefore blocked up as they were by ſea, whilſt their lands all around were ravaged by the enemy, a party amongſt them were concerting the method of delivering up the city into the hands of the Athenians. But thoſe in the adminiſtration, getting wind of their deſign, refrained indeed from making a buſtle about it in public; but, fetching over Aſtyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief with his four ſhips from Erythræ, they conſulted how to prevent the execution of the plot by the mildeſt and moſt gentle methods, either by taking hoſtages for the fidelity of the ſuſpected, or ſome other ſuch cautionary expedients. In this poſture ſtood affairs at Chios.

The battle of Miletus.

But from Athens, in the cloſe of the ſame ſummer, one thouſand five hundred heavy-armed Athenians and a thouſand Argives (for five hundred Argives who were but light-armed, the Athenians had equipped in the manner more compleat) with the addition of a thouſand confederates, in eight and forty ſail of ſhips, including the tranſports of the heavy-armed, and put under the command of Phrynichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, ſailed away to Samos, and thence ſtretching over to Miletus incamped themſelves before it. The Mileſians marched out into the field to the amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, aſſiſted by the Peloponneſians who came over with Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries furniſhed by Tiſſaphernes. Tiſſaphernes alſo aſſiſted them in perſon with an aid of cavalry. And thus, battle was joined againſt the Athenians and confederates. The Argives, of whom a whole wing was compoſed, advanced before the reſt of the line; and, contemning their enemy too much, as Ionians, and unable

unable to ſtand their ſhock, they charged in a diſorderly manner, are routed by the Mileſians, and no leſs a number than three hundred of their body are deſtroyed. But the Athenians beat firſt the Peloponneſians, and then cleared the field of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the enemy, yet came not at all to an engagement with the Mileſians. For the latter, returning towards the city from the chace of the Argives, no ſooner perceived that their own ſide was vanquiſhed than they quitted the field of battle. The Athenians therefore, as victors, poſted themſelves under the very walls of Miletus. It is obſervable, that in this battle the Ionians had on both ſides the better of the Dorians. For the Athenians beat thoſe Peloponneſians who were ranged againſt them; and the Mileſians did the ſame by the Argives. But now, after erecting a trophy, as the town was ſeated on an iſthmus, the Athenians were preparing to cut it off by a work of circumvallation; concluding, that "if "they once could get poſſeſſion of Miletus, they ſhould eaſily com- "pleat the reduction of the other *States*." *Siege of* Miletus.

It was now about the ſhut of evening, and advice is brought them that "five and fifty ſail of ſhips from Peloponneſus and Sicily are only "not at hand." For from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracuſan ſtrenuouſly adviſed to go on with what yet remained in regard to the total demolition of the Athenians, twenty ſail of Syracuſans and two of Selinuntians came over: The Peloponneſian fleet, which had been fitting out, was now ready for ſervice: And both theſe, were ſent out in conjunction under the orders of Theramenes the Lacedæmonian, who was to carry them to Aſtyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived firſt at Eleus, an iſland before Miletus. Being there informed that the Athenians lay before Miletus, they departed thence: And ſteering firſt into the gulf of Iäſus, were deſirous to pick up information how things went at Miletus. Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiuſſa in the Mileſian; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets had come to anchor for the night, and receive there a *The united fleets of the enemy arrive.*

full

full account of the battle. Alcibiades had been preſent at it, and had given his aſſiſtance to the Mileſians and Tiſſaphernes. He therefore earneſtly preſſed them, "unleſs they were deſirous to ſee all "Ionia loſt and all their great expectations blaſted at once, to repair "with all poſſible expedition to the ſuccour of Miletus, and by no "means to ſuffer it to be inveſted by a circumvallation." In purſuance of this it was reſolved, that at the firſt dawn of day they would ſtand away to its ſuccour.

The Athenians hold a council of war,

But Phrynichus the Athenian commander, when adviſed from Lerus of the certain arrival of this united fleet, even though his collegues declared openly for keeping their ground and hazarding an engagement by ſea — proteſted boldly, that "ſuch a ſtep for his "own part he could not take; and were he able to hinder it, that "neither they nor any one ſhould force him to it. For, ſince it "would be afterwards in their power, when they had got better "intelligence of the numbers of the enemy, and made what poſſi"ble acceſſions they could to their own, and when they had prepared "for action in an ample and leiſurely manner, — ſince it would be "ſtill in their power to fight, the dread of a ſhameful or reproach"ful imputation ſhould not bend him to riſk an engagement againſt "his judgment. It could be no matter of reproach to the Atheni"ans, to retire with their fleet when the exigencies of time required "it: But in every reſpect, it would be highly reproachful to them, "ſhould they fight and be vanquiſhed. He would not therefore in"volve the *State*, not only in reproach but in the greateſt of "dangers; — The *State*, which but juſt reſpiring from the terrible "blows it had received, ſcarce thought it prudential with moſt am"ple preparation to chuſe voluntary hazards, or even when the laſt "neceſſity demanded, to ſtrike firſt at the enemy — why now, "when no neceſſity compelled, muſt it be thrown into wilful ſpon"taneous dangers?" He exhorted them therefore, "without loſs of time to carry the wounded on board, to re-embark their troops,

" troops, and ſecuring what baggage they had brought along with " them, to leave behind what booty they had got from the enemy " that their ſhips might not be too deeply laden, and make the beſt " of their way to Samos: And from thence, after collecting toge- " ther what additional force they could, to watch for and ſeize the " ſeaſons of advantage to attack their foes." The advice of Phrynichus thus given, was prevailing; and, accordingly, was put in execution. He was regarded not only on the preſent but on future occaſions, not only for this but all the ſubſequent inſtances of his conduct, as a man of an excellent underſtanding.

And retire by night from Miletus.

In purſuance of this the Athenians, ſo ſoon as the evening was cloſed, made the beſt of their way from Miletus, and left their victory imperfect. And the Argives, without making the leaſt ſtay, chagrined as they were at their late defeat, departed immediately from Samos to return to Argos.

Proceedings of the combined fleet.

The Peloponneſians, early the next dawn, weighing from Teichiuſſa ſtand into Miletus. After one day's ſtay in that harbour, on the next having augmented their ſquadron with the Chian ſhips which had formerly been chaced in company with Chalcideus, they determined to go back again to Teichiuſſa to fetch off what ſtores they had landed there. Accordingly, when they were thus returned, Tiſſaphernes being come up with his land-army, perſuades them to ſtand directly againſt Iäſus, in which his enemy Amorges at that inſtant lay. Thus falling on Iäſus by ſurpriſe, the inhabitants of which expected none but an Athenian ſquadron, they become maſters of it. In this action the Syracuſans were the perſons who gained the greateſt honour. Amorges, further, the baſtard-ſon of Piſſuthnes, who was a revolter from *the king*, was taken priſoner by the Peloponneſians. They delivered him up to Tiſſaphernes, that if he pleaſed he might ſend him to *the king* in obedience to his orders. Iäſus, further, they put to the ſack; and the army made on this occaſion a very large booty: For this city had ever been remarkable for its wealth. They

Iäſus *ſurpriſed.*

Amorges *taken priſoner.*

gave

gave quarter to the auxiliaries in the ſervice of Amorges; and, without committing the leaſt inſult upon them, took them into their own troops, as the bulk of them were Peloponneſians. They delivered up the town into the hands of Tiſſaphernes, as likewiſe all the priſoners whether ſlaves or freemen, upon covenant to receive from him a * Daric-ſtater for each. This being done, they again repaired to Miletus. And from hence they detach Pedaritus the ſon of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had ſent expreſly to be governor of Chios, to march over-land to Erythræ, having under his command the auxiliaries who had ſerved under Amorges; and appoint Philippus to command at Miletus. And the ſummer ended.

* 1 *l.* 12 *s.* 3 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$.

Tiſſaphernes *is for abridging the pay of ſeamen.*

The winter now ſucceeding, after Tiſſaphernes had garriſoned and provided for the ſecurity of Iäſus, he repaired to Miletus, and diſtributed a month's ſubſiſtence, in purſuance of his engagements at Lacedæmon, to all the ſhips, at the rate of an † Attic drachma to each mariner by the day; but, for the remainder of time he declared he would only pay at the rate of ‡ three oboli, 'till he had conſulted the *king*'s pleaſure: And in caſe his maſter's orders were for it, he ſaid, he would make it up a compleat *drachma*. But, as Hermocrates the Syracuſan commander remonſtrated ſharply againſt this uſage (for Theramenes, not regarding himſelf as admiral ſince he was now at the head of the fleet meerly to carry it up to Aſtyochus, was very indolent about the article of pay,) it was at length compromiſed, that excepting the five ſupernumerary ſhips, the crews of the reſt ſhould receive more than three *oboli* a man. For to the five and fifty ſhips he paid [4] three talents a month: And for the reſt, as many as exceeded

† 7 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$.

‡ *Half a drachma.*

4 There is manifeſtly a fault here. For τεία, *three*, in the original ſhould be read τελακονία, *thirty* talents a month. Mr. *Hobbes* hath taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Peloponneſian ſhips carried eighteen men apiece. What? only ſo ſmall a crew as eighteen men for a ſhip of war with three banks of oars? or, where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did Tiſſaphernes only pay a tenth part of the number? *Xenophon*, in the firſt book of his *Greek* hiſtory, enables us to ſet all to rights.

exceeded that number, pay was to be furniſhed at the rate of only three *oboli* a day.

The Athenian *fleet reinforced.*

The ſame winter, the Athenians now lying at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of five and thirty ſail from Athens under the command of Charminus, and Strombichides, and Euctemon; and they had farther aſſembled all their ſhips from Chios, and others. A reſolution was therefore taken, after aſſigning each his peculiar command by lot, to make up againſt it with a naval force and awe Miletus; but, to ſend againſt Chios both a naval and a land-force. And this accordingly they put in execution. For, in fact, Strombichides and Onomacles and Euctemon with a ſquadron of thirty ſail and a body of tranſports, which had on board a detachment from the thouſand heavy-armed which came againſt Miletus, ſtood away for Chios, as this ſervice had fallen to them by lot. But the reſt of the commanders who now remained at Samos, having under them ſeventy-four ſhips, were quite lords of the ſea, and ſailed boldly up to awe Miletus.

rights. Lyſander is negotiating with Cyrus for an increaſe of pay. Cyrus inſiſts upon the former agreement made by Tiſſaphernes, that every ſhip ſhould receive but thirty *minæ* a month. The daily pay of each was of courſe one *mina* or one hundred *drachmas:* Whence it appears, that at three *oboli* or half a *drachma* a man, the pay of ſixty ſhips, each carrying two hundred men, would be juſt thirty *talents.* Thirty *talents* therefore paid to fifty-five ſhips for a month was two *talents* and a half above three *oboli* a day. And hence it ſeems pretty clear, that the complement of a Peloponneſian ſhip of war was two hundred men.

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what hath been already ſaid, and ſerve at the ſame time to aſcertain the number of men on board a ſhip of war. In the ſixth book Thucydides ſays, the Egeſtéans brought to Athens ſixty *talents* as a month's pay for ſixty ſhips. He ſays alſo, that in the Sicilian expedition the daily pay of the Athenian ſeamen was raiſed to a *drachma* a man. Now a *talent* a month, reckoning thirty days to the month, is two *minæ* a day; and two *minæ* are juſt two hundred *drachmas.* Hence it is plain, the complement of an Athenian ſhip was two hundred men. And, according to the former computation, that of a Peloponneſian ſhip was, as might reaſonably be expected, exactly the ſame. This is a farther confirmation, that there is a miſtake in the printed copies of the original, as was ſaid above, where inſtead of *three talents,* which amount but to 581 *l.* 5 *s. ſterling,* ſhould have been read *thirty talents,* amounting in Engliſh money to 5812 *l.* 10 *s.*

Aſtyochus. Aſtyochus, who happened at this juncture to be in Chios, ſelecting hoſtages as a prevention againſt treachery, thought proper for the preſent to deſiſt, when he heard of the arrival of the ſquadron under Theramenes, and that their engagements with Tiſſaphernes were much altered for the better. But, taking with him ten ſail of Peloponneſians and ten of Chians, he putteth to ſea: And having made an attempt upon Pteleum, though without ſucceſs, he croſſed over to Clazomenæ. He there ſummoned ſuch of the inhabitants as were attached to the Athenians to remove with their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him poſſeſſion of the place. Tamus, further, the ſub-governor of Ionia joined with him in the ſummons. But when the inhabitants rejected this offer, he made an aſſault upon the city which had no fortifications; yet, miſcarrying in the attempt, he put off again to ſea in a hard gale of wind, and reached with thoſe ſhips that kept up with him to Phocéa and Cyme; but the reſt of the ſquadron was by ſtreſs of weather forced over to the iſles which lie near to Clazomenæ, Marathuſa and Pele and Drimuſſa. And whatever effects belonging to the Clazomenians had by way of ſecurity been repoſited there, during eight days continuance which the ſtormy weather obliged them to ſtay, they partly plundered and partly deſtroyed; and, having ſecured their booty on board, got away to Phocéa and Cyme, and rejoined Aſtyochus. But, whilſt he was yet in this ſtation, embaſſadors reach him from the Leſbians imparting to him their deſires to revolt. Him indeed they perſuade, but when the Corinthians and the reſt of the confederates declared their repugnance becauſe of their former miſcarriage, he weighed from thence, and made ſail for Chios. And now a ſtorm diſperſing his ſquadron, at laſt they all come in, though from different quarters to which they had been ſeparately driven, and rejoin him at Chios.

The next ſtep to this was the junction of Pædaritus, who being now at Erythræ after marching by land from Miletus, paſſed over in perſon with the troops under his command into Chios. He had alſo

with

with him about five hundred ſoldiers, taken out of the five ſhips under Chalcideus, who had been left behind with their arms.

But now, the Leſbians notifying again their readineſs to revolt, Aſtyochus, in a conference with Pædaritus and the Chians, maintains "the neceſſity of going thither with a ſquadron to ſupport the revolt "of Leſbos; ſince, in conſequence of it, they muſt either enlarge "the number of their confederates; or, even though miſcarrying in "the deſign, muſt hurt the Athenians." But they were deaf to this remonſtrance; and Pædaritus poſitively declared that he ſhould not be attended by the ſhips of Chios. Upon this, taking with him five ſail of Corinthians, a ſixth ſhip belonging to Megara, and one more of Hermione; and all the Laconian which he himſelf brought thither; he ſtood away from thence to his ſtation at Miletus, uttering grievous threats againſt the Chians, that "how low ſoever they "might be reduced, they ſhould never receive any ſuccour from "him." Accordingly, touching firſt at Corycus of Erythræ, he moored there for the night. The Athenians, who from Samos with a conſiderable ſtrength were now bound againſt Chios, were lying at the ſame inſtant of time on the other ſide of the cape, but ſo ſtationed that neither party knew of the nearneſs of the other. At this juncture, a letter being delivered from Pædaritus, that "a party of "Erythræans, who had been priſoners at Samos and releaſed from "thence, are coming to Erythræ to betray that place," Aſtyochus puts out again immediately for Erythræ: And thus narrowly, on this occaſion, did he eſcape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pædaritus, further, had made the paſſage upon this affair: And both having joined in making all neceſſary enquiries about thoſe who were accuſed of this piece of treachery, when they found the whole to have been a plot of the priſoners at Samos merely to recover their liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and ſo departed—the latter to Chios; but the other, in purſuance of his firſt deſignation, made the beſt of his way to Miletus.

In the mean time, the armament of the Athenians, having ſailed round from Corycus to Arginum, falls in with three long veſſels of the Chians; and, no ſooner had deſcried than they gave them chace. And now a violent ſtorm ariſeth, and the veſſels of the Chians with great difficulty eſcape into harbour: But of the Athenian ſquadron three, which had moſt briſkly followed the chace, are diſabled and drive aſhore at the city of the Chians: The crews of them were partly made priſoners and partly put to the ſword. The reſt of the fleet got into a ſafe harbour, which is known by the name of Phœnicus, under the Mimas. From hence they afterwards took their courſe to Leſbos; and got all in readineſs to raiſe fortifications.

Another ſquadron from Peloponneſus.

From Peloponneſus, the ſame winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, putting out to ſea, with ten ſail of Thurians commanded by Doricus the ſon of Diagoras and two collegues, with one ſhip of Laconia, and one of Syracuſe, arriveth at Cnidus. This place was now in revolt from Tiſſaphernes. Thoſe at Miletus were no ſooner adviſed of the arrival of this ſquadron, than they ſent them orders, with one moiety of their ſhips to keep guard upon Cnidus, and with the other to poſt themſelves at the Triopium, in order to take under their convoy the trading-veſſels which were in their courſe from Egypt: The Triopium is a point in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the ſea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athenians, informed of their deſigns and ſtanding away from Samos, take ſix of the ſhips which were ſtationed at the Triopium: The crews indeed quit their ſhips, and reach the ſhore. This being done, the victors ſailed directly to Cnidus; and, making an aſſault upon that city which was quite unfortified, had very nearly taken it. On the next day they renewed the aſſault. Yet, as the inhabitants had taken care to make it more ſecure by favour of the night, and the men eſcaped from the veſſels taken at Triopium had thrown themſelves into the place, they did leſs damage than on the preceding day. After ſcouring

ſcouring and laying waſte the territory of Cnidus, they ſailed back to Samos.

About the ſame time, Aſtyochus having rejoined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponneſians were ſtill abounding in all the needful expedients of war. Good pay was regularly advanced them, and the ſoldiers had ſtore of money yet remaining of the rich booty they made at Iäſus. The Mileſians, further, ſuſtained with alacrity the burden of the war. It was, however, the opinion of the Peloponneſians, that the firſt treaty made with Tiſſaphernes by Chalcideus was in ſome articles defective and leſs advantageous to themſelves. Upon this they drew up and ratified a ſecond, in the preſence of Theramenes. The articles of it are theſe: Miletus.

Second alliance between Darius and the Lacedæmonians.

" STIPULATED by the Lacedæmonians and confederates " with king Darius and the ſons of the *king* and Tiſſaphernes, that " peace and amity ſubſiſt on the following conditions:

" Whatever province or city ſoever belongeth to king Darius, or " did belong to his father or anceſtors, againſt them in a hoſtile manner not to march and no injury to do are bound both Lacedæmo- " nians and confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Not to exact tri- " bute from any ſuch places are bound both Lacedæmonians and " confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Neither ſhall king Darius, " nor any ſubject of the *king* march in an hoſtile manner againſt, " nor do any injury to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

" But, in caſe the Lacedæmonians or confederates need any aſſiſt- " ance whatever from the *king*; or, the *king* from the Lacedæmoni- " ans and confederates; whatever either party can convince the other " to be right, let that be done.

" Be the war againſt the Athenians and confederates carried on by " both parties in ſtrict conjunction. And, in caſe an accommoda- " tion be taken in hand, be it ſettled by both parties acting in " conjunction.

" But,

" But, whatever army be brought into the territories of the *king*, " at the requeſt and ſummons of the *king*, the *king* to defray the " expence.

" And, if any of the *States* comprehended in this league with the " *king* invade the territories of the *king*, the others to oppoſe and act " with all their power in defence of the *king*.

" And, if any province belonging to the *king*, or ſubject to his " dominion, invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians or confe- " derates; the *king* to oppoſe, and with all his power to defend the " party invaded."

When the finiſhing hand was put to this treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the fleet to Aſtyochus, puts to ſea in a fly-boat, and intirely diſappears.

Proceedings at Chios.

But, the Athenians from Leſbos, having now made their paſſage and landed their forces in Chios and being maſters of the coaſt and the ſea, fortified Delphinium; a place remarkably ſtrong by nature towards the land; abounding farther with harbours, and ſeated at no conſiderable diſtance from the city of the Chians. And now the Chians — diſpirited by the many defeats they had already received, and what is worſe far from being actuated by general unanimity; but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and his adherents having been lately put to death by Pædaritus for *atticizing*, and the reſt of the citizens obliged by neceſſity to ſubmit to the *few*; each individual amongſt them ſuſpecting his neighbour — the Chians now remained quite inactive. Thus, for the reaſons above-mentioned, they neither looked upon themſelves, nor the auxiliaries under Pædaritus as a match for the enemy. Yet, as their laſt reſource, they ſend to Miletus, requeſting Aſtyochus to come over to their ſuccour. But as he was deaf to their intreaties, Pædaritus ſends a letter to Lacedæmon about him, which accuſed him of injuſtice. And to this ſituation were brought the Athenian affairs at Chios.

Their

Their ſquadron alſo at Samos made ſeveral viſits to the ſquadron of the enemy at Miletus; but, as the latter refuſed to come out to engage them, they returned again to Samos, without committing any hoſtilities.

Aſtyochus ſets out for his ſquadron at Peloponnesus.

From Peloponneſus, in the ſame winter, twenty-ſeven ſail of ſhips equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, at the inſtances of his agents Calligitus the Megaréan and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to ſea and made over to Ionia about the ſolſtice: Antiſthenes the Spartan was on board as admiral. With him the Lacedæmonians ſent alſo eleven Spartans to be a *council* to Aſtyochus, in the number of whom was Lichas the ſon of Arceſilaus. To theſe an order was given, that "when arrived at Miletus, they ſhould in "concert act in all reſpects as might be beſt for the ſervice; and this "ſquadron, or one equal in ſtrength or larger or ſmaller, at their "own diſcretion, ſhould proceed to Helleſpont for the ſervice of "Pharnabazus, and be ſent away under the command of Clearchus "the ſon of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the voyage: "And, in caſe it was judged expedient by the council of *eleven*, to "diſmiſs Aſtyochus from the chief command, and ſubſtitute Antiſthenes." On account of the letters of Pædaritus they began to ſuſpect the former. This ſquadron therefore ſtanding out to ſea from Malea arrived firſt at Melos; and, falling in with ten ſail of Athenians, they take and burn three of them, which their crews had abandoned. But apprehenſive, that thoſe Athenian ſhips which had eſcaped might advertiſe the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was actually the caſe, they ſtretched away for Crete; and, for better ſecurity keeping a good look-out and taking more time, they made land firſt at Caunus of Aſia. From thence, as being now beyond the reach of danger, they diſpatch a meſſenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend and bring them up.

The Chians ſadly diſtreſſed, preſſed

But about the ſame juncture of time, the Chians and Pædaritus, not bearing to acquieſce under the dilatory anſwers of Aſtyochus,

preſſed him by repeated meſſages " to come over with the whole of " his force and relieve them from the preſent blockade; and by no " means to look indolently about him, whilſt the moſt important of " the confederate-*States* in Ionia was ſhut up by ſea, and by " land expoſed to rapines." For the domeſtics of the Chians, — being many in number, nay the largeſt that any one community excepting the Lacedæmonians kept, and accuſtomed becauſe of their multitude to be puniſhed with extraordinary ſeverity for their miſdemeanors — no ſooner judged that the Athenian forces by throwing up works had gained a ſure footing in the iſland, than large numbers of them at once deſerted to the enemy, and were afterwards the perſons who, as perfectly well acquainted with the country, committed the heavieſt depredations. The Chians therefore urged, that " the laſt " neceſſity called upon him, whilſt yet there was hope or a poſſibi- " lity of ſucceſs remaining, the works round Delphinium yet incom- " pleat, and a larger circle even ſtill to be taken in and fortified for " the ſecurity of the camp and the fleet, to undertake their relief." Upon this Aſtyochus, who to verify his threats had never before thought ſeriouſly about it, being now convinced that the whole confederate-body was bent on their preſervation, determined in perſon to go to their ſuccour.

Aſtyochus. But juſt at this criſis, advice is brought him from Caunus, that " twenty-ſeven ſail of ſhips and the aſſiſtant-council of Lacedæmoni- " ans are arrived." Concluding upon this, that every other point ought to be poſtponed to this large reinforcement, that his junction with it might be effected in order to inveſt them with the ſovereignty of the ſea, and that the Lacedæmonians who came to inſpect his own conduct might ſecurely finiſh their voyage; throwing up immediately all concern for Chios, he ſailed away for Caunus. But, having landed in his paſſage at Cos Meropidis, the inhabitants of which had refuged themſelves in the mountains, he rifled the city which was quite unfortified, and had lately been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the

the greateſt that had been felt there in the memory of us now living. By excurſions alſo through all the country, he made prize of all he found excepting freemen, for ſuch he diſmiſſed unhurt.

From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he is diſſuaded by the Cnidians from landing his men; but, on the contrary, without loſs of time to get out to ſea, and make head againſt twenty ſail of Athenians, which Charminus one of the commanders from Samos had under his orders, and with them was watching the approach of the twenty-ſeven ſail coming up from Peloponneſus, which Aſtyochus was now going to join. For they at Samos had received from Miletus advice of their coming, and Charminus was appointed to cruize for them about Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coaſt of Lycia: And, by this time, he knew for certainty, that they were lying at Caunus.

Aſtyochus therefore without loſs of time ſtood away for Cyme, with a view to ſurpriſe the ſhips of the enemy at ſea before they could get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain and thick cloudy weather occaſioned the diſperſion of his veſſels in the dark, and ſadly diſordered him.

An action at ſea off Cyme.

When morning broke, the fleet being widely ſeparated and the left wing driven already within the view of the Athenians, the remainder yet driving in confuſion about the iſland, Charminus and the Athenians lanch out againſt them with all poſſible expedition, though with fewer than twenty ſail; imagining this to be the ſquadron from Caunus whoſe approach they were to obſerve: And proceeding inſtantly to the attack, they ſunk three, and diſabled others. They had by far the better in the action, till the more numerous remainder of hoſtile ſhips appeared to their great conſternation, and incompaſſed them round on all ſides. Then, taking to open flight, they loſt ſix of their ſhips: but with the remainder

reach in ſafety the iſle of Teugluſſa, and from thence proceed to Halicarnaſſus.

This being done, the Peloponneſians, putting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-ſeven ſail from Caunus compleating here their junction with them, they put out again to ſea in one body, and after erecting a trophy at Cyme, returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no ſooner been informed of the engagements of the ſquadrons, than with the whole of their fleet they put out from Samos, and made the beſt of their way to Cyme. And yet againſt the fleet at Cnidus they made no ſallies, as neither did the enemy againſt them: But, after taking up the tackling of the veſſels left at Cyme, and making an aſſault upon Lorima on the continent, they returned to Samos.

The treaties with Darius *diſliked by the* Lacedæmonian *council of war.*

The whole united fleet of the Peloponneſians, now lying at Cnidus, was buſy in refitting compleatly for ſervice; and the Lacedæmonian council of *eleven* had a conference with Tiſſaphernes who was now come to them, in which they notified to him their diſlike of ſome things in paſt tranſactions: And, in regard to the future operations of war, debated in what manner they might be carried on for their joint benefit and convenience. But Lichas was the perſon, who ſcrutinized moſt cloſely into the paſt, and expreſſed a diſſatisfaction with both treaties; affirming, that "even the laſt ſettled by Theramenes was far from being good; but, that terrible it would be, "ſhould the *king* now claim upon that pretext the poſſeſſion of that "tract of country, of which either he or his anceſtors had formerly "been maſters: For thus he might be enabled once more to inſlave "all the iſlands, and Theſſaly, and Locri, and quite as far as Bœotia; "whilſt the Lacedæmonians inſtead of freeing, would be obliged to "impoſe the Median ſubjection on the Grecians. He inſiſted there-"fore that a better treaty ſhould be made; or, at leaſt, the former "ſhould

" ſhould be inſtantly diſannulled, for on terms like the preſent they " would ſcorn to take pay from *the king*." Nettled at this, Tiſſaphernes went from them in a fit of choler, without bringing affairs to any kind of ſettlement.

Revolt of Rhodes.

The ſcheme now next in agitation was a voyage to Rhodes, which the moſt *powerful* perſons there had by embaſſies ſolicited them to undertake. They were full of hopes to bring into their ſubjection an iſland, by no means inconſiderable either for number of mariners or ſoldiers; and at the ſame time judged themſelves able by their preſent alliances to defray the expence of their fleet, without requeſting pay from Tiſſaphernes. Accordingly, this winter, with great diſpatch they put to ſea from Cnidus; and, arriving firſt at Camirus on the Rhodian coaſt with ninety-four ſhips, they ſtruck a conſternation into the *multitude* who knew nothing of paſt tranſactions, and were the ſooner tempted to abandon their dwellings as the city was not guarded by the leaſt fortification. The Lacedæmonians, afterwards, ſummoning to a conference theſe, and the Rhodians alſo from two other cities, Lindus and Ielyſus, perſuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly went over to the Peloponneſians.

At the ſame juncture of time the Athenians, who had diſcovered their deſign, put out with their fleet from Samos, earneſtly bent on preventing the ſcheme. They were ſeen indeed out at ſea by the enemy, but made their appearance a little too late. For the preſent therefore they put back to Chalce, and from thence to Samos. And afterwards, making frequent trips from Chalce, and Cos and Samos, they warred againſt Rhodes.

The Peloponneſians exacted from the Rhodians a ſum amounting to about * two and thirty talents; and, having laid their ſhips aground, continued with them eighty days, without ſubjecting them to any farther impoſition.

* 6200 *l. Sterling.*

During this interval of time, nay extended further back before they undertook this enterprise against Rhodes, the following transactions happened:

Politic conduct of Alcibiades.

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, falling under the suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through them a letter having been sent from Lacedæmon to Astyochus to put him to death; for he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in other respects was become notorious; — Alcibiades, I say, fearful of his life, withdraws himself first to Tissaphernes; and, in the next place, did all that lay in his power to undermine what interest the Peloponnesians had in him. Grown at length his dictator in every affair, he abridged their pay, that instead of an Attic * *drachma* three *oboli* only should be given them, and that too with no punctuality. He advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate to them, that "the Athenians, who "through a long tract of time had gained experience in naval affairs, paid only three *oboli* to their seamen; — not so much from a "principle of frugality, as to prevent their seamen from growing insolent through too much plenty: Some of them would otherwise "render their bodies less fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to "purchase those pleasures by which weakness is occasioned; and "others would desert, and leave their arrears to balance their desertion." He instructed him further, how by seasonable gratuities to the commanders of ships and generals of the *States* he might persuade them all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting the Syracusans: For amongst these, Hermocrates alone made loud remonstrances in behalf of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades himself took upon him to give the denial to such *States* as petitioned for money, making answer himself instead of Tissaphernes; that, for instance, "the "Chians were void of all shame, who, though the most wealthy of "the Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the auxiliary efforts of "others, yet are ever requiring strangers to expose their lives and "fortunes

* 6 oboli, *or* 7*d.* $\frac{3}{4}$ *Sterling.*

" fortunes to keep them free." As for other *States*, he maintained " they acted baſely, if when ſubjected to vaſt expences before they " revolted from the Athenians, they refuſed to lay out as much, nay " a great deal more in their own defence." He was alſo dextrous at proving that " Tiſſaphernes, ſince now he ſupported the war at " his own private expence, was in the right to be frugal; but aſ- " ſuredly, when returns were made him from the *king*, he would " make up the preſent abatement of pay, and do ſtrict juſtice to " every ſingle *State*." He further ſuggeſted to Tiſſaphernes, that " he ſhould not be too much in a hurry to bring the war to a con- " cluſion; or entertain the wiſh, either by bringing up the Phœni- " cian fleet which he had provided, or by taking into pay a larger " number of Grecians, to turn the ſuperiority at land and ſea in fa- " vour of the Lacedæmonians: He ought rather to leave both par- " ties pretty nearly balanced in ſtrength; and ſo enable the *king*, " when one of them became troubleſome, to let the other party " looſe againſt them: whereas ſhould the dominion in both elements " be given excluſively to either, he would then be diſtreſſed for want " of ſufficient power to pull down the triumphant *State*; unleſs, at " a prodigious expence and through infinity of danger to himſelf, he " ſhould chooſe to enter the liſts in perſon, and war them down. " The riſks incurred by the other method were far more eligible, " becauſe attended with a ſmaller proportion of expence: And his " maſter might lie by with perfect ſecurity, whilſt he was wearing " out the Grecians by their own reciprocal embroilments." He moreover hinted to him, that " the Athenians were the beſt ſuited of " the two to ſhare the dominion with him: becauſe they were leſs " deſirous of power on the continent, and by their peculiar turn of " politics and military conduct were better adapted for his purpoſe: " They would be glad at the ſame time, to ſubdue the maritime " parts to their own yoke, and to that of the *king* all Grecians " whatever who live upon the continent: The Lacedæmonians, on

" the

" the contrary, came thither with the ſole paſſion to ſet them " free; — nor in common prudence could it be judged likely, that " *men* who were this moment employed to deliver Grecians from " the yoke of Grecians, would in that caſe be ſtopped by any thing " but a ſuperior force from delivering them alſo from the yoke of " Barbarians." He adviſed him therefore, " in the firſt place to " wear out the ſtrength of both; and, after clipping as much as " poſſible the wings of the Athenians, then inſtantly to drive the " Peloponneſians from off his coaſts."

He gains the aſcendent with Tiſſaphernes.

The larger part of this advice Tiſſaphernes determined to follow, ſo far at leaſt as may be gathered from his actions. For ſatisfied by this means with Alcibiades, as a perſon who on theſe points gave him ſound advice, and reſigning himſelf up to his guidance, he paid but ſorrily their ſubſiſtence to the Peloponneſians, and would not ſuffer them to engage at ſea. By the conſtant pretext that the Phœnician fleet was coming up; and then, with ſo great a ſuperiority of ſtrength the war might be brought to a clear deciſion, he ruined all operations of war; he ſuffered the vigor of their fleet, which in fact was ſtrong and mighty, inſenſibly to moulder away, and diſconcerted them ſo openly in other reſpects, that his motives in doing it were no longer to be concealed.

His view is to get recalled from baniſhment.

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave to Tiſſaphernes and the *king*, when he had opportunities; and which he really thought to be the beſt in policy. But, at the ſame time, he had deep in his heart and in his ſtudy, his own return to his country; aſſured within himſelf, that if he preſerved it from a total deſtruction, he might find a time to compaſs his own reſtoration: And nothing he judged could expedite his purpoſe more, than if it appeared to the world that Tiſſaphernes was his friend; which alſo was verified by fact.

Caballing at Samos.

For when the Athenian troops at Samos perceived that he had ſo ſtrong an intereſt with Tiſſaphernes; and Alcibiades had already paved the way by ſending intimations beforehand to the men of influence

influence and authority amongſt them, how deſirous he was "they "ſhould patronize his return with the conſent of the perſons of the "greateſt honour and worth in their company; ſince only under an "*oligarchy*, but not under an iniquitous *cabal* or that *democracy* "which had formerly baniſhed him, could he even deſire it;—and "thus recalled, he would come and join his cares with theirs for the "public welfare, and procure them further the friendſhip of Tiſſa-"phernes;"—when more than this, the officers of thoſe Athenians at Samos and the men of higheſt authority amongſt them, were voluntarily inclined to put an end to the *democracy*;—the method of bringing it about began to be agitated, firſt in the army, and from thence ſoon made a ſtir in Athens itſelf.

Propoſal to change the popular government.

Some perſons paſſed over from Samos to concert matters with Alcibiades; who gave them room to hope, that "he could render firſt "Tiſſaphernes, and in the next place the *king* their friend, if they "would diſſolve the *democracy*; ſince, on this ſole condition, could "the *king* be aſſured of their ſincerity." This contributed to inhance their ſanguine expectations, that on this their affairs might take a new turn, in which men of firſt rank in the community, who in the preſent management were moſt depreſſed, might recover the adminiſtration and gain the aſcendent over their enemies. Returning therefore to Samos, they took in the moſt proper perſons there to be aſſiſtants to the ſcheme; and to the *many* made public declarations, that "the *king* might be made their friend and ſupply them with "money, were Alcibiades recalled and the *democracy* ſuſpended." The effect of theſe declarations on the *many* was this, that though for the preſent they were chagrined at the ſcheme in agitation, yet ſoothed by the flattering hope of the royal ſubſidies, they refrained from all manner of tumult.

Oppoſed by Phrynichus.

But the ſet which was caballing in favour of an *oligarchy*, after ſuch open declarations to the *multitude*, re-conſidered the promiſes of Alcibiades amongſt themſelves, and with a larger number of their aſſociates.

The

The ſcheme was judged by all the reſt to be feaſible and ſure; but Phrynichus, who was yet in the command, declared a total diſlike of it. It appeared to him (which was really the caſe) that "Alcibiades "cared as little for an oligarchical as a democratical government; "and, that no other thought lay ſeriouſly at his heart, than to throw "the preſent government into ſome ſtate of confuſion, which his "friends might ſo far improve as to carry his recalment. Of con-"ſequence, the firſt point themſelves ſhould guard againſt was, not "to be thrown into ſeditions for the benefit of the *king*. It was not "probable, (he plainly told them,) when the Peloponneſians had "gained a power by ſea equal to their own, and were maſters of ci-"ties not the moſt inconſiderable amidſt the *king*'s dominions; that "the latter ſhould turn the balance in favour of the Athenians in "whom he hath no confidence at all; whilſt he might firmly de-"pend upon the friendſhip of Peloponneſians, who had never done "him any harm. As for confederate-*States*, to whom they were to "give a certain pledge of future oligarchy by ſetting up that go-"vernment amongſt themſelves; *he told them* he was well aſſured, "that on that account neither ſuch as had revolted would the ſooner "return, nor ſuch as were at preſent their own would the longer "continue in their duty; ſince the point, on which their wiſhes "turned, was not to be inſlaved by an oligarchy rather than a demo-"cracy; but to recover their liberty, indifferent equally to either "form. As for thoſe of their fellow-citizens, to whom was given "the appellation of *worthy and good*, even they would perplex the "train of government as much as the *people*, when by cajoling that "people and authoritatively leading them into a ſeries of bad mea-"ſures, they would principally regard their own private emolu-"ments: And ſhould they be ſubjected to the caprice of ſuch, to "die by violence and without a trial muſt be the general fate; "whereas, the *people* was a ſure reſource in ſeaſons of extremity, "and ever tempered the fury of the *great*. He was well convinced,

"the

" the *States*, enlightned by a long tract of experience, judge of their
" government in the ſame light. Upon the whole therefore the ne-
" gotiations of Alcibiades and all at preſent upon the carpet could in
" no wiſe be approved by him."

The party however aſſociated together in this deſign, abiding by their former determinations, reſolved to proceed to their execution; and were preparing to ſend Piſander and others by way of deputation to Athens, to ſet on foot the nagotiations concerning the return of Alcibiades, the diſſolution of the *popular* government there, and the gaining over Tiſſaphernes to the Athenian friendſhip. *In vain.*

Phrynichus — now convinced, that the return of Alcibiades would be brought upon the carpet, and the Athenians aſſuredly grant it; apprehenſive, further, that from the oppoſition he had given it at their conſultations, he ſhould then be expoſed to his reſentments, as one who had endeavoured to ſtop it — hath recourſe to the following project. He ſends to Aſtyochus admiral in chief of the Lacedæmonians, who yet continued in the ſtation of Miletus, a ſecret hint by letter, that " Alcibiades is ruining their affairs, by endeavouring to " gain over Tiſſaphernes to the Athenians." And, after giving him a clear explanation of other matters, he pleaded " the candor of " Aſtyochus in his own excuſe, if he deſired in this manner to ruin " his mortal foe, though with ſome prejudice to the welfare of his " country." But Aſtyochus had given up all thoughts of putting Alcibiades to death; eſpecially, as now he never came within his reach. Yet, on this occaſion, making a viſit to him and Tiſſaphernes at Magneſia, he communicates to them the advices ſent him from Samos, and becomes himſelf an informer. He is accuſed by report, not only on this but many other occaſions, to have made court to Tiſſaphernes for his own private lucre: And for the ſame reaſon, when the pay was not fully rendered before, he ſuffered it much more pliantly than in duty he ought to have done. Alcibiades ſends away immediate notice to the managing party at Samos, that the treachery of Phry- *His counterplot.*

nichus was detected by his own letter, and inſiſts upon it that he be put to death. Phrynichus, terribly alarmed and puſhed to the very brink of deſtruction by ſuch a diſcovery, ſends again to Aſtyochus, blaming his indiſcretion on the former occaſion in not keeping his ſecret, and aſſuring him that "now he was ready to deliver up to his "fury the whole force of the Athenians at Samos" (diſtinctly reciting to him the particulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the whole ſcheme might be accompliſhed) and that "undoubtedly he "ought not to be cenſured, if, when his unrelenting foes had re-"duced him to ſuch extremity of danger, he choſe to do this, or "even more than this, rather than be deſtroyed by their rancour." But this propoſal alſo Aſtyochus communicates to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Aſtyochus betrayed him, and that notice each moment was only not arrived from Alcibiades about the contents of his laſt, anticipated the diſcovery, and becomes himſelf informer to the army, that "the enemy had reſolved, as Samos "was unfortified and the whole of their fleet not ſecurely ſtationed "within the harbour, to endeavour a ſurpriſe: of this he had gained "the moſt certain informations; and therefore, Samos ought ne-"ceſſarily to be put into a poſture of defence with the utmoſt expe-"dition, and proper guards in every reſpect be appointed." He himſelf commanded, and conſequently was impowered to ſee this put in execution. All hands were inſtantly at work on the fortification; and Samos, though otherwiſe intended ſoon to be, was by this piece of artifice immediately ſecured. And no long time after came letters from Alcibiades, importing that "the army was betrayed by "Phrynichus, and in purſuance of it the enemy was coming to ſur-"priſe them." Their opinion of the good faith of Alcibiades was not in the leaſt eſtabliſhed by this: It was argued, that as he was privy to the plans of the enemy, from a principle of enmity he had faſtened upon Phrynichus the charge of being their accomplice. By the laſt notification therefore he was ſo far from hurting him, that he only confirmed his evidence.

Yet,

Yet, ſubſequent to this, Alcibiades continued to make uſe of all his addreſs and perſuaſion with Tiſſaphernes to gain him over to the Athenians, who in fact ſtood moſt in terror of the Peloponneſians, becauſe they had a larger fleet at hand than the Athenians; but was inwardly inclined, were it any how feaſible, to comply with his ſuggeſtions; eſpecially, as ever ſince the jar at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes he had been exaſperated againſt the Peloponneſians: For that jar had already happened at the time of their expedition to Rhodes; and the ſuggeſtion of Alcibiades formerly mentioned, that "the views of the Lacedæmonians were to ſet the cities free," was yet more verified by the behaviour of Lichas, who had affirmed, that "it was an article never to be ſuffered in treaty, that the *king* "ſhould have thoſe cities of which either himſelf or his anceſtors "had at any time been poſſeſſed." And in truth Alcibiades, as one who had important concerns at ſtake, continued with much zeal and aſſiduity to ingratiate himſelf with Tiſſaphernes.

A deputation ſent to Athens.

The Athenian deputies with Piſander at their head, who were ſent from Samos, had no ſooner reached Athens, than they obtained an audience from the *people*; where, after touching in a ſummary manner upon many other advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, that "by recalling Alcibiades and making an alteration in the demo-"cratical form of government they might gain the friendſhip of the "*king* and a ſuperiority over the Peloponneſians." Large was the number of thoſe, who would not hear the propoſal againſt the *democracy*. The enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in their clamours, that "ſhameful it would be, if ſo enormous a tranſgreſſor of "the laws were recalled; one, to whoſe crimes in point of the "myſteries the [5] Eumolpidæ and Ceryces had bore ſolemn atteſta-"tion,

5 Theſe were ſacerdotal families at Athens, deſcended from Eumolpus and Ceryx. The former of them inſtituted the Eleuſinian myſteries; and it was the grand privilege of his deſcendents to preſide at and regulate thoſe ſacred rites. Who

" tion, the conſequence of which was his exile; nay, had further " denounced a curſe upon thoſe who ſhould reſtore him." Piſander, interpoſing to put a ſtop to this violent oppoſition and theſe tragical outcries, addreſſed himſelf apart to each of theſe opponents, and aſked them ſingly — " Whether any hope they had left of ſaving " their country, now that the Peloponneſians had as many ſhips " upon the ſea as they had themſelves, but a larger number of con- " federate-*States*, beſide ſupplies of money from the *king* and Tiſſa- " phernes, whilſt themſelves were quite exhauſted, unleſs ſome " body could perſuade the *king* to declare in their favour?" And when thoſe, to whom the demand was put, replied in the negative, he proceeded to make them this plain declaration — " And yet this " turn in your favour can never take place, unleſs we temper our " form of government with greater moderation, and intruſt the ad- " miniſtration in the hands of *the few*, that *the king* may have room " to place confidence in us. For we are at preſent to conſult about " the very being of the *State*, and not to litigate the forms of its " adminiſtration. The ſequel may again enable us to return to the " primitive form, if we find it expedient; and we ſhall recover " Alcibiades, the only man alive who is able to accompliſh the " point."

Their plan approved.

The people, in fact, upon the firſt mention of an *oligarchy*, were ſtung to the heart. Yet afterwards, convinced by Piſander that no other reſource was left, diſpirited by fear, and encouraged at the ſame time by a diſtant hope that another change might in the ſequel be brought about, they yielded up the point to the neceſſity of the

Ceryx was, and what the particular privileges of his deſcendents, any farther than that (according to Suidas) they were " holy and venerable," is not agreed. All of them were commanded to pronounce the ſolemn curſe on Alcibiades, when he was outlawed. Yet one prieſteſs (as *Plutarch* relates) Theano, the daughter of Menon, refuſed to obey; alledging, that " it was her duty to bleſs, and not to " curſe."

State,

State. Accordingly they paſſed a decree, that " Piſander and the " ten joined with him in the deputation ſhould paſs the ſea, and ne- " gotiate the affair with Tiſſaphernes and Alcibiades, in the method " judged by them moſt conducive to the public ſervice." At the ſame time, as Piſander had preferred a charge of male-adminiſtration againſt Phrynichus, they diſcharged him and his collegue Skirondas from their commands, and ſent away Diomedon and Leon to take upon them the command of the fleet. The article with which Piſander charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of Iäſus and Amorges. The truth is, he thought him by no means a proper perſon to be let into a ſhare of their intrigues with Alcibiades.

They proceed to Tiſſaphernes.

And thus Piſander — after viſiting in order all the ſeveral junto's of the accomplices, already formed in the city with a view to thruſt themſelves into the ſeats of judicature and the great offices of ſtate; and exhorting them ſeverally, to act with unanimity, and by general concurrence to labour the demolition of the *popular* government; and after adjuſting all previous meaſures to guard the beſt againſt dilatory proceedings — repaſſeth the ſea to Tiſſaphernes, accompanied by his ten aſſociates in the deputation.

Rhodes.

In the ſame winter, Leon and Diomedon being arrived at their poſt, at the head of the Athenian fleet made an expedition againſt Rhodes: And there, they find the ſhips of the Peloponneſians hawled aſhore. They made a deſcent upon the coaſt; and after defeating in battle ſuch of the Rhodians as made head againſt them, they ſtood away for Chalce: And for the future carried on the war more from thence than from Cos. For in that ſtation they were better enabled to watch the motions of the Peloponneſian fleet.

The Chians.

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas a Lacedæmonian, diſpatched by Pædaritus from Chios with advice, that " the works of the Athe- " nians were almoſt perfected, and unleſs with the whole of their " ſhipping they came over to relieve them, all is loſt at Chios." A reſolution accordingly was taken to endeavour their relief. But in

the

the mean time Pædaritus, at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the Chians, with all the force he could aſſemble together, ſallied out againſt the rampart which the Athenians had raiſed around their ſhips; demoliſhed a part of it; and made himſelf maſter of thoſe veſſels which were hawled aſhore. The Athenians ran from all quarters to their defence; and, having firſt engaged and put to flight the Chians, the reſt of the forces under Pædaritus are alſo defeated.

Pædaritus killed. Pædaritus is killed, as were numbers alſo of the Chians, and many arms were taken. And after this, the Chians were blocked up by ſea and land more cloſely than ever, and a terrible famine raged amongſt them.

The deputies do nothing with Tiſſaphernes. The Athenian deputation headed by Piſander, having reached Tiſſaphernes, enter into conference about terms of accommodation. Alcibiades now, as the conduct of Tiſſaphernes was ſtill dubious and wavering, ſince he ſtood in great awe of the Peloponneſians, and adhered to that rule of policy he had learned from him "to war both "ſides out," — Alcibiades now had recourſe to another piece of refinement, cauſing Tiſſaphernes to inſiſt upon ſuch exorbitant terms that no accommodation could enſue. Tiſſaphernes truly ſeems to me to have proceeded in this manner from his own voluntary motives, becauſe fear was predominant in him: But in Alcibiades it was purely art; ſince, as he found the other would not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected to ſtrike the conceit into the Athenians, that it really was in his power to manage him at pleaſure, and that he was already wrought to their purpoſe and willing to come to terms, whereas the Athenians would not offer enough. For Alcibiades himſelf made ſuch extravagant demands (ſince, tho' Tiſſaphernes aſſiſted at the conference, the other managed it,) that tho' the Athenians had yielded to the far greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty would be thrown at their doors. It was inſiſted, beſide other demands, that "all Ionia ſhould be given up;" and what is more, "all the iſlands on the Ionian coaſt;" and other points.

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The Athenians ſeeming to acquieſce in theſe, at length upon the third meeting, leſt the ſmallneſs of his own influence ſhould be plainly detected, he demanded leave " for *the king* to build a fleet, " and to ſail along the Athenian coaſts, wherever, and with what- " ever force he pleaſed." Here all accommodation was over. The Athenians, concluding theſe points inſuperable and that they were abuſed by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation, and return to Samos.

He re-ingratiates himſelf with the Peloponneſians.

In the ſame winter, immediately after breaking off the conference, Tiſſaphernes repairs to Caunus with intention to bring the Peloponneſians again to Miletus, and to form other compacts with them the beſt he ſhould be able, to ſupply them further with pay, and by all means to ſtave off an open rupture. He was in fact apprehenſive, that ſhould ſo large a fleet be deprived of ſubſiſtence, or neceſſitated to engage with the Athenians ſhould ſuffer a defeat, or ſhould the mariners quit their veſſels, the Athenians then would carry their point without thanks to him: But his greateſt fear was this, leſt for the ſake of ſubſiſtence they ſhould ravage the continent. Upon all theſe conſiderations, and the prudential motives ariſing from each, co-operating with his principal maxim of balancing the Grecians againſt one another, he ſent for the Peloponneſians, pays them their arrears of ſubſiſtence; and makes the following treaty, the third of the kind, with them:

A third treaty of alliance.

" IN the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas " preſiding in the college of *Ephori* at Lacedæmon, articles are ſigned " in the plain of Mæander between the Lacedæmonians and confe- " derates on one ſide; and Tiſſaphernes, Hieramenes, and the ſons " of Pharnacus on the other; concerning the affairs of *the king* and " thoſe of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

" The

" The whole of the *king*'s dominions ſituate in Aſia belongeth " to the *king*: And, all his own dominions let the *king* govern, " as to him ſeemeth meet.

" The Lacedæmonians and confederates are not to enter the do- " minions of the *king* to commit any act of hoſtility whatever: " Nor he thoſe of the contracting parties, for any act of hoſtility " whatever.

" And, in caſe any of the Lacedæmonians or confederates enter in " an hoſtile manner the dominions of the *king*, the Lacedæmonians " and confederates are bound to reſtrain them: And, in caſe any " ſubjects of the *king* act in a hoſtile manner againſt the Lacedæ- " monians and confederates, be the *king* alſo bound to reſtrain " them.

" Tiſſaphernes ſhall pay ſubſiſtence to the ſhips now upon the ſta- " tion, according to the rates agreed on, 'till the *king*'s fleet " come up.

" But, the Lacedæmonians and confederates, ſo ſoon as the *king*'s " fleet ſhall be come up, ſhall have it in their own option to maintain " if they pleaſe their own fleet; or, in caſe they chuſe to take " ſubſiſtence from Tiſſaphernes, he is bound to ſupply them: Yet, " the Lacedæmonians and confederates, at the expiration of the " war, ſhall repay to Tiſſaphernes whatever ſums they may thus re- " ceive from him.

" When the *king*'s fleet cometh up, let the ſhips of the Lacedæ- " monians and thoſe of the confederates and thoſe of the *king* " carry on the war in concert, by the joint counſels of Tiſſapher- " nes and of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

" And, whenever a peace with the Athenians be thought " adviſable, it ſhall be concluded by the joint-conſent of both " parties."

The treaty was made and ratified in theſe terms. And after this, Tiſſaphernes employed himſelf with diligence to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and duly to perform all the branches whatever of his engagements. At leaſt, he was willing to convince the Peloponneſians by the meaſures he took, that he was heartily in earneſt.

Steps towards the revolt of Eubœa.

In the cloſe of this winter, the Bœotians got poſſeſſion of Oropus by treachery, though an Athenian garriſon was in it. The buſineſs was effectuated by the management of a party of Eretrians, and thoſe Oropians who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For as this town was ſituated over-againſt Eretria, it was impoſſible but whilſt in Athenian hands it muſt terribly annoy both Eretria and the reſt of Eubœa. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, the Eretrians repair to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponneſians to come over to Eubœa: But their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios now ſadly diſtreſſed. Putting therefore from Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they ſtood away to ſea: And having gained the height of Triopium, they deſcry the Athenian ſquadron out at ſea in a courſe from Chalce. Yet, neither making any motion to bear down upon the other, one fleet purſued their courſe to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They were now convinced that, without fighting at ſea, they could not poſſibly relieve Chios.

Here this winter ended: and the twentieth year of this war expired, the hiſtory of which Thucydides hath compiled.

YEAR XXI.

Before Chriſt 411.

IN the enſuing ſummer, upon the firſt commencement of the ſpring, Dercylidas a *Spartan*, at the head of an army not conſiderable for numbers, was ſent over-land to Helleſpont, to effectuate the revolt of Abydus: They are a colony of the Mileſians. The Chians alſo, whilſt Aſtyochus was perplexed about the method of relieving

The Chians.

them, were neceſſitated by the intolerable cloſeneſs of the blockade to hazard an engagement at ſea. It happened, whilſt Aſtyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon a *Spartan*, who came over with Antiſtenes, though merely as a paſſenger, had arrived at Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after the death of Pædaritus, with twelve ſail of ſhipping draughted from the ſquadron ſtationed at Miletus: Of theſe five were Thurian, four Syracuſan, one belonged to Anæa, another was Mileſian, and one was Leon's own. Upon this the Chians, having ſallied out with all their force and carried a ſtrong poſt from the enemy, and at the ſame time their fleet conſiſting of ſix and thirty ſail lanching forth againſt the thirty-two Athenian, an engagement followed. And, after a battle hotly maintained on both ſides, the Chians and allies, who had not the worſt of the diſpute, ſheered off again into harbour: For by this time it began to grow dark.

Fight at ſea.

Revolt of Abydus *and* Lampſacus.

Inſtantly upon this, Dercylidas having compleated his march from Miletus, Abydus in Helleſpont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus: And two days after Lampſacus did the ſame.

The latter reduced.

But intelligence of this having reached Strombichides at Chios, and he with twenty-four ſail of Athenians including the tranſports which carried the heavy-armed, ſtretching thither with all poſſible expedition, the Lampſacenes ſallied out to repulſe him. He defeated them in battle; and, having at a ſhout made himſelf maſter of Lampſacus which was quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and ſlaves for pillage to his men; and, after re-eſtabliſhing ſuch as were free in their old habitations, proceeded againſt Abydus. But, finding them deaf to all ſchemes of accommodation and himſelf unable to reduce them by force, croſſing over to the ſpot oppoſite to Abydus, he garriſons Seſtus a city in the Cherſoneſe, which had formerly belonged to the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard the Helleſpont.

The Chians.

During this interval of time, the Chians had very much inlarged their room at ſea, and thoſe ſtationed at Miletus and even Aſtyochus, upon

upon receiving the particulars of the late engagement and advice that Strombichides was drawn off with ſo many ſhips, began to be high in ſpirits. Aſtyochus, accordingly, arriving at Chios with only two ſhips, carrieth off along with him what ſhipping was there, and with the whole force is now at ſea in order to make an attempt upon Samos. But when the enemy there, becauſe mutually embroiled in jealouſies, came not out againſt him, he returned again to the ſtation of Miletus. For about this time or rather before, the democracy was overturned at Athens.

Detail of the revolution at Athens.

The deputation, at the head of which was Piſander, were no ſooner returned to Samos from Tiſſaphernes, than they found their ſchemes had gained a ſtronger footing in the army, and that the Samians had been encouraging the men of power amongſt the Athenians to join their efforts with them for the erection of an oligarchy, though a party was very buſy in oppoſing them with a view to quaſh the projected alteration. The Athenians, further, at Samos had in private conferences come to a reſolution — "to think no longer of Alcibiades, ſince he ſhewed himſelf ſo averſe to join them, and in fact "was by no means a proper perſon to have a ſhare in an oligarchical "adminiſtration: — But merely from a principle of ſelf-preſervation, as now they were environed with dangers, they ſhould take "all poſſible care that the project ſhould not drop in the execution: — "That, further, they ſhould proſecute the war with vigor, and contribute largely towards it from their own private purſes, and anſwer every other exigence of ſervice, ſince no longer for others but "their own ſakes they muſt continue the ſtruggle." Determined therefore to proceed in this manner, they diſpatch Piſander and half the former deputation once more to Athens, to manage the execution of the project there: To whom, further, inſtructions were given, at whatever places in their dependency they ſhould touch upon the voyage, to ſet up the oligarchy. The other half they ſent ſeverally about to other of the dependent-*States*. Diotrephes alſo, who was

now at Chios but appointed to take upon him the command of the Thracian provinces, they ordered away immediately to his poſt.

Diotrephes upon his arrival at Thaſus diſſolved the *popular* government. And, in the ſecond month at moſt after this, the Thaſians fortified their city, as men who no longer cared for an *ariſtocracy* under Athenian influence, but were in daily expectation of receiving liberty from the Lacedæmonians. For a number of their countrymen, driven out by the Athenians, were now refuged among the Peloponneſians. Theſe were labouring the point with their correſpondents in Thaſus, to bring off their ſhipping, and declare a revolt. The preſent alteration therefore fell out exactly to their own wiſh; their *State* was reſtored to its ancient form without any trouble; and the *people*, who alone were able to diſconcert them, were diveſted of their power. In Thaſus therefore the event took an oppoſite turn to what thoſe Athenians, who laboured the *oligarchy*, had at heart. And, in my judgment, the caſe was the ſame with many other of their dependent-*States*. For having now their eyes open to their own welfare, and being exempted from the dread of ſuffering for what others did, they ran into the ſcheme of a total independence, which they preferred before the precarious ſituation of being well-governed by the Athenians.

Piſander and his collegues in the courſe of their voyage obſerved their inſtructions, and diſſolved the *popular* governments in the cities where they touched. From ſome of theſe they alſo procured parties of heavy-armed to aid them in the grand project, and ſo landed at Athens. Here they find affairs in great forwardneſs through the activity of their accomplices. For ſome of the younger ſort having combined together in a plot againſt Androcles, who had the greateſt ſway amongſt the people, and had alſo been deeply concerned in baniſhing Alcibiades, they ſecretly diſpatch him. On him, for a double reaſon, becauſe of his influence with the people, and with the thought that it might oblige Alcibiades, whoſe recalment was

now

now expected and through his intereſt the friendſhip of Tiſſaphernes, they choſe firſt to wreak their fury. Of ſome others alſo, whoſe tractability they doubted, they had rid themſelves by the ſame practices. A ſpecious harangue had further been dreſſed up for the purpoſe that " none ought to receive the public money but ſuch as " ſerved the *State* in war with their perſons; that, affairs of ſtate " ought not to be communicated to more than *five thouſand*, and " thoſe to be men who were beſt qualified by their eſtates and perſonal bravery to ſerve the public."

This with the majority of the city had a fair outſide, ſince ſuch as ſhould concur in the change, bid faireſt for a ſhare in the adminiſtration. Yet ſtill the aſſembly of the *people*, and the * council of the *bean* continued their meetings: But then they only paſſed ſuch decrees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of this number were all who ſpoke, and who had previouſly conſidered together what ſhould be ſaid upon every occaſion. No other perſon preſumed at any time to oppoſe their motions, through dread of a cabal which they ſaw was large. Or, did any one venture to open his mouth, by ſome dextrous contrivance he was certainly put to death. Who were the agents in theſe murders, no enquiry at all; and of who were ſuſpected, no kind of juſtification. The people on the contrary looked on with ſtupid gaze, and ſuch a fit of conſternation as to think it clear gain not yet to have ſuffered violence, even though they held their tongues. Imagining beſides, that the conſpiracy had ſpread much farther than it really had, they were quite diſpirited. To diſcover any certainty of their numbers they were quite unable, becauſe of the great extent of the city and their ignorance how far their neighbours might be concerned. On the ſame account it was alſo impoſſible for him, who deeply reſented his condition, to bemoan himſelf in the hearing of another, or to participate counſels for reciprocal defence. He muſt either have opened his mind to one whom he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom he durſt not confide.

* *The* Senate.

confide. For all the *popular* party regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in ſome meaſure involved in the preſent machinations. Some in fact were concerned, who could never have been ſuſpected of oligarchical principles: And theſe men gave riſe to the great diffidence which ſpread amongſt the *many*, and drew after it the higheſt ſecurity to the ſchemes of the *few*, as it kept alive that mutual diſtruſt which reigned among the people.

Piſander therefore and his aſſociates, arriving at this very juncture, gave the finiſhing ſtroke without delay. In the firſt place, having called an aſſembly of the people, they moved for a decree — "That "a committee of *ten* ſhould be elected with full diſcretionary "power: — This committee of *ten* ſhould draw up the form of a "decree to be reported to the people on a day prefixed — in what "manner the *State* may be beſt adminiſtred." In the next place, when that day came, they ſummoned an aſſembly of the people at Colonus: This is a temple of Neptune without the city and diſtant from it about * ten ſtadia. And here, the committee reported no other propoſal but this — That "it be lawful for any Athenian to "deliver whatever opinion he himſelf thought proper." They then enacted heavy penalties againſt any man, who hereafter ſhould accuſe the ſpeaker of a breach of law or ſhould bring him into any trouble whatever.

* 1 Engliſh mile.

This being done, it was now without the leaſt reſerve or ambiguity moved — That "no magiſtrate whatſoever ſhould continue in his "poſt upon the old eſtabliſhment, nor receive a public ſalary; but "that five † preſidents be choſen, who ſhould chuſe one hun- "dred perſons, and each of theſe hundred ſhould name three per- "ſons for aſſociates: That theſe perſons ſhould enter into the "ſenate, be inveſted abſolutely with the adminiſtration, and ſhould "farther be impowered to convene the *five thouſand* whenever they "ſhould deem it proper."

† Πεντήκοντες.

Piſander

Piſander was the perſon who made this propoſal, and who alſo in other reſpects ſhewed himſelf openly one of the moſt zealous to pull down the democracy. But he, who contrived the whole of the plan, and by what ſteps the affair ſhould be thus carried into execution, was Antipho; a man, who in perſonal merit was ſecond to no Athenian then alive, and the greateſt genius of his time to deviſe with ſagacity, and ingeniouſly to expreſs what he had once deviſed. At the aſſemblies of the people or any public debate he never aſſiſted, if he could poſſibly decline it, ſince the *multitude* was jealous of the great reputation he had gained: Yet, in the courts of judicature or appeals to the people, he was the only perſon, who was able effectually to ſerve thoſe clients who could get him for their patron. And this ſame Antipho, when in proceſs of time the government of the *four hundred* was quite demoliſhed, and ſeverely proſecuted by the *people*, is judged to have defended their conduct and pleaded in a cauſe where his own life was at ſtake, the beſt of any perſon that down to this time was ever heard to ſpeak.

Piſander *moved for the* oligarchy.

Antipho.

Phrynichus alſo was another, who ſingularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf in his zeal for the *oligarchy*. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conſcious that he was privy to the whole of the correſpondence he had carried on with Aſtyochus. He proceeded thus on the ſuppoſition that Alcibiades would never be reſtored by an oligarchical government. And then he was a man, in whoſe capacity and zeal, if once engaged, the greateſt confidence might reaſonably be placed.

Phrynichus.

Theramenes further the ſon of Agnon, a man who both in ſpeaking and acting made no ordinary figure, had a principal ſhare in the diſſolution of the *popular* government. No wonder therefore, as the buſineſs was managed by ſo many and ſo able agents, that ſpite of every obſtacle it was brought to effect. Grievous indeed it was to the Athenian people, to ſubmit to the loſs of their liberty a century after the expulſion of their tyrants, during which period they had not

Theramenes

not only been independent, but accuſtomed for above half that ſpace to give law to others.

To return. When in the aſſembly of the people not a ſoul was heard to oppoſe the motion, it paſſed into a law, and the aſſembly was adjourned. They afterwards introduced the *four hundred* into the ſenate, in the following manner:

The four hundred take poſſeſſion of the government.

The whole body of the citizens were daily under arms either upon the walls or in the field, to bridle the excurſions of the enemy from Deceléa. Therefore, on the day appointed, they ſuffered ſuch as were not in the ſecret to repair to their poſts as uſual; but to thoſe in the plot it had been privately notified — "by no means to repair "to their poſts, but to lag behind at a diſtance, and in caſe any one "ſhould ſtrive to oppoſe what was now to be agitated, they ſhould "take up arms and quell all oppoſition." Thoſe, to whom theſe orders were previouſly imparted, were the Andrians, and Teïans, three hundred of the Caryſthians and other perſons now eſtabliſhed in Ægina, whom the Athenians had ſent thither by way of colony, but were now invited to repair to Athens with their arms to ſupport the ſcheme. When theſe diſpoſitions were formed, the *four hundred*, each carrying a concealed dagger, and guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of Greece whoſe hands they had employed when aſſaſſination was the point, broke in upon the * *counſellors of the bean*, who were this moment ſitting in the ſenate-houſe, and called out to them "to quit the place and take their [6] ſalaries." Accordingly, they had ready for them the full arrears due to them, which they paid to each as he went out of the houſe. In this manner the *Senate*, without giving the leaſt oppoſition, removed themſelves tamely from their office: And the reſt of the citizens made no effort to check ſuch proceedings, and refrained from any the leaſt tumult.

* *The* Senate *of* five hundred.

6 The ſtated ſalary for a ſenator of Athens was a *drachma* or ſeven pence three farthings a day.

The

The *four-hundred*, having thus gained poſſeſſion of the ſenate-houſe, proceeded immediately to ballot for a * ſet of *preſidents* from amongſt their own body: and made uſe of all the ſolemn invocations of the deities and the ſacrifices, with which the preſiding magiſtrates execute their office. By their ſubſequent proceedings, they introduced conſiderable alterations in the *popular* form of government; excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they refrained from recalling exiles. But, in all other reſpects, they ruled with all poſſible ſeverity. Some perſons, whoſe removal was deemed convenient, though few in number, they got aſſaſſinated; ſome they threw into priſon, and ſome they baniſhed. To Agis alſo king of the Lacedæmonians, who was ſtill at Deceléa, they diſpatched a deputation; "notifying their readineſs to accommodate all diſputes; and that "with greater confidence he might proceed to make up matters "with *them*, than with a *democracy*, which was not to be truſted."

* Πρυτάνεις.

Agis, full of the imagination that the city would not quietly ſubmit to theſe changes, and that the *people* would not thus tamely part with their ancient liberty; or, ſhould they now behold his numerous army approaching, that public combuſtions muſt enſue amongſt them; unable to perſuade himſelf, that at the preſent juncture they could poſſibly be kept from tumults; — Agis, I ſay, returned no propoſal of terms to the deputation, which came to him from the *four-hundred*. But, having ſent for a numerous reinforcement from Peloponneſus, he advanced ſoon after with the garriſon of Deceléa and the freſh reinforcements up to the very walls of Athens. He took this ſtep on the preſumption, that "thus, either thrown into "utter confuſion they might be maſtered whenever he gave the "word; or, even at the firſt ſight of his approach, through the "great confuſion which in all probability muſt follow both within "and without: Since, to make himſelf maſter of their *long-walls*, "as there could not be hands at leiſure for their defence, he could "not fail."

Agis *marcheth up to* Athens.

He again retreats.

But when, upon his nearer approach, the Athenians within were thrown into no ſtir or buſtle at all; when even they cauſed their cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, to ſally out into the field, who made a ſlaughter of ſuch as were too far advanced, and became maſters of their arms and dead bodies; — finding then he had proceeded upon wrong preſumptions, he again drew off his army. After this, he himſelf with the former garriſon continued in the poſt of Deceléa; but the late reinforcement, after ſome continuance in the country, was ſent back to Peloponneſus.

Proceedings of the four-hundred.

Yet ſubſequent to this, the *four-hundred* perſiſted in ſending deputations to Agis with as much eagerneſs as ever: And, he now receiving them in a better manner and with encouragements to proceed, they even ſend an embaſſy to Lacedæmon to propoſe a treaty, being of all things deſirous to obtain an accommodation.

They alſo ſend to Samos a deputation of ten, in order to ſatisfy the army, and give them ample aſſurance, that "the *oligarchy* was not "ſet up for the prejudice either of the *State* or any individuals, but "as the only expedient left to preſerve the whole community; — "that the number of thoſe who now had the management was *five* "*thouſand* and not barely *four hundred*: And yet, on no occaſion "whatever had the Athenians, partly through employs in their ar-"mies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever met together to "conſult on affairs of ſtate, in a number ſo large as five thouſand." Having inſtructed them to inſert ſome other alleviating pleas, they ſent them away upon the firſt inſtant of the change they had made; apprehenſive of what actually came to paſs, that the bulk of their ſeamen would never quietly ſubmit to an oligarchical government, and an oppoſition beginning there might overturn all that had hitherto been done.

For at Samos ſome ſtirs had already aroſe about the *oligarchy*; and that which is now to be recited happened exactly at the time,

the time, that the *four-hundred* ſeized the adminiſtration at Athens.

The party, which at this juncture was ſubſiſting at Samos againſt the *nobility*, and were of the *popular* ſide, having now altered their ſchemes, and followed the ſuggeſtions of Piſander ever ſince his return from Athens, and gained the concurrence of Athenians at Samos, combined together by oath to the number of about three hundred, and reſolved to fall upon their antagoniſts as factious on the ſide of the *people*. Accordingly, they murder one [7] Hyperbolus an Athenian, *A turn at* Samos.

7 This was the perſon, whom the *oſtraciſm* made in ſome meaſure famous, and who made the *oſtraciſm* quite infamous. *Plutarch* hath repeated the ſtory thrice: The following extract is taken from the Life of *Nicias*:

" When the oppoſition was very hot at " Athens between Alcibiades and Nicias, " and the day for *oſtracizing* was drawing " on; which at certain intervals the peo- " ple of Athens were uſed to inforce, and " ſend away into a ten years exile ſome " one citizen ſuſpected of deſigns againſt " their liberty, or odious for being too il- " luſtrious or rich; each of theſe grand " competitors was under grievous appre- " henſions, and with reaſon too, that it " might be his own lot to be exiled on this " occaſion. Alcibiades was hated for his " way of life, and for his bold and enter- " priſing genius. Nicias was envied on " account of his wealth; his way of living " was neither ſociable nor popular; as he " avoided a crowd and herded with a few " intimates, he gave great diſtaſte: Beſides, " as he had often oppoſed the caprices of " the people and conſtrained them to pur- " ſue their real intereſt, he was deep in " their diſpleaſure. In ſhort, the conteſt " ran high between the young and military " men on one ſide, and the old pacific " Athenians on the other, whilſt each " were endeavouring to throw the *oſtra-* " *ciſm* upon the hated object. But,

" Parties ran high, and ſcoundrels got renown.

" Such diſſenſions in the community gave " ſcope to knaves and incendiaries. There " was one Hyperbolus of Perithadæ, very " aſſuming without the leaſt reaſon to be " ſo, however by dint of impudence work- " ing himſelf into power, and the diſgrace " of his country ſo ſoon as he had made " himſelf conſpicuous in it. On this oc- " caſion, Hyperbolus could have no ſuſpi- " cion of becoming himſelf the butt of an " *oſtraciſm*; he had a much better title to " the gallows. Preſuming on the contrary, " that, when either of theſe great men " were exiled, he himſelf could eaſily make " head againſt the other, he manifeſted " great pleaſure at the conteſt, and irritated " the fury of the people againſt them both. " Nicias and Alcibiades perceiving his " roguiſh

Athenian, a ſcurvy fellow, and baniſhed by the *oſtraciſm*, not from a dread of his influence or weight but for the profligacy of his life and his being a public diſgrace to his country. In this they were countenanced by Charminus one of the commanders and ſome of the Athenians aſſociated with them, to whom they gave this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of the ſame nature they committed by inſtructions from them; and had it in agitation to multiply their blows. But thoſe marked out for deſtruction, getting wind of their ſcheme, communicate the whole to Leon and Diomedon who thought of an *oligarchy* with high regret, becauſe their credit was high with the *people*; to [8] Thraſybulus alſo and Thraſyllus, the former a captain of a trireme and the latter of a band of heavy-armed,

" roguiſh intent, conferred privately toge-
" ther, and getting their ſeveral factions to
" unite, ſecured one another, and threw
" the votes on Hyperbolus. Such a turn
" at firſt gave the Athenians much pleaſure
" and diverſion; yet ſoon after they were
" highly chagrined, by reflecting that mak-
" ing ſuch a ſcoundrel the object of it was
" ſhaming the *oſtraciſm* for ever: There
" was dignity even in puniſhments: The
" *oſtraciſm* was of ſuch a nature as to ſuit a
" Thucydides, an Ariſtides, and men of
" ſuch exalted characters: It was clear
" honour to Hyperbolus, and gave him
" room to boaſt, that though a ſcoundrel
" he had been diſtinguiſhed like the greateſt
" and beſt Athenians; as Plato, the comic
" poet, ſays of him:

" He always acted worthy of himſelf,
" But quite unworthy of ſuch high re-
proof:
" The *ſhell* was ne'er deſign'd to honour
ſcoundrels.

" In a word, no perſon was ever baniſhed
" by the *oſtraciſm* after Hyperbolus; it
" was he who cloſed the liſt."

8 Thraſybulus, whoſe name now firſt occurs, acts a very high-ſpirited and noble part in the cloſe of this hiſtory. " If virtue could be weighed merely by itſelf " without any regard to outward circum- " ſtance, I ſhould not heſitate (ſays Cornelius Nepos) to prefer him before all " the great men of Greece. But I aver, " that not one of them ſurpaſſed him in " integrity, in reſolution, in grandeur of " ſoul, and true patriotiſm. —— Yet, I " know not how it is, though no body " excelled him in real merit, many have " outſtripped him in point of fame. In " the Peloponneſian war *(the part of it " which now remains)* Thraſybulus did " many things without Alcibiades, Alci- " biades did nothing without Thraſybulus; " and yet the other, through an happineſs " peculiar to himſelf, reaped the glory and " benefit

armed, and to ſuch others as were judged moſt likely to ſtem the fury of the conſpirators. Theſe they conjured " not to look calmly on 'till " their deſtruction ſhould be compleated, and Samos rent away from " the Athenians, by which alone 'till now their empire had been pre- " ſerved and ſupported." Liſtening therefore to theſe repreſentati- ons, they privately exhorted every ſingle ſoldier not to ſuffer ſuch proceedings, and more earneſtly than others the *Paralian*, ſince all that ſailed in that veſſel were citizens of Athens, all free, and enemies determined from time immemorial to an *oligarchy*, even when it had no exiſtence. Leon alſo and Diomedon never went out to ſea without leaving them ſome ſhips for their guard; inſomuch that when the *three-hundred* made their attempt, as all theſe united in their obſtruc- tion, but moſt heartily of all the *Paralians*, the *popular* party at Samos was reſcued from deſtruction. Thirty of thoſe *three hundred* they even ſlaughtered, and three of the moſt factious amongſt the ſurvivors they doomed to baniſhment. Then having publiſhed an indemnity for the reſt, they continued to ſupport the *democracy* at Samos.

The democracy ſecured there.

But the Samians and ſoldiery diſpatch the *Paralus* with all expe- dition to Athens, having on board her Chæreas the ſon of Archeſtratus an Athenian, who had born a conſiderable ſhare in the laſt turn of affairs, charged with a notification of theſe laſt tranſactions: For yet it was not known at Samos, that the *four-hundred* had ſeized the ad- miniſtration. No ſooner therefore were they come to their moor- ings, than the *four-hundred* cauſed two or three of the crew of the *Paralus* to be dragged away to priſon: The reſidue they turned over from that veſſel into another ſhip of war, and ordered them away

" benefit of all." So far this elegant Roman writer. The reader will ſoon ſee ſome of Thraſybulus his exploits, ſeparately from and in concert with Alcibiades. But the glory of his life was ridding Athens ſome years after of *thirty* tyrants at a blow; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, the moſt honourable recompence his grateful countrymen could beſtow upon him. He was ever a firm, intrepid, diſintereſted patriot; and loſt his life at laſt in the ſervice of his country.

as a guard-ſhip for the ſtation of Eubœa. But Chæreas, ſenſible in what train affairs were going, had the good fortune to make his eſcape: And returning again to Samos, related to the ſoldiery all that had been done in Athens, exaggerating every point with abundant ſeverity. — That "every citizen was now kept in awe with "whips and ſcourges, and that even their own wives and children "daily felt the inſolence of thoſe tyrants; — nay, they have it now "in agitation, that if any on duty at Samos ſhall preſume to oppoſe "their pleaſure, immediately to arreſt and impriſon the whole of "their kindred; and, in caſe the former will not ſubmit, to put the "latter to death." On many other points he alſo expatiated, all aggravated with falſhoods.

Thoſe at Samos *in fury againſt the* four hundred.

His audience, in the firſt inſtant of their paſſion, were fully bent on the deſtruction of all thoſe, who had appeared moſt active for an *oligarchy*, and in ſhort of all who had any hand in its promotion. But, being ſtopped by the interpoſition of others more moderate, and liſtening to the remonſtrance, that "they ought not to accelerate "the ruin of their country, now that a fleet of the enemy lay almoſt "ranged againſt them for battle," they deſiſted. And afterwards, thoſe who had openly avowed the deſign of reſtoring the democratical form at Samos, namely Thraſybulus the ſon of Lycus and Thraſyllus (for theſe had the principal agency in this new revolution;) cauſed every ſoldier to ſwear the moſt ſolemn oaths, more eſpecially ſuch as were for an *oligarchy*, that "they would ſubmit to no "form but the *democracy*, and would act in this cauſe with general "unanimity; and, further, would zealouſly proſecute the war "againſt the Peloponneſians: That, eternal enemies they would re-"main to the *four-hundred*, and would enter into no treaty of ac-"commodation with them." All the Samians, further, that were old enough to bear arms took the ſame oaths: And henceforth, the army communicated all their affairs to the Samians, and gave them an inſight into all the dangers which might attend the ſequel; convinced,

convinced, that otherwiſe no ſafe reſource remained for either; but, if the *four-hundred* or the enemy at Miletus proved too hard for them, their ruin was unavoidable.

They depoſe their commanders.

Terrible were the preſent embroilments of the times, whilſt thoſe at Samos were ſtriving to re-eſtabliſh the *democracy* at Athens, and thoſe at Athens to force an *oligarchical* form upon the army. The ſoldiers further immediately ſummoned a general aſſembly, in which they depoſed their former commanders, and all ſuch captains of triremes as fell under their ſuſpicions; and then choſe others to fill up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and land-commanders, amongſt whom were Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus. The laſt roſe up in the aſſembly, and encouraged them by every topic of perſuaſion, particularly — that "they had not the leaſt reaſon to "be diſpirited, tho' Athens itſelf had revolted from them; for this "was merely the ſeceſſion of a minority from men whoſe numbers "were greater, and who were better furniſhed for every exigence; — "becauſe, the whole navy of Athens was their own, by which they "could compel dependent-ſtates to pay in their former contingents "of tribute, as fully as if they ſailed on ſuch an errand from Athens "itſelf. Even yet, they were maſters of a city at Samos, a city "deſpicable in no reſpect, but which once in a former war had well "nigh wreſted the empire of the ſea from the Athenians. The ſeat "of war in regard to their public enemies would continue the ſame "as it was before. Nay, by being maſters of the fleet, they were "better enabled to procure all the needful ſupplies than their oppo-"nents who were now at Athens. It was purely owing to their "own peculiar ſituation at Samos, that the others had hitherto been "maſters of the entrance into the Piræus: And they ſoon ſhould be "highly diſtreſſed, if they refuſed to reſtore them their ancient po-"lity, ſince theſe at Samos could more eaſily bar them the uſe of "the ſea than be barred up by them. What aſſiſtances Athens had "hitherto given them againſt the enemy were but trifling and of no

"real

" real importance: Nothing could be loſt from that quarter which " was no longer able to ſupply them with money, ſince with that " *they* had been ſupplied by the army; nor to ſend them any valuable " inſtructions, for the ſake of which alone the troops abroad were " ſubmiſſive to the orders of the *State* at home. Nay, in ſome " points thoſe at Athens had moſt egregiouſly offended, ſince they " had over-turned the laws of their country, which thoſe *here* " had preſerved, and were exerting their efforts to compel others " to the obſervance of them. And therefore in every method of " valuation, the men who *here* provided well for the public welfare " were in no reſpect worſe patriots than the men at Athens. Even " Alcibiades, ſhould they grant him an indemnity and a ſafe return, " would readily procure them *the king*'s alliance. And, what had the " greateſt weight, ſhould they miſcarry in every branch of their " preſent deſigns, many places of refuge lay always open to men poſ- " ſeſſed of ſo conſiderable a fleet, in which they might find freſh " cities and another country."

After ſuch occurrences in the aſſembly convened by the ſoldiery, and the concluſion of their mutual exhortations, they continued their preparations for war with unremitting diligence. —— But the deputation of *ten* ſent from the *four-hundred* to Samos, being informed of theſe proceedings, when they were advanced in their voyage ſo far as Delos, thought proper to proceed no farther.

Miletus. About this very time, the Peloponneſians on board the fleet in the ſtation of Miletus clamoured loudly amongſt themſelves, that " they " are betrayed by Aſtyochus and Tiſſaphernes, as the former had al- " ready refuſed to engage, when themſelves were hearty and in fine " condition, and the fleet of the Athenians was ſmall; nor would " do ſo even now, when the latter are reported to be embroiled with " inteſtine ſeditions, and their own ſhips are daily impairing; but, " under pretext of a Phœnician fleet to be brought up by Tiſſa- " phernes, an aid merely nominal and which would never join them,

he

" he was ruining all by dilatory meaſures: And as for Tiſſaphernes,
" it was never his intention to bring up that fleet; but he was plainly
" undermining the ſtrength of theirs, by not ſupplying them con-
" ſtantly and fully with their pay. The time therefore (they inſiſted)
" ought no longer to be thus idly waſted, but an engagement ha-
" zarded at once." Yet in ſuch clamours thoſe deepeſt concerned were the Syracuſans.

The grand fleets on both ſides at ſea.

The confederates and Aſtyochus himſelf being affected with theſe clamours, and having declared in a council of war for engaging the enemy forthwith, as they had received undoubted intelligence of the confuſions at Samos; putting out to ſea with the whole of their fleet amounting to a hundred and twelve ſail, and having ordered the Mileſians to march thither over-land, they ſtood away for Mycale. At Glaucæ of Mycale the Athenians were now lying, with eighty-two ſhips of the Samian department: For in this quarter of Mycale Samos lies but a ſmall diſtance from the continent. But when they ſaw the fleet of the Peloponneſians approaching they retired to Samos, judging their own ſtrength inſufficient for an engagement with the foe which might prove deciſive. Beſides, as they had diſcovered the intention of thoſe at Miletus to venture an engagement, they expected Strombichides from the Helleſpont, who was to bring to their aſſiſtance the ſhips on the ſtation of Chios which had gone up to Abydus: And a meſſage had already been diſpatched to haſten him up. For theſe reaſons they plied away to Samos. The Peloponneſians, arriving at Mycale, incamped upon the ſhore along with the land-forces of the Mileſians and thoſe ſent in by the bordering people. On the next day, when they were fully bent on ſtanding directly againſt Samos, advice is brought them that " Strombichides
" is come up with the ſhips from the Helleſpont;" upon which, they made the beſt of their way back again to Miletus. And now the Athenians, having gained ſo large an acceſſion of ſtrength, ſhew themſelves immediately before Miletus with a hundred and

eight ſail, deſirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy. But as nothing ſtirred out againſt them, they alſo returned to Samos.

The Peloponneſians *ſend a ſquadron to* Pharnabazus.

In the ſame ſummer, immediately after the former movements, the Peloponneſians — who had waved coming out to an engagement, ſince with the whole of their ſtrength they thought themſelves by no means a match for their enemy, and were now reduced to great perplexities about the methods of procuring ſubſiſtence for ſo numerous a fleet, eſpecially as Tiſſaphernes was ſo remiſs in his payments — ſend away to Pharnabazus (purſuant to the prior inſtructions from Peloponneſus) Clearchus the ſon of Ramphias with a detachment of forty ſail. For Pharnabazus had demanded ſuch a force, and was ready to ſupport the expences of it: And it had further been notified to them in form, that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt. And thus this detachment of Peloponneſians, having ran out far to ſea to get clear of the Athenians during the courſe, met with very tempeſtuous weather. The bulk of them, it is true, with Clearchus rode it out to Delos, and from thence return again to Miletus. But Clearchus ſetting out again travelled over land to Helleſpont, and took upon him the command. Ten ſhips however of the detachment, under Elixus the Megaréan who was joined in the command, reached the Helleſpont without damage, and effectuate the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos informed of theſe incidents ſend away a detachment to the Helleſpont, to ſupport and guard the adjacent cities. And a ſmall engagement happens before Byzantium, between eight ſhips on a ſide.

Alcibiades *recalled by the troops at* Samos.

Thoſe who were in the management at Samos, and above all Thraſybulus, adhering ſtill to the ſentiments they had entertained ever ſince the laſt turn of affairs there, that Alcibiades muſt needs be recalled; the latter at laſt obtained in full aſſembly the concurrence of the ſoldiery. Accordingly, when they had voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, Thraſybulus repaired immediately to Tiſſaphernes,

phernes, and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos; convinced, their laſt reſource depended on his being able to alienate Tiſſaphernes from the Peloponneſians. Hereupon, an aſſembly being called, Alcibiades at large expatiated upon and deplored the malignity of his fate in having been exiled from his country. And then, having amply run over every topic relating to the preſent poſture of affairs, he raiſed their expectations high in regard to the future. He magnified with a mighty parade of words his own intereſt in Tiſſaphernes; from the view, not only to intimidate the patrons of the oligarchical government at Athens, and put a ſtop to their cabals; but alſo, to render himſelf more reſpectable to theſe at Samos, and to raiſe up their confidence in him as high as poſſible; — to give the enemy, further, as many handles as he was able to calumniate Tiſſaphernes, and to lower all their preſent ſanguinary expectations. Theſe were the ſchemes of Alcibiades, when with all imaginable oſtentation he gave the ſtrongeſt aſſurances to his audience, that "Tiſſaphernes had pledged his word to him, that could he once "firmly depend upon the Athenians, they never ſhould be diſtreſſed "for want of ſupplies whilſt he had any thing left, nay though at "laſt he ſhould be forced to turn into ready caſh the very bed he "lay on; and the Phœnician fleet already come up to Aſpendus he "would join with the Athenians, but never with the Peloponneſians: "The only pledge of fidelity he required from the Athenians, "was for Alcibiades to be recalled and paſs his word for their future "conduct."

And appointed a commander.

The army, delighted with theſe and many other ſoothing topics, proceed immediately to aſſociate him with the reſt of the commanders, and implicitly truſted every thing to their management. Not a man was any longer to be found amongſt them, who would have parted with his preſent confidence of certain ſecurity and revenge on the *four-hundred* for all the treaſure in the univerſe. Nay, they were ready this very moment, upon the ſtrength of what

Alcibiades had ſaid, to ſlight the enemy now at hand and ſteer directly for the Piræus. But, though numbers with vehemence recommended the ſtep, he ſtopped their ardor by remonſtrances, that "they ought by no means to think of ſteering for the Piræus and "leave their nearer enemies upon their backs. But in relation to the "operations of war, ſince he was elected a *general* (he ſaid) he "would firſt go and confer with Tiſſaphernes, and would then pro-"ceed to action." Accordingly, the aſſembly was no ſooner diſſolved than he immediately departed, that he might appear in all reſpects to be perfectly united with Tiſſaphernes; deſirous alſo to raiſe himſelf in his eſteem, and give him a ſenſible proof that he was appointed a general; and, by virtue of this, enabled either to do him ſervice or to do him harm. It was the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by Tiſſaphernes, and Tiſſaphernes by the Athenians.

A mutiny at Miletus.

The Peloponneſians at Miletus had no ſooner heard of the recal of Alcibiades, than, as before they ſuſpected treachery in Tiſſaphernes, they now loudly vented invectives againſt him. What more inflamed them was, that ever ſince the Athenians ſhewed themſelves before Miletus and they had refuſed to put out to ſea and engage them, Tiſſaphernes had ſlackened more than ever in his payments: and thus hated by them for that reaſon ſufficiently before, he now became more odious on account of Alcibiades. The ſoldiery again, as on former occaſions, ran together in parties, and enumerated their grievances. Nay, ſome of higher ranks, perſons of real importance and not merely the private men, were full of remonſtrances, that "they had at no time received their full ſubſiſtence; his payments "had been always ſcanty, and even thoſe had never been regular: "in ſhort, unleſs they were led directly againſt the enemy, or car-"ried to ſome other ſtation where they might be ſure of ſubſiſtence, "the crews would abandon their veſſels. And the whole blame of "all that befel ought to be charged upon Aſtyochus, who for "private

" private lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tiſſaphernes." Employed as they were in thus enumerating grievances, a tumult actually broke out againſt Aſtyochus. For the mariners belonging to the Syracuſan and Thurian veſſels, by how much they enjoyed the greateſt liberty of all others in the fleet, by ſo much the more heightened confidence did they flock about him and demand their pay. Upon this, Aſtyochus returned an anſwer too full of ſpirit, threatning hard * *that Dorian*, who ſeconded and encouraged the demands of his men, and even lifting up his ſtaff and ſhaking it at him. This was no ſooner perceived by the military crowd, than ſeamen as they were with a loud uproar they ruſhed at Aſtyochus to knock him down: But, aware of their deſign, he flies for refuge to an altar. He eſcaped indeed without any blows, and the fray was ended without any harm committed.

* Hermocrates.

The Mileſians alſo made themſelves maſters by ſurprize of a fort erected by Tiſſaphernes at Miletus, and oblige the garriſon left in it to evacuate the place. Theſe things pleaſed the reſt of the allies, and not leaſt of all the Syracuſans. Lichas however was by no means ſatisfied with theſe proceedings. He inſiſted " the Mileſians were " obliged in duty to be ſubmiſſive to Tiſſaphernes; and, that all " others who lived in the dominions of *the king* lay under the ſame " obligation, and were bound to pay due regard to his juſt autho- " rity, 'till ſuch time as the war was handſomly compleated." This drew upon him the reſentment of the Mileſians; and becauſe of theſe expreſſions and ſome others of the ſame nature, when he afterwards died of a natural diſeaſe, they would not ſuffer him to be buried in a ſpot of ground, which the Lacedæmonians who were amongſt them had choſe for his interment.

Whilſt affairs were thus ſadly embroiled between the ſoldiery on one ſide, and Aſtyochus and Tiſſaphernes on the other; Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon, as ſucceſſor to Aſtyochus in the chief command of the fleet. Accordingly he takes the command upon him, and

Mindarus *ſucceeds* Aſtyochus.

and Aſtyochus ſailed away for home. But with him as embaſſador Tiſſaphernes ſent one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a Carian, who ſpoke both languages, to accuſe the Mileſians about the ſeizure of the fort, and alſo to make apologies for *his* conduct. He knew that the Mileſians were already ſet out with an outcry, chiefly againſt him; and, that Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed with proofs that Tiſſaphernes in concert with Alcibiades baffled all the Peloponneſian ſchemes, and baſely tampered with both the warring parties. But an enmity had always ſubſiſted between theſe two about the payments of ſubſiſtence. And at length, when Hermocrates was baniſhed from Syracuſe, and other Syracuſans came to Miletus to take upon them the command of the Syracuſan veſſels, namely Potamis, and Myſcon, and Demarchus, Tiſſaphernes vented his choler more bitterly than ever againſt Hermocrates now an exile; and amongſt his other accuſations of him affirmed, that "he had demanded a ſum of money, which being refuſed him, he "had ever ſince declared himſelf his enemy." Aſtyochus therefore and the Mileſians and Hermocrates are now ſailed for Lacedæmon.

The deputies from the four-hundred at Samos.

By this time alſo Alcibiades had repaſſed from Tiſſaphernes to Samos. And from Delos, the deputation ſent from the *four-hundred* on the late revolution to ſooth and gain the concurrence of thoſe at Samos, arrive alſo whilſt Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an aſſembly being called, they endeavoured to open the cauſe. The ſoldiers at firſt refuſed to hear them, and roared aloud for the murder of thoſe who had overturned the *popular* government. At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, they gave them a hearing.

Their plea.

The deputies remonſtrated, that "not for the ruin of Athens "was this new change introduced, but purely for its preſervation — "in no wiſe to betray it into the hands of the enemy; becauſe that "might have been done effectually, upon the late approach of its "enemy to her walls, ſince *they* were in power. Every ſingle perſon amongſt

" amongſt the *five-thouſand* was intended to have a regular ſhare
" in the adminiſtration. Their friends and relations are not treated
" in an inſolent manner, as Chæreas had maliciouſly ſuggeſted to
" them; nay, were not in the leaſt moleſted, but every where re-
" mained in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their property."

Though on theſe topics they amply enlarged, yet they were heard with no manner of complacence, but with manifeſt indignation. Different methods of proceeding were recommended by different perſons, but the majority declared for ſailing away at once for the Piræus. On this occaſion Alcibiades firſt ſhewed himſelf a true patriot; nay, as much a patriot as ever Athenian had been. For when the Athenians at Samos were hurried furiouſly along to invade their own-ſelves, the plain conſequence of which was giving up at once Ionia and Helleſpont to their public foes, he mollified their fury; and, at a criſis when no other man living could have been able to reſtrain the multitude, he perſuaded them to deſiſt from this ſtrange invaſion; and, by reprimanding thoſe whoſe private reſentments burſt out moſt violently againſt the deputies, prevented miſchief. At length, he himſelf diſmiſſed them with the following anſwer: —— That, Alcibiades *gives the anſwer.*

" the adminiſtration in the hands of *five-thouſand* he had no
" intention to oppoſe: But he ordered them to give an immediate
" diſcharge to the *four-hundred*, and to reſtore the council of *five-*
" *hundred* to their prior ſtate. If further, from a principle of frugality
" they had made retrenchments, in order that thoſe who ſerved in
" the armies of the *State* might be better ſubſiſted, he praiſed them
" altogether. He then recommended to them a ſteddy reſiſtance,
" and by no means in any ſhape to give way to the enemy. For
" could the *State* once be ſecured from its public foes, a reconciliation
" amongſt its members might eaſily be hoped for; but, ſhould either
" party be once deſtroyed, either this at Samos, or theirs at Athens,
" none would ſoon be left to be reconciled at all."

There

There were preſent at this audience embaſſadors from the Argives, who brought aſſurances of aid to the *people* of Athens at Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their zeal; and then, exhorting them to hold themſelves in readineſs to come upon a ſummons ſent, he civilly diſmiſſed them. Theſe Argives came to Samos in company with the *Paralians*, who had been lately turned over by the *four-hundred* into a veſſel of war, to cruize round Eubœa, and to carry to Lacedæmon the embaſſadors, Læſpodias, Ariſtophon, and Meleſius, ſent thither from the *four-hundred*. But, when advanced to the height of Argos, they put the embaſſadors under arreſt as chief agents in pulling down the *democracy*, and delivered them up to the Argives. They had no buſineſs now at Athens, and ſo came from Argos to Samos, convoying the Argive embaſſadors in the trireme which they had ſeized.

The myſterious conduct of Tiſſaphernes.

The ſame ſummer Tiſſaphernes — about that juncture of time in which the Peloponneſians were moſt furious againſt him, for the other reaſons, and the recalment of Alcibiades, as having now pulled off the maſk and declared for the Athenians, — deſirous, as in truth it appeared, to efface the bad impreſſions they had entertained of him, got ready to go to Aſpendus to the Phœnician fleet, and prevailed with Lichas to bear him company. In regard to the Peloponneſians, he declared that he ſubſtituted his own lieutenant Tamas to pay them their ſubſiſtence, whilſt he himſelf ſhould be abſent. Various accounts are vented about this ſtep; nor can it certainly be known, with what view he repaired to Aſpendus, or why when there he did not bring up the fleet. That a Phœnician fleet conſiſting of one hundred forty-ſeven ſail was now come up to Aſpendus, is allowed on all ſides; but, why they did not come forwards, is variouſly conjectured. Some think, he went out of ſight merely to carry on his old ſcheme of wearing away the Peloponneſians; and, in conſequence of this, Tamas paid in their ſubſiſtence which he was ordered to pay, not better but even worſe than Tiſſaphernes. Others ſay it was, that ſince

ſince he had brought the Phœnicians to Aſpendus, he might ſave large ſums by diſmiſſing them there, as he never had ſincerely deſigned to make uſe of their ſervice. Others again attribute it to a deſire to quiet the clamours againſt him at Lacedæmon, and to get himſelf repreſented there as one abounding in good faith, and who is actually gone to bring up a fleet fairly and honeſtly fitted out for ſervice.

Its ſolution.

But, in my opinion, the true ſolution of the myſtery is this. He would not bring them up, merely to wear out and to balance the ſtrength of the Grecians, that during his abſence and this ſtudied prolongation the latter might be running into ruin; and further, for the ſake of balancing, to join with neither party for fear of making them too ſtrong. For, had he once determined to join heartily in the war, the conſequence was certain beyond a doubt. Had he brought them up to join the Lacedæmonians, he muſt in all probability have given them the victory, ſince already their naval ſtrength was rather equal than inferior to that of their opponents. But, that their ruin alone was deſigned by him, is plain from the excuſe he made for not bringing up that fleet. He pretended they were fewer in number than *the king* had ordered to be aſſembled. Yet if this were ſo, he might have ingratiated himſelf more abundantly with *the king*, if he made a great ſaving of money for his maſter and with leſs expence had accompliſhed his ſervice. To Aſpendus however, whatever was his view, Tiſſaphernes repairs and joins the Phœnicians: Nay further, at his own deſire, the Peloponneſians ſent Philippus a noble Lacedæmonian with two triremes to take charge of this fleet.

Alcibiades follows Tiſſaphernes to Aſpendus.

Alcibiades had no ſooner received intelligence that Tiſſaphernes was at Aſpendus, than taking with him thirteen ſail he haſtened thither after him, promiſing to thoſe at Samos an aſſured and important piece of ſervice: For "he would either bring the Phœnician fleet "to the Athenians, or at leaſt prevent their junction with the Pelo-

" ponneſians." It is probable, that from a long acquaintance he was privy to the whole intention of Tiſſaphernes never to bring up this fleet: And his project was now, to render Tiſſaphernes ſtill more odious to the Peloponneſians for the regard he ſhewed to himſelf and the Athenians, that ſo he might at laſt be neceſſitated to ſtrike in with the latter. He ſtood away therefore directly by Phaſelis and Caunus, and held on his courſe upwards.

Freſh cabals in Athens.

The deputation ſent from the *four-hundred*, being returned from Samos to Athens, reported the anſwer of Alcibiades, — how " he " encouraged them to hold out and give way in no ſhape to the " enemy; and that his confidence was great he ſhould be able " throughly to reconcile them with the army, and give them victory " over the Peloponneſians." By this report they very much revived the ſpirits of many of thoſe who had a ſhare in the *oligarchy*, and yet would gladly extricate themſelves from the buſineſs upon aſſurances of indemnity. They had already begun to hold ſeparate cabals, and ſhew open diſcontent at the train of affairs. They were headed by ſome of principal authority even in the preſent *oligarchy* and who filled the great offices of ſtate, namely Theramenes [9] the ſon of Agnon, and Ariſtocrates the ſon of Sicelius, and others, who were moſt deeply concerned in late tranſactions; and from a dread, as they gave out, of the army at Samos and Alcibiades, had con-

9 Theramenes was very expert at turning about and ſhifting his party. He got by it the nick-name of *Cothurnus* or the *Buskin*; becauſe the tragedians' buskin was made large enough for any foot to go into it. He was however a man of great abilities, and generally regarded as a lover of his country. His turns were dextrous, well-timed, and made with the view of public good. Cæſar, when making Cicero a compliment, likened him to Theramenes. He was deeply concerned in all the ſubſequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finiſhing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians after the taking of Athens by Lyſander, when they demoliſhed their long-walls, opened their harbours, and gave up their ſhipping. He was afterwards, nominally, one of the *thirty* tyrants: For he ſoon began to oppoſe them; firſt, with moderation; then, with vehemence; which exaſperated them ſo, that they put him to death.

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curred in ſending an embaſſy to Lacedæmon, leſt by unſeaſonable diſſents from the majority they might have done miſchief to the public. Not that they haſted themſelves even now to put an utter end to the oligarchical government; but, to inforce the neceſſity of making uſe of the *five-thouſand* not merely in name but in act, and to render the polity more equal. This was, it muſt be owned, the political ſcheme which they all pretended; but, through private ambition, the majority had given into that courſe by which an *oligarchy* founded upon the ruins of a *democracy* is ripe for ſubverſion. For it was the daily claim of each ſingle perſon concerned, not to be equal with the reſt but to be pre-eminently the firſt. Whereas, when out of a democracy a preference is awarded, the diſtinction is the more eaſily brooked, as if it were the real conſequence of ſuperior worth. But what, of a certainty, elevated them moſt was the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own conſciouſneſs that this buſineſs of an oligarchy carried with it no proſpect of firm or laſting continuance. A contention therefore enſued amongſt them, which of them ſhould ſhew the greateſt zeal for the *people*.

A new fortification.

But ſuch of the *four-hundred*, as made the greateſt oppoſition to this new ſcheme, and were leaders of their party, — namely, Phrynichus, who formerly during his employment as general at Samos had embroiled himſelf with Alcibiades, — and Ariſtarchus, one of the moſt violent and alſo moſt inveterate opponents of the *people*, — and Piſander, and Antipho, and others of the greateſt influence amongſt them, — who formerly, upon eſtabliſhing themſelves firſt in the government, and ever ſince the army at Samos had diſſented from them in favour of the *democracy*, had beſtirred themſelves in ſending embaſſies to Lacedæmon, in more firmly eſtabliſhing the *oligarchy*, and erecting a new fortification on the ſpot which is called Eëtioneïa: — Theſe, I ſay, exerted themſelves with much greater ardor than ever ſince the return of the deputies from Samos, as they plainly ſaw the inclinations of numbers, and ſome of their own body,

on whoſe perſeverance they had highly depended, were intirely changed. They even cauſed Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten others, to ſet out with all expedition; ſo apprehenſive were they of freſh oppoſition both in Athens itſelf and from Samos; and charged them with inſtructions to ſtrike up an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, upon any tolerable terms they could poſſibly procure. They alſo carried on with redoubled diligence the new works at Eëtioneïa. Theſe works were intended, as was given out by Theramenes and his party, not ſo much to keep out of the Piræus thoſe from Samos ſhould they endeavour to attempt it, as to enable themſelves at their own diſcretion to receive both the ſhips and land-forces of the enemy. For Eëtioneïa is the mole of the Piræus, and the entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. The new work was therefore joined in ſuch a manner to that which guarded it before on the ſide of the land, that a ſmall party poſted behind could command the entrance. For the extremities of it were continued down to the fort in the very mouth of the harbour which was narrow; and both the old wall which was built on the land-ſide, and this new fortification within reached down to the ſea. They alſo enlarged and ſecured the *great portico*, which adjoined to the new work erected in the Piræus, and kept it intirely in their own cuſtody. Here they obliged all the citizens to lodge what corn they already had, and all that ſhould hereafter be imported, and here only to expoſe it to ſale, and to vend it.

It raiſeth great jealouſy.

Theſe proceedings had for a long time drawn ſharp inſinuations from Theramenes. And when the embaſſy returned from Lacedæmon, without bringing to any manner of iſſue a general accommodation for the whole of the *State*, he averred that "by this new "work the ſafety of the city was viſibly endangered." For from Peloponneſus, at this inſtant of time, at the requeſt of the Eubœans no leſs than forty-two ſail of ſhips were on the coaſt of Laconia, ſome of which were Italian from Tarentum and from Locri, and ſome Sicilian, and all were now bound for Eubœa: At the head of

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this equipment was Hegeſandridas a Spartan, the ſon of Hegeſander. Theramenes maintained, that "it was ſet out leſs for Eubœa than "for thoſe who were now fortifying at Eëtioneïa; and, unleſs we "ſtand upon our guard, they will ſurpriſe and compleat the ruin of "Athens." There was really ſomething in the conduct of the men he accuſed to countenance this charge, nor was it merely the outcry of ſlander. Thoſe, who now compoſed the *oligarchy*, were principally deſirous to preſerve in their hands the whole appenage of the republic: If this were impracticable, to ſecure the ſhipping and walls, and ſubſiſt with independence: But, ſhould they be unable to compaſs this, rather than fall the firſt victims to the *democracy* re-eſtabliſhed, to let in the enemy; and, reſigning their ſhipping and fortifications, to make any terms whatever for the *State*, provided they could obtain ſecurity for their own perſons. They accelerated therefore this new work, which was ſo contrived as to have poſterns, and ſally-ports, and paſſages enow to let in the enemy: And they proceed with all imaginable diſpatch in order to outſtrip prevention.

Hitherto indeed this charge againſt them had only been whiſpered with an air of ſecrecy amongſt a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon his return from the embaſſy to Lacedæmon, was treacherouſly ſtabbed by one of the *patrole* in the forum at the hour of public reſort, being got but a few ſteps from the houſe where the *council* was ſitting, and dropped down dead upon the ſpot; — when further the aſſaſſin made his eſcape; and a ſtranger from Argos, who aſſiſted at the fact, being apprehended and tortured by the *four-hundred*, diſcovered not the name of any one perſon who ſet them on, nor made any farther confeſſion than that "he knew large numbers met at the "houſe of the officer who commanded the *patrole*, and at other "places;" — then at length, as nothing could be made of this affair, Theramenes, and Ariſtocrates, and as many either of the *four-hundred* or of others as were combined with them, proceeded to act in a more open and reſolute manner. For by this time the fleet was come

Phrynichus ſtabbed in the forum.

come round from Laconia, and riding before Epidaurus had made ravages upon Ægina. Theramenes therefore averred it improbable, that " were they intended for Eubœa they would ever have put into " Ægina, and then go again and lie at Epidaurus, unleſs they had " been ſent out at the expreſs invitation of thoſe whom he had always " accuſed of traiterous deſigns; and, it was impoſſible to be paſſive " any longer under ſuch practices." In fine, after many ſpeeches made to excite a tumult and many ſuſpicions diſſeminated abroad, they *A ſedition.* fell to work in earneſt. For the heavy-armed poſted in the Piræus to carry on the new works of Eëtioneïa, amongſt whom Ariſtocrates himſelf was employed at the head of his own band, lay under an arreſt Alexicles, who commanded there for the *oligarchy*, and was a moſt vehement adverſary to the oppoſite party, and carrying him into a houſe put him under confinement. To this action they were alſo emboldened by the concurrence of others as well as by Hermon, who commanded the *patrole* aſſigned for Munichia: And, what was of moſt importance, it was openly countenanced by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The news of it was immediately carried to the *four-hundred*, who were this moment aſſembled together in council: And all, excepting thoſe diſſatisfied with their meaſures, were ready to run to arms, and vented terrible threats againſt Theramenes and his aſſociates.

But he, apologizing for himſelf, declared his readineſs to take up arms along with them, and attend them to the reſcue of Alexicles: And, taking with him one of the generals who was in his ſecret, he hurried down to the Piræus. Ariſtarchus alſo ran down to aſſiſt; as did further the young men belonging to the cavalry of the *State*.

Great in truth was the tumult and full of horror. For thoſe, who were left in the upper-city, imagined that the Piræus was already ſeized, and that Alexicles was ſlain: And they in the Piræus each moment expected an aſſault from thoſe in the city. Not without difficulty

difficulty could the men of years and experience ſtop ſuch as were wildly running up and down the ſtreets, and ruſhing to arms. And Thucydides the Pharſalian, public hoſt of the *State*, who happened then to be at Athens, threw himſelf with lively zeal in the way of all who were flocking down; conjuring them earneſtly, "not to finiſh "the ruin of their country, when the enemy lay ſo near to ſtrike "the blow." But thus, at length, their fury abated, and the effuſion of one another's blood was prevented.

The new works demoliſhed.

As for Theramenes, he was no ſooner got down to the Piræus, than aſſuming authority (for he himſelf was at this time a *general*) he pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this piece of mutiny, at leaſt ſo far as mere making a noiſe could do it; whilſt Ariſtarchus and all the oppoſite faction were angry with them in earneſt. But the bulk of the heavy-armed drew together in a body, and betray no ſign of regret for what they had done. Nay, they demanded aloud from Theramenes — "If in his judgment theſe new works were "raiſed with a good deſign, or would not better be demoliſhed?" His reply was this — That "if *they* thought it expedient to demoliſh "them, his opinion ſhould concur with theirs." Hereupon, at a ſignal given, the heavy-armed and many others who belonged to the Piræus ruſhed on in a moment, and pulled down all the new fortification.

Progreſs of the ſedition.

The watch-word now publiſhed to the *multitude* was this —— "Whoſoever would have the adminiſtration lodged in the *five-* "*thouſand* inſtead of the *four-hundred*, let him join in the work." For even ſtill they judged it politic to veil their deſign under the name of the *five-thouſand*, and not to ſay downright — "Whoſoever "would have the *democracy* reſtored,"— leſt poſſibly the former might have been actually in force, and a perſon ſpeaking to any one of them might ſpoil all by ſome inadvertent expreſſions. And on the ſame account, the *four-hundred* would neither have the *five-thouſand* declared, nor yet have it known that they had never been appointed.

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To admit ſo large a number into a ſhare of the government, they judged was in fact a mere democracy; but, that leaving the matter in ſuſpence would ſtrike a dread of his neighbour into every Athenian.

The next morning the *four-hundred*, though highly diſordered in their politics, aſſembled however in council. But thoſe in the Piræus, after enlarging Alexicles, whom they had put under confinement and compleating the demolition of the new works, marched to the theatre of Bacchus in Munichia; and there, all armed as they were, held a formal aſſembly. And then, in purſuance of what had been reſolved, marched directly into the upper-city, and poſted themſelves in the Anacéum. Here they were accoſted by a ſelect committee ſent from the *four-hundred*, who man to man reaſoned calmly with them; and, perceiving any to be tractable, plied them with perſuaſions to proceed in a gentle manner and to reſtrain the fury of their aſſociates; giving them aſſurances, that " the *five-thouſand* would be declared, " and from them by regular ſucceſſion at the pleaſure of the *five-* " *thouſand* the *four-hundred* ſhould be appointed;" conjuring them in the mean time, " not to forward through impatience the deſtruc- " tion of the *State*, nor give it up for a prey to the public enemy." The whole multitude of the heavy-armed, attentive to theſe arguments, on which many expatiated at large and preſſed home upon numbers, became more tractable than they were at firſt, and were moſt terribly alarmed at the mention of the total deſtruction of their *polity*. It was at laſt concluded, that on a ſet day an aſſembly ſhould be held in the temple of Bacchus to deviſe an accommodation.

Approach of the enemy's fleet.

But, when this aſſembly to be held in the temple of Bacchus came on, and all parties were only not compleatly met, comes in the news that " the two and forty ſail and Hegeſandridas are coaſt- " ing along from Megara towards Salamis." Not one of the heavy-armed this moment but pronounced it true, what before was given out

out by Theramenes and his friends, that " to the new fortifications " theſe ſhips are now bound ;" and it was judged, that in the nick of time they had been levelled with the ground. But Hegeſandridas, as perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only hovered about at Epidaurus, or the adjacent coaſt. It is however probable, that on account of the preſent ſedition amongſt the Athenians, he lay for a time in this ſtation, in hope to ſeize ſome fair opportunity to ſtrike a blow.

All now eager on defence.

Be this as it will, the Athenians no ſooner heard the news than to a man they flocked down amain to the Piræus ; leſs alarmed at their own domeſtic war, than at an invaſion from a public enemy, no longer remote but at their very ports. Some of them threw themſelves on board what ſhipping was ready, others lanched ſuch as were aground, and others poſted themſelves upon the walls and at the mouth of the harbour.

They put to ſea.

But the Peloponneſian fleet, having ſailed by and doubled the cape of Sunium, comes to anchor between Thoricus and Praſiæ, and proceeds afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, manning out their ſhips with what hands could be got on this ſudden emergency, as in a city diſtracted with ſedition, and yet eager to ſtave off the greateſt danger that had ever threatned it (for as Attica was occupied by the enemy, Eubœa now was their *all*,) cauſe Thymocharis a commander to ſtand away with their fleet to Eretria. On their arrival there, and their junction with ſuch as were already in Eubœa, they amounted to ſix and thirty ſail, and were immediately forced to engage: For Hegeſandridas, after the hour of repaſte, came out in line of battle from Oropus.

The diſtance of Oropus from the city of the Eretrians acroſs the ſea is about * ſixty ſtadia. And therefore, upon his approach, the Athenians ordered their men on board, imagining the ſoldiers to be ready at hand to obey their orders ; whereas, they happened not yet to be returned from the market whither they had gone to buy proviſions.

* *About ſix* English *miles.*

For, through the management of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by way of ſale, except in ſuch houſes as lay in the moſt remote quarters of the city; with an intent, that the enemy might attack the Athenians before they were all embarked, and oblige them in a hurrying and diſorderly manner to begin the fight. Nay, a ſignal had even been held out to the enemy from Eretria towards Oropus, at what time they ought to come forward to the attack.

Battle of Eretria. Upon ſo ſhort a notice the Athenians, having formed their line as well as they were able, and engaging the enemy before the harbour of Eretria, made however a gallant reſiſtance for a time. At length, being compelled to ſheer off, they are purſued to land. And as many of them, as ran for ſafety to the city of the Eretrians, ſuffered the moſt cruel treatment, in being murdered by the hands of men whom they ſuppoſed their friends. Such indeed as could reach the fort of Eretria, which was garriſoned by Athenians, are ſafe; as alſo the veſſels which could make Chalcis.

The Athenians *defeated.* But the Peloponneſians, after making prizes of two and twenty Athenian veſſels, and either butchering or making priſoners all on board them, erected a trophy. And no long time after they cauſed all

Revolt of Eubœa. Eubœa to revolt, excepting Oréus, which an Athenian garriſon ſecured, and then ſettled the ſtate of that iſland at their own diſcretion.

When advice of what was done at Eubœa reached Athens, the

Athens *in the utmoſt conſternation.* greateſt conſternation enſued of all that had to this day been known. Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, though great concern in truth it gave them, nor any other public diſaſter cauſed ſo terrible an alarm amongſt them. For at a time, when their army at Samos was in open revolt, when they had no longer either ſhipping in ſtore or mariners to go on board, when they were diſtracted with inteſtine ſedition, and ready each moment to tear one another to pieces; — and on the neck of all theſe *this* great calamity ſupervened, in which they loſt their fleet, and (what was more of conſequence) Eubœa, which had better ſupplied their neceſſities than Attica itſelf, — had they not

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ample reaſon now to fall into utter dejection? But what alarmed them moſt was the proximity of ruin, in caſe the enemy, fluſhed with their late ſucceſs, ſhould ſtand immediately into the Piræus, now utterly deſtitute of ſhips. Not a moment paſſed, but they imagined they were only not in the very harbour: Which in truth, had they been a little more daring, they might eaſily have been. Nay, had they made this ſtep and blocked up the city, they muſt infallibly have increaſed the ſeditions within it, muſt have neceſſitated the fleet to come over from Ionia, though averſe to the *oligarchy*, in order to prevent the ruin of their own relations, and the total deſtruction of their country. And in the mean time, Helleſpont, Ionia, the iſles even up to Eubœa, in a word the whole empire of Athens muſt have been their own. Yet not in this inſtance only but many others, the Lacedæmonians ſhewed themſelves moſt commodious enemies for the Athenians to encounter. For as nothing differed more than their reſpective tempers; the *one* being active, the *other* ſlow; enterpriſing *theſe*, but timorous *thoſe* eſpecially in naval competitions; they gave them many advantages. The truth of this the Syracuſans moſt plainly ſhewed, who very nearly reſembled the Athenians in diſpoſition, and ſo warred againſt them with the higheſt ſpirit and ſucceſs.

Another revolution of government.

Terrified however at theſe tidings, the Athenians made a ſhift to man out twenty veſſels, and convened an aſſembly of the people, on the firſt report of their loſs, in the place which is called the *Pnyx*, and where generally that aſſembly was held. In this they put an end to the adminiſtration of the *four-hundred*, and decreed "the "ſupreme power to be veſted in the *five-thouſand*, which number to "conſiſt of all ſuch citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour; "and that no one ſhould receive a ſalary for any public magiſtracy; "whoever offended in this point they declared a traitor." Other frequent aſſemblies were afterwards held, in which they appointed

Nomothetæ [1], and filled up the other poſts in the government. And now at leaſt, though for the firſt time in my opinion, the Athenians ſeem to have modelled their government aright. A moderation finely tempered between the *few* and the *many* was now inforced. And from the low ſituation into which their affairs were now plunged, this enabled Athens to re-erect her head.

Alcibiades *recalled.*

They decreed farther the recalment of Alcibiades and his adherents; and, diſpatching a *deputation* to him and the army at Samos, exhorted them to exert their utmoſt efforts for the public ſervice.

Oenoë *betrayed.*

In the firſt moments of this new revolution, Piſander and Alexicles with their partiſans, and in general all the great ſticklers for the *oligarchy*, withdraw privately to Deceléa. But Ariſtarchus, who was one of the generals of the *State* took a different route from all the reſt; and, carrying off a party of archers, though rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoë: Oenoë was a fortreſs of the Athenians on the frontiers of Bœotia. But the Corinthians, on a provocation peculiar to themſelves, having procured the concurrence of the Bœotians held it now blocked up, becauſe a party of their countrymen drawing off from Deceléa had been put to the ſword by a ſally of the garriſon from Oenoë. Ariſtarchus therefore, having in a conference ſettled matters with the beſiegers, deceives the garriſon in Oenoë by aſſuring them, that "as their countrymen in Athens had made up "all their quarrels with the Lacedæmonians, they alſo were bound "to deliver up this place to the Bœotians; and, that this was an

[1] The general courſe of appointing *Nomothetæ* was by lot. Their number in the whole was a thouſand and one. Their buſineſs was not as the name ſeems to imply, to make new laws, ſince that belonged to the ſupreme power lodged in the people; but, to inſpect ſuch as were already made, to re-conſider ſuch as were thought to be or were complained of as grievous, and regularly report ſuch as ought to be continued or ought to be repealed.

"expreſs

" expreſs proviſion in the treaty." Giving credit therefore to him as in public command, and ignorant of all the late tranſactions becauſe cloſely blocked up, they agree with the enemy and evacuate the fortreſs. In this manner the Bœotians regained poſſeſſion of abandoned Oenoë. And thus the oligarchy and ſedition were ſuppreſſed at Athens.

Miletus. But about the ſame ſpace of time in the current ſummer, in regard to the Peloponneſians at Miletus: — When none of thoſe, who were ſubſtituted by Tiſſaphernes during his abſence at Aſpendus, made regular payments, and nothing could be ſeen either of Tiſſaphernes or the Phœnician fleet; — and Philippus who accompanied him ſent advice to Mindarus the admiral in chief; and Hippocrates further, a citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaſelis, adviſed him alſo, that " this fleet would never join him, and in all reſpects they were " ſhamefully abuſed by Tiſſaphernes:" — As Pharnabazus had made them an invitation, and declared himſelf ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, to engage as ſtrongly as Tiſſaphernes for the revolt of what cities yet remained in ſubjection to the Athenians: — Mindarus, hoping to find more punctuality in the latter, with notable conduct and by a ſudden ſignal to the fleet that his motions might not be diſcovered at Samos, weighs from Miletus with ſeventy-three ſail, and *The grand fleet quits* Miletus. bent his courſe to the Helleſpont. But earlier this ſummer, ſixteen ſhips had ſteered their courſe thither, and ravaged part of the Cherſoneſus. Mindarus met with tempeſtuous weather in his paſſage, which forced him to put into Icarus; and, after ſtaying there five or ſix days for want of weather to keep the ſea, he arrives at Chios.

And the Athenian *fleet quits* Samos. Thraſyllus, ſo ſoon as informed of the departure from Miletus, ſtood after him with five and fifty ſail, making the beſt of his way leſt the other ſhould enter the Helleſpont before he reached him. But gaining intelligence that he was put into Chios, and concluding he deſigned to remain there, he fixed his ſcouts at Leſbos and the oppoſite continent; that, if the Peloponneſian fleet put out, their motions

motions might be deſcried. He himſelf, repairing to Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and other neceſſaries to be prepared, that in caſe he ſhould be forced to ſtay in theſe parts, he might make frequent cruizes from Leſbos againſt Chios.

Ereſſus. But, as Ereſſus in Leſbos had revolted, his deſign was further to attempt its reduction, in caſe it were feaſible. For ſome of the Methymnéan exiles, and thoſe not the moſt inconſiderable of the number, having brought over from Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were moſt firmly attached to their cauſe, and hired others from the continent, which increaſed their number to about three hundred, Anaxarchus the Theban in reſpect of conſanguinity being choſe their leader --- aſſaulted firſt Methymne: And being repulſed in the attempt by the Athenian garriſon which came up from Mitylene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought in the field, they retired acroſs the mountain, and make Ereſſus revolt. Thraſyllus therefore, ſteering with his fleet againſt Ereſſus, projected an aſſault. But Thraſybulus with five ſhips from Samos was arrived there before him, upon information received of the re-paſſage of the exiles: Yet coming too late before Ereſſus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor before it. Two other ſhips alſo bound homewards from the Helleſpont came in, and the Methymnéan. All the ſhips in the fleet amounted now to ſixty-ſeven, from which they draughted an army for the operations of land, as fully bent if poſſible to take Ereſſus by a bold aſſault, with engines and all the arts of attack.

Courſe of the Peloponneſians *to the* Helleſpont. In the mean time, Mindarus and the Peloponneſian fleet at Chios, after two whole days employment in taking in proviſions, and receiving from the Chians every man on board three Chian [2] *teſſeracoſts*, on the third day with urgent diſpatch launch out from Chios into the

2 This, according to Spanheim, was a month's pay, ſince he explains it by forty-three Chian *drachmas*: But the words will not bear ſuch a conſtruction. A *teſſeracoſt* was, it is moſt probable, a coin peculiar to the Chians; but, of what value is not known; nor is it of any great importance.

wide

wide ſea, that they might not be deſcried by the fleet before Ereſſus, and leaving Leſbos on the left ſtood over to the continent. There, putting into the harbour of Crateræi on the coaſt of Phocéa and taking their noon repaſte, they proceeded along the coaſt of Cyme and ſupped at Arginuſæ of the continent, over-againſt Mitylene. From thence, at dead of night, they went forwards along the ſhore; and, being arrived at Harmatus which lies facing Methymne and having eat their dinner there, they paſſed with the utmoſt ſpeed by Lectus, and Lariſſa, and Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reach Rhætium of the Helleſpont before midnight. Not but that ſome ſhips of the fleet got up no further than to Sigæum, and ſome other adjacent places on that coaſt.

The Athenians, who were lying with eighteen ſail at Seſtus, when the lights were waved by their own friends for ſignals and they beheld numerous fires kindled on a ſudden on the hoſtile coaſt, were well aſſured that the Peloponneſians are approaching. The ſame night therefore, under favour of the dark and with the utmoſt expedition, they crept along under the Cherſoneſus, and reached Eléus; deſirous to put out to ſea and avoid the enemy: And, for the ſixteen ſhips at Abydus, they ſtole away unperceived of the Abydians, though notice had been ſent them from their friends juſt arrived to keep a good look-out, and not ſuffer them to ſteal off. Yet morning no ſooner appeared, than finding themſelves in ſight of the fleet under Mindarus and that they were actually chaced, they could not all get off. The greater part indeed fled ſafe to the continent and Lemnos; but four, that got laſt under ſail, are overtaken by the enemy near Eléus. One alſo that run aſhore at the temple of Proteſilaus, they ſeize with all her hands; and two more, the crews of which eſcaped. One further, but abandoned, they burn at Imbrus.

This done, the ſhips from Abydus having joined them, and the whole fleet being now increaſed to fourſcore and ſix ſail, they ſpent the reſt of the day in inveſting Eléus; but, as it would not ſurrender, they drew off to Abydus.

The

The Athenians purſue.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their ſcouts and never imagined that ſo large a number of hoſtile ſhips could paſs along undeſcried, were very coolly carrying on their ſiege; but yet, were no ſooner informed of the enemy's motions, than inſtantly quitting Ereſſus they advanced with the utmoſt expedition to ſecure the Helleſpont. They alſo pick up two ſhips of the Peloponneſians, which running out too boldly to ſea in the late purſuit fell in amongſt them. And, coming up only one day after them, they anchor at Eléus, and re-aſſemble from Imbrus the ſhips which had fled thither. Five whole days they ſpend here in getting every thing in readineſs for a general engagement. And after this reſpite they came to an action in the following manner.

Battle at Cynos-ſema.

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle a-head, ſtood along ſhore towards Seſtus. The Peloponneſians, aware of their deſign, ſtood out to ſea from Abydus to be ready to receive them. And, as both ſides were determined to engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater length; the Athenians, along the Cherſoneſus, reaching from Idacus to Arrhianæ, in all ſixty-eight ſail; and the Peloponneſians, over-againſt them, from Abydus to Dardanus, being eighty-ſix. The line of the Peloponneſians was thus formed: The Syracuſans had the right; and on the left was ranged Mindarus and the ſhips moſt remarkable for being good ſailors. Amongſt the Athenians, Thraſyllus had the left, and Thraſybulus the right: The reſt of the commanders were regularly poſted according to their rank. The Peloponneſians, ſhewing moſt eagerneſs to begin the engagement, endeavoured with their left to over-reach the right of the Athenians, in order to exclude them if poſſible from ſtretching out into the main ſea, and by keeping them cramped up to force their centre againſt the ſhore, which was not far diſtant. The Athenians, aware of the enemy's deſign to ſhut them up, plying up a-head forced themſelves an opening, and in velocity beat them all to nothing.

By theſe motions, the left of their line became extended beyond the cape called Cynos-ſema. The conſequence of which was expoſing their

their centre, compoſed only of the weakeſt ſhips and thoſe ranged at too great a diſtance from one another; eſpecially, as in number of veſſels they were quite inferior, and as the coaſt round the Cynos-ſema was ſharp and in an acute angle runs out into the water, ſo that part of the line on one ſide was out of ſight of the other. The Peloponneſians therefore charging the centre drove at once the ſhips of the Athenians upon the beach; and, being ſo far manifeſtly victors, leaped boldly on ſhore to purſue them. But neither thoſe under Thraſybulus could aſſiſt the centre from the right, becauſe of the multitude of ſhips that ſtood in to awe them; nor could thoſe under Thraſyllus do it from the left, becauſe the interpoſition of cape Cynos-ſema hid from him the view of what had paſſed; and at the ſame time, the Syracuſans and others, who equal in ſtrength lay hard upon him, prevented his moving. At length the Peloponneſians, preſuming the victory their own, broke their order to give different chace to ſingle ſhips, and in too heedleſs a manner threw confuſion upon a part of their own line. And now thoſe under Thraſybulus, finding the ſquadron oppoſed to them began to ſlacken, ſtopped all farther extenſion of their line a-head; and, tacking upon them, reſolutely engaged, and put them to flight. Charging next the diſperſed ſhips of the Peloponneſians, which compoſed the ſquadron that preſumed itſelf victorious, they made havoc; and, by ſtriking them with a panic, routed the greater part without reſiſtance. Now alſo, the Syracuſans were beginning to give way before the ſquadron under Thraſyllus, and ſeeing others in open flight were more eaſily tempted to follow their example. The defeat now being manifeſtly given, and the Peloponneſians flying away for ſhelter firſt towards the river Pydius and afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians made prize of only an inconſiderable number of ſhipping; for the Helleſpont being narrow afforded ſhort retreats to the enemy. However they gained a victory by ſea, moſt opportune indeed in their preſent ſituation. For hitherto, afraid of the naval ſtrength of the Peloponneſians becauſe of the rebuffs they had lately received from it, and the

The Athenians victorious.

calamitous event of the Sicilian expedition, from this moment they ſtopped all fruitleſs ſelf-aceuſations, or groundleſs exaggerations of the enemy's ability by ſea. Some ſhips of the enemy in fact they take; for inſtance, eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Bœotian; but, of Leucadian and Lacedæmonian and Syracuſan and Pellenéan, a ſingle one of each: But then they ſuffered the loſs of fifteen ſhips of their own.

The news received joyfully at Athens.

After erecting a trophy upon the cape of Cynos-ſema, and picking up the ſhatters of the fight, and giving up under truce their dead to the enemy, they diſpatched a trireme to Athens to notify the victory. On the arrival of this veſſel, thoſe at home, after hearing the news of this unhoped-for ſucceſs, greatly reſumed their ſpirits, which had been dejected by the recent misfortunes at Eubœa and the ſad effects of their ſedition, and hoped the *State* might again reſume its power, if they chearfully exerted their efforts in its behalf.

Reduction of Cyzicus.

On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians, having diligently refitted their fleet at Seſtus, ſailed againſt Cyzicus which had revolted. And, deſcrying eight ſhips from Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium and Priapus, they crowded ſail towards them; and, having in battle upon the ſhore defeated their crews, made prizes of them all. Repairing thence againſt Cyzicus which was quite unfortified, they reduced it once more, and exacted large contributions from it.

But during this interval, the Peloponneſians made a trip from Abydus to Eléus, and brought off as many of their own ſhips which had been taken as were able to ſail; the reſidue the Eléuſians burnt. They alſo diſpatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch up their fleet from thence.

Alcibiades.

About the ſame ſpace of time, Alcibiades alſo at the head of his ſquadron of thirteen ſail returned from Caunus and Phaſelis into the harbour of Samos; reporting, that "by his management he had diverted the junction of the Phœnician fleet with the Peloponneſians, "and made Tiſſaphernes a faſter friend than ever to the Athenians."

After

After enlarging his ſquadron by the addition of nine more juſt manned, he levied large contributions upon the Halicarnaſſéans, and fortified Cos. After theſe exploits and putting the government of Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about autumn, to Samos [3].

From Aſpendus alſo, Tiſſaphernes rode back poſt-haſte into Ionia, ſo ſoon as adviſed of the departure of the Peloponneſian fleet from Miletus for the Helleſpont. Tiſſaphernes.

But as the Peloponneſians were now in the Helleſpont, the Antandrians (who are of Æolic deſcent) having procured from Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched acroſs mount Ida, received them into their city, provoked to this ſtep by the injurious conduct of Arſaces, a Perſian, lieutenant to Tiſſaphernes. This man, pretending he had enemies to cope with whom yet he never named, prevailed with the Delians ſettled in Adramittium, becauſe they had been obliged by

3 As the Engliſh reader is here to take his leave of Alcibiades, he may have the curioſity to know what became of him after — Every thing ſucceeded ſo well under him and his active collegues, that the Lacedæmonians, having received ſeveral defeats both by land and ſea and loſt two hundred ſhips, were again neceſſitated to ſue for peace. After ſuch great ſervices, Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole city flocked down to the Piræus to meet him. All ſtrove to get a ſight of Alcibiades; they careſſed him, crowned him, curſed the authors of his exile, and hurried him away to an aſſembly of the people. There he harangued them for a time, then ſtopped and ſhed tears in abundance, then harangued them again. In ſhort, they undid all they had ever done againſt him; and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. Yet, in ſubſequent commands he happened not to be ſucceſsful, a crime which his countrymen very ſeldom forgave. He became a ſecond time an exile from Athens. His great abilities made him a continual terror both to foreign and domeſtic enemies. Yet now he perſevered to ſerve his country, by caballing in their favour, and adviſing them on critical occaſions. Yet all in vain, Lyſander was ſoon maſter of the Piræus, and of Athens. Alcibiades retired into Phrygia, and was handſomly ſupported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus; who however was wrought upon at laſt, by the joint-ſolicitations of his enemies, and the plea of its neceſſity for the ſervice of *the king*, to undertake his deſtruction. The agents of Pharnabazus durſt not attempt him in an open manner, but ſet fire to his houſe by night. By throwing in cloaths to damp the flames, he got out ſafe. The Barbarians ſoon ſpied him, ſhot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut off his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I ſhall only add, that he was but forty years old, when he was thus deſtroyed.

the Athenians to quit Delos, in the affair of the expiation, to attend him in this ſecret expedition with the flower of their ſtrength; and, leading them forwards with all the ſhew of friendſhip and alliance, watched the opportunity when they were buſy at their meal, ſurrounded them with a body of his own ſoldiers, and ſhot them to death with darts. Fearing him therefore becauſe of this inſtance of a cruel temper, leſt ſome ſuch act of violence he might execute alſo upon them, as in other reſpects he had impoſed ſome burdens upon them which they could not bear, the Antandrians eject his garriſon out of their citadel. But Tiſſaphernes, perceiving how deeply the Peloponneſians were concerned in this affair, and eſteeming himſelf ſadly injured alſo at Miletus and Cnidus (ſince in thoſe places too his garriſons had been ejected;) and fearing they would proceed to other commiſſions of the ſame nature; chagrined moreover, that perhaps Pharnabazus in leſs time and with leſs expence having obtained their concurrence ſhould make a greater progreſs againſt the Athenians;—he determined in perſon to repair to Helleſpont, in order to expoſtulate with them about their late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe off as handſomly as he could the aſperſions thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the Phœnician fleet, and other points. Arriving therefore firſt at Epheſus, he offered ſacrifice to Diana, * * * * * [4]

When the winter following this ſummer ſhall be ended, the twenty-firſt year of the war will be alſo compleated.

4 Here breaks off abruptly the Hiſtory of the Peloponneſian war by Thucydides. The adjuſtment of time annexed ſeems plainly of another hand.

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VOL. I.

In the Preface, page 6. line 18. for *oppoſite* read *appoſite* p. xxiii. l. 9. for *hath* read *had* p. 49. l. 15. for *Phormis* read *Phormio* p. 168. l. 28. for *Ægon* read *Agnon.*

VOL. II.

Page 175. in the Note. for *Skivitæ* read *Skiritæ* p. 226. bottom line. for *power.* read *power,* p. 227. l. 3. for *conclude it to be* read *conclude it to be ſo* p. 282. l. 22. for *incited* read *invited* p. 287. l. 16. for *Athens.* read *Athens,* p. 317. l. 28. for *Hyrcanian* read *Hyccarian* p. 372. at the bottom. for *undone, undone,* read *undone! undone!* p. 396. l. 10. for *Ætæans* read *OEtæans.*